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I'm going to do that.

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I encourage questions.

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I may not be able to answer all your questions
either because, A, I don't know or, B, I cannot

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say.

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I am going to leave it to you to figure out
which one is which.

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[LAUGHTER] I would like to say a few things
before I start.

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One is I'm not a historian so I'm not here
to give a history of the military and the

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Shuttle.

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I am here to give you my experiences with
it which is a very select data slice, I think,

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as you will see.

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Second, the things I say here, although we're
going to tape them, I have to [NOISE OBSCURES]

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very carefully.

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And, third, I really speak from a different
era.

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I speak from an area of the '70s and early
'80s when the political situation was a lot

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different than it is today.

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When a Cold War was hot.

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When there was a real threat of a massive
land war, plus worse, in Northern Europe.

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When there were real threats of nuclear exchanges
between the super powers.

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Things which are not true today, thank goodness.

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We have now been overcome by other threats
and challenges, but I speak really from an

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era of the '70s and '80s.

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So, with that, I would like to start.

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Again, I encourage questions.

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Here is what I would like to do today.

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I would like to give you a little bit of intro
and background.

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Talk about DoD and Air Force space missions.

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There is a difference which I shall highlight.

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I will talk about military system requirements
and impacts on the Space Shuttle as a system.

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I will talk about facility impacts because
that is easy to do, but there are impacts

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that are far more far reaching than that.

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I will close a little bit on national space
policy and then I will show you a ten minute

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video.
For the video I would like Tom to turn off
the recording and we will just watch it kind

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of in silence.

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OK.

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Any questions?

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My background is I served 29 years in the
Air Force.

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As you folks know, you can retire up to 20,
so I couldn't count.

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I stayed far longer than I should have.

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The reason I stayed was because the Air Force
gave me assignments I could not turn down.

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I have had lots of experience from a program
office payload user perspective on Shuttle,

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Titans off both coasts, MX, Pegasus XL.

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Last January I gave a talk, which I will repeat
this year, on my activities on two accident

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investigations.

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One on Titan IV and one on Pegasus.

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I do that at one time.

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It takes about an hour and a half.

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If any of you are on campus in January, please
come by.

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It's an interesting story.

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I served in multiple program offices in programs
A and B.

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Programs A and B are subsets of the NRO.

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I won't say any more about that, but Program
A is the Air Force element.

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Program A not only built Air Force satellites
for the intelligence community, they also

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provided all the launch services for the intelligence
community.

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I have been director of two major programs.

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The first one Space-Based Infrared Low.

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The second one was the DoD Space Test Program.

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I have also been the NRO Director of Safety.

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In general, Air Force and DoD space missions
fall into this laundry list.

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The first one is Navigation which you know
from GPS Communication which has many satellites

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of which Nelstar and DSCS are the ones you
recognize.

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DSCS was launched on the Space Shuttle I believe
twice, I'm not sure.

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Meteorology, the Air Force launches the DMSP
which is the polar orbiting weather satellite

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now replaced now by the NPOESS system.

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For missile launch detection, the intelligence
community and the Air Force have either operated

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the DSP satellite system or else proposed
SVRS which is suffering tremendous programmatic

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problems currently.

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For arms free verification, it is terribly
important to have complied at one time with

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[UNINTELLIGIBLE] limitations.

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That is an interesting slice of history where
at one time the total number of warheads,

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total number of bombers, submarines, ships,
this sort of thing was limited by international

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agreement but it was the responsibility of
the other side to verify compliance.

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There is also nuclear weapons test detection
on Vela.

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And then a whole handful of what I call intelligence
community or IC programs.

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Bob Siemens, a retired professor emeritus
is planning to drop by today for the Q&A.

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His position, his role in this story is really
very central.

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His influence is woven throughout the whole
story of the DoD and the Space Shuttle, and

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I hope you will get a chance to talk to him.

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An extremely interesting and very pivotal
guy.

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I would like to concentrate on Vandenberg
Air Force Base right up on the Eastern Range

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for the Space Shuttle because the Vandenberg
Air Force Base launch site was really built

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up for sun synchronous polar orbits, for really
one payload, and that was the fellow here

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depicted in the late 1970s, launching out
of the Western Range.

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This is a Titan IIID.

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I have helped launched, I think, eight of
these off the West Coast.

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This is a heavy lift machine.

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It is roughly 30,000 pounds in low earth orbit,
27,000 to 30,000.

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It has two solid strap-ons.

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I saw the first one go in 1970 and subsequently
was able to transition into the Program Office

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to launch several times out of there.

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As some of you are aware because I have talked
to you out of class, I served for many years

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not in what we call the regular Air Force
but what is called the Office of Special Projects.

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It is called an Air Force Element.

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We did not report for the usual chain of command
through the Air Force chains.

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We went straight up to the secdef of the JCS.

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We were given the responsibility to launch
things quickly, quietly, with great national

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pressure.

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And we did that.

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And the machines we used to launch, payloads
included, are Titans of various kinds, Atlases,

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as well as the Space Shuttle.

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The story I am going to tell you is really
the special projects utilization of the Shuttle.

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More so than what I call the regular Air Force
missions.

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In any case, when I joined SAFSP in the late
1970s, life was really exciting.

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We were in the midst of phasing out all the
expendables for the Space Shuttle.

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And when I went in there, I found within the
first week they said the Space Shuttle is

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designed for our program, because we were
flying on a regular basis out of the Western

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Range.

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So, the payload that sits inside here is a
form, fit and function drop-in in the Space

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Shuttle bay.

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At the time, there were no Space Shuttle payloads
of that size yet on the drawing boards.

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The intent was to have a seamless transition
from Titans into Space Shuttle, first for

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our program and then for others.

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We drove the payload bay size, as you've heard
from Professor Hoffman and Aaron Cohen, 15

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x 60.

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The cross-range requirement dictated the configuration
of the vehicle plus the wing size because

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the Air Force and the DoD was very, very insistent
on having a return to launch base capability.

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First orbit deploy, come back cross-range,
land back at Vandenberg, recycle, be ready

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to go hopefully in a matter of days.

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It is interesting to note the evolution of
the Titan space launch family.

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In the 1970s we pick it up with the Titan
IIID we see here.

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The 3E was a Transtage version used for basically
out-of-space missions.

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This is a commercial version.

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But the DoD use went from the 34B, 3C, 34D
through this family here, and now we see the

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4A and the 4B which are the heavy lift guys.

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These guys basically were the follow-on to
Shuttle.

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They lifted the Shuttle payloads that the
Shuttle could not carry.

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And I will explain that in a few minutes.

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Very large, expensive, complex machines, complex
programs.

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At Vandenberg, it turns out that back in the
'60s there was a program called the Manned

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Orbiting Laboratory, MOL.

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Many of the original Space Shuttle Mercury
astronauts were part of that.

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They built up a space lodge complex up there
called Slick-6 to launch the MOL.

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It was going to be a space capsule with military
officers onboard to do recognizance and surveillance

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flying off a rather large Titan IIIC.

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To do that, again, back in the '60s, they
built a launch pad.

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I'm sorry.

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As we got ready for the Shuttle, they took
the MOL things and did all these things to

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it to make it shuttle-ized.

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They operated a launch pad.

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They put in a Mobile Service Tower.

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As you know, at the Cape, what they do is
kind embrace the Shuttle and its stack with

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a gantry.

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And they pull back a little bit and then they
launch.

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The Mobile Service Tower is a large, almost
like a skyscraper complex that completely

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encloses the rocket during processing and
then rolls back several hundred yards to expose

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the vehicle for launch, a totally different
OPS concept.

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This facility here, the OMCF is similar to
the KSC Orbiter Processing Facility.

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Then they have other facilities here.

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The payload preparation room where the payloads
are received from transportation put together

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and tested.

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The PCRs were the payloads actually put into
the shuttle bay.

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The Vandenberg runway was almost doubled in
length.

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And then all this infrastructure is put in
here, including crew quarters for the astronauts.

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And they were able to reuse the MOL facilities.

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A lot of [UNINTELLIGIBLE].

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But what you see here is the buildup of a
complex very similar to Cape Kennedy only

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on a California coast.

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Very, very elaborate, very, very complicated,
very expensive, and taking a tremendous amount

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of budget to go do it.

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Back in the '70s by law or by policy, which
is perhaps even more powerful, the Space Shuttle

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was going to be the only launch system for
all military, civil and commercial payloads.

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This is somewhat of a forgotten fact, but
at one time the cry went out from the advocates

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that said by having a reusable spacecraft
that can launch 25, 30 times a year from both

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coasts, so that is times two, we can do great
things.

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And certainly, coming from the folks that
gave us Apollo, this did not seem that farfetched.

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The idea of launching a spacecraft like an
airliner, as we know, did not happen in our

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generation.

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I think in your generation, if you can make
that happen, that would be extremely wonderful.

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But at one time there was going to be a phase
out, a shutdown of all the launch vehicles.

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All the launch vehicle folks were told fly
out what you have, close up business, break

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00:11:08,060 --> 00:11:12,480
up your tool and dies, send your people home,
we are going to go with Shuttle.

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00:11:12,480 --> 00:11:18,190
And to do that there was extensive redesign
of payloads to fit the payload bay, the width,

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the length, to fit the safety requirements.

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All these things changed.

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So, it was not just a matter of just taking
your existing payloads for these guys and

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dropping them into the shuttle payload bay.

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It was a huge engineering effort.

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And we thought at one time this is the way
it is going to be forever.

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The things that are unique about this is,
first of all, liftoff and flight loads are

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much different because of not only the main
events, everything from the SRBs, the staging,

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but also being able to survive safely, things
like slap down on landing if you had to come

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back home with a payload.

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Many of the heavy payloads require, as you
know, upper stages.

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The PAMs are the small payload assist module,
small [UNINTELLIGIBLE] upper stages.

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00:12:04,500 --> 00:12:09,240
The IUSs, as you probably heard, are much,
much more elaborate solid fuel devices.

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00:12:09,240 --> 00:12:14,500
The Shuttle Center, Cryo Center was going
to be a cryogenic upper stage that was going

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00:12:14,500 --> 00:12:17,430
to take our biggest payloads up to GEO.

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00:12:17,430 --> 00:12:22,840
That never got through the safety process
but they worked it hard.

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The safety requirements, to make sure that
the crew was not endangered at any time by

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anything, either accidental or inadvertent
or a mishap, were huge.

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00:12:32,340 --> 00:12:36,570
That is a whole separate discussion in itself,
which I will be glad to have with you, but

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basically everything was looked at in terms
of being dual fault tolerant so that in no

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case could any two events link up to cause
hazard to the crew, even including accommodation

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00:12:49,660 --> 00:12:52,110
of hardware and software errors.

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00:12:52,110 --> 00:12:59,110
This was huge and caused, in many cases, extensive
retests and redesign of payload systems.

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00:13:00,020 --> 00:13:03,170
National Space Policy, back in the '70s and
'80s.

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00:13:03,170 --> 00:13:08,840
First of all, in '78 there was "strong endorsement
for the Space Shuttle to be the prime mover

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00:13:08,840 --> 00:13:11,010
for national security and civil missions".

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What is missing from this lineup here?

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Commercial.

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There were very few, almost no commercial
missions at the time.

201
00:13:19,360 --> 00:13:20,470
Civil means NASA.

202
00:13:20,470 --> 00:13:26,500
The launch business of that time was dominated
by the government, NASA and the DoD.

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00:13:26,500 --> 00:13:29,850
1982 the position was strengthened.

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00:13:29,850 --> 00:13:34,890
And, by the way, I suggest if you haven't
already to look up these documents.

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00:13:34,890 --> 00:13:38,500
National Space Policy is voiced in these documents.

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00:13:38,500 --> 00:13:40,320
It is extremely powerful.

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00:13:40,320 --> 00:13:41,750
It is the basis for programs.

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00:13:41,750 --> 00:13:43,170
It is the basis for legislation.

209
00:13:43,170 --> 00:13:45,020
It is the basis for budgets.

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00:13:45,020 --> 00:13:46,520
It is huge.

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00:13:46,520 --> 00:13:52,060
Every word in these documents is worked over
at great length by all the competing stakeholders,

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00:13:52,060 --> 00:13:53,910
and it is big.

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00:13:53,910 --> 00:13:59,990
But in '82, SCS was going to be the primary
launch for national security in civil missions.

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00:13:59,990 --> 00:14:05,390
What that really meant was anybody else with
a rocket was told you're in the wrong list,

215
00:14:05,390 --> 00:14:07,080
don't come back.

216
00:14:07,080 --> 00:14:08,910
Then we had Challenger.

217
00:14:08,910 --> 00:14:12,980
And in 1988 there was now a directive.

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00:14:12,980 --> 00:14:18,570
A 1988 PD that said we shall have a mix between
man and unmanned launch systems.

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00:14:18,570 --> 00:14:21,570
This is in contradiction to this I'm sure
as you notice.

220
00:14:21,570 --> 00:14:28,570
An NSPD4 in 1981 now gave us the words "assured
access to space." Code words.

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00:14:29,860 --> 00:14:36,260
Anybody here care to tell me what that really
means in plain English, anybody?

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00:14:36,260 --> 00:14:36,650
Yes.

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00:14:36,650 --> 00:14:41,720
Even if the Space Shuttle won't fly they want
to have some alternatives.

224
00:14:41,720 --> 00:14:42,500
That's right.

225
00:14:42,500 --> 00:14:47,610
It says don't put all your eggs in one basket.

226
00:14:47,610 --> 00:14:51,080
Have two ways to get to space for your heavy
payloads.

227
00:14:51,080 --> 00:14:54,360
This is authorization for what we now know
as the EELV.

228
00:14:54,360 --> 00:15:01,360
But also at the time shortly after Challenger,
Pete Aldridge who was Secretary of the Air

229
00:15:02,820 --> 00:15:08,180
Force at the time, now an executive of the
Aerospace Corporation, previously the director

230
00:15:08,180 --> 00:15:14,420
of the NRO, prior to Challenger in the '84,
'85 time period started getting a little bit

231
00:15:14,420 --> 00:15:18,860
antsy about access to space because of all
the delays in the Shuttle Launch Manifest.

232
00:15:18,860 --> 00:15:25,240
And so he authorized, on his own authority,
a start-up of the Titan fleet again.

233
00:15:25,240 --> 00:15:31,710
This led to huge problems with NASA because
what they saw that as, correctly, was a loss

234
00:15:31,710 --> 00:15:35,210
of support for the Space Shuttle Program.

235
00:15:35,210 --> 00:15:36,130
But he did that.

236
00:15:36,130 --> 00:15:42,990
And when the Challenger disaster occurred
in '86, the Air Force was about 18 to 24 months

237
00:15:42,990 --> 00:15:44,110
ahead of where they would have been.

238
00:15:44,110 --> 00:15:45,020
Here is Dr.

239
00:15:45,020 --> 00:15:45,320
Siemens.

240
00:15:45,320 --> 00:15:45,930
Hi, Bob?

241
00:15:45,930 --> 00:15:46,540
Hi, Pete.

242
00:15:46,540 --> 00:15:48,360
You want to sit over here?

243
00:15:48,360 --> 00:15:50,779
I would like to have you meet Dr.

244
00:15:50,779 --> 00:15:51,390
Bob Siemens.

245
00:15:51,390 --> 00:15:55,380
And he will be here for the Q&A afterwards.

246
00:15:55,380 --> 00:16:02,180
Bob, I'm just going over some of the National
Space Policy.

247
00:16:02,180 --> 00:16:04,940
Write-ups that kind of led to where we are
today.

248
00:16:04,940 --> 00:16:07,730
This was NSC37.

249
00:16:07,730 --> 00:16:11,380
This was NSC42, the primary launch.

250
00:16:11,380 --> 00:16:14,850
This was the post-Challenger mix between the
manned and unmanned systems.

251
00:16:14,850 --> 00:16:21,850
And then this was the assured access to space
presidential declaration.

252
00:16:23,330 --> 00:16:28,860
From a user perspective, the security requirements
to fly on Shuttle were huge.

253
00:16:28,860 --> 00:16:33,880
What was required to be protected was any
information on the mission type and details.

254
00:16:33,880 --> 00:16:38,649
LEO, GEO, HEO, you name it, that could not
leak out.

255
00:16:38,649 --> 00:16:43,800
Any information on the spacecraft, who made
it, where it was supposed to go, of course

256
00:16:43,800 --> 00:16:47,210
what the payload did had to be protected.

257
00:16:47,210 --> 00:16:51,060
Also protected was the Program Office and
the prime contractors because often you can

258
00:16:51,060 --> 00:16:53,339
tell from that who does what.

259
00:16:53,339 --> 00:16:57,820
And during operations the deployment time
location and the final payload orbit had to

260
00:16:57,820 --> 00:16:58,960
be protected.

261
00:16:58,960 --> 00:16:59,510
This is huge.

262
00:16:59,510 --> 00:17:04,398
As you know, thousands of people participate
in getting a mission together for the Shuttle.

263
00:17:04,398 --> 00:17:08,630
It starts with a mission planning template
that is roughly two to three years prior to

264
00:17:08,630 --> 00:17:09,029
flight.

265
00:17:09,029 --> 00:17:13,959
It goes all the way through preparation of
the flight plans, the mission rules, the launch

266
00:17:13,959 --> 00:17:19,550
constraint documents, the processing, and
finally the on orbit ops.

267
00:17:19,550 --> 00:17:20,959
All that had to be protected.

268
00:17:20,959 --> 00:17:22,740
And that was big.

269
00:17:22,740 --> 00:17:25,709
It was a huge and expensive philosophy.

270
00:17:25,709 --> 00:17:30,380
It was called the Control Mode Security System.

271
00:17:30,380 --> 00:17:33,190
It took a lot of effort from all parts and
was almost airtight.

272
00:17:33,190 --> 00:17:34,200
Yes, a question.

273
00:17:34,200 --> 00:17:37,570
Was this for every shuttle mission or just
DoD payloads?

274
00:17:37,570 --> 00:17:40,640
No, this is for what I call the intelligence
community DoD missions.

275
00:17:40,640 --> 00:17:47,640
If you go back and look on the Shuttle Manifest,
and I am not going to do it for you but you

276
00:17:48,770 --> 00:17:54,350
can do it if you want, you will see a number
of missions where they will say DoD mission

277
00:17:54,350 --> 00:18:01,120
payload type, not unknown, but not available,
NA.

278
00:18:01,120 --> 00:18:07,470
Also, the DoD/Air Force missions were all
military astronauts.

279
00:18:07,470 --> 00:18:12,679
That is felt to be a safe thing to do.

280
00:18:12,679 --> 00:18:18,160
For implementation of encrypted voice data
and commanding links starting, really, with

281
00:18:18,160 --> 00:18:22,720
the testing at the launch sites but also going
through the flight ops.

282
00:18:22,720 --> 00:18:27,890
I mention all these things having been involved
in the safety certifications.

283
00:18:27,890 --> 00:18:30,290
I will say that was long and arduous.

284
00:18:30,290 --> 00:18:36,730
The safety review process has to be extremely,
extremely thorough starting early on.

285
00:18:36,730 --> 00:18:41,540
It is not just a whitewash of what the hardware
is that comes with the pad.

286
00:18:41,540 --> 00:18:48,330
In many cases, it changed the design of the
spacecraft, the design of its deployment systems

287
00:18:48,330 --> 00:18:51,600
and things like that.

288
00:18:51,600 --> 00:18:56,410
To protect classified information there also
had to be need-to-know access to program details.

289
00:18:56,410 --> 00:19:02,090
This was a major, major set of impacts to
the Space Shuttle system and payload mission.

290
00:19:02,090 --> 00:19:05,910
All these areas, which I can talk to you about
at great length afterwards.

291
00:19:05,910 --> 00:19:12,480
I will say, thought, that when I do get back
to JSC or when I talk to my NASA friends,

292
00:19:12,480 --> 00:19:15,200
they all say they were proud to have been
on those missions.

293
00:19:15,200 --> 00:19:19,480
They were all hooked together on missions
of great national importance.

294
00:19:19,480 --> 00:19:23,910
To the best of my knowledge, security has
held tight over all those years, despite all

295
00:19:23,910 --> 00:19:26,260
the people who were cleared of the programs.

296
00:19:26,260 --> 00:19:29,240
And the programs were extremely successful
as a result.

297
00:19:29,240 --> 00:19:29,700
Yes.

298
00:19:29,700 --> 00:19:31,270
You said all military crews.

299
00:19:31,270 --> 00:19:36,309
Does that mean active military or people who
have been transitioned to the regular astronaut

300
00:19:36,309 --> 00:19:36,600
corp.

301
00:19:36,600 --> 00:19:37,450
from the military?

302
00:19:37,450 --> 00:19:42,970
These are military folks who transitioned
to the astronaut corp., yes.

303
00:19:42,970 --> 00:19:47,000
There were also impacts of the Air Force Satellite
Communication Networks.

304
00:19:47,000 --> 00:19:51,890
As you know, these are the worldwide set of
tracking stations that were going to be replaced

305
00:19:51,890 --> 00:19:52,809
by TDRS.

306
00:19:52,809 --> 00:19:53,960
That is an interesting story.

307
00:19:53,960 --> 00:19:58,010
The selling point for TDRS was they would
shut down the AFSCNs which were getting old

308
00:19:58,010 --> 00:19:58,960
and were very labor intensive.

309
00:19:58,960 --> 00:20:01,740
Well, we still have them both today.

310
00:20:01,740 --> 00:20:06,970
Worldwide network scattered around the world,
but to provide secure Shuttle communication

311
00:20:06,970 --> 00:20:12,170
there had to be extensive upgrades because
working with the Shuttle with a complicated

312
00:20:12,170 --> 00:20:17,470
payload in orbit, getting it initialized,
tested and deployed was something new for

313
00:20:17,470 --> 00:20:18,340
the SCN.

314
00:20:18,340 --> 00:20:24,650
The SCN ordinarily just did space-to-ground
data transfers through orbiting satellites,

315
00:20:24,650 --> 00:20:30,580
so to be working with a human crew and human
system, to have all the contingencies in place

316
00:20:30,580 --> 00:20:31,740
was big.

317
00:20:31,740 --> 00:20:36,330
The SCNs were involved in the all the prelaunch
testing and commanding, health and status

318
00:20:36,330 --> 00:20:39,910
checks, as well as all the deployment and
post-deployment payload communications.

319
00:20:39,910 --> 00:20:44,670
I wish I could show you the contingencies,
all the workarounds, the plan As, the plans

320
00:20:44,670 --> 00:20:47,040
Bs required for a complicated mission.

321
00:20:47,040 --> 00:20:47,790
It is immense.

322
00:20:47,790 --> 00:20:49,880
It takes a long time to do it right.

323
00:20:49,880 --> 00:20:54,980
The point is that when you're ready to fly,
you should be ready for all know contingencies,

324
00:20:54,980 --> 00:20:59,910
even up to loss of communication, failure
of critical computer systems and that sort

325
00:20:59,910 --> 00:21:00,160
of thing.

326
00:21:00,120 --> 00:21:06,160
You never want to fly and have to scratch
your head and say what should we do next?

327
00:21:06,160 --> 00:21:08,870
Pre first flight issue was an STS1.

328
00:21:08,870 --> 00:21:13,620
Another MIT professor, Gene Covert who is
also here and someone you should really talk

329
00:21:13,620 --> 00:21:18,179
to at some point in time, was part of our
panel that reviewed Space Shuttle main engine

330
00:21:18,179 --> 00:21:20,350
quality testing.

331
00:21:20,350 --> 00:21:23,880
And they were the folks that really came to
grips with this new and emerging issue called

332
00:21:23,880 --> 00:21:24,760
turbine micro-cracks.

333
00:21:24,760 --> 00:21:31,760
The turbine blades in the SSME were found
to be developing very small cycle dependent

334
00:21:33,140 --> 00:21:33,970
micro-cracks.

335
00:21:33,970 --> 00:21:36,690
The question came up what is the ultimate
failure mode?

336
00:21:36,690 --> 00:21:39,820
How many cycles can they stand?

337
00:21:39,820 --> 00:21:41,370
How good are they good for?

338
00:21:41,370 --> 00:21:45,840
The original intent, as you know, was to be
able to re-fly the SSMEs with zero maintenance

339
00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:47,940
between flights many times.

340
00:21:47,940 --> 00:21:49,299
That hasn't happened.

341
00:21:49,299 --> 00:21:54,030
But even the question of would it be good
even for one mission was a big, big question.

342
00:21:54,030 --> 00:22:00,110
And Gene, who is an extremely thorough manager
and engineer, a lot of common sense, a lot

343
00:22:00,110 --> 00:22:01,980
of smarts, worked that very, very hard.

344
00:22:01,980 --> 00:22:05,220
There were also issues, of course, about thermal
tile loss.

345
00:22:05,220 --> 00:22:07,820
There were questions about whether those would
fall off.

346
00:22:07,820 --> 00:22:08,530
This is not ice now.

347
00:22:08,530 --> 00:22:09,520
This is thermal tiles.

348
00:22:09,520 --> 00:22:16,520
And, at the same time, there were huge costs
growing in the development of the IUS, the

349
00:22:17,080 --> 00:22:20,420
Shuttle Centaur upper stage and also Vandenberg
facilities.

350
00:22:20,420 --> 00:22:23,929
Everything was either late and/or over cost.

351
00:22:23,929 --> 00:22:27,500
Many folks thought that the IUS would never
fly because the development problems were

352
00:22:27,500 --> 00:22:28,880
so huge.

353
00:22:28,880 --> 00:22:33,270
The fact that it has flown as many times as
it has, on a variety of launch platforms,

354
00:22:33,270 --> 00:22:37,360
is truly amazing from my sight.

355
00:22:37,360 --> 00:22:43,390
And we also saw, prior to first flight, several
delays, two and a half years is about right.

356
00:22:43,390 --> 00:22:45,179
And then more delays ensued.

357
00:22:45,179 --> 00:22:51,950
And so, from a user perspective, all these
delays really added up to lost opportunities,

358
00:22:51,950 --> 00:22:57,040
extensive cost growth and things like that,
really a heartbreaking story.

359
00:22:57,040 --> 00:23:01,340
This is a picture of a Defense Satellite Program,
DSP.

360
00:23:01,340 --> 00:23:05,070
A machine lifting out of the shuttle bay.

361
00:23:05,070 --> 00:23:05,790
I think you have seen this.

362
00:23:05,790 --> 00:23:11,250
This is the IUS turntable that rotates the
vehicle up and pushes it out with springs.

363
00:23:11,250 --> 00:23:16,929
This is a two-stage solid misconfiguration
that takes the beast out to geosynch.

364
00:23:16,929 --> 00:23:22,390
Post-Challenger, the space policy was changed.

365
00:23:22,390 --> 00:23:27,100
The Shuttle was not to be used anymore for
lifting all satellites but only for mission

366
00:23:27,100 --> 00:23:28,590
where human presence was required.

367
00:23:28,590 --> 00:23:30,470
But there was a problem.

368
00:23:30,470 --> 00:23:36,820
Because of the backup of missions, the SCS
had to fly out the existing DoD payloads.

369
00:23:36,820 --> 00:23:39,890
We looked very hard at converting them back
to the Titans.

370
00:23:39,890 --> 00:23:43,679
Since we were taking steps to shut down the
Titan line, the Titans weren't ready at that

371
00:23:43,679 --> 00:23:45,210
time.

372
00:23:45,210 --> 00:23:52,210
But what we saw afterwards was increased use
of, a restart, really, of these efforts, modernizations.

373
00:23:52,750 --> 00:23:57,230
And that was interesting because there was
always the chance the Shuttle could come back

374
00:23:57,230 --> 00:24:00,660
and launch, hopefully, 15, 20 times a year.

375
00:24:00,660 --> 00:24:03,490
And we hoped it would happen but it never
did.

376
00:24:03,490 --> 00:24:08,460
Steven Dorfman from Hughes was here as a visiting
professor several years ago.

377
00:24:08,460 --> 00:24:13,000
He was extremely bitter about the fact that,
from a satellite manufacturing point of view,

378
00:24:13,000 --> 00:24:17,990
he had to eat the cost to switch back to extendables
from Shuttle.

379
00:24:17,990 --> 00:24:22,390
First he was told by National Space Policy,
"Thou shalt fly on Space Shuttle." Then he

380
00:24:22,390 --> 00:24:27,950
was told, "You are now bared from flying that
Space Shuttle." A huge lost to him.

381
00:24:27,950 --> 00:24:29,530
And I think Hughes is still contesting it.

382
00:24:29,530 --> 00:24:32,169
I don't think it will ever win that in court.

383
00:24:32,169 --> 00:24:37,919
And kind of most importantly, from a Central
California point of view, the Vandenberg shuttle

384
00:24:37,919 --> 00:24:40,679
facilities were shut down completely.

385
00:24:40,679 --> 00:24:47,530
My DoD SCS mission involvement personally
was I worked on the very first DoD sponsored

386
00:24:47,530 --> 00:24:48,880
mission STS4.

387
00:24:48,880 --> 00:24:55,880
It was Columbia launched in late June of '84
flown by Ken Mattingly and Hank Hartsfield.

388
00:24:57,100 --> 00:24:59,910
This was a pathfinder for the DoD.

389
00:24:59,910 --> 00:25:06,790
It was a test not only of the security procedures
but also the ability to do launch operations,

390
00:25:06,790 --> 00:25:09,130
orbital operations in a classified way.

391
00:25:09,130 --> 00:25:10,419
It came out truly successfully.

392
00:25:10,419 --> 00:25:11,980
We learned a lot.

393
00:25:11,980 --> 00:25:14,309
It was not easy.

394
00:25:14,309 --> 00:25:19,080
Getting any complicated mission to fly on
the Shuttle is a very, very difficult process.

395
00:25:19,080 --> 00:25:23,440
To do it under the cloak of security makes
it even harder.

396
00:25:23,440 --> 00:25:28,320
I was a primary DoD launch integrator, the
interface between the Program Office and the

397
00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:31,360
Air Force, for two primary missions.

398
00:25:31,360 --> 00:25:32,820
I shadowed three others.

399
00:25:32,820 --> 00:25:36,600
I was also member of the NASA DoD Safety Review
Team.

400
00:25:36,600 --> 00:25:37,780
This was interesting.

401
00:25:37,780 --> 00:25:44,780
The Safety Review Team or SRT was a very small,
streamlined, fast-moving team that basically

402
00:25:45,370 --> 00:25:47,900
reviewed and bought off on the payload.

403
00:25:47,900 --> 00:25:54,059
As opposed to having the figurative casts
of thousands, we had a cast of just a very

404
00:25:54,059 --> 00:25:57,679
small number of people both from the DoD and
the NASA side.

405
00:25:57,679 --> 00:26:01,940
And we moved as quickly as we could to get
these missions approved and bought off.

406
00:26:01,940 --> 00:26:08,630
And, lastly, in the mid '90s, I was a program
manager for the DoD space test program.

407
00:26:08,630 --> 00:26:11,320
STP is in existence today.

408
00:26:11,320 --> 00:26:15,990
Their charter is to be the sponsor for space
experiments with military relevant.

409
00:26:15,990 --> 00:26:20,840
They flew, among other things, the first atomic
clocks that led to GPS as we know it today.

410
00:26:20,840 --> 00:26:26,830
They continue to fly numerous secondary and
piggyback missions not just on Shuttle but

411
00:26:26,830 --> 00:26:31,290
also on Ariens, Russian vehicles, Korean vehicles,
Indian vehicles.

412
00:26:31,290 --> 00:26:33,520
When I was the manager of the program it was
great.

413
00:26:33,520 --> 00:26:38,210
It was like you were running a big used car
lot and you were offering rides to everybody.

414
00:26:38,210 --> 00:26:39,140
It was terrific.

415
00:26:39,140 --> 00:26:45,190
The emphasis here is to use excess launch
capacity to fly space experiments that you

416
00:26:45,190 --> 00:26:47,480
would screen every year.

417
00:26:47,480 --> 00:26:53,230
And then, on rare occasions, you would build
a dedicated satellite and launch vehicle about

418
00:26:53,230 --> 00:26:57,650
every four years to launch the bigger satellites.

419
00:26:57,650 --> 00:27:04,309
My summary is that the DoD had requirements
that really went back to the first years,

420
00:27:04,309 --> 00:27:06,510
the first days of the Shuttle Program.

421
00:27:06,510 --> 00:27:11,580
They were extremely demanding and dramatically
affected the architecture of the Space Shuttle

422
00:27:11,580 --> 00:27:12,150
system.

423
00:27:12,150 --> 00:27:17,650
The heartbreak, of course, as we know, is
that we never were able to achieve the launch

424
00:27:17,650 --> 00:27:20,760
rates and the low recurring costs that were
promised.

425
00:27:20,760 --> 00:27:26,520
That really when we realized it was slipping
away, those were truly sad days.

426
00:27:26,520 --> 00:27:33,320
I don't think anyone ever anticipated the
one-time expenses and effort required to redesign

427
00:27:33,320 --> 00:27:34,380
payloads.

428
00:27:34,380 --> 00:27:38,280
Not just for mechanical form-fit function
but also for safety.

429
00:27:38,280 --> 00:27:45,280
No one realized the extensive work required
to certify the payloads for manned operations.

430
00:27:45,490 --> 00:27:51,210
The mission integration at the Cape was very
complicated, and security, as you can tell,

431
00:27:51,210 --> 00:27:52,480
permeated everything.

432
00:27:52,480 --> 00:27:59,480
And, lastly, the sad thing is that MOL and
SCS at Vandenberg all suffered from the curse

433
00:28:00,260 --> 00:28:06,240
of Slick-6, which was that both programs were
cancelled despite millions of dollars put

434
00:28:06,240 --> 00:28:10,830
into refurbishing the facilities.

435
00:28:10,830 --> 00:28:13,650
I have here a list of references.

436
00:28:13,650 --> 00:28:16,500
Heppenheimer's book "Development of the Space
Shuttle" I found was quite good.

437
00:28:16,500 --> 00:28:18,669
It talks a lot about the programmatics of
the Space Shuttle.

438
00:28:18,669 --> 00:28:21,100
I hope you've had a chance to read it.

439
00:28:21,100 --> 00:28:23,410
I took some information from here.

440
00:28:23,410 --> 00:28:26,510
The Federation of America Scientists, the
FAS site is interesting.

441
00:28:26,510 --> 00:28:29,110
I think it is still current on the Space Shuttle.

442
00:28:29,110 --> 00:28:34,350
And there are these books here which I point
you to give you a little bit more insight

443
00:28:34,350 --> 00:28:40,030
into the missions, the roles of the intelligence
community doing things such as flying and

444
00:28:40,030 --> 00:28:41,530
operating satellites in space.

445
00:28:41,530 --> 00:28:47,750
If there are any questions, I will be glad
to take them now and then I will show a short

446
00:28:47,750 --> 00:28:48,600
ten-minute video.

447
00:28:48,600 --> 00:28:51,160
How am I doing on time?

448
00:28:51,160 --> 00:28:52,440
I'm moving fast.

449
00:28:52,440 --> 00:28:53,289
Yes, question.

450
00:28:53,289 --> 00:28:56,280
How many times was the [UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE]?

451
00:28:56,280 --> 00:28:59,690
Was it even used to launch the Shuttle?

452
00:28:59,690 --> 00:29:03,640
Slick-6 never saw anything launched out of
there until they launched a Lockheed low-cost

453
00:29:03,640 --> 00:29:08,539
machine called the Athena in about 1996.

454
00:29:08,539 --> 00:29:13,539
Presently, the Delta 4, remember the big machine
that flew out of the Cape about nine months

455
00:29:13,539 --> 00:29:18,820
ago, is stacked there at Slick-6 ready to
go with an operational payload.

456
00:29:18,820 --> 00:29:23,760
They are having big concerns, though, about
fuselage so their launch date, which was going

457
00:29:23,760 --> 00:29:27,010
to be last week, has been rolled off to the
right several months.

458
00:29:27,010 --> 00:29:32,150
They had a problem on the first flight of
basically fuel cavitatation.

459
00:29:32,150 --> 00:29:34,380
And they are not happy with it yet.

460
00:29:34,380 --> 00:29:35,429
It is ready to go.

461
00:29:35,429 --> 00:29:41,690
When the Delta 4 launches out of Slick-6,
it will be the first large payload system

462
00:29:41,690 --> 00:29:44,990
to go out of there for the first time.

463
00:29:44,990 --> 00:29:45,240
Question.
Yes.
I don't know if it is really fair, but in
hindsight, was it worth it for the military

464
00:29:55,210 --> 00:29:56,990
to get onboard with the Shuttle from the military's
perspective?

465
00:29:56,990 --> 00:29:59,799
Well, if the promises had been kept it certainly
would have been worthwhile.

466
00:29:59,799 --> 00:30:04,620
With the way things have turned out, was it
worth it?

467
00:30:04,620 --> 00:30:06,820
We were kind of driven into it.

468
00:30:06,820 --> 00:30:10,990
Can you say was it worth it from a cost point
of view, from a schedule point of view?

469
00:30:10,990 --> 00:30:11,890
The answer is no.

470
00:30:11,890 --> 00:30:18,890
I think from the perspective of having people
do extremely difficult tasks under very pressing

471
00:30:21,080 --> 00:30:27,559
circumstances, it showed us what NASA and
the Air Force could do, although at a great

472
00:30:27,559 --> 00:30:28,100
cost.

473
00:30:28,100 --> 00:30:34,169
It was certainly one of the more, I will say,
exciting times.

474
00:30:34,169 --> 00:30:37,190
It was one of the more exciting times for
NASA.

475
00:30:37,190 --> 00:30:38,190
Questions?

476
00:30:38,190 --> 00:30:39,190
Yes.

477
00:30:39,190 --> 00:30:45,960
When you talked about safety certifying these
payloads, was it mainly an issue of the fuel

478
00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:47,390
supplies for the payloads?

479
00:30:47,390 --> 00:30:50,510
Well, I will just give you one example.

480
00:30:50,510 --> 00:30:56,270
To get a payload into the bay and withstand
launch loads, you have to have very large

481
00:30:56,270 --> 00:31:01,870
structural members, steel rods, for example,
that had to take all of the launch loads and

482
00:31:01,870 --> 00:31:06,330
not have the satellite break away inside the
payload bay in the worst case either during

483
00:31:06,330 --> 00:31:09,909
liftoff or in the worst case on landing.

484
00:31:09,909 --> 00:31:15,710
You could have as many as 18 to 24 steel bolts
that all had to be fractured simultaneously

485
00:31:15,710 --> 00:31:19,630
within seconds by pyrotechnics to get them
out.

486
00:31:19,630 --> 00:31:24,270
You had to prove by analysis and by test that
you could have these simultaneous events for

487
00:31:24,270 --> 00:31:26,030
which you could not have any redundancy.

488
00:31:26,030 --> 00:31:27,720
You just couldn't do it.

489
00:31:27,720 --> 00:31:30,070
These were must-work devices.

490
00:31:30,070 --> 00:31:35,659
As probably Professor Hoffman has told you,
on every Shuttle launch there is a large number

491
00:31:35,659 --> 00:31:39,260
of must-work category-one issues and items.

492
00:31:39,260 --> 00:31:44,350
Like the bolts that free the external tank
from the vehicle, if those don't work you've

493
00:31:44,350 --> 00:31:46,049
got a big problem.

494
00:31:46,049 --> 00:31:50,090
From a safety certification point of view
on the Shuttle, we had to make sure that in

495
00:31:50,090 --> 00:31:57,090
no case could the payloads pose any hazard
to the crew under any circumstances, including

496
00:31:57,220 --> 00:32:03,409
the ones that are the most farfetched such
as landing overseas in Spain or Morocco.

497
00:32:03,409 --> 00:32:09,289
But the things we were worried about was having
a payload hung up during deployment so the

498
00:32:09,289 --> 00:32:16,070
Shuttle couldn't return or a payload damaging
the Shuttle at any time and causing obviously

499
00:32:16,070 --> 00:32:18,419
big problems there and things like that.

500
00:32:18,419 --> 00:32:22,640
Plus things such as propulsion systems accidentally
activating.

501
00:32:22,640 --> 00:32:26,990
Liquid solids, it didn't matter, all extremely
hazardous.

502
00:32:26,990 --> 00:32:31,470
And we found out a lot, because it is one
thing to design a payload for launching an

503
00:32:31,470 --> 00:32:31,770
expendable.

504
00:32:31,770 --> 00:32:34,429
There are certain things that you can or should
not do.

505
00:32:34,429 --> 00:32:38,890
But when you go to a Shuttle context, we have
a lot of commanding going into the vehicle.

506
00:32:38,890 --> 00:32:45,890
Pre-flight, during assent and ops, it becomes
a much more tough a problem.

507
00:32:46,120 --> 00:32:48,230
For example, I will just give one example.

508
00:32:48,230 --> 00:32:52,980
If you have a very complicated payload which
consists of a spacecraft bus, all the housekeeping

509
00:32:52,980 --> 00:32:58,460
and the payload front-end which may have all
kinds of hazards associated with it like antenna

510
00:32:58,460 --> 00:33:04,049
booms that come out on command, how do you
verify final configuration before you liftoff?

511
00:33:04,049 --> 00:33:10,230
How do you know every system is in the state
that you think it is?

512
00:33:10,230 --> 00:33:10,940
How do you verify that?

513
00:33:10,940 --> 00:33:12,990
That is very hard.

514
00:33:12,990 --> 00:33:16,490
Because you can go in there with test equipment,
but test equipment has subtleties all its

515
00:33:16,490 --> 00:33:16,990
own.

516
00:33:16,990 --> 00:33:17,480
OK.

517
00:33:17,480 --> 00:33:17,980
Questions?

518
00:33:17,980 --> 00:33:24,980
Do you think it would be possible to do the
one orbit and return to base type mission?

519
00:33:27,900 --> 00:33:31,240
It sounds very difficult to do.

520
00:33:31,240 --> 00:33:33,490
It is not that hard.

521
00:33:33,490 --> 00:33:37,280
First orbit deploys were not easy but they
were done.

522
00:33:37,280 --> 00:33:41,669
Coming back, I think the big problem is that
it really forces the timelines.

523
00:33:41,669 --> 00:33:47,360
Because, as you know, to do a de-orbit burn
and return to earth, it requires quite a bit

524
00:33:47,360 --> 00:33:52,549
of mission planning, real-time updates to
verify you're on the right track, plus making

525
00:33:52,549 --> 00:33:55,360
sure that you have everything right so when
you do the de-boost you're going to be within

526
00:33:55,360 --> 00:33:56,030
your corridors.

527
00:33:56,030 --> 00:34:01,539
To the best of my knowledge, NASA has never
done a first orbit return.

528
00:34:01,539 --> 00:34:02,750
And I don't think they would want to.

529
00:34:02,750 --> 00:34:07,809
It's very stressing because in 90 minutes
you have to not only get the spacecraft out,

530
00:34:07,809 --> 00:34:12,989
but then the vehicle re-safed and buttoned
up and planned out to land back either at

531
00:34:12,989 --> 00:34:16,049
the primary or an alternate landing site.

532
00:34:16,049 --> 00:34:19,139
That's a lot of work to do in 90 minutes.

533
00:34:19,139 --> 00:34:20,518
Any other questions?

534
00:34:20,518 --> 00:34:20,978
Yes.

535
00:34:20,978 --> 00:34:27,978
Is there any way to give a ballpark figure
of how many DoD payloads can be put in space

536
00:34:29,478 --> 00:34:30,339
by the Shuttle?

537
00:34:30,339 --> 00:34:30,719
Ten or hundreds?

538
00:34:30,719 --> 00:34:31,379
Oh, not, it's not hundreds.

539
00:34:31,379 --> 00:34:35,498
The NASA Manifest is published.

540
00:34:35,498 --> 00:34:39,849
From what they call a regular Air Force site,
they launched a whole series of communication

541
00:34:39,849 --> 00:34:42,168
satellites, DSCS, DSP.

542
00:34:42,168 --> 00:34:48,339
In fact, the very last DSP satellites are
still Shuttle compatible and could be launched

543
00:34:48,339 --> 00:34:49,779
if there was a problem with the Titans.

544
00:34:49,779 --> 00:34:53,569
They are up there in storage in Southern California.

545
00:34:53,569 --> 00:34:57,349
And then there are a fairly large number of
what are called Intelligence Community Missions

546
00:34:57,349 --> 00:34:58,869
that are flown.

547
00:34:58,869 --> 00:35:04,690
And all the manifest will say is that these
were just DoD missions.

548
00:35:04,690 --> 00:35:06,170
Let's see.

549
00:35:06,170 --> 00:35:13,170
What I would like to do is ask Tom to shut
off the videotape and I will give you a little

550
00:35:13,630 --> 00:35:17,200
introduction to my video which I hope will
run.

551
00:35:17,200 --> 00:35:23,529
We are ready to start her, folks.

552
00:35:23,529 --> 00:35:29,410
Bob Siemens is really a very pivotal person,
not only in the Space Shuttle story, but also

553
00:35:29,410 --> 00:35:33,009
in the Apollo Program, which he can probably
talk to you at a separate time.

554
00:35:33,009 --> 00:35:36,150
But I think he will like to spend ten or fifteen
minutes talking about his role in the Space

555
00:35:36,150 --> 00:35:37,680
Shuttle story.

556
00:35:37,680 --> 00:35:38,660
OK.

557
00:35:38,660 --> 00:35:40,180
Here we go.

558
00:35:40,180 --> 00:35:44,410
I'm just wondering where to go to get comfortable.

559
00:35:44,410 --> 00:35:48,359
Can we turn that off?

560
00:35:48,359 --> 00:35:49,940
We cannot.

561
00:35:49,940 --> 00:35:51,519
All right.

562
00:35:51,519 --> 00:35:54,989
I would just like to get comfortable here.

563
00:35:54,989 --> 00:36:01,989
You know, as Pete said -- First of all, I
thought that was a great summary of actually

564
00:36:03,930 --> 00:36:09,979
a very difficult subject to discuss.

565
00:36:09,979 --> 00:36:16,249
Let me just take you back, first of all, to
the early '60s.

566
00:36:16,249 --> 00:36:23,249
I know that is going awful far back, but that
was when I joined NASA as a general manager.

567
00:36:23,690 --> 00:36:29,940
And, before we knew it, we had gone from a
billion dollar a year operation with the Mercury

568
00:36:29,940 --> 00:36:36,940
Program to a situation where we were given
the assignment of putting men on the moon.

569
00:36:37,099 --> 00:36:44,099
And that was a gigantic shift in our responsibility.

570
00:36:44,119 --> 00:36:51,119
And in all of the planning and the discussions
and so on, and we did work very closely with

571
00:36:54,759 --> 00:37:01,690
the Department of Defense, the Department
of Defense had all kinds of assets that were

572
00:37:01,690 --> 00:37:04,880
going to be required in the Space Program.

573
00:37:04,880 --> 00:37:07,819
The Navy, for example, to pick up the astronauts.

574
00:37:07,819 --> 00:37:14,819
One example, a major example most people never
heard of, was we had to construct very large

575
00:37:16,339 --> 00:37:17,460
facilities.

576
00:37:17,460 --> 00:37:23,289
The most famous and obvious is the Vertical
Assembly Building and the large facility down

577
00:37:23,289 --> 00:37:24,420
at the Cape.

578
00:37:24,420 --> 00:37:29,569
You just saw the Shuttle taking off from that
facility.

579
00:37:29,569 --> 00:37:35,769
And, in operating down there at the Cape,
there already was Cape Canaveral.

580
00:37:35,769 --> 00:37:40,849
And there was not room for what we were going
to do to fit on Cape Canaveral.

581
00:37:40,849 --> 00:37:46,190
We looked at seven different world sites and
finally decided to camp on Merritt Island

582
00:37:46,190 --> 00:37:53,190
which is just across the river from Cape Canaveral
because, again, the Department of Defense

583
00:37:54,430 --> 00:37:58,710
had all kinds of facilities down there with
a tracking range and so on.

584
00:37:58,710 --> 00:38:03,219
But the biggest support that we got was in
the building of those facilities.

585
00:38:03,219 --> 00:38:10,219
There was absolutely no confidence in NASA
to build the largest structure in the world,

586
00:38:12,729 --> 00:38:18,410
the VAB, or many other facilities for assembly
and for tests and so on.

587
00:38:18,410 --> 00:38:22,680
The Corp of Engineers was a major part of
the operation.

588
00:38:22,680 --> 00:38:29,680
I am bringing this out because we had to figure
out how far we were going to go with our launch

589
00:38:31,400 --> 00:38:35,219
vehicles on a shared basis.

590
00:38:35,219 --> 00:38:42,219
This is before anybody thought of a manned
shuttle that would carry stuff up and stick

591
00:38:43,390 --> 00:38:45,869
it into orbit.

592
00:38:45,869 --> 00:38:52,869
But we put together a planning organization
that actually operated for over a year's time.

593
00:38:55,380 --> 00:39:02,380
A fellow named Golivan for NASA, a fellow
named Cavanaugh for the Department of Defense

594
00:39:02,519 --> 00:39:04,869
put this together.

595
00:39:04,869 --> 00:39:09,130
One of the big emphases was the use of the
Titan.

596
00:39:09,130 --> 00:39:15,809
The Titan was coming along to the point where
we thought that the earliest version would

597
00:39:15,809 --> 00:39:19,589
be suitable for the Mercury Program.

598
00:39:19,589 --> 00:39:26,589
And, at that time, in 1961, we were thinking
that Mercury only weighed 3,000 pounds.

599
00:39:29,190 --> 00:39:30,249
You could put one man in it.

600
00:39:30,249 --> 00:39:32,279
You couldn't do much with it.

601
00:39:32,279 --> 00:39:38,599
But if we could, in effect, just enlarge it
and have a more powerful vehicle, an Atlas,

602
00:39:38,599 --> 00:39:45,599
namely the Titan, we could really have a vehicle
that would have some capability to run through

603
00:39:47,739 --> 00:39:52,789
a lot of the orbital operation and so on that
we're going to ultimately be required for

604
00:39:52,789 --> 00:39:54,630
going to the moon.

605
00:39:54,630 --> 00:40:01,630
And out of that came the planning for the
Titan III, the Titan IV and vehicles that

606
00:40:04,339 --> 00:40:11,339
proved right off the bat, and over time, they
still are very important to our defense capability.

607
00:40:13,749 --> 00:40:17,339
Well, I don't think that is quite true.

608
00:40:17,339 --> 00:40:23,969
I don't think we are using any of those assets
today within NASA.

609
00:40:23,969 --> 00:40:30,969
And if you then go forward in time, in 1968,
I have been down there in NASA for 7.5 years.

610
00:40:35,349 --> 00:40:37,329
I planned to go down for two.

611
00:40:37,329 --> 00:40:38,190
I came back.

612
00:40:38,190 --> 00:40:45,190
MIT was nice enough to invite me back, and
I came back right here as a Hunsaker professor.

613
00:40:45,799 --> 00:40:52,799
To my very great amazement, I got a call one
day from somebody I had never met, a man named

614
00:40:54,930 --> 00:40:56,209
Mel Laird.

615
00:40:56,209 --> 00:41:03,209
I just barely knew that he had been designated
by Nixon to be the next Secretary of Defense.

616
00:41:05,009 --> 00:41:07,999
He said are you going to be down here in Washington
the next day or two?

617
00:41:07,999 --> 00:41:13,880
As a matter of fact, I was because I was going
to go down the next day to get on a plan and

618
00:41:13,880 --> 00:41:20,880
fly down and see the launch of Apollo 8 which
was going to fly around the moon.

619
00:41:21,900 --> 00:41:23,700
And he said come on for lunch.

620
00:41:23,700 --> 00:41:29,119
That is when he asked if I would be the willing
to be the Secretary of the Air Force.

621
00:41:29,119 --> 00:41:31,079
I told him that was absolutely impossible.

622
00:41:31,079 --> 00:41:33,410
We just moved our family back here.

623
00:41:33,410 --> 00:41:36,539
My wife is in the hospital, which she was.

624
00:41:36,539 --> 00:41:38,239
But he was very persistent.

625
00:41:38,239 --> 00:41:45,239
And after about ten days I agreed to go back
down in the government, but that is a long

626
00:41:45,529 --> 00:41:50,569
story you don't want to hear the details of
getting my wife well and getting a house and

627
00:41:50,569 --> 00:41:53,160
all that stuff.

628
00:41:53,160 --> 00:41:57,569
One thing that I inherited right off the bat
was the Manned Orbital Laboratory.

629
00:41:57,569 --> 00:42:04,569
And, even then, it was clearly in some jeopardy.

630
00:42:05,200 --> 00:42:10,529
When programs start getting a ceiling built
in where they say we're going to keep it going

631
00:42:10,529 --> 00:42:16,549
but it is going to be kept going at a level
of, and I forget what the level was for MOL,

632
00:42:16,549 --> 00:42:22,890
something like $500 million or something like
that.

633
00:42:22,890 --> 00:42:28,609
Because any large program over time there
is always opposition to it and there is more

634
00:42:28,609 --> 00:42:34,069
time for it to be shot down and ultimately
eliminated.

635
00:42:34,069 --> 00:42:41,069
I realize that it was in deep trouble when
I was over in the Bureau of the Budget talking

636
00:42:42,109 --> 00:42:48,420
to a junior member of the Bureau of the Budget
and he said I hope you realize that the Shuttle

637
00:42:48,420 --> 00:42:55,420
is in deep trouble from a standpoint of support
here in the White House.

638
00:42:55,559 --> 00:43:02,299
And so I went back to Mel Laird and said,
look, one thing I want to do is to have one

639
00:43:02,299 --> 00:43:09,299
shot with the President to be sure he fully
understands what the capability of the MOL

640
00:43:09,440 --> 00:43:10,269
will be.

641
00:43:10,269 --> 00:43:14,749
It was far along.

642
00:43:14,749 --> 00:43:21,749
Lots of expense had gone into it, including
major facility construction out of Vandenberg.

643
00:43:26,079 --> 00:43:27,079
I had my day in court.

644
00:43:27,079 --> 00:43:28,890
It was a sunny afternoon.

645
00:43:28,890 --> 00:43:34,190
I got General Stewart, who was very involved
in the MOL, to join me and Mel Laird.

646
00:43:34,190 --> 00:43:34,890
And we went over there.

647
00:43:34,890 --> 00:43:40,420
It was just Kissinger and the President.

648
00:43:40,420 --> 00:43:46,390
And I had a few simple-minded charts that
showed what we were going to do from a resolution

649
00:43:46,390 --> 00:43:53,390
standpoint if we kept going with the MOL and
what that would mean in terms of understanding

650
00:43:54,509 --> 00:44:01,509
more clearly what was going on in a given
situation.

651
00:44:02,239 --> 00:44:03,700
I had my half-hour in court.

652
00:44:03,700 --> 00:44:08,029
I could see a band outside getting ready to
play so I knew that the President was about

653
00:44:08,029 --> 00:44:12,469
to be rushed out for some kind of a ceremony.

654
00:44:12,469 --> 00:44:13,650
That was a Saturday.

655
00:44:13,650 --> 00:44:15,450
Monday morning I got a call from Kissinger.

656
00:44:15,450 --> 00:44:21,729
And he said Bob, and I cannot really imitate
his German accent, that was a very, very fine

657
00:44:21,729 --> 00:44:22,849
presentation.

658
00:44:22,849 --> 00:44:28,959
And a day later I found out that MOL was cancelled.

659
00:44:28,959 --> 00:44:31,359
That was with President Nixon.

660
00:44:31,359 --> 00:44:32,339
He sat there the whole time.

661
00:44:32,339 --> 00:44:37,529
He had a yellow foolscap and took prodigious
notes of everything I was saying, which was

662
00:44:37,529 --> 00:44:43,059
sort of nerve-racking, the President of the
United States bothering with what I am saying.

663
00:44:43,059 --> 00:44:50,059
Anyway, that was sort of where I came from,
from the MOL.

664
00:44:52,140 --> 00:44:59,140
The next step along the way was after Apollo,
what was going to happen in space?

665
00:44:59,680 --> 00:45:06,440
There were to be eight launches of the Apollo
Lunar Program.

666
00:45:06,440 --> 00:45:11,019
Nixon cut that back to two sort of arbitrarily.

667
00:45:11,019 --> 00:45:15,140
And there were no plans for using those assets.

668
00:45:15,140 --> 00:45:19,869
Jim Webb was my boss in NASA.

669
00:45:19,869 --> 00:45:22,930
And I used to see him.

670
00:45:22,930 --> 00:45:25,739
He was very, very ill the latter part of his
life.

671
00:45:25,739 --> 00:45:29,849
And I would drop by.

672
00:45:29,849 --> 00:45:36,749
And he would ask me strange questions like
what do you plan to do with your life before

673
00:45:36,749 --> 00:45:39,479
you kick the bucket kind of questions like
that.

674
00:45:39,479 --> 00:45:41,869
And he said I haven't got long to live.

675
00:45:41,869 --> 00:45:44,589
And I would say you're doing fine, Jim.

676
00:45:44,589 --> 00:45:49,950
And I am just going to work along and see
what I can do to help out here and there.

677
00:45:49,950 --> 00:45:56,950
Anyway, his big thrust was we felt we were
building a major capability for the country

678
00:45:57,380 --> 00:46:01,390
and now it is all being washed away.

679
00:46:01,390 --> 00:46:08,390
And what is going to replace it?

680
00:46:11,029 --> 00:46:15,609
The Shuttle came up as an option.

681
00:46:15,609 --> 00:46:22,609
Actually, to say on the surface, it makes
an awful lot of sense to recover something.

682
00:46:23,569 --> 00:46:30,569
We could easily visualize a transportation
system for the country where every time a

683
00:46:35,599 --> 00:46:40,489
747 went across the country with a payload
everybody jumped out and then you threw it

684
00:46:40,489 --> 00:46:41,509
in the ocean.

685
00:46:41,509 --> 00:46:43,809
It didn't seem to make much sense.

686
00:46:43,809 --> 00:46:48,209
You just knew it had to be more efficient
to reuse something.

687
00:46:48,209 --> 00:46:52,279
Although, with Gemini, we had looked into
that possibility.

688
00:46:52,279 --> 00:46:56,650
We were recovering the Gemini's, why didn't
we use them again?

689
00:46:56,650 --> 00:47:03,650
And we found that we are going to have to
put probably 75% of the original cost into

690
00:47:04,109 --> 00:47:06,440
reactivating the Gemini's.

691
00:47:06,440 --> 00:47:11,680
So, actually, I had a hunch that it wasn't
going to be quite as simple as landing an

692
00:47:11,680 --> 00:47:18,459
airplane and then taking off again.

693
00:47:18,459 --> 00:47:22,430
The Air Force was going to be one of the prime
users of the Shuttle.

694
00:47:22,430 --> 00:47:29,430
And the question was how large did the bomb
bay -- Not the bomb bay.

695
00:47:29,839 --> 00:47:36,839
[LAUGHTER] How large did the experimental
bay have to be for the missions that were

696
00:47:36,949 --> 00:47:38,599
going to be carried out?

697
00:47:38,599 --> 00:47:44,359
There was no thought, let me just quickly
say, of putting armament aboard the Shuttle.

698
00:47:44,359 --> 00:47:47,999
I misspoke.

699
00:47:47,999 --> 00:47:54,999
And then one of the questions was how rapidly
did you have to recover it if something happened

700
00:47:57,289 --> 00:48:04,130
and you wanted to bring something back in
a hurry?

701
00:48:04,130 --> 00:48:11,130
And to bring it back you had to make up a
co-planer change, and that was going to take

702
00:48:12,749 --> 00:48:18,009
a certain amount of energy, to put it mildly.

703
00:48:18,009 --> 00:48:21,219
Anyway, those are many of the issues.

704
00:48:21,219 --> 00:48:27,759
And I think, as I remember it, my friends
in NASA thought the Air Force was being pretty

705
00:48:27,759 --> 00:48:31,180
tough on them.

706
00:48:31,180 --> 00:48:37,400
But if we were going to accept the use of
a vehicle, in all seriousness, as you've just

707
00:48:37,400 --> 00:48:44,400
heard, it had to have ability to carry out
the missions.

708
00:48:45,380 --> 00:48:48,319
And so that was sort of the next step along
the way.

709
00:48:48,319 --> 00:48:55,319
And then, after I got through in the government,
I ended up some years later out at Aerospace

710
00:48:57,509 --> 00:49:00,640
and ended up as the chairman of the corporation.

711
00:49:00,640 --> 00:49:05,829
And they worked closely with that element
in the Air Force that was so much involved

712
00:49:05,829 --> 00:49:11,930
in these type programs that you've just been
hearing about.

713
00:49:11,930 --> 00:49:18,930
And we were beginning to go into shock, at
least
those in the nucleus who were sort of running

714
00:49:27,949 --> 00:49:29,489
the aerospace.

715
00:49:29,489 --> 00:49:32,739
[UNINTELLIGIBLE] and myself.

716
00:49:32,739 --> 00:49:37,920
More and more it appeared that we were going
to not be allowed to put anything in space

717
00:49:37,920 --> 00:49:40,579
except through the Shuttle.

718
00:49:40,579 --> 00:49:41,999
And that seemed to be imminently wrong.

719
00:49:41,999 --> 00:49:46,019
To think that you're going to have to risk
the life of astronauts every time you wanted

720
00:49:46,019 --> 00:49:49,150
to put any kind of a satellite in orbit.

721
00:49:49,150 --> 00:49:56,150
From the standpoint of a paperclip individual
who is looking at cost, to just have the one

722
00:49:58,729 --> 00:50:05,729
vehicle and use it and use it and use it and
thereby supposedly cutting the cost, had a

723
00:50:06,529 --> 00:50:09,499
lot of charm.

724
00:50:09,499 --> 00:50:16,499
And it reached the point where he and I decided
we had to try to do something about it.

725
00:50:20,349 --> 00:50:26,479
And we made an appointment with the then Secretary
of the Air Force and said you've just going

726
00:50:26,479 --> 00:50:33,479
to be stashing away Titan somewhere so that
if we run into trouble with the Shuttle we

727
00:50:34,109 --> 00:50:41,109
are going to be able to move over and put
these very important payloads into orbit.

728
00:50:43,039 --> 00:50:47,829
And then they had the Challenger accident.

729
00:50:47,829 --> 00:50:54,829
At that point this, I think, major fallacy
in policy was changed back where it should

730
00:50:57,479 --> 00:50:59,479
have been.

731
00:50:59,479 --> 00:51:02,719
You just shouldn't rely on a single vehicle.

732
00:51:02,719 --> 00:51:05,359
And that is my introduction.

733
00:51:05,359 --> 00:51:06,119
Yes.

734
00:51:06,119 --> 00:51:11,969
You wanted reusability, but some people also
didn't want to risk the lives of astronauts.

735
00:51:11,969 --> 00:51:17,180
Why not make a reusable unmanned vehicle?

736
00:51:17,180 --> 00:51:23,130
That's a very good question.

737
00:51:23,130 --> 00:51:25,019
Why couldn't we do it?

738
00:51:25,019 --> 00:51:31,559
That might be a good design challenge for
you guys here in this class to investigate

739
00:51:31,559 --> 00:51:34,359
that possibility.

740
00:51:34,359 --> 00:51:36,949
Unmanned.

741
00:51:36,949 --> 00:51:43,949
We've gone partway in that direction by, say,
recovering the Shuttle casings, obviously

742
00:51:48,759 --> 00:51:50,589
the Shuttle itself.

743
00:51:50,589 --> 00:51:57,589
But, trying to recover at least elements of
the unmanned launch vehicles, I'm not prepared

744
00:52:02,670 --> 00:52:04,670
to really give you a definitive answer on
that.

745
00:52:04,670 --> 00:52:07,579
That's a good question and we will talk about
it later.

746
00:52:07,579 --> 00:52:07,849
Yes.

747
00:52:07,849 --> 00:52:14,849
Before the Shuttle concept was finalized and
military requirements were finalized for the

748
00:52:24,599 --> 00:52:31,599
Shuttle, the military had been launching their
satellites and their missions using Titan's

749
00:52:31,739 --> 00:52:33,390
and Atlas's, correct?

750
00:52:33,390 --> 00:52:39,539
So why this requirement of the Shuttle having
to be able to bring back a satellite using

751
00:52:39,539 --> 00:52:44,959
really a military satellite when that wasn't
being done or required beforehand?

752
00:52:44,959 --> 00:52:47,259
Like why was that created?

753
00:52:47,259 --> 00:52:50,009
What was so special about it?

754
00:52:50,009 --> 00:52:57,009
We worked very hard on proposals to bring
back satellites that were out of fuel or needed

755
00:52:58,009 --> 00:53:02,509
refurbishment, but when I was referring to
landing with the Shuttle with payloads in

756
00:53:02,509 --> 00:53:04,279
the bay that is for a failed mission.

757
00:53:04,279 --> 00:53:06,869
And for some reason the payload could not
get ejected.

758
00:53:06,869 --> 00:53:11,819
You still had to be able to land back what
was now a very heavy spacecraft and glide

759
00:53:11,819 --> 00:53:13,459
on it and land safely.

760
00:53:13,459 --> 00:53:16,660
That turns out to be a really hard thing to
do, especially if you're carrying solids and

761
00:53:16,660 --> 00:53:22,959
liquids onboard that were close to being ready
to ignite, so to speak.

762
00:53:22,959 --> 00:53:25,009
But there is talk of retrieving satellites.

763
00:53:25,009 --> 00:53:30,749
And, as you know, NASA did bring back some
small satellites, the Palapa one from Hughes.

764
00:53:30,749 --> 00:53:33,799
And also did a lot of very innovative repairs
in space.

765
00:53:33,799 --> 00:53:37,920
But when we looked at it from a customer point
of view, it turns out there is a lot that

766
00:53:37,920 --> 00:53:40,630
wears out in satellites, not just using a
propellant.

767
00:53:40,630 --> 00:53:47,630
But the processors degrade due to radiation,
solar panels degrade just due to micro dust

768
00:53:47,819 --> 00:53:48,989
and things like that.

769
00:53:48,989 --> 00:53:54,640
And so bringing back a satellite for reuse
was never felt, at the time we looked at it,

770
00:53:54,640 --> 00:53:56,219
to be a worthwhile thing to do.

771
00:53:56,219 --> 00:54:01,160
And that ties in directly with what I was
saying about recovering a Gemini.

772
00:54:01,160 --> 00:54:07,880
And, of course, on top of that with a Gemini
is the fact you are landing them in the water

773
00:54:07,880 --> 00:54:12,140
so they got a good dousing of salt.

774
00:54:12,140 --> 00:54:19,140
And so the degradation of the Gemini's were
such that we just didn't think it made any

775
00:54:22,289 --> 00:54:25,779
sense to try to refurbish them.

776
00:54:25,779 --> 00:54:26,880
Yes.

777
00:54:26,880 --> 00:54:33,880
The military was only really looking to capture
and service in space, then release, not necessarily

778
00:54:34,359 --> 00:54:36,359
capture and bring back?

779
00:54:36,359 --> 00:54:39,699
They never seriously went after the capture
and refurbish and release.

780
00:54:39,699 --> 00:54:43,839
They really went after launch and deployment.

781
00:54:43,839 --> 00:54:48,880
But I would say that in that theme the most
successful story actually of refurbishment

782
00:54:48,880 --> 00:54:50,699
is the Hubble Space Telescope.

783
00:54:50,699 --> 00:54:52,299
And not for the reasons that you think of.

784
00:54:52,299 --> 00:54:55,719
When you think about stories of the Hubble
Space Telescope you hear about Jeff Hoffman

785
00:54:55,719 --> 00:54:59,199
going up there and changing processors and
fixing the optics.

786
00:54:59,199 --> 00:55:05,239
Also on those missions they replaced solar
panels that were causing huge problems due

787
00:55:05,239 --> 00:55:09,650
to thermal warpage and shrinkage and what
they call oil canning due to thermal stresses.

788
00:55:09,650 --> 00:55:16,160
And so the replacement of those solar panels,
which turned out to be not very good as initially

789
00:55:16,160 --> 00:55:20,559
designed, is one of the really true success
stories of man in space.

790
00:55:20,559 --> 00:55:26,729
And there is actually a very nice video which
maybe you have seen of the lady astronaut

791
00:55:26,729 --> 00:55:33,599
who did the replacement of the solar panels
on Hubble pushing out and releasing the solar

792
00:55:33,599 --> 00:55:35,150
panels.

793
00:55:35,150 --> 00:55:39,329
Things fly away in the sunshine looking like
giant butterfly wings reflecting all the colors

794
00:55:39,329 --> 00:55:40,880
and then finally fall into the atmosphere.

795
00:55:40,880 --> 00:55:44,119
It is almost poetic, I tell you.

796
00:55:44,119 --> 00:55:45,239
It's amazing.

797
00:55:45,239 --> 00:55:52,239
On the Hubble, one of the considerations right
from the beginning was that it should be a

798
00:55:54,900 --> 00:55:57,199
serviceable satellite.

799
00:55:57,199 --> 00:56:03,809
It was designed so that you could get inside
of it relatively easily and so on.

800
00:56:03,809 --> 00:56:09,939
Frankly, I don't know of any other satellite
that was really designed quite that way.

801
00:56:09,939 --> 00:56:11,930
Maybe I'm wrong.

802
00:56:11,930 --> 00:56:14,589
I believe you're right.

803
00:56:14,589 --> 00:56:15,249
Yes.

804
00:56:15,249 --> 00:56:20,249
On the solar panel, it wasn't designed to
replace the panel.

805
00:56:20,249 --> 00:56:27,249
But you can go back to SkyLab, which was the
next to last launching of the Apollo.

806
00:56:29,859 --> 00:56:35,640
On that one, I guess, we decided to take what
was the third stage of a Saturn and just gut

807
00:56:35,640 --> 00:56:42,640
it, not have any propulsion in it and fit
it out to be a spacecraft, namely a space

808
00:56:43,910 --> 00:56:45,099
station.

809
00:56:45,099 --> 00:56:51,019
And, when they got up there, the solar panels
got fouled up.

810
00:56:51,019 --> 00:56:57,749
And one of the real tricks when the astronauts
first got to it because it was not launched

811
00:56:57,749 --> 00:57:04,749
manned was to unravel some wires that got
caught on it so actually the panels could

812
00:57:05,150 --> 00:57:10,329
spread out and it could start to operate again.

813
00:57:10,329 --> 00:57:17,029
Colonial Siemens, I don't know if either of
you would know, but what are the duties involved

814
00:57:17,029 --> 00:57:23,069
in like the heavy payload aspect of the new
CEV project?

815
00:57:23,069 --> 00:57:26,900
Delta 4 going out of Vandenberg was carrying
classified payload.

816
00:57:26,900 --> 00:57:29,079
It's not a dummy either.

817
00:57:29,079 --> 00:57:30,400
It is real.

818
00:57:30,400 --> 00:57:35,219
They have standing requirements for these
types of things.

819
00:57:35,219 --> 00:57:37,069
The national needs go on.

820
00:57:37,069 --> 00:57:40,739
The international stage, as we know, is filled
with new actors and new threats.

821
00:57:40,739 --> 00:57:46,130
We have what is called unsymmetrical warfare,
things that are hard to counter by conventional

822
00:57:46,130 --> 00:57:47,359
means.

823
00:57:47,359 --> 00:57:51,209
Back in the '70s and '80s we had symmetrical
warfare, submarines versus submarines, missiles

824
00:57:51,209 --> 00:57:51,969
versus missiles.

825
00:57:51,969 --> 00:57:54,660
Now, as we know, it is much harder, much tougher,
but the needs are still there.

826
00:57:54,660 --> 00:57:59,969
But is the collaboration between NASA and
the military still pretty active?

827
00:57:59,969 --> 00:58:01,439
It is not in terms of payloads.

828
00:58:01,439 --> 00:58:07,059
It is there in exchange of technologies, things
like development of more efficient sensors,

829
00:58:07,059 --> 00:58:08,569
processors, that sort of thing.

830
00:58:08,569 --> 00:58:12,660
It is everybody's benefit, for example, to
have more powerful, faster, rad-hard space

831
00:58:12,660 --> 00:58:13,269
processors.

832
00:58:13,269 --> 00:58:17,579
Everybody wins in that type of situation.

833
00:58:17,579 --> 00:58:19,739
Back to your question on reusability.

834
00:58:19,739 --> 00:58:24,349
You will notice that one of the real strong
pluses or the calling cards of the Space Shuttle

835
00:58:24,349 --> 00:58:28,199
Program was the fact that it was a reusable
launch vehicle.

836
00:58:28,199 --> 00:58:33,279
In this current environment of the CEVs and
new launch vehicles, what do you hear today

837
00:58:33,279 --> 00:58:34,999
about reusable launch vehicles?

838
00:58:34,999 --> 00:58:35,559
Nothing.

839
00:58:35,559 --> 00:58:42,099
Isn't it amazing how things have changed just
in a matter of 25 years?

840
00:58:42,099 --> 00:58:46,759
One thing I just sort of forgot to mention
with regard to the Manned Orbital Laboratory.

841
00:58:46,759 --> 00:58:53,759
It was thought, at that time, that by having
men there and their ability to inspect a fairly

842
00:58:56,180 --> 00:59:03,170
wide swath that they would have time in flying
over that swath to do some searching.

843
00:59:03,170 --> 00:59:10,170
And could do a better job of detecting possible
items of tremendous interest from a military

844
00:59:13,029 --> 00:59:15,729
standpoint than trying to do it all automatically.

845
00:59:15,729 --> 00:59:22,729
And, of course, what finally washed out that
argument was the ability to have satellites

846
00:59:25,079 --> 00:59:30,529
that had almost instantaneous transmission
of information back home.

847
00:59:30,529 --> 00:59:37,529
What was the design for the MOL for crew transportation?

848
00:59:38,079 --> 00:59:45,079
They were going to take off on a Titan, they
were going to aboard a Gemini, and they were

849
00:59:46,189 --> 00:59:53,189
going to have a laboratory of sorts which
would have the necessary reconnaissance and

850
00:59:55,289 --> 00:59:56,180
other equipment aboard.

851
00:59:56,180 --> 01:00:03,180
So it was similar to SkyLab in that you had
a non-reusable capsule as the crew transfer?

852
01:00:04,410 --> 01:00:09,359
It had a Gemini type return vehicle, but it
was definitely going to be very small and

853
01:00:09,359 --> 01:00:10,369
cramped compared to Shuttle.

854
01:00:10,369 --> 01:00:15,969
There was no thought of having another Gemini
come up and make use of it.

855
01:00:15,969 --> 01:00:16,719
Yes.

856
01:00:16,719 --> 01:00:23,719
Why did Gemini, Apollo and Mercury all land
on water, because that is very expensive,

857
01:00:29,959 --> 01:00:31,089
and the Russians landed on land?

858
01:00:31,089 --> 01:00:31,339
Well, very simple.
If you take a look at where the launch sites
were for the Soviets, if they aborted they

859
01:00:36,799 --> 01:00:43,119
had to have the capability of coming down
on land, any kind of abort mission.

860
01:00:43,119 --> 01:00:50,119
Similarly, operating out of the Cape Canaveral
area, if you abort, you have to come down

861
01:00:50,699 --> 01:00:51,849
on the water.

862
01:00:51,849 --> 01:00:56,369
The question was then was it worthwhile to
have the capability of doing both?

863
01:00:56,369 --> 01:00:58,019
Well, that just added weight.

864
01:00:58,019 --> 01:01:01,559
And so we stuck with the water and they stuck
with the land.

865
01:01:01,559 --> 01:01:08,559
Do any of the new defense payloads require
human intervention in their deployment or

866
01:01:13,829 --> 01:01:15,199
are they all completely [OVERLAPPING VOICES]?

867
01:01:15,199 --> 01:01:18,739
They are all Titan IV EELV compatible.

868
01:01:18,739 --> 01:01:20,180
Anything else?

869
01:01:20,180 --> 01:01:24,479
I think we wore everybody out.

870
01:01:24,479 --> 01:01:30,199
Well, you know, Bob and I will stick around,
but we're not going to hold you down here

871
01:01:30,199 --> 01:01:31,839
if there are no questions.

872
01:01:31,839 --> 01:01:33,779
I guess we will call the class.

873
01:01:33,779 --> 01:01:36,499
And we will stick around if anybody wants
to ask any more detailed questions or have

874
01:01:36,499 --> 01:01:36,900
follow-ups.

875
01:01:36,900 --> 01:01:39,150
My phone number and email is up there.

876
01:01:39,150 --> 01:01:42,549
I will be glad to talk to any of you one-on-one
about any of this.

877
01:01:42,549 --> 01:01:45,979
There is quite a lot more detail we can provide,
either Bob or myself.

878
01:01:45,979 --> 01:01:50,819
And, if I have to, I will write Bob a note
asking for further information.

879
01:01:50,819 --> 01:01:51,579
OK?

880
01:01:51,579 --> 01:01:53,400
Well, thanks a lot.

881
01:01:53,400 --> 01:01:53,690
[APPLAUSE]