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It was quite an experience for all of us to
get to hear him.

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And it is equally very fortunate now to have
Wayne Hale who has had a very illustrious

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career at NASA.

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Wayne came to NASA the same year I did in
1978, worked his way up as an engineer through

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the propulsion system, the integrated communication
systems.

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Became a flight director in 1988 and served
there for 15 years.

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He was flight director both for the orbit
phase and then the most really kind of intense

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flight control phase as ascent and entry.

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And Wayne was ascent and entry flight director
and then lead flight director for many flights,

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including-- we were trying to figure out before.

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But I think he actually served for all of
my last four flights.

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So we've known each other for a long time.

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In 2003, he was sent to the Kennedy Space
Center to be head of launch operations.

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But he didn't get to spend very much time
in the Florida sunshine because they asked

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him to come back to Houston the next year
as deputy program manager for the Space Shuttle.

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And then, when Bill Gerstenmeyer left to move
up to NASA headquarters, Wayne became the

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program manager.

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So he is able to talk to us both about Mission
Control operations and the current and future

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state of affairs of the Shuttle.

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And he is very happy to have you ask questions
while he is talking.

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And I am not going to talk anymore because
they came to hear you, Wayne.

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WAYNE: Thank you, Jeff.

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I cannot tell you how much I've been looking
forward to coming here to talk to you folks.

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This is my favorite subject.

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Space, number one.

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The Shuttle, number two.

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And Mission Control, number three.

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Maybe not exactly in that order, but they
are all three topics that have been--

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[NOISE OBSCURES]

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Oh, that was you.

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I thought that was me.

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I thought that's a sound I haven't heard before
and I'm in big trouble.

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OK.

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But, as Jeff said, please feel free to ask
any questions.

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I will tell you all kinds of interesting stories
today, I think.

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Some of them might even be about Dr. Hoffman.

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I should tell you my background as an engineer.

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I got my bachelor's and master's degree in
mechanical engineering.

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Did not decide to pursue a doctorate degree
for a variety of reasons.

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You need to understand that the organization
of NASA is very much around the centers.

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It was organized as a group largely of independent
centers with a very thin veneer of integration

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at NASA headquarters.

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And it remains that way to this day.

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And every center is quite different from every
other center.

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We have some centers that are largely involved
in research.

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And, if you want to work in the research center,
Langley, Glenn, Ames then you need to clearly

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pursue a PhD.

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If you're more interested in an ops center,
Kennedy, Marshall, Johnson, then you need

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to kind of not go after the PhD.

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Because people with PhDs clearly do not have
a real world practical understanding of problems.

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And it is only the guys with bachelor's degrees
that get out and know how to turn wrenches

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in their spare time required there.

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So it is very interesting, the different cultures.

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I can say that with a grin because there are
different cultures within NASA.

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And working between the centers is very interesting.

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And since I have moved in the management ranks,
for what reason I don't understand, I have

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fouled up in my career.

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[OVERLAPPING VOICES]

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make you a manager when you don't get to do
the things that you're good at anymore.

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Yes, promote you something that you were never
trained for.

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It has been very interesting for me to try
to work between the various centers to help

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them accomplish the goals that the agency
has.

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One of the things I should say is that I regret
my academic career as I didn't take more psychology,

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more accounting.

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Because, frankly, when I was in graduate school,
I can remember one of the courses I had was

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systems of nonlinear partial differential
equations.

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Anybody taken a class that has a title vaguely
similar to that?

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I never used that class.

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I have never touched a differential equation
in my professional career.

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Now, why that is, is kind of interesting.

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But what I really did need was trigonometry
and accounting.

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And you will see a little bit of that.

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Today my class is not going to be highly technical.

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It is going to be a series of illustrations
about Mission Control.

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And, as I said, I will be happy to talk to
you about it.

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I go to a lot of conferences these days, and
I frequently sit in advanced space systems

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sessions.

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I sat in a very interesting future reusable
launch vehicle session the last AIAA conference

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I went to.

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And I walked away totally distressed because
they have no concept of what the real world

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is like in many of these academic seminars.

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And I want to inject a little bit of real
world realism into what you guys think about

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as engineers.

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One of the favorite topics of people these
days that are designing advanced space systems

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include what they call and "austere" launch
pad.

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In other words, you cannot fix anything on
the rocket when it is on the launch pad.

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And the reason they side is look how much
money all these programs spend fixing their

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rocket out on the launch pad.

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Well, the fact of the matter is rockets are
very finicky, rockets have very little margin

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in many of their components and things break.

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They can break and you don't even know it
until you plug them all together and turn

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them on.

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And if you have a launch pad that is austere
and you can do no work on it, well, what was

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one of those colorful phrases that Chris Kraft
would use?

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You have really bought the farm.

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I won't use his colorful phrases.

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You wind up spending a lot more money because
you've got to take the rocket back to the

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barn and take it all apart rather than maybe
get access to fix it.

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If there was anything that I wish we had was
more capability to fix things on the launch

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pad.

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We spend a lot of time and money working around
problems that we cannot fix at the launch

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pad, even though we have a huge amount of
capability.

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You don't save money there.

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It is a false economy.

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Similarly, there is a notion en vogue that
you don't need a big Mission Control.

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That is just a lot of people that cost a lot
of money that you don't really need.

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I think it reached the height of the anti
Mission Control forces during the DCX program

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when they were very proud to proclaim their
Mission Control was a trailer house with three

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people in it.

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And they thought that was all any space vehicle
needed to have to launch.

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Of course, they only reached an altitude to
5000 feet and they crashed their only prototype

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vehicle, not because of Mission Control but
perhaps because they didn't pay enough attention

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to operational situations.

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In my business now, I can tell you that in
the Space Shuttle program Mission Control

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cost me less than 2% of the total budget for
the Space Shuttle program.

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What we get for that 2% is quite amazing.

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And every time the budget folks come down
from Washington to review our budget, they

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want to help us drive down the ops cost, they
take one look, you have the budget breakdown

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of the Shuttle program and they say you guys
don't spend very much on ops.

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This is not where we need to look if we want
to save some money.

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If you want to save some money, you need to
make a reusable vehicle.

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Reusable and not so maintenance intensive
to turn it around.

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And that may be a theme that you hear today.

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I've got a couple of things I want to pass
out to get started, a couple of glossy brochures.

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I think there are enough of these for everyone
about Mission Control.

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People in the class should get first dibs
at this, but hopefully there are enough to

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go around.

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I think there are plenty of these.

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And the little one is similar to the big one.

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And I'm not going to spend a lot of time.

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If you want to know about how Mission Control
Room is laid out and who the people are that

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do things, it's all in this brochure.

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I don't intend to go over that.

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I think Chris Kraft probably gave you a good
background about why do we have a Mission

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Control.

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Why did he invent a Mission Control?

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And this is kind of the nuts and bolts of
Mission Control as it exists today.

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Public Affairs Office is really good about
putting those things together, and I don't

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intend to cover them.

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Also because I had a whole bunch of copies
of my last two papers sitting around that

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I needed to get rid of, I lugged them up here.

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I want to give you copies of my last two papers
which have to do with operational issues that

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you can read at your leisure.

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And I particularly want you to look at the
considerations in rendezvous launch windows.

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Those are two different papers.

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One discussing entry operational considerations
and hypersonic entry that we've learned with

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the Space Shuttle.

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The other about rendezvous launch windows.

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And it will give you a little flavor for what
a real operation needs.

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Many people can talk to you about the physics,
kind of the things that God says you must

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do if you are going to rendezvous in space,
for example.

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But there are many other considerations that
you run into in the real world.

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So I am going to talk today mostly about Mission
Control.

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Perhaps at the end we can talk a little bit
about the Shuttle program.

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And these I am short of so, please, people
in the class only as my handout for the slides

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here today.

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And the slides will be posted on the Web as
well.

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Yes.

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Dr.

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Hoffman has got them off my electronics here.

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OK, so the things I am going to talk about
today basically are outlines on this page.

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We have a Mission Control.

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Here are some of the reasons we are going
to talk about trajectory.

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Planning and monitoring flight planning.

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Systems engineering.

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And then I've got a couple of stories from
the trenches.

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And then I promise you no differential equations
today.

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Question.
Why should you have a Mission Control?

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Why is it necessary to have a Mission Control?

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I have four basic reasons to have a Mission
Control.

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The first one is safety.

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We have seven or eight astronauts flying arguably
the most complex flight vehicle that has ever

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been invented.

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They don't have enough time or enough resources
to watch everything to the degree that is

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necessary.

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We have a large group of folks on the ground
in Mission Control, about 800 folks in Mission

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Control that are also monitoring at a very
detailed level with more information than

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the astronauts get to make sure that everything
is operating as it should be.

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We provide a level of safety in Mission Control.

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Secondly, we provide flexibility.

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We start planning a Space Shuttle Mission
typically about 18 months in advance.

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The flight operations people are the flight
planning people, so the Space Shuttle program,

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NASA headquarters will come down and say you
need to fly a Space Shuttle flight that does

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X, services the Hubble Space Telescope, deploys
the Chandra X-Ray Telescope, goes to the International

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Space Station and adds a module or carries
supplies or what have you.

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Then it is up to the planners who will become
the operators to put that plan together.

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How are we going to accomplish the big objectives
on this flight?

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It's not just enough to take this big module
up and plug it into the Space Station.

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You've got to wire it up.

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You've got know when to do which wire first
and what switch to throw in what order or

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you will fry the circuits.

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It's a very complicated business.

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It is really complicated when you have to
deal with scientists.

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So, when we fly scientific payloads, we deal
with folks that are not operationally minded.

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They may have been working on their experiment
for, oh, how long did it take to get a doctorate

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degree, 15, 20 years in some cases.

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They have been working on this experiment
for many years.

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They are going to get the maximum amount of
data they can, but they are not aware of the

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fact that there are four other payloads onboard
and four other competing folks that want to

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get their science data in.

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00:13:22,449 --> 00:13:28,019
We always have a discussion about how many
person hours of astronaut time can we devote

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to an experiment?

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00:13:28,749 --> 00:13:32,920
How many kilowatt hours of power can we devote
to an experiment?

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00:13:32,920 --> 00:13:34,749
On and on and on.

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And it makes these researchers do some really
tough sole-searching.

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And the saddest thing that I have ever seen
is an experiment, and there has been more

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than one of them, where they flipped the switch,
it blew the fuse, it was down for the count

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and lost all objectives with the first switch
throw.

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00:13:54,980 --> 00:14:00,459
And then the scientists would come running
and in and say if you'll just let the astronauts

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00:14:00,459 --> 00:14:04,839
take the back panel off and rewire this circuit
it will work.

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00:14:04,839 --> 00:14:08,660
And we don't have time to do that on a spaceflight.

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00:14:08,660 --> 00:14:12,699
Or, if we did have time to do it, we would
take that time away from experimenter number

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00:14:12,699 --> 00:14:16,999
two or experimenter number three or all of
the above.

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00:14:16,999 --> 00:14:22,920
In operations, there is a lot of work to set
priorities, set timelines, make sure you do

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00:14:22,920 --> 00:14:27,300
things in the right order, and then train
the operators and the crew.

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Now, once you do that planning for 18 months
you understand the priorities, the pros and

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00:14:33,749 --> 00:14:38,269
cons, the logic behind all of those trades.

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00:14:38,269 --> 00:14:43,899
And so, when you go into flight and something
happens, as it always does, we can re-plan

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00:14:43,899 --> 00:14:46,389
it on the fly.

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And we do, almost every flight or the vast
majority of flights, take the flight plan

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00:14:51,300 --> 00:14:56,470
that we published pre-flight, put it gently
in the recycle bin and develop a new flight

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00:14:56,470 --> 00:14:58,800
plan that can be drastically different.

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And we're able to achieve a great degree of
success in our operation of the objectives

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that we set out to do because we have the
people that can, in real-time while we're

225
00:15:09,879 --> 00:15:15,939
flying the flight, in this short period of
less than two weeks overnight re-plan and

226
00:15:15,939 --> 00:15:18,290
come back with a new plan to accomplish the
objectives.

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00:15:18,290 --> 00:15:18,670
Yes sir.

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00:15:18,670 --> 00:15:25,309
Wayne, I was one of those scientists who didn't
understand about the realities of spaceflight.

229
00:15:25,309 --> 00:15:32,309
And I liked your choice of the words "you
would discuss with us".

230
00:15:35,759 --> 00:15:37,790
Dictate would be the key word.

231
00:15:37,790 --> 00:15:38,040
Indeed.

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00:15:37,839 --> 00:15:39,309
The question I wanted to address to you is
this business of taking the flight pad, putting

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00:15:39,309 --> 00:15:42,279
it in the wastebasket and then generating
a new one.

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00:15:42,279 --> 00:15:48,809
In the seven Shuttle flights that I would
have investigator status on, they all had,

235
00:15:48,809 --> 00:15:52,019
as their basic philosophy, a return to baseline.

236
00:15:52,019 --> 00:15:56,119
If something went wrong, get back to your
baseline plan as quickly as you could, even

237
00:15:56,119 --> 00:15:58,480
if you knew that it was non-optimal.

238
00:15:58,480 --> 00:16:00,579
Could you comment on that?

239
00:16:00,579 --> 00:16:03,149
I would say, from my perspective, quite the
opposite.

240
00:16:03,149 --> 00:16:04,730
Yes, there is a baseline plan.

241
00:16:04,730 --> 00:16:06,639
And there were very good reasons for that
baseline plan.

242
00:16:06,639 --> 00:16:09,850
But the flight control team is always looking
for the optimum solution.

243
00:16:09,850 --> 00:16:14,309
So I would say my perspective may be a little
bit different from yours, but that has been

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00:16:14,309 --> 00:16:15,100
my experience.

245
00:16:15,100 --> 00:16:18,889
We are always trying to achieve the maximum
number of objectives.

246
00:16:18,889 --> 00:16:22,699
So flexibility from Mission Control is the
second big advantage.

247
00:16:22,699 --> 00:16:27,329
The third big advantage is let the crew focus
on those things that people can only do in

248
00:16:27,329 --> 00:16:27,579
space.
They have access to vacuum.

249
00:16:29,399 --> 00:16:30,749
They've got zero gravity.

250
00:16:30,749 --> 00:16:36,009
They've got the high vantage point to do earth
observations, what have you.

251
00:16:36,009 --> 00:16:37,670
You cannot do those things on earth.

252
00:16:37,670 --> 00:16:39,799
That is why we put people in space.

253
00:16:39,799 --> 00:16:46,799
And why would we make them calculate the gas
budget for deorbit burn which can be done

254
00:16:47,589 --> 00:16:54,399
by some bachelor of science engineer with
an accounting minor on the ground?

255
00:16:54,399 --> 00:16:59,029
So we let the crews focus on those things
that you can only do in space and we do every

256
00:16:59,029 --> 00:17:00,720
job that we can on the ground.

257
00:17:00,720 --> 00:17:04,980
Somebody calculated for me one time, and I
almost hate to give the statistic, that it

258
00:17:04,980 --> 00:17:07,900
is $30,000 a minute for people in space.

259
00:17:07,900 --> 00:17:13,030
You can hire a lot of engineers to offload
that amount of time.

260
00:17:13,030 --> 00:17:16,130
And, finally, there are some jobs that you
can only do on the ground.

261
00:17:16,130 --> 00:17:22,500
The NOAA weather satellites do not directly
uplink to the Shuttle so the astronauts don't

262
00:17:22,500 --> 00:17:26,869
know anything about weather, other than the
little part of the world they can see out

263
00:17:26,869 --> 00:17:27,690
their window.

264
00:17:27,690 --> 00:17:32,210
If you want to forecast where you land, that's
a job that you can only do on the ground.

265
00:17:32,210 --> 00:17:36,550
Obviously, radar tracking there are hundreds
of things that you can only do on the ground.

266
00:17:36,550 --> 00:17:41,180
And I would say interact with management and
review the priorities is one of those things

267
00:17:41,180 --> 00:17:42,910
that can only be done on the ground.

268
00:17:42,910 --> 00:17:49,110
Here is my first cartoon for the day that
compares airline travel to space travel.

269
00:17:49,110 --> 00:17:53,330
And I think this is a telling cartoon because
it is entirely true.

270
00:17:53,330 --> 00:18:00,330
I flew in last night on probably a 12 or 15
year old 737.

271
00:18:00,760 --> 00:18:03,520
It was a nice plane but a little shabby.

272
00:18:03,520 --> 00:18:07,820
And we got bumped around pretty good coming
into Boston.

273
00:18:07,820 --> 00:18:14,820
And I am thinking all the time about I wonder
if they have maintained this aircraft well.

274
00:18:16,440 --> 00:18:17,860
You can pick up the papers.

275
00:18:17,860 --> 00:18:22,680
And they do a very good job in the airlines,
but the fact of the matter is much of the

276
00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:27,060
airline industry is involved with passengers
and customer relations and baggage handling

277
00:18:27,060 --> 00:18:28,410
and all those good things.

278
00:18:28,410 --> 00:18:32,710
And the maintainers and the safety people
are few by comparison.

279
00:18:32,710 --> 00:18:39,460
In comparison with the Shuttle, we don't have
very many passengers to deal with.

280
00:18:39,460 --> 00:18:40,910
Generally, they are cooperative.

281
00:18:40,910 --> 00:18:43,430
Sometimes they get surly.

282
00:18:43,430 --> 00:18:45,510
But we don't have very many to deal with.

283
00:18:45,510 --> 00:18:49,390
And everybody in the program is a safety worker.

284
00:18:49,390 --> 00:18:54,140
And that is something we continuously exercise.

285
00:18:54,140 --> 00:19:01,140
To turn a Space Shuttle orbiter around from
one flight to the next takes 500,000 man hours

286
00:19:02,140 --> 00:19:03,480
of maintenance.

287
00:19:03,480 --> 00:19:06,450
There is a gem for you.

288
00:19:06,450 --> 00:19:13,450
People have been working for 30 years to decrease
the amount of time that it takes to turn the

289
00:19:14,330 --> 00:19:15,990
Space Shuttle orbiter around.

290
00:19:15,990 --> 00:19:22,990
It is a reusable vehicle, but it is a reusable
vehicle built with very small margins with

291
00:19:23,440 --> 00:19:27,020
a lot of complicated technology.

292
00:19:27,020 --> 00:19:28,780
And it takes a lot of maintenance.

293
00:19:28,780 --> 00:19:35,300
Some people think we would have been better
launching expendable rockets.

294
00:19:35,300 --> 00:19:40,360
The same amount of time, actually, a little
more is involved in launching Titan IVs which

295
00:19:40,360 --> 00:19:45,680
have the same payload throw weight as the
orbiter does to low earth orbit.

296
00:19:45,680 --> 00:19:52,680
The new launch vehicles Atlas V, Delta IV
and its variance are supposed to be launched

297
00:19:53,070 --> 00:19:54,900
with a whole lot less.

298
00:19:54,900 --> 00:19:58,410
However, they do not have the payload capacity
to orbit.

299
00:19:58,410 --> 00:20:05,380
And, in fact, they have not achieved their
goals of man hours to a launch that they have

300
00:20:05,380 --> 00:20:06,350
set out to yet.

301
00:20:06,350 --> 00:20:07,360
Although, they are early yet.

302
00:20:07,360 --> 00:20:09,430
We've got to give them time to work on it.

303
00:20:09,430 --> 00:20:14,660
But, the fact of the matter, getting into
space, whether you doing with an Ariane, a

304
00:20:14,660 --> 00:20:21,660
Soyuz, an H2 or an Atlas V, Delta IV or the
Space Shuttle remains a very expensive process

305
00:20:23,950 --> 00:20:27,800
which I think the public doesn't quite understand.

306
00:20:27,800 --> 00:20:31,060
I would like to talk about some of the things
that Mission Control does to get ready for

307
00:20:31,060 --> 00:20:33,870
a flight and then how they execute it in-flight.

308
00:20:33,870 --> 00:20:35,990
And first among those is trajectory control.

309
00:20:35,990 --> 00:20:41,930
Who in here is an orbital mechanics wizard?

310
00:20:41,930 --> 00:20:42,180
Good.

311
00:20:42,100 --> 00:20:42,480
OK.

312
00:20:42,480 --> 00:20:45,800
We will have some equations for you in just
a minute.

313
00:20:45,800 --> 00:20:48,430
Here is the first one.

314
00:20:48,430 --> 00:20:52,570
Would you like to step up and explain?

315
00:20:52,570 --> 00:20:55,040
OK.

316
00:20:55,040 --> 00:20:58,390
This is all involved in orbital mechanics.

317
00:20:58,390 --> 00:21:00,310
This is how do you get to orbit?

318
00:21:00,310 --> 00:21:04,240
We have the flight performance reserve of
main propulsion system propellant.

319
00:21:04,240 --> 00:21:08,430
We load a half a million gallons of propellant.

320
00:21:08,430 --> 00:21:15,430
That is over 2.5 million pounds of liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen in the external

321
00:21:16,960 --> 00:21:18,030
tank for the Shuttle.

322
00:21:18,030 --> 00:21:25,030
How much do we have for a normally planned
mission at the end of when you achieve orbital

323
00:21:26,560 --> 00:21:27,230
insertion?

324
00:21:27,230 --> 00:21:31,190
Anybody want to guess?

325
00:21:31,190 --> 00:21:37,280
Remember, every pound of propellant that you
leave in the tank and throw away into the

326
00:21:37,280 --> 00:21:41,850
ocean is a pound of payload that you could
have carried to orbit.

327
00:21:41,850 --> 00:21:45,110
So this is not a trivial process.

328
00:21:45,110 --> 00:21:47,080
Our goal is about 900 pounds.

329
00:21:47,080 --> 00:21:48,200
And you are going to see how we do.

330
00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:52,910
But this is a little plot that we've developed
based on mixture ratio of the engines.

331
00:21:52,910 --> 00:21:59,910
Now, the Space Shuttle main engines have what
we call an overboard mixture ratio of 6.039

332
00:22:00,270 --> 00:22:00,990
nominally.

333
00:22:00,990 --> 00:22:06,110
We test fire them at the Stennis Space Center,
every engine for every flight, to check how

334
00:22:06,110 --> 00:22:12,200
they operate mixture ratio because mixture
ratio and ISP are critical.

335
00:22:12,200 --> 00:22:17,620
When we updated the Space Shuttle main engines
to the block two engines they are vastly safer

336
00:22:17,620 --> 00:22:22,170
than the original engines in the Shuttle because
they operate at lower pressures, lower temperatures

337
00:22:22,170 --> 00:22:27,350
and their rotating turbo machinery operates
considerably slower RPM.

338
00:22:27,350 --> 00:22:29,870
However, we gave us a second and a half of
ISP.

339
00:22:29,870 --> 00:22:36,020
And that is huge in this business, a second
and a half of ISP.

340
00:22:36,020 --> 00:22:40,250
This plot shows, as a function of mixture
ratio, if you have any shift in mixture ratio

341
00:22:40,250 --> 00:22:45,080
in flight, which we have, I'm going to talk
a little bit about that, you will change the

342
00:22:45,080 --> 00:22:46,660
amount of residual remaining.

343
00:22:46,660 --> 00:22:53,660
Here the
little blue dots are the normal flight performance
reserve.

344
00:22:57,500 --> 00:23:01,460
That is how much gas you've got left in the
tank when you get to orbit.

345
00:23:01,460 --> 00:23:07,490
And you can see our goal here is about 2500
pounds.

346
00:23:07,490 --> 00:23:14,490
Of that about 900 pounds is fuel residual
based on this curve right here.

347
00:23:15,120 --> 00:23:20,040
Now, you may ask why do you want to have an
extra amount of hydrogen fuel in the tank

348
00:23:20,040 --> 00:23:22,210
over oxygen, what is the difference?

349
00:23:22,210 --> 00:23:26,400
The engines are designed, the cutoff hydrogen
rich.

350
00:23:26,400 --> 00:23:31,010
We don't operate at the stoichiometric chemical
ratio that you would combine hydrogen and

351
00:23:31,010 --> 00:23:32,180
oxygen to make water.

352
00:23:32,180 --> 00:23:38,170
We operated at about a mixture ratio of six
instead of a mixture ratio that would be 18,

353
00:23:38,170 --> 00:23:38,570
I think.

354
00:23:38,570 --> 00:23:40,570
Did I do my chemistry right?

355
00:23:40,570 --> 00:23:42,590
It's been a while.

356
00:23:42,590 --> 00:23:44,850
We operate considerably off the stoichiometric
ratio.

357
00:23:44,850 --> 00:23:49,930
As you get mixture ratios that approach the
stoichiometric mixture ratio your fire burns

358
00:23:49,930 --> 00:23:52,100
a lot hotter.

359
00:23:52,100 --> 00:23:54,180
You get a lot more heat out of that fire.

360
00:23:54,180 --> 00:23:57,330
Metallurgically, the engines cannot stand
those higher temperatures.

361
00:23:57,330 --> 00:24:00,390
We already operate at 6000 degrees Fahrenheit.

362
00:24:00,390 --> 00:24:06,400
That is tough.

363
00:24:06,400 --> 00:24:11,940
You run out of fuel and cut off oxygen rich,
those temperatures will go out of site in

364
00:24:11,940 --> 00:24:13,720
the engine turbo pumps.

365
00:24:13,720 --> 00:24:16,590
So we want to cut off fuel rich.

366
00:24:16,590 --> 00:24:21,080
We biased ourselves so we cut off fuel rich,
but it does not take very much of a mixture

367
00:24:21,080 --> 00:24:24,490
ratio shift to get you to cut of LOX rich.

368
00:24:24,490 --> 00:24:31,490
In fact, as mixture ratio crosses the knee
of this curve, you wind up leaving actually

369
00:24:35,170 --> 00:24:38,870
a lot of LOX in the system cutting off on
the fuel side.

370
00:24:38,870 --> 00:24:42,640
So we have to carefully monitor how the engines
come in.

371
00:24:42,640 --> 00:24:47,610
And, when we talk about overboard mixture
ratio, that is not just what the engines operate

372
00:24:47,610 --> 00:24:50,180
at, but it's whatever losses you have in the
system.

373
00:24:50,180 --> 00:24:57,180
As you bleed hot hydrogen or hot oxygen off
the engines to repressurize the tank, that

374
00:24:57,730 --> 00:25:00,590
becomes a loss and that affects mixture ratio.

375
00:25:00,590 --> 00:25:05,450
One of the real problems we're dealing with
is, as we develop what we call engine tags

376
00:25:05,450 --> 00:25:10,660
down at the Stennis Space Center, we have
found an interesting phenomenon.

377
00:25:10,660 --> 00:25:17,550
In flight, we pressurize the tanks with their
native constituent, the oxygen tanks pressurized

378
00:25:17,550 --> 00:25:20,740
with oxygen and the hydrogen tanks pressurized
with hydrogen.

379
00:25:20,740 --> 00:25:27,320
At Stennis, where we do the engine tests and
develop the characteristics of each engine,

380
00:25:27,320 --> 00:25:31,600
and every engine is just a little bit different,
they pressurize their tanks with nitrogen

381
00:25:31,600 --> 00:25:33,870
for safety reasons.

382
00:25:33,870 --> 00:25:39,340
The nitrogen can diffuse into your hydrogen,
but more importantly it can diffuse into your

383
00:25:39,340 --> 00:25:40,410
oxygen system.

384
00:25:40,410 --> 00:25:47,410
And, therefore, you have a less pure propellant
and it drives our mixture ratio off as a function

385
00:25:49,240 --> 00:25:51,620
of having impurities in the propellant.

386
00:25:51,620 --> 00:25:56,650
So we get a tag of what we think the mixture
ratio is of the engine.

387
00:25:56,650 --> 00:25:59,850
That is different than what we get when we
go fly.

388
00:25:59,850 --> 00:26:04,950
And, in fact, the last flights, one of the
last meetings I had before I came down here

389
00:26:04,950 --> 00:26:11,950
yesterday was a meeting with our flight analyst
who have an unexplained missing 300 pounds

390
00:26:13,980 --> 00:26:19,000
of hydrogen every flight for the last 10 or
12 flights.

391
00:26:19,000 --> 00:26:23,740
And we are beginning to converge on the idea
that it is this nitrogen impurity in Stennis

392
00:26:23,740 --> 00:26:30,740
that gives us a false mixture ratio which
we design our flights around.

393
00:26:32,250 --> 00:26:34,380
Let's talk a little bit about it.

394
00:26:34,380 --> 00:26:36,130
Here is a little schematic.

395
00:26:36,130 --> 00:26:39,900
The external tanks really have two tanks,
the oxygen tank on top and the hydrogen tank

396
00:26:39,900 --> 00:26:41,590
on bottom.

397
00:26:41,590 --> 00:26:45,710
When we make it to orbit, how much is remaining
in each tank?

398
00:26:45,710 --> 00:26:48,880
Well, the answer to that question is none.

399
00:26:48,880 --> 00:26:51,930
What we are running on at orbit insertion
is what is left in the pipe.

400
00:26:51,930 --> 00:26:56,560
And it is really not orbit insertion but close
enough to talk about it.

401
00:26:56,560 --> 00:27:03,560
So we have 17 inch diameter pipe coming down
the side of the hydrogen tank from the oxygen

402
00:27:06,590 --> 00:27:07,630
tank up above.

403
00:27:07,630 --> 00:27:10,240
It goes across into the engine compartment
of the orbiter.

404
00:27:10,240 --> 00:27:15,560
And this shows you where several of the early
flights were at main engine cutoff, guided

405
00:27:15,560 --> 00:27:21,460
cutoff where we wanted to be from an orbital
mechanics standpoint, altitude velocity, flight

406
00:27:21,460 --> 00:27:22,600
path angle and so forth.

407
00:27:22,600 --> 00:27:23,600
That is where we were.

408
00:27:23,600 --> 00:27:26,230
That is how much was remaining in the tank.

409
00:27:26,230 --> 00:27:26,810
None in the tank.

410
00:27:26,810 --> 00:27:28,750
That is how much is remaining in the line.

411
00:27:28,750 --> 00:27:34,160
That is how close you have to cut it for spaceflight.

412
00:27:34,160 --> 00:27:38,360
I have another presentation, and if we have
time I might show you a few charts out of

413
00:27:38,360 --> 00:27:42,690
that, that talks about the difference between
commercial aviation and spaceflight.

414
00:27:42,690 --> 00:27:45,200
We operate on much smaller margins.

415
00:27:45,200 --> 00:27:51,050
And every pound you see in that far part of
the table that talks about the residual remaining,

416
00:27:51,050 --> 00:27:56,720
those number of pounds, and, by the way, we're
antiques.

417
00:27:56,720 --> 00:28:01,440
We use English tradition units in the Space
Shuttle program.

418
00:28:01,440 --> 00:28:05,880
But every pound residual that you have in
that far column is a pound that you could

419
00:28:05,880 --> 00:28:11,570
have taken to orbit of payload but did not.

420
00:28:11,570 --> 00:28:12,400
You threw that away.

421
00:28:12,400 --> 00:28:12,690
Yes.

422
00:28:12,690 --> 00:28:18,570
How do you measure that mass?

423
00:28:18,570 --> 00:28:19,520
Very good question.

424
00:28:19,520 --> 00:28:21,500
They look at pressure hit.

425
00:28:21,500 --> 00:28:27,810
We have pressure transducers down in the lines
as they approach the engine and you're accelerating

426
00:28:27,810 --> 00:28:29,170
at 3G.

427
00:28:29,170 --> 00:28:34,710
We have an inertial measurement unit that
measures velocity, and we control the engine

428
00:28:34,710 --> 00:28:38,400
throttle setting to 3Gs as we approach MECO.

429
00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:43,710
And so you look at the pressure and that determines,
based on a very simple head calculation, where

430
00:28:43,710 --> 00:28:47,100
you are in that standby coming down the outside.

431
00:28:47,100 --> 00:28:49,200
The fuel side is a little bit more complicated.

432
00:28:49,200 --> 00:28:54,770
They have a 5% level sensor in the tank that
tells you when you're at 5% in the tank.

433
00:28:54,770 --> 00:29:00,460
And then we have fuel flow meters on the hydrogen
side, and they calculate flow rate minus from

434
00:29:00,460 --> 00:29:03,520
the 5% level down to when a main engine is
cut off.

435
00:29:03,520 --> 00:29:05,880
So those are the ways we can do residual.

436
00:29:05,880 --> 00:29:07,760
And that is not a simple exercise.

437
00:29:07,760 --> 00:29:13,990
It is vastly more complicated than the simple
explanation I just gave you because the engines

438
00:29:13,990 --> 00:29:15,370
are throttling continuously.

439
00:29:15,370 --> 00:29:22,370
Now, I wanted to talk a little bit, if I can
move from normal mission planning to abort

440
00:29:22,940 --> 00:29:23,980
mission planning.

441
00:29:23,980 --> 00:29:28,810
Normal mission planning is something we do
upfront and then we monitor during flight.

442
00:29:28,810 --> 00:29:33,060
And one of the stories at the very end of
this presentation is about a day when things

443
00:29:33,060 --> 00:29:37,820
did not go right in the engine world and what
we did about it.

444
00:29:37,820 --> 00:29:39,960
This is going to talk about abort modes.

445
00:29:39,960 --> 00:29:42,180
Now, the Shuttle is very interesting.

446
00:29:42,180 --> 00:29:46,260
Human spaceflight is different than expendable
spaceflight because we would really like to

447
00:29:46,260 --> 00:29:46,880
get the people back.

448
00:29:46,880 --> 00:29:53,880
And expendable spaceflight, your basic principle
is if one of the rocket engines quits early

449
00:29:54,270 --> 00:29:57,210
you are done.

450
00:29:57,210 --> 00:29:58,870
The payload goes in the water.

451
00:29:58,870 --> 00:30:00,160
Or, if you launch from

452
00:30:00,160 --> 00:30:00,670
[NOISE OBSCURES]

453
00:30:00,670 --> 00:30:02,530
it may go into Mongolia.

454
00:30:02,530 --> 00:30:04,380
But you don't get it back.

455
00:30:04,380 --> 00:30:08,750
There are no overs with very few exceptions.

456
00:30:08,750 --> 00:30:13,950
If you have a problem in your main propulsion
system on an expendable rocket it is time

457
00:30:13,950 --> 00:30:16,090
to talk to your insurance company because
you are done.

458
00:30:16,090 --> 00:30:23,090
Even very minor problems can strand satellites
in lower orbits than they have useful life.

459
00:30:24,610 --> 00:30:29,280
It is very important that the propulsion system
work well.

460
00:30:29,280 --> 00:30:35,990
But the Shuttle was designed with the thought
that one of the three main engines could shut

461
00:30:35,990 --> 00:30:36,620
down early.

462
00:30:36,620 --> 00:30:42,050
We have safety monitoring on those engines
to make sure that they would shut down if

463
00:30:42,050 --> 00:30:48,550
something goes wrong in a contained, that
is to say they don't blow up, manner.

464
00:30:48,550 --> 00:30:52,860
And then you have to have the capability to
get the crew back, much like an airliner.

465
00:30:52,860 --> 00:30:59,100
If you fly on an airliner or any kind of multi-engine
aircraft, one of the things that they must

466
00:30:59,100 --> 00:31:02,310
be certified for is engine out operations.

467
00:31:02,310 --> 00:31:07,830
Lose an engine, pass the commitment point
on takeoff and still be able to takeoff safely

468
00:31:07,830 --> 00:31:09,260
and return to the airport.

469
00:31:09,260 --> 00:31:14,470
That is a fundamental principle in aviation
safety for a multi-engine aircraft.

470
00:31:14,470 --> 00:31:16,590
One of the Shuttle design goals is very similar.

471
00:31:16,590 --> 00:31:22,490
Lose one of the rocket engines, have it shut
down prematurely and still be able to land

472
00:31:22,490 --> 00:31:24,450
safely somewhere.

473
00:31:24,450 --> 00:31:25,720
Notice I said one engine.

474
00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:26,740
Not two engines.

475
00:31:26,740 --> 00:31:27,870
Not three engines.

476
00:31:27,870 --> 00:31:30,010
One engine.

477
00:31:30,010 --> 00:31:33,700
That is a huge technological leap over expendable
rockets.

478
00:31:33,700 --> 00:31:35,840
A huge technological leap.

479
00:31:35,840 --> 00:31:39,130
And we pay the price in terms of performance.

480
00:31:39,130 --> 00:31:41,210
Here is a little bit of the different abort
modes.

481
00:31:41,210 --> 00:31:46,020
If you have an engine out somewhere between
launch and about four minutes into flight,

482
00:31:46,020 --> 00:31:51,559
you have to return to the launch site which
involves turning around and flying backwards

483
00:31:51,559 --> 00:31:57,110
at mach 6 through your own rocket plume, which
is everybody's favorite thing to want to avoid

484
00:31:57,110 --> 00:31:57,790
doing.

485
00:31:57,790 --> 00:32:03,150
A little bit later than that we pick up the
capability to do transatlantic abort.

486
00:32:03,150 --> 00:32:07,430
Sometimes we call the transoceanic aborts,
but the acronym really is transatlantic abort,

487
00:32:07,430 --> 00:32:07,880
TAL.

488
00:32:07,880 --> 00:32:11,350
And land somewhere in Europe or Africa.

489
00:32:11,350 --> 00:32:15,470
And somewhat further along you can abort to
orbit.

490
00:32:15,470 --> 00:32:21,830
You can actually dump your secondary propellant
and wind up in a lower orbit.

491
00:32:21,830 --> 00:32:26,540
And then you may orbit once around or you
may come back on the third orbit.

492
00:32:26,540 --> 00:32:31,130
Or you may be able, in fact, to fly nearly
a normal mission depending on how lucky you

493
00:32:31,130 --> 00:32:36,280
got for the time that the engine was out and
how you were doing with reserves.

494
00:32:36,280 --> 00:32:39,550
Here is a little bit of different graphic,
a cartoon of the same thing.

495
00:32:39,550 --> 00:32:44,890
I don't like it too much because RTLS actually
turns the other way.

496
00:32:44,890 --> 00:32:49,480
But, as you can see, we would try to return
to the Kennedy Space Center which has possibly

497
00:32:49,480 --> 00:32:56,480
the worst weather in the entire western hemisphere
or continue on around or up on end to orbit.

498
00:32:56,880 --> 00:33:02,090
And you have to always be concerned about
external tank disposal.

499
00:33:02,090 --> 00:33:07,040
This was the abort regions chart generated
pre-flight for our last flight, STS-114.

500
00:33:07,040 --> 00:33:13,760
We have three TAL sites, transatlantic intact
TAL sites, one at the Zaragoza Air Base in

501
00:33:13,760 --> 00:33:20,760
North Spain, one at Moron Air Base in South
Spain near Seville and one at Le Tube which

502
00:33:21,090 --> 00:33:25,640
is the French Air Force Flight Test Facility
near Marseilles.

503
00:33:25,640 --> 00:33:28,600
And then we have what we call "Press to ATO".

504
00:33:28,600 --> 00:33:34,930
Press to abort which involves a dump, involves
changing your inclination of your orbit to

505
00:33:34,930 --> 00:33:37,170
a lower inclination if you invoke this.

506
00:33:37,170 --> 00:33:41,990
You cannot, for example, ever rendezvous with
the Space Station because you won't wind up

507
00:33:41,990 --> 00:33:45,570
in the right orbital inclination, even though
you may make the altitude.

508
00:33:45,570 --> 00:33:49,990
And then we have what we call "Press to MECO"
which involves just kind of closing your eyes

509
00:33:49,990 --> 00:33:56,559
and riding it out and see what happens as
you get close to your guided MECO.

510
00:33:56,559 --> 00:33:59,370
So we build these charts in advance.

511
00:33:59,370 --> 00:34:04,360
And then we have a very sophisticated computer
program in Mission Control that monitors the

512
00:34:04,360 --> 00:34:10,089
engines the entire time during launch called
the "abort region determinator" that can emulate

513
00:34:10,089 --> 00:34:14,739
a single engine out, two engines out, three
engines out or a vacuum impact point.

514
00:34:14,739 --> 00:34:18,399
And a flight dynamics officer is responsible
for making those calls.

515
00:34:18,399 --> 00:34:20,840
The crew does not make these calls.

516
00:34:20,840 --> 00:34:25,790
The crew has a crew card very similar to this
onboard so that if they lose communication

517
00:34:25,790 --> 00:34:31,030
with the ground and something bad happens
they might have a chance at pulling it off.

518
00:34:31,030 --> 00:34:35,429
But it is based on everything more or less
performing as planned.

519
00:34:35,429 --> 00:34:42,429
If anything is performing off normal than
these charts are no good.

520
00:34:42,918 --> 00:34:45,310
That is hosted in Mission Control.

521
00:34:45,310 --> 00:34:49,940
And until some day we put a supercomputer
onboard the space vehicle it will continue

522
00:34:49,940 --> 00:34:51,300
to be hosted in Mission Control.

523
00:34:51,300 --> 00:34:52,219
Do you have a question?

524
00:34:52,219 --> 00:34:52,469
Yes.

525
00:34:52,369 --> 00:34:58,460
That is a critical real-time call that is
made in a hurry.

526
00:34:58,460 --> 00:34:58,710
It is not always decision aid.
Can you comment a little bit on the reliance
upon the automatic decision aid computer that

527
00:35:03,630 --> 00:35:08,020
is grinding this out and the judgment of flight
control?

528
00:35:08,020 --> 00:35:12,310
Well, first of all, you have made a false
distinction because the people that wrote

529
00:35:12,310 --> 00:35:15,500
the computer code are the flight controllers.

530
00:35:15,500 --> 00:35:21,670
They understand the logic that went into it
with practice probably three days a week in

531
00:35:21,670 --> 00:35:27,950
Mission Control exercising simulated missions
that have engine problems so you practice

532
00:35:27,950 --> 00:35:28,890
that.

533
00:35:28,890 --> 00:35:30,010
It's not an either or.

534
00:35:30,010 --> 00:35:32,460
It's a symbiotic relationship.

535
00:35:32,460 --> 00:35:38,080
The abort region determinator doesn't work
without operators.

536
00:35:38,080 --> 00:35:42,380
Operators only have the cue cards to go on
if the abort region determinator software

537
00:35:42,380 --> 00:35:43,470
quits.

538
00:35:43,470 --> 00:35:45,550
You cannot get by without the other.

539
00:35:45,550 --> 00:35:47,050
There is some judgment involved.

540
00:35:47,050 --> 00:35:51,060
And a good flight dynamics officer with these
charts, with no

541
00:35:51,060 --> 00:35:51,680
[UNCLEAR]

542
00:35:51,680 --> 00:35:56,360
can make some judgment calls based on trends
and performance.

543
00:35:56,360 --> 00:35:58,190
But we need both.

544
00:35:58,190 --> 00:35:59,600
You cannot have one or the other.

545
00:35:59,600 --> 00:36:01,150
It is very sophisticated.

546
00:36:01,150 --> 00:36:02,770
It is very subtle.

547
00:36:02,770 --> 00:36:07,300
And very small changes can make this software,
this predictor work.

548
00:36:07,300 --> 00:36:14,300
It is probably the best example of an expert
system that I know of, but it takes a great

549
00:36:14,800 --> 00:36:16,290
deal of care and feeding.

550
00:36:16,290 --> 00:36:19,760
And it is very, very sensitive to the inputs.

551
00:36:19,760 --> 00:36:23,430
So it does take a lot of judgment and experience
to interpret.

552
00:36:23,430 --> 00:36:29,080
Along with that, we need to talk about where
you land.

553
00:36:29,080 --> 00:36:31,050
Because here are all the places.

554
00:36:31,050 --> 00:36:36,460
We kind of closed down Banjul and the Gambia
because we don't fly that inclination anymore.

555
00:36:36,460 --> 00:36:41,880
We do fly at the International Space Station
Missions, and we have the TAL sites I talked

556
00:36:41,880 --> 00:36:42,970
about.

557
00:36:42,970 --> 00:36:48,940
We could fly as high as 57 degrees inclination,
which we have done in the past, but that is

558
00:36:48,940 --> 00:36:52,190
outside the range of what we need to do for
the Space Station.

559
00:36:52,190 --> 00:36:56,630
The interesting thing is we get into the weather
story and the weather forecasting, and deciding

560
00:36:56,630 --> 00:37:01,790
which landing site you can go to is pretty
complicated.

561
00:37:01,790 --> 00:37:03,810
I never studied meteorology in college.

562
00:37:03,810 --> 00:37:04,590
It is another subject I wish I had.

563
00:37:04,590 --> 00:37:07,090
That is not all.

564
00:37:07,090 --> 00:37:10,640
We talked about intact abort landings if one
engine quits.

565
00:37:10,640 --> 00:37:14,740
But being good flight planners and controllers
you always take it to the next level.

566
00:37:14,740 --> 00:37:16,090
What if two engines quit?

567
00:37:16,090 --> 00:37:17,780
What if all three engines quit?

568
00:37:17,780 --> 00:37:22,300
And so we have made agreements all the way
up the East Coast of the United States with

569
00:37:22,300 --> 00:37:25,740
the Canadians to have places to land.

570
00:37:25,740 --> 00:37:29,670
And, again, we have agreements with all of
these landing sites.

571
00:37:29,670 --> 00:37:34,190
We send people to train them about what would
happen if the Shuttle would land there.

572
00:37:34,190 --> 00:37:35,390
We check the weather.

573
00:37:35,390 --> 00:37:40,030
Across the Atlantic we have landing sites.

574
00:37:40,030 --> 00:37:45,580
Again, Shannon, Ireland was probably the first
dry patch of land that you can come to on

575
00:37:45,580 --> 00:37:47,500
the far side of the Atlantic Ocean.

576
00:37:47,500 --> 00:37:54,110
Typical weather conditions there are 500 feet
overcast and rain and fog so we don't really

577
00:37:54,110 --> 00:37:55,369
probably want to use that.

578
00:37:55,369 --> 00:37:56,510
England is a little better.

579
00:37:56,510 --> 00:37:58,710
Cologne Bonn is a little better.

580
00:37:58,710 --> 00:38:02,050
And then we have all of these landing sites
that we can look at.

581
00:38:02,050 --> 00:38:06,790
And that keeps the State Department busy for
us because we have to have international agreements

582
00:38:06,790 --> 00:38:08,000
to use any of these places.

583
00:38:08,000 --> 00:38:14,619
It took us two years to negotiate with the
French government for emergency use only of

584
00:38:14,619 --> 00:38:16,580
their landing site.

585
00:38:16,580 --> 00:38:22,210
We typically don't have people at these landing
sites other than our intact TAL sites, Moron,

586
00:38:22,210 --> 00:38:26,910
Zaragoza and Istres-Le Tube.

587
00:38:26,910 --> 00:38:28,050
But they are there.

588
00:38:28,050 --> 00:38:32,460
We would not hold the launch up if one of
the landing sites for two or three engines

589
00:38:32,460 --> 00:38:39,360
out was not available, but we would if we
did not have an intact landing site which

590
00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:40,440
is the one engine out requirement.

591
00:38:40,440 --> 00:38:42,200
So we have requirements difference.

592
00:38:42,200 --> 00:38:48,200
One of the really fun things is when we get
into the summer months we frequently cannot

593
00:38:48,200 --> 00:38:51,000
use some of these airports because they have
air shows going on.

594
00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:58,000
And they would really like us to land the
Shuttle there during an air show, but we don't.

595
00:38:58,640 --> 00:39:02,100
One of the things that we have to watch very
carefully is where do we get rid of the external

596
00:39:02,100 --> 00:39:02,350
tank?
Now, we can carry the external tank to orbit.

597
00:39:05,020 --> 00:39:11,090
There have been some very colorful viewgraph
presentations put together of using the external

598
00:39:11,090 --> 00:39:13,720
tank as parts for a Space Station.

599
00:39:13,720 --> 00:39:17,590
Totally science fiction.

600
00:39:17,590 --> 00:39:20,119
Operationally it would be extremely difficult
to do.

601
00:39:20,119 --> 00:39:26,210
Carrying the tank to orbit would be very easy,
but we stopped just short of orbital velocity

602
00:39:26,210 --> 00:39:29,560
so that we can control the disposal of the
tank.

603
00:39:29,560 --> 00:39:33,690
We now have international treaties that say
you shouldn't put things in orbit without

604
00:39:33,690 --> 00:39:38,470
being able to put them in a place where they
don't hurt people.

605
00:39:38,470 --> 00:39:42,730
We don't like to have satellites reenter and
drop radioactive garbage or even just big

606
00:39:42,730 --> 00:39:48,830
hunks of metal on top of people, so we have
the external tank that we separate and drop

607
00:39:48,830 --> 00:39:53,200
just short of orbital velocity and use the
small orbital maneuvering engines on the Shuttle

608
00:39:53,200 --> 00:39:56,670
to provide the last couple hundred feet a
second to get to orbit.

609
00:39:56,670 --> 00:39:59,430
And we have to plan this very carefully.

610
00:39:59,430 --> 00:40:04,010
We've done a lot of studies to find out when
that tank will rupture, how big the pieces

611
00:40:04,010 --> 00:40:07,300
are, how far they've come apart.

612
00:40:07,300 --> 00:40:11,060
And we actually have flight rules talking
about ET disposal.

613
00:40:11,060 --> 00:40:12,790
This is a serious subject.

614
00:40:12,790 --> 00:40:19,790
Everybody that flies an expendable rocket
has to know where their stages are going to

615
00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:27,160
fall, except maybe the Russians who just drop
them in Kazak or used to.

616
00:40:27,750 --> 00:40:30,770
I grew up in New Mexico in the 1970s.

617
00:40:30,770 --> 00:40:35,510
We were very excited about the thought that
White Sands might be the launch site for the

618
00:40:35,510 --> 00:40:37,750
Shuttle when it was under early design phase.

619
00:40:37,750 --> 00:40:42,940
When they picked solid rocket boosters that
fell off just a couple hundred miles downrange,

620
00:40:42,940 --> 00:40:48,600
we knew that White Sands was out of the running
because that would put people at-risk in the

621
00:40:48,600 --> 00:40:49,950
continental United States.

622
00:40:49,950 --> 00:40:54,930
And those kinds of decisions make for launch
site decisions.

623
00:40:54,930 --> 00:40:58,930
Yes sir.

624
00:40:58,930 --> 00:41:02,940
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

625
00:41:02,940 --> 00:41:04,550
We're talking a little less than an hour.

626
00:41:04,550 --> 00:41:11,550
Probably about 45 minutes from managing cutoff
to the rupture at about, let me see, let me

627
00:41:14,080 --> 00:41:17,570
make sure I say that right, 122 kilometers.

628
00:41:17,570 --> 00:41:18,640
I don't operate in kilometers.

629
00:41:18,640 --> 00:41:23,000
I have to do the math, but it's not long.

630
00:41:23,000 --> 00:41:24,109
It's less than one orbit.

631
00:41:24,109 --> 00:41:25,730
One orbit taken 90 minutes.

632
00:41:25,730 --> 00:41:31,300
It's about halfway to two-thirds of the way
around the world that we get rid of the tank.

633
00:41:31,300 --> 00:41:33,910
And this is a very important subject.

634
00:41:33,910 --> 00:41:40,910
In fact, US laws and the Eastern Range that
we have to work with to get launch clearance

635
00:41:40,990 --> 00:41:46,570
issues what we call "Notice to Airmen" or
"ET disposal" about 48 hours prior to the

636
00:41:46,570 --> 00:41:50,640
Shuttle launch to clear the ocean area and
the air space.

637
00:41:50,640 --> 00:41:54,970
And this is all based on what we call a normal
main engine cutoff.

638
00:41:54,970 --> 00:42:00,230
We made our guided cutoff to orbit.

639
00:42:00,230 --> 00:42:05,920
And here is a little picture of a problem
we had earlier I want to talk about.

640
00:42:05,920 --> 00:42:08,770
Here are the ET disposal lines for the different
inclinations.

641
00:42:08,770 --> 00:42:15,050
You can see that some of these get kind of
close to the West Coast of Mexico, but most

642
00:42:15,050 --> 00:42:17,119
of them fall out in the Pacific Ocean.

643
00:42:17,119 --> 00:42:23,790
And, in particular, here are the Space Station
lines for disposal of the external tank.

644
00:42:23,790 --> 00:42:30,369
And, as we go through the five minute launch
window, the inclination of the orbit -- Not

645
00:42:30,369 --> 00:42:35,690
the inclination but the steering the Shuttle
has got to do to reach the Internal Space

646
00:42:35,690 --> 00:42:39,230
Station changes the place where these tanks
are disposed of.

647
00:42:39,230 --> 00:42:41,730
I think I have a better picture.

648
00:42:41,730 --> 00:42:48,730
And, in particular, we had a problem with
this little island right here that we were

649
00:42:51,609 --> 00:42:57,100
infringing on the internationally recognized
200 nautical mile limit for pieces.

650
00:42:57,100 --> 00:43:04,100
Now, if we do a normal insertion, you will
see that we have these typical nominal footprints

651
00:43:04,840 --> 00:43:06,740
based on where we were in the launch window.

652
00:43:06,740 --> 00:43:08,660
That is where all the pieces will fall.

653
00:43:08,660 --> 00:43:13,980
But we have dispersions based on trajectory
and other dispersions that say we've got to

654
00:43:13,980 --> 00:43:20,980
clear to a 99.7% probability this whole area,
or this is the area that results from all

655
00:43:21,540 --> 00:43:23,030
the dispersions at that level.

656
00:43:23,030 --> 00:43:25,250
So we don't want to drop pieces on people.

657
00:43:25,250 --> 00:43:31,280
Once upon a time, the United States Air Force
thought that Pitt Island down here was a bird

658
00:43:31,280 --> 00:43:34,060
sanctuary and nobody lived there.

659
00:43:34,060 --> 00:43:38,619
And they sent out the Notice to Airmen to
clear the area, and we found out there are

660
00:43:38,619 --> 00:43:42,250
a couple of hundred people that live on this
little island and the Australian government

661
00:43:42,250 --> 00:43:45,270
got kind of bent out of shape over that.

662
00:43:45,270 --> 00:43:50,430
We had to negotiate infringing by just a few
miles on the 200 nautical mile circle around

663
00:43:50,430 --> 00:43:55,109
these guys just at the toe of the footprint,
and that went back to the French government.

664
00:43:55,109 --> 00:43:57,730
And that took us two years to negotiate.

665
00:43:57,730 --> 00:44:01,970
So they don't teach you everything you need
to know in engineering school like negotiating

666
00:44:01,970 --> 00:44:08,970
with the French.

667
00:44:10,080 --> 00:44:10,680
JEFF:

668
00:44:10,680 --> 00:44:13,060
[BEGINS SPEAKING WITHOUT MICROPHONE]

669
00:44:13,060 --> 00:44:19,330
...disposal probability to your average diplomat,
like you say, we don't get training for that.

670
00:44:19,330 --> 00:44:20,109
Way beyond.

671
00:44:20,109 --> 00:44:26,400
Now, here is my funny story number one.

672
00:44:26,400 --> 00:44:31,760
Dick Richards, who was program manager before
me, was asked to go on speaking engagement

673
00:44:31,760 --> 00:44:33,130
to American Samoa.

674
00:44:33,130 --> 00:44:37,740
Now, I've been asked to speak a lot of places
and they are always like Boston or, you know,

675
00:44:37,740 --> 00:44:42,100
OK, this is a nice place to come, but think
about a speaking engagement in American Samoa.

676
00:44:42,100 --> 00:44:43,910
So he had to go to American Samoa to speak.

677
00:44:43,910 --> 00:44:50,210
And, as they got ready to leave, the airline
pilot came on and said we cannot take off

678
00:44:50,210 --> 00:44:53,190
because they are going to launch the Shuttle
today.

679
00:44:53,190 --> 00:44:54,859
He had seen these tanks come in.

680
00:44:54,859 --> 00:44:58,790
He was not about to violate that airspace
that they have been notified.

681
00:44:58,790 --> 00:45:02,880
And the launch time would put him past the
point of no return where they had to continue

682
00:45:02,880 --> 00:45:07,930
onto Hawaii and could not turn back to American
Samoa, so he wasn't going to take off until

683
00:45:07,930 --> 00:45:12,640
he got word that the Shuttle had either launched
or scrubbed for the day.

684
00:45:12,640 --> 00:45:13,500
And there was a delay.

685
00:45:13,500 --> 00:45:18,540
And so Dick Richards got on his cell phone
and called to Houston and found out that we

686
00:45:18,540 --> 00:45:24,290
were sitting on the ground in Florida based
on bad weather at the TAL site at Banjul and

687
00:45:24,290 --> 00:45:24,790
the Gambia.

688
00:45:24,790 --> 00:45:28,350
The passengers started talking about this.

689
00:45:28,350 --> 00:45:33,100
And they said you mean here we are in American
Samoa waiting on a Shuttle launch from Florida

690
00:45:33,100 --> 00:45:37,270
that has been delayed because of bad weather
in West Africa?

691
00:45:37,270 --> 00:45:40,010
The answer is yes.

692
00:45:40,010 --> 00:45:43,330
So, what you do has an impact all around the
world.

693
00:45:43,330 --> 00:45:44,859
OK, enough about trajectory.

694
00:45:44,859 --> 00:45:46,980
And I have quite a lot I could talk about.

695
00:45:46,980 --> 00:45:48,990
Let's talk about flight planning.

696
00:45:48,990 --> 00:45:53,890
One of the interesting things that we do onboard
the Space Shuttle is we carry a lot of laptop.

697
00:45:53,890 --> 00:45:57,750
At last count, I think we carried about 11
laptops on the last flight.

698
00:45:57,750 --> 00:46:01,490
But we don't rely on those laptops because
they keep breaking.

699
00:46:01,490 --> 00:46:05,450
What we rely on is paper.

700
00:46:05,450 --> 00:46:06,430
Spacelab flights are worse.

701
00:46:06,430 --> 00:46:13,430
I'd say the typical Space Shuttle flight that
launches carries 80 pounds of paper checklists.

702
00:46:14,320 --> 00:46:17,359
Every one of those pages lovingly crafted.

703
00:46:17,359 --> 00:46:22,300
We got maps and charts and we got all kinds
of little cue cards that stick up on Velcro

704
00:46:22,300 --> 00:46:26,369
all around the cockpit, but by and large they
come in books, and here are some of the books.

705
00:46:26,369 --> 00:46:31,510
And Mission Control folks build those books,
understand those books, can modify those books

706
00:46:31,510 --> 00:46:33,980
in real-time, and frequently do.

707
00:46:33,980 --> 00:46:38,800
One of the things we have to watch is printer
paper onboard because we cannot run out of

708
00:46:38,800 --> 00:46:40,830
printer paper when we update checklists.

709
00:46:40,830 --> 00:46:45,440
And so we have to monitor how much paper we
are using as we print out changes to the checklists

710
00:46:45,440 --> 00:46:45,960
onboard.

711
00:46:45,960 --> 00:46:47,790
Yes sir.

712
00:46:47,790 --> 00:46:51,170
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

713
00:46:51,170 --> 00:46:54,570
In so far as paper can be made low flammable.

714
00:46:54,570 --> 00:46:58,859
It is but it is paper and it will burn.

715
00:46:58,859 --> 00:47:02,980
The Shuttle cockpit is full of flammable stuff.

716
00:47:02,980 --> 00:47:05,300
But it is tried to kept under control.

717
00:47:05,300 --> 00:47:06,300
It is tried to be protected.

718
00:47:06,300 --> 00:47:10,109
And, of course, we don't operate in a pure
oxygen atmosphere as Apollo did.

719
00:47:10,109 --> 00:47:14,350
It is very much like earth normal atmosphere.

720
00:47:14,350 --> 00:47:16,800
So, no, it is not fire proof.

721
00:47:16,800 --> 00:47:18,780
I wish it was.

722
00:47:18,780 --> 00:47:22,200
When we start a flight, we start out with
what we call a flight requirement.

723
00:47:22,200 --> 00:47:24,390
Here is the flight definition requirement
document.

724
00:47:24,390 --> 00:47:29,250
Here is the flight we just flew and the basic
parameters that we've got.

725
00:47:29,250 --> 00:47:30,849
Which orbiter are we going to fly?

726
00:47:30,849 --> 00:47:32,900
The next flight up we're going to fly Atlantis.

727
00:47:32,900 --> 00:47:34,770
Which external tank is TBD?

728
00:47:34,770 --> 00:47:36,619
Because we're still arguing about that.

729
00:47:36,619 --> 00:47:39,480
Which solid rocket booster pair, so on and
so forth?

730
00:47:39,480 --> 00:47:41,869
Which main engine by serial number?

731
00:47:41,869 --> 00:47:43,520
Which flight software release?

732
00:47:43,520 --> 00:47:47,760
How many cryogenic tanks do we have the arm
onboard and all this stuff?

733
00:47:47,760 --> 00:47:49,320
What is the manifest?

734
00:47:49,320 --> 00:47:56,320
Well, it is a station manifest for the utilization
flight 1.1 which has got an MPLM.

735
00:47:57,280 --> 00:48:03,080
It used to be called the Miniature Payload
Logistics Module.

736
00:48:03,080 --> 00:48:04,250
Now it is the Multi-Purpose.

737
00:48:04,250 --> 00:48:08,730
That transmigration of acronyms over time
have become more politically correct as a

738
00:48:08,730 --> 00:48:12,580
subject for a doctoral thesis, I think.

739
00:48:12,580 --> 00:48:14,990
Which launch pad we're going to operate out
of?

740
00:48:14,990 --> 00:48:17,040
And how many days are we going to fly?

741
00:48:17,040 --> 00:48:17,740
How many people?

742
00:48:17,740 --> 00:48:22,820
We're going to carry seven up, six down, land
at KSC and a bunch of remarks.

743
00:48:22,820 --> 00:48:24,520
This is kind of the basic definition.

744
00:48:24,520 --> 00:48:26,930
This is the starting point for a flight.

745
00:48:26,930 --> 00:48:29,900
This is what we get to start.

746
00:48:29,900 --> 00:48:31,680
And then we have to flush those out.

747
00:48:31,680 --> 00:48:36,700
We build a word document and we talk about
the requirements for a flight.

748
00:48:36,700 --> 00:48:38,359
This is done at the program level.

749
00:48:38,359 --> 00:48:39,930
What is the launch window?

750
00:48:39,930 --> 00:48:41,940
What is the launch period?

751
00:48:41,940 --> 00:48:48,090
And many of these things are just flushing
out the basic requirements you saw in the

752
00:48:48,090 --> 00:48:48,340
chart.

753
00:48:48,210 --> 00:48:53,970
Here is an interesting one, part of that flight
requirements document that talks about EVA

754
00:48:53,970 --> 00:48:58,080
spacewalks and talks about what we're going
to do.

755
00:48:58,080 --> 00:49:04,210
And you will notice, in great bureaucratic
language, the purposes of the EVAs are defined

756
00:49:04,210 --> 00:49:06,340
in another document that you have to go off
and look at.

757
00:49:06,340 --> 00:49:09,820
So, they're not any flight requirements documents
but at least you got a reference where to

758
00:49:09,820 --> 00:49:10,070
go.

759
00:49:09,950 --> 00:49:14,130
And here are some of the things we are going
to be able to do on this flight.

760
00:49:14,130 --> 00:49:19,500
And, in fact, we're going to have some contingency
or emergency EVAs that can do these emergency

761
00:49:19,500 --> 00:49:23,480
things, which we hope we don't have to do
but we are going to be prepared to do.

762
00:49:23,480 --> 00:49:26,810
From that we develop flight rules and flight
plans.

763
00:49:26,810 --> 00:49:31,330
Here is a page out of the flight rules book
that the ops people built.

764
00:49:31,330 --> 00:49:36,190
This is discussing how we take pictures of
the external tank.

765
00:49:36,190 --> 00:49:40,820
You saw those beautiful pictures just a few
minutes ago of the tank taken by the Shuttle.

766
00:49:40,820 --> 00:49:42,270
And here are the guidelines.

767
00:49:42,270 --> 00:49:49,270
We're going to have to do a thrust from the
plus X jets, but we won't do it if we've got

768
00:49:49,270 --> 00:49:54,150
problems in the propellant system, if we are
way under speed, if we're going to be dark

769
00:49:54,150 --> 00:49:59,650
because we don't have a flash that big, and
so on and so forth.

770
00:49:59,650 --> 00:50:02,890
And then that's the automated umbilical well
camera.

771
00:50:02,890 --> 00:50:05,280
And then we've got the handheld photography.

772
00:50:05,280 --> 00:50:07,780
And we've got a whole bunch of reasons why
we wouldn't do that.

773
00:50:07,780 --> 00:50:12,410
If we had to go to a backup software, we don't
want to do that because it makes it too sporty,

774
00:50:12,410 --> 00:50:14,510
just all kinds of reasons.

775
00:50:14,510 --> 00:50:17,119
Bob's people are thinking about this all the
time.

776
00:50:17,119 --> 00:50:19,349
And, in fact, it's not enough to have the
rule.

777
00:50:19,349 --> 00:50:21,540
Here is the rationale behind that rule.

778
00:50:21,540 --> 00:50:26,530
Why is it we decided you would or would not
take those pictures which are very important

779
00:50:26,530 --> 00:50:31,300
to us for post-flight analysis on a very detailed
level?

780
00:50:31,300 --> 00:50:36,859
Anything you see in italics font is what we
call flight rule rationale which is the subject

781
00:50:36,859 --> 00:50:43,190
of interminable meetings and lots of haranguing
and wrangling.

782
00:50:43,190 --> 00:50:45,430
Here is a little bit of the inspect rule.

783
00:50:45,430 --> 00:50:49,599
We all know that the thermal protection system
on the Shuttle is not as robust as we would

784
00:50:49,599 --> 00:50:50,020
like it to be.

785
00:50:50,020 --> 00:50:51,690
We are going to inspect it every time.

786
00:50:51,690 --> 00:50:57,380
Here are the priorities that are planned before
flight for thermal inspection system.

787
00:50:57,380 --> 00:51:00,190
And we start with the most important and we
work to the least important.

788
00:51:00,190 --> 00:51:05,150
Your goal is to do them all but your plan
is to have a plan ready if you run out of

789
00:51:05,150 --> 00:51:06,390
time.

790
00:51:06,390 --> 00:51:10,890
And then, again, the backup of why did we
say that.

791
00:51:10,890 --> 00:51:13,250
And, again, it is more inspection priorities.

792
00:51:13,250 --> 00:51:14,510
I am not going to go over all of these.

793
00:51:14,510 --> 00:51:15,510
You can look at them.

794
00:51:15,510 --> 00:51:17,700
I want to come back to EVAs for a minute.

795
00:51:17,700 --> 00:51:21,330
Here are some of the EVA task objectives.

796
00:51:21,330 --> 00:51:26,119
This is something that they did just the other
day onboard the International Space Station.

797
00:51:26,119 --> 00:51:30,359
This happens to be an International Space
Station rule, but it is closely related to

798
00:51:30,359 --> 00:51:31,090
the Shuttle rules.

799
00:51:31,090 --> 00:51:33,930
They put in a new camera group.

800
00:51:33,930 --> 00:51:38,560
All this is perfectly clear to you guys, all
these acronyms.

801
00:51:38,560 --> 00:51:42,750
It takes about six weeks to learn the language
when you come to work at NASA.

802
00:51:42,750 --> 00:51:48,310
And then we have something on the Station
called the floating point potential measurement

803
00:51:48,310 --> 00:51:54,180
device which is broken and became junk and
they threw it overboard just a couple of days

804
00:51:54,180 --> 00:51:54,430
ago.

805
00:51:54,250 --> 00:51:59,280
Well, you get through all the rules and you
come to a flight plan.

806
00:51:59,280 --> 00:52:00,420
And here is the flight plan.

807
00:52:00,420 --> 00:52:01,700
This is from the last flight.

808
00:52:01,700 --> 00:52:04,810
Eileen Collins, here is what she is doing
this particular day.

809
00:52:04,810 --> 00:52:08,320
This is flight day number three.

810
00:52:08,320 --> 00:52:11,480
This is what the pilot is doing.

811
00:52:11,480 --> 00:52:17,580
Some time I will have to tell you the difference
between pilot astronauts and mission specialists.

812
00:52:17,580 --> 00:52:18,070
Dr.

813
00:52:18,070 --> 00:52:19,359
Hoffman has his PhD.

814
00:52:19,359 --> 00:52:21,980
He well versed in many things.

815
00:52:21,980 --> 00:52:28,060
And the pilot, Jim Kelly, one of my favorite
guys, I like him a lot, flies jet planes so

816
00:52:28,060 --> 00:52:35,060
he gets post-sleep exercise.

817
00:52:36,040 --> 00:52:37,820
And so we have all the guys.

818
00:52:37,820 --> 00:52:41,200
And what they are doing by the hour of the
day, and this is the overview, by the way,

819
00:52:41,200 --> 00:52:43,990
but these guys are going out on a spacewalk.

820
00:52:43,990 --> 00:52:50,330
And so here is their EVA preparation, purging
their suits, getting setup, going out the

821
00:52:50,330 --> 00:52:50,900
door.

822
00:52:50,900 --> 00:52:54,540
Here is the EVA which are going to be outside
for 6.5 hours.

823
00:52:54,540 --> 00:53:00,270
And this particular day they're doing the
thermal protection system repair detailed

824
00:53:00,270 --> 00:53:04,200
test objective which you saw in the rules
as one of the priorities.

825
00:53:04,200 --> 00:53:06,080
So, we build this level of flight plan.

826
00:53:06,080 --> 00:53:08,290
Now, this is not it.

827
00:53:08,290 --> 00:53:14,660
We go to the minute-by-minute level, detailed
checklist, this is the overview.

828
00:53:14,660 --> 00:53:18,770
This is kind of OK, you've got to get up and
brush your teeth and make breakfast and then

829
00:53:18,770 --> 00:53:20,440
go do some work kind of thing.

830
00:53:20,440 --> 00:53:24,930
And then we have all of our other procedure
and checklist to make sure everything goes

831
00:53:24,930 --> 00:53:26,700
as perfectly as it possibly can.

832
00:53:26,700 --> 00:53:27,780
And this is just A day.

833
00:53:27,780 --> 00:53:30,730
And then we get all kinds of good little information
down here.

834
00:53:30,730 --> 00:53:34,140
One of which is when we're going to be able
to communicate with the astronauts.

835
00:53:34,140 --> 00:53:39,050
There was a revolution in flight control when
we launched the Tracking and Data Relay Satellites.

836
00:53:39,050 --> 00:53:44,440
Before we had Tracking and Data Relay Satellites
and you just had ground stations to communicate

837
00:53:44,440 --> 00:53:48,540
with the crew, we could talk to the crew about
15% of the time.

838
00:53:48,540 --> 00:53:51,540
85% of the time they were out of communications
with the earth.

839
00:53:51,540 --> 00:53:55,900
Now, if you were going to the Moon and you
used a Deep Space Network, you pretty much

840
00:53:55,900 --> 00:53:57,550
had continuous comm.

841
00:53:57,550 --> 00:54:01,220
But if you were doing Shuttle or any other
low-earth orbit kind of thing you could only

842
00:54:01,220 --> 00:54:04,550
talk to the crew for about 15% of the time.

843
00:54:04,550 --> 00:54:08,690
And sometimes it lined up that you would talk
to them three or four minutes every hour and

844
00:54:08,690 --> 00:54:10,140
a half.

845
00:54:10,140 --> 00:54:15,510
The Russians have a huge problem in that they
lost all of their tracking stations outside

846
00:54:15,510 --> 00:54:17,740
of geographical Russia.

847
00:54:17,740 --> 00:54:22,349
And so they talk to their crew and plan their
crew day on those parts of the orbit where

848
00:54:22,349 --> 00:54:23,810
they come over geographical Russia.

849
00:54:23,810 --> 00:54:25,510
And they are a slave to that.

850
00:54:25,510 --> 00:54:27,930
And we launched the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite.

851
00:54:27,930 --> 00:54:30,410
Now we can talk to the crew all the time.

852
00:54:30,410 --> 00:54:33,609
There is virtually no time you cannot talk
to the crew.

853
00:54:33,609 --> 00:54:35,030
The crew gets really tired of that.

854
00:54:35,030 --> 00:54:39,630
They want to shut the radio off because Mission
Control is always calling up and yammering

855
00:54:39,630 --> 00:54:40,720
at them.

856
00:54:40,720 --> 00:54:45,530
But it is a revolution because now we can
get continuous data, communications and command

857
00:54:45,530 --> 00:54:47,060
with the crew from the ground.

858
00:54:47,060 --> 00:54:50,730
And the bottom line on that is we're much
more efficient.

859
00:54:50,730 --> 00:54:56,540
We don't have to wait for critical activities
to happen until we get that communication

860
00:54:56,540 --> 00:54:57,099
link.

861
00:54:57,099 --> 00:54:57,730
Yes sir.

862
00:54:57,730 --> 00:54:58,730
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

863
00:54:58,730 --> 00:55:05,170
Mars there are going to be four to 20 minute
time delays in communications one way.

864
00:55:05,170 --> 00:55:06,210
Yes.

865
00:55:06,210 --> 00:55:11,099
What are the preliminary plans for dealing
with that?

866
00:55:11,099 --> 00:55:12,470
I don't know.

867
00:55:12,470 --> 00:55:13,700
No, I'm sorry.

868
00:55:13,700 --> 00:55:14,820
I'm serious.

869
00:55:14,820 --> 00:55:16,640
A lot of people are really worried about that.

870
00:55:16,640 --> 00:55:21,020
It will be a different way to operate.

871
00:55:21,020 --> 00:55:24,109
And the folks that are working on those programs
have got a real challenge.

872
00:55:24,109 --> 00:55:25,660
Two quick questions.

873
00:55:25,660 --> 00:55:31,150
One is if you time the checklist, I mean do
you know how long page three is going to take?

874
00:55:31,150 --> 00:55:31,849
Absolutely.

875
00:55:31,849 --> 00:55:36,540
And the other thing is do you have backup
flight plans for every contingency pretty

876
00:55:36,540 --> 00:55:41,030
much where you know if this experiment fails,
per se, we will pull out this flight plan

877
00:55:41,030 --> 00:55:42,740
and it reschedules everybody?

878
00:55:42,740 --> 00:55:43,470
No.

879
00:55:43,470 --> 00:55:46,339
In fact, what we do is we have some emergency
checklists.

880
00:55:46,339 --> 00:55:50,770
If you develop a leak in a cabin, OK, here
is the emergency drill checklist to get you

881
00:55:50,770 --> 00:55:53,040
back on the ground as soon as possible.

882
00:55:53,040 --> 00:55:58,480
But the flexibility that I talked about in
Mission Control is no, we don't build complete

883
00:55:58,480 --> 00:56:00,400
different timelines.

884
00:56:00,400 --> 00:56:03,460
Say if experiment A doesn't work we have a
different timeline.

885
00:56:03,460 --> 00:56:07,500
What we do is we have the smart people in
Mission Control that can take the existing

886
00:56:07,500 --> 00:56:09,900
timeline and build a new one.

887
00:56:09,900 --> 00:56:11,990
And, in fact, they do almost every night.

888
00:56:11,990 --> 00:56:12,780
I call it night.

889
00:56:12,780 --> 00:56:13,960
That is when the crew is asleep.

890
00:56:13,960 --> 00:56:19,290
It could be daytime in Houston but it is when
the crew is asleep.

891
00:56:19,290 --> 00:56:21,960
The last thing I want to talk about in a flight
preparation.

892
00:56:21,960 --> 00:56:22,210
Yes.
If the crew fall asleep at the same time,
isn't that not a bad idea in case something

893
00:56:28,190 --> 00:56:28,880
goes wrong?

894
00:56:28,880 --> 00:56:30,619
Shouldn't someone be keeping watch?

895
00:56:30,619 --> 00:56:33,609
Mission Control is watching, A, number one.

896
00:56:33,609 --> 00:56:36,490
And, B, number two, there are enough automatic
sensing.

897
00:56:36,490 --> 00:56:42,050
The computer is watching the really vital
things so that if you've got a link in the

898
00:56:42,050 --> 00:56:49,050
cabin, if you've got fire, something like
that happens, the alarms will go off and wake

899
00:56:49,150 --> 00:56:49,760
the crew off.

900
00:56:49,760 --> 00:56:54,320
One of the case studies I am going to show
is when Mission Control didn't get to watch,

901
00:56:54,320 --> 00:56:59,080
so look for that in a minute.

902
00:56:59,080 --> 00:57:00,190
The post-sleep period?

903
00:57:00,190 --> 00:57:02,500
Ask Jeff.

904
00:57:02,500 --> 00:57:09,500
The post-sleep period is what do you do after
your alarm clock goes off?

905
00:57:11,450 --> 00:57:18,450
There is cleanup, shave, get dressed and make
breakfast, which is a huge deal.

906
00:57:18,990 --> 00:57:24,050
This is not like taking something out of the
freezer, throw it in the microwave and eat

907
00:57:24,050 --> 00:57:24,560
it.

908
00:57:24,560 --> 00:57:28,740
It's a huge deal to cook and cleanup onboard.

909
00:57:28,740 --> 00:57:29,950
Personal hygiene time.

910
00:57:29,950 --> 00:57:33,330
It's also time that most crews spend reading
the morning mail.

911
00:57:33,330 --> 00:57:38,030
They don't get a newspaper but they get reams
and reams of paper off the printer from Mission

912
00:57:38,030 --> 00:57:38,400
Control.

913
00:57:38,400 --> 00:57:42,410
You thought you were going to do an EVA today,
but here is what we're really going to do.

914
00:57:42,410 --> 00:57:49,410
It's a really important time, getting ready
for the day, so we allow the crews about an

915
00:57:54,020 --> 00:57:57,380
hour and a half of post-sleep activities.

916
00:57:57,380 --> 00:58:00,849
And that is everything to get to work.

917
00:58:00,849 --> 00:58:01,099
Yes.
How do you decide what to tell the crew and
who makes that decision?

918
00:58:06,790 --> 00:58:09,470
Well, that's an interesting discussion.

919
00:58:09,470 --> 00:58:11,230
The flight director, of course, is in overall
charge.

920
00:58:11,230 --> 00:58:15,580
I should say that there are three shifts of
flight controllers in Mission Control, who

921
00:58:15,580 --> 00:58:18,190
are not ironmen, but that work about 9 hours.

922
00:58:18,190 --> 00:58:23,849
There is an hour handover period, and so three
shifts a day cover the day.

923
00:58:23,849 --> 00:58:26,280
A flight director is in charge of the team.

924
00:58:26,280 --> 00:58:31,609
The flight planners, big flight activities
officer we call them, obviously have a big

925
00:58:31,609 --> 00:58:32,500
part of this.

926
00:58:32,500 --> 00:58:39,500
On a day like this when it's an EVA day the
EVA officers have a big part of this.

927
00:58:40,130 --> 00:58:46,230
The CAPCOM, capsule communicator which is
held over from Mercury days, is an astronaut.

928
00:58:46,230 --> 00:58:48,080
And hopefully a flown astronaut.

929
00:58:48,080 --> 00:58:52,460
Not always but typically a flown astronaut
that is the crew's representative in Mission

930
00:58:52,460 --> 00:58:53,830
Control.

931
00:58:53,830 --> 00:58:57,940
And the CAPCOM is a very valuable resource
in saying here are things the crew would want

932
00:58:57,940 --> 00:59:01,530
to know, here are some things the crew already
knows so we don't have to tell them.

933
00:59:01,530 --> 00:59:06,650
Here you've built a plan that is going to
overwork the crew or here you've built a plan

934
00:59:06,650 --> 00:59:12,280
that has got people sitting around with a
lot of white space not doing anything getting

935
00:59:12,280 --> 00:59:14,950
bored.

936
00:59:14,950 --> 00:59:16,589
So, it becomes a team effort.

937
00:59:16,589 --> 00:59:22,990
Finally, the flight director approves all
uplink messages.

938
00:59:22,990 --> 00:59:23,240
Yes.
[AUDIENCE]

939
00:59:23,830 --> 00:59:30,830
...when do you tell the crew about that and
who decides?

940
00:59:32,980 --> 00:59:39,980
Well, again, it is a team so it's not this
military hierarchy that orders come from the

941
00:59:41,460 --> 00:59:41,710
top.

942
00:59:41,670 --> 00:59:42,570
There is a team.

943
00:59:42,570 --> 00:59:47,230
The team will develop here is what is happening,
here is what we think we're going to do.

944
00:59:47,230 --> 00:59:50,560
The stories come together enough and here
is the judgment factor.

945
00:59:50,560 --> 00:59:56,859
The flight director will tell the CAPCOM to
tell the crew in basic terms what the crew

946
00:59:56,859 --> 00:59:58,890
should know.

947
00:59:58,890 --> 01:00:01,619
Now, we have a lot of ways to communicate
with the crew.

948
01:00:01,619 --> 01:00:08,619
And the Shuttle we are very fixed, obsessed
with doing things on an open air to ground

949
01:00:10,580 --> 01:00:17,580
because in the old days they did some things
kind of pine that got came out in press conferences

950
01:00:18,060 --> 01:00:18,580
that were bad.

951
01:00:18,580 --> 01:00:25,580
The station crew has got this IP phone, Internet
Protocol phone and they can call you.

952
01:00:25,920 --> 01:00:28,330
Like right now if they had your phone number.

953
01:00:28,330 --> 01:00:32,460
They can just call you and talk on the phone,
and nobody knows what's going on.

954
01:00:32,460 --> 01:00:33,750
We have email with the crew.

955
01:00:33,750 --> 01:00:40,359
And a lot of things go up on email, but all
of those communication paths are utilized

956
01:00:40,359 --> 01:00:43,849
to get information back and forth to the crew.

957
01:00:43,849 --> 01:00:47,470
I probably ought to tell you one little short
story.

958
01:00:47,470 --> 01:00:51,849
This is my sports analogy story so you will
have to put up with that.

959
01:00:51,849 --> 01:00:55,460
Working in Mission Control is like working
in different sports.

960
01:00:55,460 --> 01:01:01,940
If you are the ascent entry shuttle team it
is like playing basketball full court press

961
01:01:01,940 --> 01:01:02,380
all the time.

962
01:01:02,380 --> 01:01:07,230
You are always running short time but very
intense.

963
01:01:07,230 --> 01:01:11,750
If you are a shuttle on orbit it is kind of
like American football.

964
01:01:11,750 --> 01:01:16,210
You huddle up, figure out what play you're
going to do, go out, execute the play, it

965
01:01:16,210 --> 01:01:18,410
worked or it didn't work, you come back, huddle
up.

966
01:01:18,410 --> 01:01:24,660
It is very episodic but it can happen fast
when it is happening, when you're executing

967
01:01:24,660 --> 01:01:25,089
it.

968
01:01:25,089 --> 01:01:28,020
The Space Station is baseball.

969
01:01:28,020 --> 01:01:33,109
It's a very much different game.

970
01:01:33,109 --> 01:01:38,930
And one of the hard things as you move as
a flight control from Shuttle ascent to Shuttle

971
01:01:38,930 --> 01:01:44,800
orbit to Space Station, you have to accommodate
the different rhythms of the game.

972
01:01:44,800 --> 01:01:49,070
The Russians have a phrase for when the Shuttle
comes to visit the Space Station.

973
01:01:49,070 --> 01:01:51,109
They say the hurricane came through.

974
01:01:51,109 --> 01:01:58,109
Because they have this nice orderly regime
and these folks come and fill the place up

975
01:01:59,650 --> 01:02:05,510
and they're doing stuff and they're throwing
things here and there and then they leave.

976
01:02:05,510 --> 01:02:12,390
And then we have to sort it all out and go
back to our normal kind of placid existence.

977
01:02:12,390 --> 01:02:16,490
The last thing about flight planning is we
talk about decision making.

978
01:02:16,490 --> 01:02:21,690
Here is the simplified diagram for the Chandra
X-Ray Telescope launch decision.

979
01:02:21,690 --> 01:02:28,690
AXAF, as you might know, is the Advanced X-Ray
Astrophysics Facility which got renamed Chandra

980
01:02:30,839 --> 01:02:31,089
Telescope.

981
01:02:30,900 --> 01:02:35,730
And we have the ascent flight direction, we
have a mission director, we have the ops director,

982
01:02:35,730 --> 01:02:38,480
we have the launch director, we've got the
KSC people and all these people.

983
01:02:38,480 --> 01:02:41,839
Then the prelaunch timeframe are all watching
their parts of this.

984
01:02:41,839 --> 01:02:42,859
They're watching the telescope.

985
01:02:42,859 --> 01:02:44,070
They're watching the upper stage.

986
01:02:44,070 --> 01:02:44,910
They're watching the Shuttle.

987
01:02:44,910 --> 01:02:46,490
They're watching a launch complex.

988
01:02:46,490 --> 01:02:49,300
Somebody has got to decide and they all have
got to talk to each other.

989
01:02:49,300 --> 01:02:52,420
And they are all, by the way, geographically
in different places.

990
01:02:52,420 --> 01:02:57,089
And you've got to know who is responsible
for what and who has authority to give information

991
01:02:57,089 --> 01:02:57,589
for what.

992
01:02:57,589 --> 01:03:03,349
Because you don't want somebody in the AXAF
control center saying to the NASA test director

993
01:03:03,349 --> 01:03:06,430
your shuttle doesn't look right on TV.

994
01:03:06,430 --> 01:03:12,690
He doesn't know that his TV is out of adjustment
or something.

995
01:03:12,690 --> 01:03:17,740
The plan to get all these people together,
what numbers they call, what they loops they

996
01:03:17,740 --> 01:03:19,680
talk on has got to all be worked through.

997
01:03:19,680 --> 01:03:24,480
That is a real operational nightmare when
you come to decision-making and communications.

998
01:03:24,480 --> 01:03:29,820
We have literally thousands of people involved
on a launch decision, a payload deploy decision

999
01:03:29,820 --> 01:03:31,770
and looking at their piece part.

1000
01:03:31,770 --> 01:03:35,400
It has to be clearly defined what you're looking
at, what you're going to do if it doesn't

1001
01:03:35,400 --> 01:03:41,000
look right, and so you have to spend a conservable
amount of time planning that, training for

1002
01:03:41,000 --> 01:03:43,099
it and then executing.

1003
01:03:43,099 --> 01:03:50,099
And I think we ought to break here if we're
going to take a two-minute break.

1004
01:03:57,020 --> 01:04:00,650
Thanks, Jeff.

1005
01:04:00,650 --> 01:04:03,790
I hope this is helpful to you guys.

1006
01:04:03,790 --> 01:04:06,420
It is not exactly the standard academic fare.

1007
01:04:06,420 --> 01:04:09,170
I want to talk a little bit about systems
engineering because one of the things we pride

1008
01:04:09,170 --> 01:04:13,349
ourselves on in an operations community is
that we are systems engineers.

1009
01:04:13,349 --> 01:04:16,010
We're not mechanical, aero, what have you.

1010
01:04:16,010 --> 01:04:20,400
You're a systems engineer and you've got to
know a little bit about a lot.

1011
01:04:20,400 --> 01:04:22,779
One of my favorite authors is Robert Heinlein.

1012
01:04:22,779 --> 01:04:25,089
You may have heard of him.

1013
01:04:25,089 --> 01:04:31,150
And his quotation about what a human being
is I think is particularly appropriate to

1014
01:04:31,150 --> 01:04:33,000
us.

1015
01:04:33,000 --> 01:04:40,000
And somehow this didn't come off on the page,
but the bottom line is he comes out with specialization

1016
01:04:42,520 --> 01:04:47,220
is for insects.

1017
01:04:47,220 --> 01:04:48,369
I'm not going to go over the Shuttle.

1018
01:04:48,369 --> 01:04:51,500
You guys kind of know what it looks like and
why it got there.

1019
01:04:51,500 --> 01:04:58,089
I was looking at the syllabus of the class
thinking I should have been in this class.

1020
01:04:58,089 --> 01:04:59,920
Structurally, it is a complex vehicle.

1021
01:04:59,920 --> 01:05:03,050
Inordinately complex in my way of thinking.

1022
01:05:03,050 --> 01:05:09,359
But that is because of requiring wings for
the cross range, large aero surfaces for the

1023
01:05:09,359 --> 01:05:15,520
aerodynamics and, of course, being able to
transform from a rocket to an on-orbit spacecraft

1024
01:05:15,520 --> 01:05:19,250
to a hypersonic glider is not easy.

1025
01:05:19,250 --> 01:05:24,329
The main landing gear and the tires is a subject
that I could talk about for a long time.

1026
01:05:24,329 --> 01:05:27,190
And, in the interest of time, I took it out
of my presentation.

1027
01:05:27,190 --> 01:05:31,630
But if I ever get a chance to come back -- I
think you probably had a discussion of that,

1028
01:05:31,630 --> 01:05:34,140
but operationally they are a bear.

1029
01:05:34,140 --> 01:05:38,380
Al Louviere actually gave a nice talk.

1030
01:05:38,380 --> 01:05:38,630
Good.

1031
01:05:38,599 --> 01:05:43,849
We are the only folks that operate tires in
that regime, other than the Concorde.

1032
01:05:43,849 --> 01:05:46,029
And you guys know what happened to the Concorde.

1033
01:05:46,029 --> 01:05:50,400
And we have real constraints on our tires
and fret about them all the time.

1034
01:05:50,400 --> 01:05:57,170
Here is a list of the Space Shuttle systems
that we divide up into.

1035
01:05:57,170 --> 01:05:59,079
One of my favorites is right here in the middle.

1036
01:05:59,079 --> 01:06:02,040
Food.

1037
01:06:02,040 --> 01:06:07,510
But it goes everywhere from the main propulsion
system onto the waste management system.

1038
01:06:07,510 --> 01:06:08,800
Isn't that a great NASA acronym?

1039
01:06:08,800 --> 01:06:13,430
This, I think, is an erroneously named chart
because it says Space Shuttle Systems.

1040
01:06:13,430 --> 01:06:15,560
This ought to be Orbiter Systems.

1041
01:06:15,560 --> 01:06:20,480
There are many other systems in the main engines
and so forth.

1042
01:06:20,480 --> 01:06:23,990
One I would like to talk just a little bit
about is the environmental life control system.

1043
01:06:23,990 --> 01:06:27,000
I think you probably had a little talk about
that before.

1044
01:06:27,000 --> 01:06:30,849
Have you had an introduction to the environmental
system before?

1045
01:06:30,849 --> 01:06:32,390
I think it is a wonderful system.

1046
01:06:32,390 --> 01:06:33,900
Again, it is wonderfully complex.

1047
01:06:33,900 --> 01:06:37,920
We have water in the crew compartment so that
if it leaks it is not hazardous.

1048
01:06:37,920 --> 01:06:44,890
We have Freon out in a payload bay so it won't
freeze when it gets very cold.

1049
01:06:44,890 --> 01:06:50,880
And we have this ammonia stuff for the last
part of entry which is a pain in the butt

1050
01:06:50,880 --> 01:06:52,410
but it is what it takes to get there.

1051
01:06:52,410 --> 01:06:59,410
As you know the story, basically we take oxygen
and hydrogen in the fuel cells and make electricity.

1052
01:06:59,440 --> 01:07:01,839
And, as a happy byproduct, we make water.

1053
01:07:01,839 --> 01:07:05,020
My case study here is going to be what do
we do with the water?

1054
01:07:05,020 --> 01:07:10,730
These days, most of the time, we give the
water to the International Space Station where

1055
01:07:10,730 --> 01:07:16,140
they can electrolyze it using electrical energy
from the solar rays and turn it back into

1056
01:07:16,140 --> 01:07:21,540
oxygen, dump the hydrogen overboard and breath
the oxygen.

1057
01:07:21,540 --> 01:07:26,950
We probably made this stuff by electrolyzing
seawater so it is going this back and forth,

1058
01:07:26,950 --> 01:07:30,029
water to electricity to components.

1059
01:07:30,029 --> 01:07:33,500
I wanted to talk a little bit about what we
do with this water.

1060
01:07:33,500 --> 01:07:38,210
Some of the water is used as coolant through
the flash evaporator system.

1061
01:07:38,210 --> 01:07:42,420
It is very important to us but we typically
run in excess, and so we've got to get rid

1062
01:07:42,420 --> 01:07:46,240
of it which becomes a waste management problem.

1063
01:07:46,240 --> 01:07:49,450
If the crew doesn't drink it, we have to dump
it overboard.

1064
01:07:49,450 --> 01:07:51,460
As I say, we've tied into that system.

1065
01:07:51,460 --> 01:07:56,930
And typically we've used the very pure water
and give it to the International Space Station

1066
01:07:56,930 --> 01:07:57,920
these days.

1067
01:07:57,920 --> 01:08:00,640
I am sorry the print is kind of small.

1068
01:08:00,640 --> 01:08:03,109
But right here is the dump valve.

1069
01:08:03,109 --> 01:08:08,210
And one of these is the waste and one of them
is the supply water dump valve where we dump

1070
01:08:08,210 --> 01:08:08,910
that water out.

1071
01:08:08,910 --> 01:08:12,109
Now, you'll notice something very interesting
about that dump valve.

1072
01:08:12,109 --> 01:08:16,149
We have a window in a hatch and we've got
windows up here and we've got a TV camera

1073
01:08:16,149 --> 01:08:23,149
here and a TV camera here and nobody can see
what is going on.

1074
01:08:23,319 --> 01:08:25,960
Nobody can see what is going on coming out
of that dump valve.

1075
01:08:25,960 --> 01:08:31,779
The only way to see is to take the arm out
and put it in a very sensitive position to

1076
01:08:31,779 --> 01:08:35,330
look at what happened.

1077
01:08:35,330 --> 01:08:37,420
In the old days they used to teach drafting.

1078
01:08:37,420 --> 01:08:39,149
I always liked to look at these.

1079
01:08:39,149 --> 01:08:41,859
The computer did not do this drawing.

1080
01:08:41,859 --> 01:08:43,290
This is a work of art.

1081
01:08:43,290 --> 01:08:44,899
This is the nozzle.

1082
01:08:44,899 --> 01:08:48,690
The Shuttle was developed in the 1970s.

1083
01:08:48,690 --> 01:08:51,979
We don't have a CAD model of the Shuttle.

1084
01:08:51,979 --> 01:08:55,390
Jeff asked me could you send us the CAD model
of the Shuttle?

1085
01:08:55,390 --> 01:08:59,630
We had a little arrow CAD model of the outer
mold line that the aero people use.

1086
01:08:59,630 --> 01:09:01,559
There is no CAD model of the Shuttle.

1087
01:09:01,559 --> 01:09:06,630
It exists on 800,000 paper drawings.

1088
01:09:06,630 --> 01:09:12,960
And, when I came to work, one of the things
I got in the Program Office was a recommendation

1089
01:09:12,960 --> 01:09:15,809
from the independent people to go off and
computerize all of this.

1090
01:09:15,809 --> 01:09:19,140
And so we went off and tried to develop an
estimate to computerize it.

1091
01:09:19,140 --> 01:09:25,899
They said it would take us eight years and
cost about $40 million to convert these drawings

1092
01:09:25,899 --> 01:09:31,830
from paper to the latest -- What's the CAD
model that everybody uses?

1093
01:09:31,830 --> 01:09:32,279
CATIA.

1094
01:09:32,279 --> 01:09:33,649
I cannot remember.

1095
01:09:33,649 --> 01:09:37,479
We are not going to do it because we don't
have the money, so we're still working with

1096
01:09:37,479 --> 01:09:37,870
the paper products.

1097
01:09:37,870 --> 01:09:38,839
Anyway, here is the nozzle.

1098
01:09:38,839 --> 01:09:39,799
The water comes in.

1099
01:09:39,799 --> 01:09:46,270
There is an orifice and a set of heaters because
you've got space on this side.

1100
01:09:46,270 --> 01:09:48,750
And if you just push water out there it will
freeze.

1101
01:09:48,750 --> 01:09:53,380
You want to keep it from freezing so you've
got the heaters in there.

1102
01:09:53,380 --> 01:09:58,870
And this is a very tricky small orifice to
design, install and maintain.

1103
01:09:58,870 --> 01:10:02,090
Now, here is what Mission Control sees.

1104
01:10:02,090 --> 01:10:07,120
This is a plot of temperature, well, it's
actually three or four things versus time.

1105
01:10:07,120 --> 01:10:11,050
And what we have here is the first thing that
happens is you turn on the heaters on the

1106
01:10:11,050 --> 01:10:13,580
nozzle and the nozzle temperature warms up.

1107
01:10:13,580 --> 01:10:18,550
Then you open the dump valve and the water
supply quantity goes down.

1108
01:10:18,550 --> 01:10:24,790
And, as the water goes out, the nozzle temperatures
jitter a little bit, but they basically stay

1109
01:10:24,790 --> 01:10:29,910
in this nice, warm 150 degree temperature
range.

1110
01:10:29,910 --> 01:10:31,190
Close the dump valve.

1111
01:10:31,190 --> 01:10:36,199
The water quits flowing, the nozzle bakes
out, turn the heaters off and it turns off.

1112
01:10:36,199 --> 01:10:41,070
That is a normal water dump, what Mission
Control looks at all the time.

1113
01:10:41,070 --> 01:10:43,570
The crew has got a timer.

1114
01:10:43,570 --> 01:10:49,830
Or, better yet, Mission Control calls and
says start the dump now, stop the dump now.

1115
01:10:49,830 --> 01:10:54,020
Sometimes they'll set a timer.

1116
01:10:54,020 --> 01:10:58,400
Here is a little bit of an abnormal signature.

1117
01:10:58,400 --> 01:11:03,660
Turn the heaters on, the temperature comes
up, it plateaued out and it kind of does this

1118
01:11:03,660 --> 01:11:08,820
kind of thing, and people start scratching
their heads what is going on?

1119
01:11:08,820 --> 01:11:13,150
There is another interesting thing.

1120
01:11:13,150 --> 01:11:17,690
Here is one that warmed up, didn't get quite
as warm as it should have, sputtered out and

1121
01:11:17,690 --> 01:11:18,820
quit.

1122
01:11:18,820 --> 01:11:23,239
What is going on?

1123
01:11:23,239 --> 01:11:27,860
We actually took the arm out and looked at
this nozzle, and there was an icicle that

1124
01:11:27,860 --> 01:11:29,120
had grown on the outside.

1125
01:11:29,120 --> 01:11:36,120
And, if you go back to this little drawing,
it turns out there is an offset here.

1126
01:11:37,630 --> 01:11:40,510
And this nozzle has got a little offset to
it.

1127
01:11:40,510 --> 01:11:47,510
And they had rotated the offset 180 degrees
so that the heat wasn't being applied properly

1128
01:11:47,800 --> 01:11:49,020
and we were building an icicle.

1129
01:11:49,020 --> 01:11:54,480
And we built probably a 16 foot long icicle
off the side of the Shuttle on more than one

1130
01:11:54,480 --> 01:11:55,469
occasion.

1131
01:11:55,469 --> 01:11:59,620
And actually went out on one flight with the
arm and knocked it off.

1132
01:11:59,620 --> 01:12:04,130
Actually knocked it off like you would knock
an icicle off your eaves.

1133
01:12:04,130 --> 01:12:11,130
The thing that clued us into this, in addition
to these temperature plots, was the fact that

1134
01:12:15,190 --> 01:12:18,890
we came back with ice stuck to the top of
the payload bay doors.

1135
01:12:18,890 --> 01:12:22,520
There was actually a lump of ice that survived
reentry.

1136
01:12:22,520 --> 01:12:27,250
At the Kennedy Space Center there was a lump
of ice on top of the payload bay doors.

1137
01:12:27,250 --> 01:12:33,580
How would you get a lump of ice on top of
the payload bay door?

1138
01:12:33,580 --> 01:12:39,000
The reason is when this door is open, right
here, it hangs over.

1139
01:12:39,000 --> 01:12:45,040
And this icicle had grown all the way from
the gap from the nozzle to the open door and

1140
01:12:45,040 --> 01:12:46,770
had actually stuck on the open door.

1141
01:12:46,770 --> 01:12:52,980
And when we closed the door the icicle broke
off, people theorize, at the root and then

1142
01:12:52,980 --> 01:12:57,920
carried this long stick of ice up and reentered
that way.

1143
01:12:57,920 --> 01:13:04,920
And when we landed most of it was gone but
about a two or three pound ball of ice on

1144
01:13:05,199 --> 01:13:07,150
the doors had survived reentry.

1145
01:13:07,150 --> 01:13:09,400
Now, you might say, well, what is the big
deal about that?

1146
01:13:09,400 --> 01:13:15,780
We also found a big hunk out of the insulating
tile on the OMS pod where some of that had

1147
01:13:15,780 --> 01:13:20,090
broken off and had traveled back during entry
and struck the OMS pod.

1148
01:13:20,090 --> 01:13:25,449
This is not a good thing because you are depending,
in early phases of atmospheric flight, on

1149
01:13:25,449 --> 01:13:29,230
these thrusters for attitude control.

1150
01:13:29,230 --> 01:13:34,150
And their propellant tank is right there inside
that pod.

1151
01:13:34,150 --> 01:13:36,750
Not a good plan.

1152
01:13:36,750 --> 01:13:41,309
There is an example of a mystery in Mission
Control that we had to work our way through

1153
01:13:41,309 --> 01:13:44,070
over the course of, really, several flights.

1154
01:13:44,070 --> 01:13:45,350
And they redesigned the nozzle.

1155
01:13:45,350 --> 01:13:48,150
Here is the simplified drawing of the electrical
system.

1156
01:13:48,150 --> 01:13:50,880
I think you guys have seen some of these systems
things before.

1157
01:13:50,880 --> 01:13:56,530
We've got three fuel cells connected to three
main buses which branch out into all these

1158
01:13:56,530 --> 01:13:58,480
sub-buses.

1159
01:13:58,480 --> 01:14:02,460
If you are a flight controller you need to
understand how you get electrical power because

1160
01:14:02,460 --> 01:14:04,600
everything on the Shuttle works on electricity.

1161
01:14:04,600 --> 01:14:11,350
I am old enough now that I went to work in
Mission Control before the simulator had programmed

1162
01:14:11,350 --> 01:14:13,320
in the electrical system.

1163
01:14:13,320 --> 01:14:19,170
And I was a propulsion guy, OMS RCS guy, and
we practiced all this stuff about the propulsion

1164
01:14:19,170 --> 01:14:20,940
system and what would you do if different
things happened.

1165
01:14:20,940 --> 01:14:25,960
One day they released a new drop of the software
and all of a sudden the trainers could cause

1166
01:14:25,960 --> 01:14:27,830
electrical power buses to fail.

1167
01:14:27,830 --> 01:14:33,250
We didn't know what the heck was going on
but we learned in a big hurray because that

1168
01:14:33,250 --> 01:14:36,590
is a big important part of our job.

1169
01:14:36,590 --> 01:14:42,170
Here is a simplified picture of the communication
systems onboard the Shuttle.

1170
01:14:42,170 --> 01:14:43,449
This is the simplified.

1171
01:14:43,449 --> 01:14:44,960
Did you catch that?

1172
01:14:44,960 --> 01:14:48,320
Have you guys been through the communication
system?

1173
01:14:48,320 --> 01:14:55,320
We have S-band FM, S-band PM and Ku, and it
all comes in here and goes out there.

1174
01:14:56,570 --> 01:15:02,750
And it is all cross-strap so that if any one
of these little black boxes doesn't work the

1175
01:15:02,750 --> 01:15:06,360
integrated communications officer can send
commands and change it all around.

1176
01:15:06,360 --> 01:15:09,670
Unless it was the communications boxes didn't
work, in which case we've got to call the

1177
01:15:09,670 --> 01:15:13,420
crew on the other radio and tell them to go
throw some switches, which is very complicated.

1178
01:15:13,420 --> 01:15:17,320
And if you don't talk to the crew from Mission
Control you don't do anything.

1179
01:15:17,320 --> 01:15:23,340
If you don't get telemetry from the vehicle,
from Mission Control, you don't do anything.

1180
01:15:23,340 --> 01:15:27,320
If you cannot command the vehicle, from Mission
Control, you don't do anything.

1181
01:15:27,320 --> 01:15:30,820
You might as well go out and get a cup of
coffee because there is nothing you can do.

1182
01:15:30,820 --> 01:15:36,800
If the comm systems folks are having a bad
day -- And I will just add that's one of the

1183
01:15:36,800 --> 01:15:42,370
most serious malfunctions that we would practice
all the time so you had it cold.

1184
01:15:42,370 --> 01:15:46,980
I mean if most things, if they break, you
can talk to the ground, get some help, they're

1185
01:15:46,980 --> 01:15:53,250
looking over your shoulder, but if you cannot
communicate with the ground at that point

1186
01:15:53,250 --> 01:16:00,250
onboard your success in getting home depends
on being able to analyze what is the malfunction

1187
01:16:02,580 --> 01:16:03,460
and reestablish communication.

1188
01:16:03,460 --> 01:16:05,670
So, we take that very seriously.

1189
01:16:05,670 --> 01:16:08,380
And, I've got to tell you, this is a serious
design flaw in the Shuttle.

1190
01:16:08,380 --> 01:16:11,550
And here is a principle you need to remember.

1191
01:16:11,550 --> 01:16:13,300
When the systems were categorized

1192
01:16:13,300 --> 01:16:14,400
[NOISE OBSCURES]

1193
01:16:14,400 --> 01:16:18,550
they were categorized on the basis of the
severity of their failure mode.

1194
01:16:18,550 --> 01:16:23,300
Obviously, the main propulsion system is what
we call a criticality one system.

1195
01:16:23,300 --> 01:16:27,480
If bad things go wrong in the main propulsion
system really bad things could happen, so

1196
01:16:27,480 --> 01:16:32,340
they spent serious design effort making sure
that nothing bad would happen.

1197
01:16:32,340 --> 01:16:36,460
The communication system is a crit-3 system.

1198
01:16:36,460 --> 01:16:40,880
That means that people did not spend the time
to make a robust communication system.

1199
01:16:40,880 --> 01:16:43,820
It is not as reliable as some of the other
systems.

1200
01:16:43,820 --> 01:16:45,730
And that was a huge mistake.

1201
01:16:45,730 --> 01:16:47,930
And we have to fuss with this all the time.

1202
01:16:47,930 --> 01:16:51,080
That is a huge headache.

1203
01:16:51,080 --> 01:16:55,489
When you design something people say, well,
communications isn't critical.

1204
01:16:55,489 --> 01:16:56,760
Absolutely wrong.

1205
01:16:56,760 --> 01:16:59,130
Communications is absolutely vital.

1206
01:16:59,130 --> 01:17:00,989
You cannot do anything without communication.

1207
01:17:00,989 --> 01:17:05,150
A flight rule on the books says if we lose
all communication between a station and a

1208
01:17:05,150 --> 01:17:09,530
shuttle the crew must land within 24 hours.

1209
01:17:09,530 --> 01:17:15,199
And we keep updated with just enough information
so that they know where to land without communication.

1210
01:17:15,199 --> 01:17:20,620
That is part of the news you get every morning
is an update of if you lose communication

1211
01:17:20,620 --> 01:17:21,410
these are the landing sites.

1212
01:17:21,410 --> 01:17:21,780
That's right.

1213
01:17:21,780 --> 01:17:22,600
Here is where you want to go.

1214
01:17:22,600 --> 01:17:24,770
Here is the weather and here are the times.

1215
01:17:24,770 --> 01:17:29,460
This is the simplified drawing of the data
processing system.

1216
01:17:29,460 --> 01:17:32,989
This is the hardware of the data process system.

1217
01:17:32,989 --> 01:17:37,699
And you've got this general purpose computer
that goes out through all these data buses

1218
01:17:37,699 --> 01:17:41,790
to all these multiplexers and demultiplexers
to talk to all these different pieces of gear.

1219
01:17:41,790 --> 01:17:48,790
And we've got different buses to get into
each of the black boxes.

1220
01:17:49,510 --> 01:17:54,699
And you can switch ports and it is very reconfigurable
and is a big pain in the butt.

1221
01:17:54,699 --> 01:18:00,440
And if you want to operate as a systems flight
controller you have to understand it cold.

1222
01:18:00,440 --> 01:18:05,070
This is the software, very simplified high
level view of the flight software onboard

1223
01:18:05,070 --> 01:18:05,980
the computer.

1224
01:18:05,980 --> 01:18:08,840
You guys talk about the onboard computers
on the Shuttle?

1225
01:18:08,840 --> 01:18:09,980
OK.

1226
01:18:09,980 --> 01:18:13,300
How much memory does a general purpose computer
have?

1227
01:18:13,300 --> 01:18:20,300
512K memory.

1228
01:18:23,480 --> 01:18:24,610
Not megs, not gigs, K.

1229
01:18:24,610 --> 01:18:31,610
Of course, it works in ascent and vibrations
and radiation and all these other things.

1230
01:18:33,190 --> 01:18:37,710
Very sophisticated software in a very small
place.

1231
01:18:37,710 --> 01:18:40,440
What I grew up on is the reaction control
system.

1232
01:18:40,440 --> 01:18:45,440
This has got helium pressurization going through
a series of regulators and valves down to

1233
01:18:45,440 --> 01:18:48,860
propellant tanks which get manifolded out
to the various thrusters.

1234
01:18:48,860 --> 01:18:50,440
You've got oxidizer and fuel.

1235
01:18:50,440 --> 01:18:52,070
They come together and they make fire.

1236
01:18:52,070 --> 01:18:58,440
And so I started life as a mechanical engineer
specializing in fluids so I'm supposed to

1237
01:18:58,440 --> 01:19:01,650
understand things like pressure and temperature
and combustion.

1238
01:19:01,650 --> 01:19:07,230
But I had to learn about valves which are
mechanical and electrically operated that

1239
01:19:07,230 --> 01:19:12,880
are operated through the computer system so
all of those data buses on this page right

1240
01:19:12,880 --> 01:19:13,960
here became very important to me.

1241
01:19:13,960 --> 01:19:19,390
They are sometimes operated automatically
by the software so I have to understand all

1242
01:19:19,390 --> 01:19:20,050
the software.

1243
01:19:20,050 --> 01:19:23,690
And then we get to what we call we redundancy
management.

1244
01:19:23,690 --> 01:19:27,920
We have this basic principle that we want
to have more than one of a critical thing.

1245
01:19:27,920 --> 01:19:31,590
And so the question is how do you monitor
and manage that redundancy.

1246
01:19:31,590 --> 01:19:38,590
And the reaction control system has got the
most sophisticated redundancy management program

1247
01:19:38,820 --> 01:19:39,900
in the Shuttle.

1248
01:19:39,900 --> 01:19:46,900
And it depends on instrumentation coming back
through those multiplexers and signal conditioners

1249
01:19:48,130 --> 01:19:53,150
going to the computer that when it commands
through the digital autopilot those jets to

1250
01:19:53,150 --> 01:19:54,870
fire they either do or they don't.

1251
01:19:54,870 --> 01:19:56,250
And it tells it all about it.

1252
01:19:56,250 --> 01:19:58,730
And then the crew gets notified back over
here.

1253
01:19:58,730 --> 01:20:01,610
And it is very complicated, redundancy management.

1254
01:20:01,610 --> 01:20:05,020
Redundancy is a way to provide reliability.

1255
01:20:05,020 --> 01:20:07,300
Redundancy is not a means to an end.

1256
01:20:07,300 --> 01:20:10,739
I noticed Chris Kraft said that the Shuttle
is quad redundant.

1257
01:20:10,739 --> 01:20:12,340
That is not correct, Chris.

1258
01:20:12,340 --> 01:20:13,860
The Shuttle is not quad redundant.

1259
01:20:13,860 --> 01:20:14,880
We have four computers.

1260
01:20:14,880 --> 01:20:16,730
They are not quad redundant.

1261
01:20:16,730 --> 01:20:18,940
Now, if you go to a lot of systems, you only
have three of.

1262
01:20:18,940 --> 01:20:24,360
If you go to some systems that you have four
of, one cannot do the job.

1263
01:20:24,360 --> 01:20:25,570
For example, flight control.

1264
01:20:25,570 --> 01:20:32,300
We have four flight control hydraulic channels
that operate the elevons.

1265
01:20:32,300 --> 01:20:33,860
One channel cannot operate that.

1266
01:20:33,860 --> 01:20:35,410
It takes two.

1267
01:20:35,410 --> 01:20:37,150
So you've got four but it takes two.

1268
01:20:37,150 --> 01:20:38,320
That means I can lose two.

1269
01:20:38,320 --> 01:20:40,690
So, I am at best, three redundant.

1270
01:20:40,690 --> 01:20:43,570
I can lose two and fly with two.

1271
01:20:43,570 --> 01:20:47,780
The trouble is if you lose two and they get
in a fight with the other two it becomes very

1272
01:20:47,780 --> 01:20:49,030
difficult to manage.

1273
01:20:49,030 --> 01:20:51,550
One of my favorite systems is the inertial
measurement system.

1274
01:20:51,550 --> 01:20:57,059
The main requirement on Shuttle avionics is
that it is fail operational/fail safe.

1275
01:20:57,059 --> 01:21:00,940
You've got to be able to take the first failure
and you can keep flying the mission as planned.

1276
01:21:00,940 --> 01:21:06,110
You take the second failure and you're still
safe to land because you've got one left.

1277
01:21:06,110 --> 01:21:09,250
Three inertial measurement units, clearly
we are fail operational/fail safe.

1278
01:21:09,250 --> 01:21:10,020
Well, no.

1279
01:21:10,020 --> 01:21:16,550
If the first inertial measurement unit fails,
good to go, we keep on doing what we're doing.

1280
01:21:16,550 --> 01:21:23,550
But those last two, if they disagree, how
do you know which one is telling you the truth?

1281
01:21:24,460 --> 01:21:26,260
That is tough.

1282
01:21:26,260 --> 01:21:33,260
We developed this mathematical scheme using
matrices and the navigation quaternion that

1283
01:21:33,480 --> 01:21:34,940
would give us the best chance.

1284
01:21:34,940 --> 01:21:40,510
We have about a 99.5% chance of determining
which IMU is telling us the truth versus lying

1285
01:21:40,510 --> 01:21:43,410
to us, but it isn't foolproof.

1286
01:21:43,410 --> 01:21:47,130
It takes people to manage it.

1287
01:21:47,130 --> 01:21:52,130
We have opened ourselves, through redundancy,
to a system in some cases where we don't have

1288
01:21:52,130 --> 01:21:53,130
quad redundancy.

1289
01:21:53,130 --> 01:21:55,239
We have four ways to fail the system.

1290
01:21:55,239 --> 01:22:02,239
The reaction control system is one of my favorites
because we have four jets on each side.

1291
01:22:02,580 --> 01:22:05,219
For example, the yaw jets in the aft that
you need.

1292
01:22:05,219 --> 01:22:06,860
So, you would say quad redundancy.

1293
01:22:06,860 --> 01:22:09,449
No, I have four ways to fail.

1294
01:22:09,449 --> 01:22:14,140
What I'd really like to have is just one jet
that would do the job and was highly reliable,

1295
01:22:14,140 --> 01:22:20,020
but I've got four jets that are leaky that
get clogged up, that lie to you on the instrumentation

1296
01:22:20,020 --> 01:22:24,059
that you've got to watch all the time because
I need at least two of them to do the job

1297
01:22:24,059 --> 01:22:26,030
during entry.

1298
01:22:26,030 --> 01:22:28,250
So, be careful when you say things about redundancy.

1299
01:22:28,250 --> 01:22:31,440
What you're really after is reliability, not
redundancy.

1300
01:22:31,440 --> 01:22:33,920
Redundancy is a way to reliability.

1301
01:22:33,920 --> 01:22:40,449
And you build these incredibly complicated
schemes to deal with redundancy to provide

1302
01:22:40,449 --> 01:22:44,270
the reliability of the system level you need.

1303
01:22:44,270 --> 01:22:46,719
Simple is better, let me tell you.

1304
01:22:46,719 --> 01:22:48,070
Complicated is not.

1305
01:22:48,070 --> 01:22:54,010
I've got two stories from the trenches and
then I'm going to quit.

1306
01:22:54,010 --> 01:22:58,100
You guys have not been asking too many questions
so that either means I am a brilliant lecturer

1307
01:22:58,100 --> 01:23:01,410
or I'm putting you to sleep.

1308
01:23:01,410 --> 01:23:02,980
This is not your standard academic fair.

1309
01:23:02,980 --> 01:23:04,309
Is this good for you guys?

1310
01:23:04,309 --> 01:23:04,760
OK.

1311
01:23:04,760 --> 01:23:05,660
Yes sir.

1312
01:23:05,660 --> 01:23:08,090
I have a question on the redundancy.

1313
01:23:08,090 --> 01:23:14,420
Chris Kraft talked earlier this week about
how because you have four strings that you

1314
01:23:14,420 --> 01:23:19,750
should launch if one string is broken and
not worry about it since you're still failsafe

1315
01:23:19,750 --> 01:23:26,340
with what is left and that that would increase
the turnaround time and you would be able

1316
01:23:26,340 --> 01:23:27,429
to launch more often.

1317
01:23:27,429 --> 01:23:28,699
One IMU has failed, we'll launch with the
two because we know that 99.5% of the time

1318
01:23:28,699 --> 01:23:31,219
that is good enough for us.

1319
01:23:31,219 --> 01:23:32,070
Do you have any comments on that?

1320
01:23:32,070 --> 01:23:36,730
Chris and I have had this discussion before.

1321
01:23:36,730 --> 01:23:41,030
I have a technical response to this discussion.

1322
01:23:41,030 --> 01:23:41,360
Bullshit.

1323
01:23:41,360 --> 01:23:47,070
We are not reliable enough to launch with
anything down.

1324
01:23:47,070 --> 01:23:53,380
This vehicle is barely reliable enough to
make the mission as planned when we launch

1325
01:23:53,380 --> 01:23:55,309
full up.

1326
01:23:55,309 --> 01:24:02,199
If you want to build a spacecraft that needs
two of or three of or four of.

1327
01:24:02,199 --> 01:24:07,820
And you want to be able to launch with one
broken on the launch pad like sometimes your

1328
01:24:07,820 --> 01:24:11,500
airplane takes off with something broken that
you, the passenger, don't know, but the pilot

1329
01:24:11,500 --> 01:24:14,400
does and say it is OK.

1330
01:24:14,400 --> 01:24:16,190
We're not at that stage.

1331
01:24:16,190 --> 01:24:17,610
That is a nice idea.

1332
01:24:17,610 --> 01:24:18,620
That is a great goal.

1333
01:24:18,620 --> 01:24:22,160
I think people, when they thought about designing
the Shuttle, thought that we ought to do it

1334
01:24:22,160 --> 01:24:22,929
that way.

1335
01:24:22,929 --> 01:24:26,320
It doesn't work with the design we've got.

1336
01:24:26,320 --> 01:24:29,179
If you were going to build a new Shuttle,
yeah, I would put five IMUs on it.

1337
01:24:29,179 --> 01:24:35,800
Well, shoot, I would throw out the IMUs and
I would put GPS on it or something like that

1338
01:24:35,800 --> 01:24:37,710
because it is more reliable.

1339
01:24:37,710 --> 01:24:42,940
But we are not at a stage where we can launch
with less than the normal stuff.

1340
01:24:42,940 --> 01:24:48,280
Our flight history is that we have terminated
three Shuttle flights because we lost redundant

1341
01:24:48,280 --> 01:24:51,690
gear to the point where the flight rules said
you needed to come home.

1342
01:24:51,690 --> 01:24:57,790
Now, if you had launched with just enough
gear so that the next failure puts you into

1343
01:24:57,790 --> 01:25:01,850
shortened mission, you would have terminated
more flights early.

1344
01:25:01,850 --> 01:25:05,780
The whole theory about the Shuttle, if you
go back to the very beginning, we are going

1345
01:25:05,780 --> 01:25:07,250
to fly a flight a week.

1346
01:25:07,250 --> 01:25:07,580
What?

1347
01:25:07,580 --> 01:25:10,540
64 flights a year originally.

1348
01:25:10,540 --> 01:25:12,330
That didn't happen for a variety of reasons.

1349
01:25:12,330 --> 01:25:17,679
If you flew 64 flights a year, the theory
was if you got up there and something broke

1350
01:25:17,679 --> 01:25:21,630
and you had to bring the payload back, OK,
we would just role it into the one next week

1351
01:25:21,630 --> 01:25:23,580
and we would have enough flights.

1352
01:25:23,580 --> 01:25:25,210
It hasn't happened that way.

1353
01:25:25,210 --> 01:25:29,000
Spaceflight remains difficult because these
flights are rare.

1354
01:25:29,000 --> 01:25:35,270
The best we've ever done, I think, is ten
flights in a year in 1985.

1355
01:25:35,270 --> 01:25:38,170
And typically we're talking four or five flights
in a year.

1356
01:25:38,170 --> 01:25:39,050
These flights are rare.

1357
01:25:39,050 --> 01:25:45,670
The pressure is on to get the maximum advantage
out of every flight.

1358
01:25:45,670 --> 01:25:49,800
And I think spaceflights are going to remain
rare with the technology we've got into the

1359
01:25:49,800 --> 01:25:50,230
future.

1360
01:25:50,230 --> 01:25:55,150
That is probably a discussion for a future
date, but the fact of the matter is that Shuttle

1361
01:25:55,150 --> 01:26:02,030
does not have the reliability in its piece
parts to launch with one of things down.

1362
01:26:02,030 --> 01:26:07,190
JEFF: Wayne, let me ask you a question to
speak to, you know, just here at a classroom,

1363
01:26:07,190 --> 01:26:10,719
not as the Shuttle manager and not for attribution.

1364
01:26:10,719 --> 01:26:13,480
This is a danger, when people

1365
01:26:13,480 --> 01:26:14,400
[OVERLAPPING VOICES]

1366
01:26:14,400 --> 01:26:14,650
.
Sheila Widnall was here and told us about
CARB and their reputation.

1367
01:26:19,590 --> 01:26:26,590
What is your feeling about the wisdom of ending
the Shuttle flights at the end of the decade?

1368
01:26:27,140 --> 01:26:28,750
WAYNE: I have a couple of thoughts.

1369
01:26:28,750 --> 01:26:30,630
First of all, I am a Shuttle hugger.

1370
01:26:30,630 --> 01:26:31,590
I grew up with Shuttle.

1371
01:26:31,590 --> 01:26:33,000
Shuttle is an amazing vehicle.

1372
01:26:33,000 --> 01:26:35,030
It is a huge technological leap.

1373
01:26:35,030 --> 01:26:37,030
I am very proud of what it has done.

1374
01:26:37,030 --> 01:26:40,179
On the other hand, we need a replacement.

1375
01:26:40,179 --> 01:26:43,120
It has got some serious shortcomings.

1376
01:26:43,120 --> 01:26:48,660
And if you look at the history of aviation
and the first 30 years from the Wright Brothers

1377
01:26:48,660 --> 01:26:55,610
to, say, the DC3, that was about 35 years,
a little less.

1378
01:26:55,610 --> 01:27:00,250
DC3 was the first economically practical airliner,
right?

1379
01:27:00,250 --> 01:27:02,739
Everybody wanted to compare the Shuttle to
the DC3.

1380
01:27:02,739 --> 01:27:09,739
The problem is between the Wright Flyer in
1903 and a DC3 in 1935 or thereabouts, they

1381
01:27:11,340 --> 01:27:15,100
went through probably 10,000 designs.

1382
01:27:15,100 --> 01:27:16,580
They had trial and error.

1383
01:27:16,580 --> 01:27:17,730
We tried things out.

1384
01:27:17,730 --> 01:27:20,000
We found out what worked, we found out what
didn't.

1385
01:27:20,000 --> 01:27:21,620
They junked the bad designs.

1386
01:27:21,620 --> 01:27:25,280
They took the good designs, and they took
the good parts of the good designs and built

1387
01:27:25,280 --> 01:27:26,800
the next designs even better.

1388
01:27:26,800 --> 01:27:32,620
They probably went through 10,000 variations
on aircraft to get to that point.

1389
01:27:32,620 --> 01:27:35,410
Now, we've been flying in space for about
35 years.

1390
01:27:35,410 --> 01:27:37,500
Count them all.

1391
01:27:37,500 --> 01:27:40,070
Chinese, Russian, American.

1392
01:27:40,070 --> 01:27:44,260
How many space vehicles have there been?

1393
01:27:44,260 --> 01:27:45,550
Human space vehicles.

1394
01:27:45,550 --> 01:27:46,429
Less than ten.

1395
01:27:46,429 --> 01:27:53,429
Soyuz, Vostok, Voskhod, Mercury, Gemini, Apollo,
Skylab, Shuttle, Shenzhou, what am I missing?

1396
01:27:57,730 --> 01:27:59,679
That's about it.

1397
01:27:59,679 --> 01:28:02,929
How can you possibly advance that technology?

1398
01:28:02,929 --> 01:28:07,179
It is ludicrous to think that you are going
to advance the technology without doing the

1399
01:28:07,179 --> 01:28:10,070
iteration that we saw in early aviation.

1400
01:28:10,070 --> 01:28:15,739
We should have replaced the Shuttle 20 years
ago as a nation with a more advanced version

1401
01:28:15,739 --> 01:28:20,469
that fixed some of the shortcomings that made
it more economical to operate.

1402
01:28:20,469 --> 01:28:25,000
We should have done a lot of things but, for
national reasons, we didn't.

1403
01:28:25,000 --> 01:28:26,640
So, I am torn.

1404
01:28:26,640 --> 01:28:27,730
I love the Shuttle.

1405
01:28:27,730 --> 01:28:29,570
It is a great machine.

1406
01:28:29,570 --> 01:28:31,130
I spent my whole career with it.

1407
01:28:31,130 --> 01:28:36,040
It gives us capabilities that we are going
to give up, frankly, when we go to the CEV.

1408
01:28:36,040 --> 01:28:38,550
It's going to be a different kind of machine
that does different kinds of things.

1409
01:28:38,550 --> 01:28:42,790
And we are going to miss the Shuttle, I am
convinced.

1410
01:28:42,790 --> 01:28:46,610
But should we long ago have built a new one?

1411
01:28:46,610 --> 01:28:47,809
Absolutely.

1412
01:28:47,809 --> 01:28:49,550
Are we behind where we should be?

1413
01:28:49,550 --> 01:28:50,969
Absolutely.

1414
01:28:50,969 --> 01:28:55,949
We need to invent the next generation of spacecraft
and be ready to go on and invent the next

1415
01:28:55,949 --> 01:28:56,559
one after that.

1416
01:28:56,559 --> 01:29:00,300
The Shuttle was designed for a ten year life.

1417
01:29:00,300 --> 01:29:06,770
We should have been working on Shuttle II
the day that Columbia launched the first flight.

1418
01:29:06,770 --> 01:29:07,469
OK.

1419
01:29:07,469 --> 01:29:09,710
That is my perspective.

1420
01:29:09,710 --> 01:29:11,040
Anybody else?

1421
01:29:11,040 --> 01:29:11,290
Yes.

1422
01:29:11,210 --> 01:29:18,210
This might be outside of the realm of the
discussion, but those 10,000 different designs

1423
01:29:18,840 --> 01:29:22,660
that were done for aircraft were done largely
by private sector, right?

1424
01:29:22,660 --> 01:29:25,070
There was a fair amount of government.

1425
01:29:25,070 --> 01:29:26,370
And, remember, it wasn't all American.

1426
01:29:26,370 --> 01:29:30,780
There was a large amount of government subsidy.

1427
01:29:30,780 --> 01:29:34,679
And it was, frankly, a cheaper technology
to develop.

1428
01:29:34,679 --> 01:29:36,390
Rocket technology is difficult to develop.

1429
01:29:36,390 --> 01:29:39,020
I will go back to Heinlein my favorite author.

1430
01:29:39,020 --> 01:29:42,460
He says when you're in earth orbit you are
halfway to anywhere in the universe.

1431
01:29:42,460 --> 01:29:47,580
Getting the first hundred miles off the planet
is very hard, but once you get in earth orbit

1432
01:29:47,580 --> 01:29:51,380
or thereabouts you are halfway to anywhere
in the universe.

1433
01:29:51,380 --> 01:29:54,050
And we still have not cracked that nut.

1434
01:29:54,050 --> 01:29:56,250
I really like the space elevator guys.

1435
01:29:56,250 --> 01:30:00,210
It is science fiction but the idea is a good
one.

1436
01:30:00,210 --> 01:30:04,870
There ought to be a different technology other
than rockets to get to space.

1437
01:30:04,870 --> 01:30:08,130
Somebody did a calculation that said if we
had an elevator to the Moon, we could get

1438
01:30:08,130 --> 01:30:10,370
to the Moon for about $10 worth of electricity.

1439
01:30:10,370 --> 01:30:15,360
Of course, there is a big "if" that goes in
front of that rolling that elevator.

1440
01:30:15,360 --> 01:30:18,870
So, rockets are an exceedingly difficult technology.

1441
01:30:18,870 --> 01:30:21,830
I want one of you guys to invent a new technology.

1442
01:30:21,830 --> 01:30:27,480
Aaron Cohen, he may have already told you
this, tells one of the great stories of all

1443
01:30:27,480 --> 01:30:28,929
times about spaceflight.

1444
01:30:28,929 --> 01:30:33,949
He talks about when he was in the management
of the Space Shuttle program and the fact

1445
01:30:33,949 --> 01:30:38,199
that the main engines were causing just awful
problems getting them developed.

1446
01:30:38,199 --> 01:30:39,610
Stop me if you heard the story.

1447
01:30:39,610 --> 01:30:45,980
And one day he woke up and said wouldn't it
be great if somebody just invented an antigravity

1448
01:30:45,980 --> 01:30:49,000
device and we could get away from rockets?

1449
01:30:49,000 --> 01:30:52,239
Wouldn't that just be great?

1450
01:30:52,239 --> 01:30:56,600
And he thought about it a little while longer
and said no, it would still have braised welds

1451
01:30:56,600 --> 01:31:00,920
and electronic parts and all the things that
are causing us problems on the engines would

1452
01:31:00,920 --> 01:31:04,440
cause us problems with the antigravity machine.

1453
01:31:04,440 --> 01:31:07,469
Get him to tell you the story.

1454
01:31:07,469 --> 01:31:09,630
He tells it better than I do.

1455
01:31:09,630 --> 01:31:12,239
But we need a better technology, quite frankly.

1456
01:31:12,239 --> 01:31:16,330
We need something that makes the transition
from propellers to jet engines.

1457
01:31:16,330 --> 01:31:19,059
We need something like that.

1458
01:31:19,059 --> 01:31:24,900
The Space Shuttle main engines in terms of
the rocket cycle thermodynamically are about

1459
01:31:24,900 --> 01:31:31,600
99% of the maximum theoretical efficiency
for a hydrogen/oxygen rocket engine.

1460
01:31:31,600 --> 01:31:34,280
You're not going to do any better.

1461
01:31:34,280 --> 01:31:36,800
We need a new technology.

1462
01:31:36,800 --> 01:31:40,420
You might make them cheaper, you might make
them more reliable but you're not going to

1463
01:31:40,420 --> 01:31:44,429
lift any more pounds to orbit.

1464
01:31:44,429 --> 01:31:45,719
So, we need that revolution.

1465
01:31:45,719 --> 01:31:46,309
OK.

1466
01:31:46,309 --> 01:31:48,150
Well, I'm passionate about it.

1467
01:31:48,150 --> 01:31:49,040
Anybody else?

1468
01:31:49,040 --> 01:31:49,290
Yes.

1469
01:31:49,170 --> 01:31:50,850
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

1470
01:31:50,850 --> 01:31:55,920
You're talking to the wrong guy.

1471
01:31:55,920 --> 01:31:57,580
Of course it's a help.

1472
01:31:57,580 --> 01:32:03,719
If you want to talk about whether it's a hindrance,
ask him after I'm gone.

1473
01:32:03,719 --> 01:32:07,500
Some of our astronauts friends which we'd
shut up.

1474
01:32:07,500 --> 01:32:12,210
But, no, seriously, I think everybody would
say that Mission Control is actually a vital

1475
01:32:12,210 --> 01:32:14,219
part of the process.

1476
01:32:14,219 --> 01:32:16,410
You've got to plan the missions.

1477
01:32:16,410 --> 01:32:17,800
You've got to execute the missions.

1478
01:32:17,800 --> 01:32:20,030
There are only so many people onboard the
vehicle.

1479
01:32:20,030 --> 01:32:21,410
These are not autonomous vehicles.

1480
01:32:21,410 --> 01:32:26,110
That is another word that really sets my teeth
on edge when people say space vehicles ought

1481
01:32:26,110 --> 01:32:30,199
to be autonomous like commercial aircraft.

1482
01:32:30,199 --> 01:32:30,929
It just sets my teeth on edge.

1483
01:32:30,929 --> 01:32:34,489
Have you ever seen what it takes to plan a
commercial aircraft flight?

1484
01:32:34,489 --> 01:32:38,469
There are more people on the ground than there
are in the cockpit by a lot.

1485
01:32:38,469 --> 01:32:42,699
And I'm not talking about the baggage handlers
and I'm not even really talking about the

1486
01:32:42,699 --> 01:32:44,370
mechanics that keep it flying.

1487
01:32:44,370 --> 01:32:49,199
Everybody has got to plan the routes, got
to make sure that they've got the manifesting

1488
01:32:49,199 --> 01:32:53,739
right, make sure that they've got the fuel
right, all that planning process, you've got

1489
01:32:53,739 --> 01:32:54,570
to have people that do that.

1490
01:32:54,570 --> 01:32:58,780
Saying you're going to get by without that
shows a total ignorance of how the world really

1491
01:32:58,780 --> 01:33:03,230
works.

1492
01:33:03,230 --> 01:33:05,840
Now I'm beginning to sound like Chris Kraft.

1493
01:33:05,840 --> 01:33:09,780
I want to share with you a couple of stories.

1494
01:33:09,780 --> 01:33:13,640
This is something you ought to past on your
wall.

1495
01:33:13,640 --> 01:33:15,449
The last law of robotics.

1496
01:33:15,449 --> 01:33:19,559
The only real errors are human errors.

1497
01:33:19,559 --> 01:33:23,170
Mother nature does not make mistakes.

1498
01:33:23,170 --> 01:33:29,760
If you flew your airplane into a thunderstorm
and it crashes, was it mother nature's fault?

1499
01:33:29,760 --> 01:33:34,239
No, you were stupid and flew your airplane
into a place that it wasn't designed to handle.

1500
01:33:34,239 --> 01:33:39,160
Perhaps the weather forecaster gave you a
bad forecast.

1501
01:33:39,160 --> 01:33:45,910
Perhaps your weather radar was insufficient
and didn't pick up that nimbus cumulous cloud

1502
01:33:45,910 --> 01:33:49,390
on its radar, but it wasn't mother nature's
fault.

1503
01:33:49,390 --> 01:33:50,760
It was a human error.

1504
01:33:50,760 --> 01:33:55,610
They used to talk about in aircraft accidents
there were really three causes for aircraft

1505
01:33:55,610 --> 01:33:56,040
accidents.

1506
01:33:56,040 --> 01:33:58,600
There is pilot error, which we all understand.

1507
01:33:58,600 --> 01:34:02,890
The pilot turned left when he should have
gone right, you know, something much more

1508
01:34:02,890 --> 01:34:04,630
sophisticated than that.

1509
01:34:04,630 --> 01:34:04,980
Pilot error.

1510
01:34:04,980 --> 01:34:06,660
There is mechanical failure.

1511
01:34:06,660 --> 01:34:08,780
Mechanical failure can come for two reasons.

1512
01:34:08,780 --> 01:34:11,940
Number one, the aircraft was not maintained
properly.

1513
01:34:11,940 --> 01:34:18,940
I remember that Alaska airline jet that went
down because it had the mechanism in the tail

1514
01:34:19,010 --> 01:34:23,520
that had the long spiral grooved shaft and
they didn't lubricate it properly and it wore

1515
01:34:23,520 --> 01:34:23,850
off.

1516
01:34:23,850 --> 01:34:27,080
And finally they had no elevator control and
the plane crashed.

1517
01:34:27,080 --> 01:34:30,150
It wasn't maintained properly or it wasn't
designed properly.

1518
01:34:30,150 --> 01:34:34,270
It wasn't design properly to handle the environment
that it flew in.

1519
01:34:34,270 --> 01:34:36,270
So, mechanically.

1520
01:34:36,270 --> 01:34:37,030
Or weather.

1521
01:34:37,030 --> 01:34:40,150
Well, I submit that weather is not a cause
of an accident.

1522
01:34:40,150 --> 01:34:44,160
Weather is a human failure because you need
to understand what you're capable of operating

1523
01:34:44,160 --> 01:34:47,870
your vehicle in, and you don't operate it
in environments that you're not capable of

1524
01:34:47,870 --> 01:34:48,370
handling.

1525
01:34:48,370 --> 01:34:50,460
The only real errors are human errors.

1526
01:34:50,460 --> 01:34:55,400
It's either the pilot, the engineer that designed
it, the guys that didn't maintain it properly

1527
01:34:55,400 --> 01:34:58,159
or maybe the guys that didn't forecast the
weather right.

1528
01:34:58,159 --> 01:34:59,090
Those are human errors.

1529
01:34:59,090 --> 01:35:01,659
They are not acts of god.

1530
01:35:01,659 --> 01:35:06,010
You need to understand the environment you're
going to operate your spacecraft in.

1531
01:35:06,010 --> 01:35:09,059
Make sure you design it robustly so it doesn't
come apart.

1532
01:35:09,059 --> 01:35:13,949
Makes sure you design it so that it can be
maintained and you make sure the instructions

1533
01:35:13,949 --> 01:35:17,360
for the maintainers is done properly.

1534
01:35:17,360 --> 01:35:22,889
And, finally, you've got to train your crews
so they can pilot it properly.

1535
01:35:22,889 --> 01:35:23,429
OK.

1536
01:35:23,429 --> 01:35:27,000
One of the things that the Shuttle doesn't
do well is navigate on its own.

1537
01:35:27,000 --> 01:35:28,940
The Shuttle has an inertial navigation system.

1538
01:35:28,940 --> 01:35:30,510
We're trying to upgrade it to GPS.

1539
01:35:30,510 --> 01:35:33,590
We've been trying to upgrade it to GPS for
ten years.

1540
01:35:33,590 --> 01:35:40,210
Maybe we will get the next vehicle Endeavor
out of its maintenance depot period with GPS

1541
01:35:40,210 --> 01:35:43,980
and fly it with GPS, but right now we fly
it with inertial measurement systems.

1542
01:35:43,980 --> 01:35:50,980
Those inertial measurement systems, developed
right here at the Charles Stark Draper Lab,

1543
01:35:51,870 --> 01:35:53,929
have some drift in them.

1544
01:35:53,929 --> 01:35:58,210
After about a day their knowledge of where
the Shuttle is creeps off.

1545
01:35:58,210 --> 01:36:05,210
It creeps off enough so that you could not
reenter safely because the error in the onboard

1546
01:36:07,449 --> 01:36:11,409
knowledge of where the Shuttle is is different
from where the Shuttle actually is.

1547
01:36:11,409 --> 01:36:18,409
In addition to that, the integration over
time doesn't give you a good state vector

1548
01:36:19,139 --> 01:36:25,489
so we track the Shuttle from the ground with
radar and update what we call the state vector

1549
01:36:25,489 --> 01:36:29,199
position, velocity and direction, six components
at least once a day.

1550
01:36:29,199 --> 01:36:32,860
On STS-32, Mission Control screwed it up.

1551
01:36:32,860 --> 01:36:37,679
There is a long flight.

1552
01:36:37,679 --> 01:36:44,679
The ninth day of the flight the INCO officer
sent a bad command that caused the Shuttle

1553
01:36:49,030 --> 01:36:51,210
orbiter to lose attitude control.

1554
01:36:51,210 --> 01:36:54,480
And if the propulsion system had been configured
differently they would have run the little

1555
01:36:54,480 --> 01:36:54,860
jets.

1556
01:36:54,860 --> 01:36:59,870
If they had been on the big jets we might
have used up enough gas so that the crew could

1557
01:36:59,870 --> 01:37:01,949
not have reentered safety.

1558
01:37:01,949 --> 01:37:03,540
This is a serious error.

1559
01:37:03,540 --> 01:37:07,510
It also happened at about 3:00 in the morning.

1560
01:37:07,510 --> 01:37:12,710
I would offer to you that you ought not do
critical things in the wee hours of the morning.

1561
01:37:12,710 --> 01:37:19,710
Writing term papers, running somewhat hazardous
experiments are not things you want to do

1562
01:37:21,389 --> 01:37:23,380
at 3:00 in the morning.

1563
01:37:23,380 --> 01:37:28,870
That error was recognized and corrective actions
were taken immediately.

1564
01:37:28,870 --> 01:37:33,760
But, due to some other circumstances, it was
a near thing.

1565
01:37:33,760 --> 01:37:36,570
We were out of control and out of communications
for about ten minutes.

1566
01:37:36,570 --> 01:37:39,389
And this was in the middle of crew sleep.

1567
01:37:39,389 --> 01:37:45,699
What they did basically was to uplink a state
vector that told the computer that the position

1568
01:37:45,699 --> 01:37:48,860
of the orbiter was somewhere outside the Milky
Way Galaxy.

1569
01:37:48,860 --> 01:37:53,260
I mean it was that kind of thing.

1570
01:37:53,260 --> 01:37:55,580
OK.

1571
01:37:55,580 --> 01:37:57,210
Here is the story for the night.

1572
01:37:57,210 --> 01:38:04,210
This is 17 days, 23 hours to 18 days GMT.

1573
01:38:04,620 --> 01:38:07,199
This was in the early part of the year.

1574
01:38:07,199 --> 01:38:09,980
This is a one hour time period.

1575
01:38:09,980 --> 01:38:14,780
The crew is awakened in the middle of crew
sleep because an onboard smoke alarm goes

1576
01:38:14,780 --> 01:38:15,670
off.

1577
01:38:15,670 --> 01:38:16,889
There was no fire.

1578
01:38:16,889 --> 01:38:20,110
It was just an erroneous alarm, but it woke
the crew up.

1579
01:38:20,110 --> 01:38:24,909
Now, when you are the flight control team
and you are working when the crew is asleep,

1580
01:38:24,909 --> 01:38:28,290
your number one goal is to keep the crew asleep.

1581
01:38:28,290 --> 01:38:29,489
Don't let them wake up.

1582
01:38:29,489 --> 01:38:31,960
So, this flight control team has already failed.

1583
01:38:31,960 --> 01:38:38,909
They allowed an erroneous alarm to wake the
crew.

1584
01:38:38,909 --> 01:38:45,639
A little bit later the flight dynamics officer
says we need to reinitialize the state vector,

1585
01:38:45,639 --> 01:38:48,370
which is something that we normally do, about
once a day.

1586
01:38:48,370 --> 01:38:51,989
It is interesting that this is in the middle
of crew sleep.

1587
01:38:51,989 --> 01:38:56,870
Normally it is done when the crew is awake,
but the flight dynamics officer says we need

1588
01:38:56,870 --> 01:39:01,440
to uplink a new position and velocity sort
of vectors.

1589
01:39:01,440 --> 01:39:04,070
The flight director says did you do a good
job, Fido?

1590
01:39:04,070 --> 01:39:05,389
Fido says of course we did.

1591
01:39:05,389 --> 01:39:09,739
Flight say OK, you have a go to uplink that
vector.

1592
01:39:09,739 --> 01:39:13,510
The integrated communication officer gets
the word from the flight dynamics officer,

1593
01:39:13,510 --> 01:39:18,969
I want you to go to the computer and get vector
number umpty-ump and uplink it to the crew.

1594
01:39:18,969 --> 01:39:24,199
And the integrated communications officer
uplinks the vector to the onboard system.

1595
01:39:24,199 --> 01:39:28,199
Now, there is a check in the onboard system
that goes into a buffer in the computer.

1596
01:39:28,199 --> 01:39:33,159
And that buffer gets sent telemetry back to
the ground, and the ground computer compares

1597
01:39:33,159 --> 01:39:38,889
what is in the onboard versus what is sent
and they should be the same.

1598
01:39:38,889 --> 01:39:44,600
We send about 5000 commands in the course
of a two week flight, and normally they always

1599
01:39:44,600 --> 01:39:45,489
compare.

1600
01:39:45,489 --> 01:39:52,130
This particular time there was a problem,
some radio noise or something and the data

1601
01:39:52,130 --> 01:39:53,260
got scrambled.

1602
01:39:53,260 --> 01:39:58,469
And it came back to the ground and the computer
put out the little words "data reject".

1603
01:39:58,469 --> 01:40:05,469
In other words, the command that you sent
is not what is onboard, the integrated communications

1604
01:40:06,610 --> 01:40:10,380
officer.

1605
01:40:10,380 --> 01:40:13,460
The backroom is doing other things.

1606
01:40:13,460 --> 01:40:20,460
The guy in the front room, integrated communications
officer checks the display and says, for whatever

1607
01:40:20,699 --> 01:40:25,750
reasons at 3:00 in the morning, OK, punches
the button to send the execute.

1608
01:40:25,750 --> 01:40:30,940
In other words, move the data from the buffer
into the navigation software.

1609
01:40:30,940 --> 01:40:31,570
It is wrong.

1610
01:40:31,570 --> 01:40:34,570
But he just makes a human error and sends
it.

1611
01:40:34,570 --> 01:40:39,800
His backroom guy, because we always work in
teams, is doing something else and didn't

1612
01:40:39,800 --> 01:40:42,400
check his work.

1613
01:40:42,400 --> 01:40:43,780
Normally there is a check and balance.

1614
01:40:43,780 --> 01:40:49,850
Before you send buffer execute you say to
somebody else does this look OK to you, too?

1615
01:40:49,850 --> 01:40:51,300
They missed that check.

1616
01:40:51,300 --> 01:40:52,280
What happens?

1617
01:40:52,280 --> 01:40:54,050
They send this command.

1618
01:40:54,050 --> 01:40:57,989
The Shuttle thinks it is in orbit around,
I was going to say Alpha Centauri, but it

1619
01:40:57,989 --> 01:41:04,989
was a lot farther away than that doing what
we call local vertical/local horizontal hold.

1620
01:41:06,770 --> 01:41:12,920
Well, now it's doing LV/LH around the star
in the Andromeda Galaxy, I guess, and it goes

1621
01:41:12,920 --> 01:41:13,550
out of control.

1622
01:41:13,550 --> 01:41:14,559
Not fast.

1623
01:41:14,559 --> 01:41:16,239
Now, this doesn't tumble end over end.

1624
01:41:16,239 --> 01:41:22,730
It reaches three degrees a minute rate, which
is not a high rate but you're moving out of

1625
01:41:22,730 --> 01:41:23,429
your attitude.

1626
01:41:23,429 --> 01:41:24,530
Well, what happens?

1627
01:41:24,530 --> 01:41:28,420
When you move out of your attitude the antennas
are no longer pointing at each other.

1628
01:41:28,420 --> 01:41:32,449
The Shuttle antenna is no longer pointing
at the tracking and data relay satellite so

1629
01:41:32,449 --> 01:41:37,620
command, data, voice, go away.

1630
01:41:37,620 --> 01:41:38,300
Loss of signal.

1631
01:41:38,300 --> 01:41:44,739
The worst thing the flight director can hear
is loss of signal with the crew.

1632
01:41:44,739 --> 01:41:46,070
OK.

1633
01:41:46,070 --> 01:41:53,070
We got lucky because about ten minutes later
it just happened to be acquired back through

1634
01:41:53,230 --> 01:41:53,889
the satellite.

1635
01:41:53,889 --> 01:41:55,300
It just happened to be acquired back.

1636
01:41:55,300 --> 01:41:57,650
We got lucky and they called the crew.

1637
01:41:57,650 --> 01:42:04,650
The crew switched to a manual autopilot, turns
on the big jets, restores the attitude and

1638
01:42:07,870 --> 01:42:08,699
life goes back to normal.

1639
01:42:08,699 --> 01:42:11,639
The crew now has been awakened twice, by the
way.

1640
01:42:11,639 --> 01:42:13,300
They are going to be grumpy the whole next
day.

1641
01:42:13,300 --> 01:42:19,820
If the big jets, which use a lot of gas, had
been on in that ten minutes, we could have

1642
01:42:19,820 --> 01:42:24,800
used the entire entry allowance of propellant.

1643
01:42:24,800 --> 01:42:27,070
OK.

1644
01:42:27,070 --> 01:42:28,889
As anything there is always a chain of events.

1645
01:42:28,889 --> 01:42:33,750
The flight dynamics officer was unable to
do this navigation state vector prior to crew

1646
01:42:33,750 --> 01:42:36,909
sleep because of the vehicle activity.

1647
01:42:36,909 --> 01:42:40,489
In other words, they had been doing maneuvers
and they had to get the radars to track to

1648
01:42:40,489 --> 01:42:42,989
build a solution.

1649
01:42:42,989 --> 01:42:46,510
Plans were made to uplink the state vector
during sleep, which is not terribly unusual

1650
01:42:46,510 --> 01:42:48,659
but not the typical situation.

1651
01:42:48,659 --> 01:42:52,909
During a sleep period, and I don't know why
they put during a sleep period, we typically

1652
01:42:52,909 --> 01:42:59,100
can have telemetry dropouts and radio frequency
interference and conditions which cause telemetry

1653
01:42:59,100 --> 01:43:00,230
dropouts.

1654
01:43:00,230 --> 01:43:03,159
They were predicted because of the orbiter
attitude.

1655
01:43:03,159 --> 01:43:06,989
The antennas don't always point in the best
part of the antenna pattern.

1656
01:43:06,989 --> 01:43:08,469
That we're going to have that.

1657
01:43:08,469 --> 01:43:11,370
We had the onboard smoke alarm that woke the
crew up.

1658
01:43:11,370 --> 01:43:13,219
We let them go back to sleep.

1659
01:43:13,219 --> 01:43:17,590
This is the same thing I went through.

1660
01:43:17,590 --> 01:43:24,120
Twelve seconds after he sent the back command
the backroom guy this did trivial recorder

1661
01:43:24,120 --> 01:43:31,120
command and we saw that they were miscompared.

1662
01:43:31,760 --> 01:43:33,139
And this is really the key.

1663
01:43:33,139 --> 01:43:37,940
Seventeen seconds after calling up the display
the backroom attempted to question the decision

1664
01:43:37,940 --> 01:43:44,080
but too late, the button had been pushed by
seventeen seconds.

1665
01:43:44,080 --> 01:43:45,239
OK.

1666
01:43:45,239 --> 01:43:50,010
The flight dynamic officer is looking to see
if we get a good state vector on the board.

1667
01:43:50,010 --> 01:43:51,820
He didn't see on the board.

1668
01:43:51,820 --> 01:43:53,050
INCO said I sent it.

1669
01:43:53,050 --> 01:43:54,219
What's going on?

1670
01:43:54,219 --> 01:43:59,739
The data processing system officer reports
that the computers, both of them, the guidance

1671
01:43:59,739 --> 01:44:05,139
and navigation computer and the system management
computer are clocking internal errors.

1672
01:44:05,139 --> 01:44:06,690
They have a term for this.

1673
01:44:06,690 --> 01:44:08,840
It's called divide by zero.

1674
01:44:08,840 --> 01:44:10,780
Computers don't like to do that arithmetically.

1675
01:44:10,780 --> 01:44:12,760
They send an alarm.

1676
01:44:12,760 --> 01:44:15,750
The propulsion system officer reports continuous
jet firing.

1677
01:44:15,750 --> 01:44:22,340
The guidance officer reports that they are
huge autopilot errors and high vehicle rates.

1678
01:44:22,340 --> 01:44:25,809
When I said three degrees, I meant three degrees
a second, quite a lot.

1679
01:44:25,809 --> 01:44:29,090
CAPCOM says wake up.

1680
01:44:29,090 --> 01:44:34,139
CAPCOM, we need to tell the crew something
is going on.

1681
01:44:34,139 --> 01:44:35,880
Wake the crew up.

1682
01:44:35,880 --> 01:44:38,800
Voice link is normally disabled during crew
sleep.

1683
01:44:38,800 --> 01:44:42,760
Because every once in a while somebody pushes
the button and wakes the crew up during crew

1684
01:44:42,760 --> 01:44:45,949
sleep so we configure it so that we cannot
do it.

1685
01:44:45,949 --> 01:44:52,870
So we had to reconfigure the ground voice
system to allow the CAPCOM to communicate.

1686
01:44:52,870 --> 01:44:55,110
We lost the one satellite.

1687
01:44:55,110 --> 01:44:57,110
We had the wrong antenna selecting.

1688
01:44:57,110 --> 01:45:02,170
And then ten minutes everybody thought they
were dead.

1689
01:45:02,170 --> 01:45:08,409
We woke the crew up, they put the vehicle
on manual mode and life returned to normal

1690
01:45:08,409 --> 01:45:10,719
after the new state vector onboard.

1691
01:45:10,719 --> 01:45:12,480
That never made the press, I don't think.

1692
01:45:12,480 --> 01:45:15,110
It was directly caused by operator error.

1693
01:45:15,110 --> 01:45:20,090
He clearly did things outside of what he was
trained to.

1694
01:45:20,090 --> 01:45:24,360
And these are all nice little bureaucratic
words saying that everything worked like it

1695
01:45:24,360 --> 01:45:29,110
was supposed to except for the guy.

1696
01:45:29,110 --> 01:45:31,290
And here is what we did in our great bureaucratic
mode.

1697
01:45:31,290 --> 01:45:32,750
Procedures were updated.

1698
01:45:32,750 --> 01:45:33,989
Software was updated.

1699
01:45:33,989 --> 01:45:35,070
Rules were updated.

1700
01:45:35,070 --> 01:45:38,290
Consol handbook procedures were updated.

1701
01:45:38,290 --> 01:45:44,210
Work guidelines of making people work ten
or twelve days in a row on nine or ten or

1702
01:45:44,210 --> 01:45:49,940
twelve hour shifts, particularly on a nice
shift were revised so we let people off.

1703
01:45:49,940 --> 01:45:54,929
And, basically, what we did was we added more
checks and balances to the system.

1704
01:45:54,929 --> 01:45:59,620
Now, is that the kind of thing that you do
when you are designing a spacecraft?

1705
01:45:59,620 --> 01:46:05,719
Why would you design a spacecraft where you
had to update the state vector every day?

1706
01:46:05,719 --> 01:46:10,830
Why would you design a spacecraft that would
crash into the surface of Mars when it was

1707
01:46:10,830 --> 01:46:15,320
supposed to go into orbit around Mars?

1708
01:46:15,320 --> 01:46:19,550
You've got to be careful when you design your
system of the unintended consequences of your

1709
01:46:19,550 --> 01:46:21,980
operation.

1710
01:46:21,980 --> 01:46:26,059
And if you don't think very clearly about
what you're putting on the operators you'll

1711
01:46:26,059 --> 01:46:30,100
force them into positions like this, so you've
got to think about the operation.

1712
01:46:30,100 --> 01:46:37,000
Not just is the wing going to fall off because
the wind gust is going to exceed the structural

1713
01:46:37,000 --> 01:46:37,600
capability?

1714
01:46:37,600 --> 01:46:39,710
You have to think about the operations.

1715
01:46:39,710 --> 01:46:40,620
I've got one more.

1716
01:46:40,620 --> 01:46:41,840
Do we have time for one more?

1717
01:46:41,840 --> 01:46:43,469
If you can do it in two minutes.

1718
01:46:43,469 --> 01:46:43,980
OK.

1719
01:46:43,980 --> 01:46:50,489
This main engine combustion chamber, the main
engines have a computer that looks at sensors

1720
01:46:50,489 --> 01:46:52,989
that controlled our mixture ratio and things.

1721
01:46:52,989 --> 01:46:55,409
One of these sensors plugged up.

1722
01:46:55,409 --> 01:46:57,030
And they give you the 30 second version.

1723
01:46:57,030 --> 01:46:59,469
You can read it all.

1724
01:46:59,469 --> 01:47:04,559
The ground had been using a pressure check
with a little pressure meter that had a Neoprene

1725
01:47:04,559 --> 01:47:07,150
rubber O ring.

1726
01:47:07,150 --> 01:47:13,670
And, when they pulled the pressure gauge off,
it left the Neoprene rubber there and stopped

1727
01:47:13,670 --> 01:47:14,650
up the sensor.

1728
01:47:14,650 --> 01:47:19,800
And, because of that, the engine nearly shut
down in flight.

1729
01:47:19,800 --> 01:47:25,309
And, if Mission Control hadn't been paying
attention and disabled that sensor during

1730
01:47:25,309 --> 01:47:30,719
real-time, we would have done our first return
to launch site abort on that engine.

1731
01:47:30,719 --> 01:47:33,300
So, little things count for a lot.

1732
01:47:33,300 --> 01:47:36,030
Small instrumentation things count for a lot.

1733
01:47:36,030 --> 01:47:37,550
I hope this has been helpful to you.

1734
01:47:37,550 --> 01:47:43,389
Anybody got any other questions before I sit
down?

1735
01:47:43,389 --> 01:47:45,320
[APPLAUSE]

1736
01:47:45,320 --> 01:47:51,380
One question from the back.

1737
01:47:51,380 --> 01:47:54,409
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

1738
01:47:54,409 --> 01:48:01,409
Well, my thoughts are: I'm excited that NASA's
got the goal of going back to the Moon and

1739
01:48:04,510 --> 01:48:09,580
Mars, I wish we'd never gotten away from that.

1740
01:48:09,580 --> 01:48:14,350
I'm working really hard in the Space Shuttle
program to free up money so that exploration

1741
01:48:14,350 --> 01:48:15,429
can do what it needs to do.

1742
01:48:15,429 --> 01:48:21,050
I'm not in a position to know whether they've
got enough to do their job.

1743
01:48:21,050 --> 01:48:24,880
It does look a little tight - I don't know,
time will tell.

1744
01:48:24,880 --> 01:48:28,290
But I'm just excited to have the opportunity
to head in that direction.

1745
01:48:28,290 --> 01:48:30,350
I'm going to give you the diplomatic answer.

1746
01:48:30,350 --> 01:48:32,849
Chris is retired; I still have to go to work.