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The formal part of the class will start about
five past nine, but I'll just start with some

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introductory remarks.

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First of all, I have got bios from a large
number of people.

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I haven't done a count yet to see from whom
I haven't gotten them, but if you haven't

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00:00:24,719 --> 00:00:27,500
sent me a short bio please do.

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00:00:27,500 --> 00:00:34,000
It just helps us to get to know who you are.

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Let's see.

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Second thing.

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The next deliverable, which is, I think, in
a week or so, I don't have the syllabus with

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me right now, we would like a preliminary
indication from you.

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I am leaving it up to you to form your own
teams.

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Roughly, we've found about 4 people make up
a good team.

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That is a good way to spread the work around.

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If any of you are having difficulty or whatever,
let me know, we will try to help, but you

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are almost all graduate students.

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You can organize yourself.

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With a preliminary indication of what system
you would like to do a study on.

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Take a handout.

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I am just wondering if you can provide a list
of email addresses to everyone so that we

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can contact each other.

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I will be happy to do that.

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I will post that.

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Let's see.

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The second thing.

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There are a fair number of listeners in the
class, and quite a few of you have contacted

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me to make sure that it is OK to be here as
listeners.

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I have no problem with that.

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The only thing that I would ask, right now
we are more or less filled to capacity.

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I expect that the class isn't going to grow
after this, so I think we are OK.

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What I did tell people is that if we get into
a seat crunch, obviously, the people who are

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taking the course for credit have priorities
for seats.

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So any of you who are listeners please keep
that in mind.

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Next thing.

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I am going to be putting some things on reserve
in the library.

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This is courtesy of Professor Cohen.

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This is the proceedings of a Space Shuttle
Technical Conference.

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Aaron, do you want to say something just about
the background?

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00:02:40,760 --> 00:02:45,599
The background is that we decided, after the
Shuttle had flown a couple of times, that

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00:02:45,599 --> 00:02:51,430
we would have a typical NACA, going back to
NACA, but this was NASA technical conference

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00:02:51,430 --> 00:02:56,270
where we actually had technical papers written
by the various people that designed the system,

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00:02:56,270 --> 00:02:58,329
some you will hear talk, some you won't.

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00:02:58,329 --> 00:03:01,250
But these are technical papers of how the
systems were developed.

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00:03:01,250 --> 00:03:05,950
So it is a pretty detailed understanding of
the thermal protection system, the main propulsion

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00:03:05,950 --> 00:03:07,790
system, so forth and so on.

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00:03:07,790 --> 00:03:10,569
So it is a pretty good documentary of how
it was done.

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00:03:10,569 --> 00:03:15,900
This should be a good reference for your papers.

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00:03:15,900 --> 00:03:18,959
It is 1983.

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Like I say, I will go down this afternoon
and put this on reserve in the library.

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00:03:25,090 --> 00:03:32,090
I will also put on reserve a copy of a systems
study that was done at Texas A&M for a similar

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00:03:36,129 --> 00:03:41,400
course that Professor taught on systems engineering
and the Space Shuttle just to give you kind

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00:03:41,400 --> 00:03:44,739
of an idea of what someone else did.

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00:03:44,739 --> 00:03:46,769
This was a rather good paper.

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00:03:46,769 --> 00:03:53,769
I see you gave them a very high mark so presumably
that means it is a good example.

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Finally, you have all got a copy of this paper
by Professor Cohen and Milt Silvera who was

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00:04:05,739 --> 00:04:10,319
also a very responsible person in the Shuttle
program.

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It is a high level background on the Shuttle
and its systems.

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I am sure there are some of you here who are
space enthusiasts and who probably have followed

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the Shuttle system pretty closely and to whom
there won't be a whole lot new here.

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But, on the other hand, we want everybody
in the course to come up to a certain level

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of knowledge about the Shuttle, its systems
and the systems engineering that went behind

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it.

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00:04:42,629 --> 00:04:47,080
So I think it's good to have something like
this available.

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It's a nice reference piece.

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Today and Thursday Professor Cohen is going
to give an introduction into the Shuttle,

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its systems and the system engineering that
went into it.

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Before we start that, are there any other
questions either about the technicalities

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of the course or just anything?

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00:05:13,659 --> 00:05:15,580
Oh, I know one thing.

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I have a few comments from people telling
me that the pdf files that I posted on the

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website, some people could read them and some
people could not read them.

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00:05:27,080 --> 00:05:33,979
I have Macs but have been posting pdf files
for numerous courses.

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00:05:33,979 --> 00:05:40,979
I have never had any problem with people reading
it before.

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First of all, who has tried to look at the
files?

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00:05:48,919 --> 00:05:49,169
OK.
Of those people who have tried to look at
the files, who has had difficulty?

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00:05:54,580 --> 00:06:01,580
This is strange.

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00:06:02,879 --> 00:06:08,020
Well, if anybody has any ideas about what
the problem might be, I would be very curious.

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00:06:08,020 --> 00:06:15,020
I mean have you ever had this problem with
other courses?

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I will do a couple of experiments and post
one or two more documents, both in pdf and

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in either Word or PowerPoint form.

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I would suggest that everybody during the
next two days go and try to open them.

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Let's see if we can isolate where the problem
might be.

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Like I said, I've never had this problem with
any other courses.

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And, in principle, I mean the whole point
of pdf files is it's supposed to be compatible

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across Macs, PCs and all that.

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00:06:54,929 --> 00:06:58,919
So I don't know what the problem is but we'll
see if we can run it down.

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00:06:58,919 --> 00:07:04,399
And thanks to those of you who let me know
that there was a difficulty.

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00:07:04,399 --> 00:07:06,059
That is all I have.

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00:07:06,059 --> 00:07:07,819
Any other questions, comments?

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00:07:07,819 --> 00:07:14,819
What are you kind of expecting with these
journal deliverables so we can kind of be

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00:07:15,369 --> 00:07:17,259
just ahead of that?

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00:07:17,259 --> 00:07:24,259
The idea is to basically put together the
highlights of the lecture from the systems

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engineering point of view.

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In other words, what we want -- When somebody
is talking about a specific system, we want

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00:07:34,839 --> 00:07:41,839
you to have a brief description of the system,
the purpose, what it does, something about

95
00:07:43,159 --> 00:07:50,159
the design considerations, something about
the operations, kind of the basic concerns

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00:07:53,939 --> 00:07:55,589
from the systems engineering point of view.

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00:07:55,589 --> 00:08:02,589
And anything they talk about, particular interactions
between that system and other systems.

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Can you think of anything else in particular?

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I think that about it.

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OK.

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I will think that through a little bit more,
and maybe I can come up with a checklist that

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would help you put that together.

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00:08:16,989 --> 00:08:18,939
It's not meant to be a big burden.

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It's just a way to organize everybody's thinking
on how to get the most out of the lecturers,

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particularly because, as I mentioned, these
lectures are all being given, by and large,

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by different people.

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They will have different styles.

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We have kind of explained to everybody the
structure of the course, what we're looking

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for, but I cannot really guarantee in advance
what the content of the lecture will be.

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Professor Cohen and I will make any attempt,
if the lectures don't cover some of those

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critical points from a systems engineering
point of view, we will try to stimulate the

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discussion on that or fill in.

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00:09:07,300 --> 00:09:09,139
But you should do the same thing.

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In other words, make sure that there is something
that you think you would like to be getting

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out of the lecture and you haven't gotten,
don't be embarrassed to ask questions.

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Something you ought to think about, when these
individual lectures come up, is it should

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be the description and function of the system.

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If they don't bring that out then we ought
to try to bring it out.

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The requirements of the subsystem or the system,
what are the requirements?

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Because that is very fundamental.

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What are the requirements?

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The development of the subsystem.

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What kind of problems did they have?

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00:09:38,490 --> 00:09:41,910
What kind of technologies did they have to
overcome?

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And, of course, the operation of the subsystems.

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Those are, I think, key points.

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Now, whether you're going to get that from
everybody or not, I don't know.

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But I think you need to look for that.

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And, if you don't, then we will try to develop
that.

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Are you looking for the notes to be taken
in class?

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I don't follow you.

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I mean I am not looking for a Xerox of what
you're writing in the notebook, if that's

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what you mean.

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No.

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I mean I would like you to put your thoughts
together into a concise form.

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And I think that will be a good reference
to you, hopefully, after the course on Shuttle

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systems.

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OK?

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Over to you.

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You are going to have a very unique opportunity.

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You are going to have people speak, lecture
you on the various Shuttle subsystems in quite

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a bit of detail.

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00:10:47,290 --> 00:10:53,550
You will have some people that will be very,
very positive about the Shuttle, that think

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it's a great design, a great operation.

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You will have others that will not think it's
so good.

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And you will have some that will give you
just a detailed technical approach of what

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happened.

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00:11:05,370 --> 00:11:10,990
What I would like to suggest to you, I think,
for your good and for the good of the future,

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future students, future designers, is that
you ought to come up with your own decision.

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Was it the right design?

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00:11:18,769 --> 00:11:19,670
Was it the correct design?

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Should it have been done differently?

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And, if so, why and how would you do it?

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00:11:24,850 --> 00:11:30,839
And I think it will be good for, when you
go to work on future projects.

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00:11:30,839 --> 00:11:35,160
And it would also be good, I think, for NASA,
something we could turn over to NASA.

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I think it's a very valuable thing to do.

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So I would suggest you do that as you go through
the course.

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And I will be very happy to talk to you about
any of your ideas that you have through the

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Internet, through emails or in person discussion.

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And you might want to do this later on as
the semester develops.

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A little bit what I am going to say today
really starts off where Dale Myers, your previous

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speaker, left off.

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00:12:04,910 --> 00:12:06,209
And it gets into a little bit more detail.

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So, as this course develops, you're going
to get more and more detail.

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00:12:10,110 --> 00:12:15,079
But let me start off again, just very much
like Dale did, and talk about the Shuttle

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history.

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In 1952, the fully reusable launch vehicles
concept was discussed.

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People were interested in that.

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00:12:26,620 --> 00:12:31,350
1962, fully reusable vehicles were seriously
considered.

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The Air Force study project Dynosaur was cancelled
in 1969.

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In 1969, NASA adopted the idea of a fully
reusable spaceship.

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I became the Orbiter Project Manager for NASA
in August of 1972.

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And, at that time, I also was manager of the
Systems Engineering Organization for the first

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two years.

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So I, you might say, the total system at that
time and the Orbiter in 1972.

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Yes?

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00:13:07,490 --> 00:13:11,769
Could you tell us a little bit about your
background?

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00:13:11,769 --> 00:13:12,279
Yes.

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Well, my background was I graduated from Texas
A&M University in 1952 and went to the Army,

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went to Korea.

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00:13:25,839 --> 00:13:29,129
And then when I came back went to work for
RCA.

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And I worked on the microwave tubes, the microwave
oven.

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In fact, when I told my wife what I was working
on, I said I'm working on a microwave oven.

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That was in 1954.

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That was a long time ago.

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How many people have microwave ovens today?

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00:13:47,819 --> 00:13:48,069
Everybody does.

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00:13:48,059 --> 00:13:52,819
Well, in 1954-1955, when they came out, they
were about $3,000 a piece.

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I was working on one and told my wife.

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And we'd been married a long time.

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I told my wife that I was working on something
called a microwave oven.

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And you are going to be able to cook a roast
in a couple of minutes and a potato in a couple

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of minutes.

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00:14:03,480 --> 00:14:05,079
And she looked at me and said that will never
sell.

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00:14:05,079 --> 00:14:08,300
Anyway, that's what I worked on.

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Then I worked for General Dynamics on the
Atlas and Centaur.

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And then, in 1962, I went to the Johnson Space
Center and worked very closely on the Apollo

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00:14:19,829 --> 00:14:23,620
Program, worked very closely with the MIT
Instrumentation Lab, now the Draper Lab on

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00:14:23,620 --> 00:14:25,370
the guidance and navigation control system.

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00:14:25,370 --> 00:14:28,600
I became head of System Engineering in Apollo.

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00:14:28,600 --> 00:14:31,230
Then manager of the Command and Service Module
in Apollo.

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00:14:31,230 --> 00:14:38,230
Then, in August 1972, I became the manager
of the Space Shuttle Orbiter.

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00:14:39,029 --> 00:14:41,999
Then I became Director of Research and Engineering
at Johnson Space Center.

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00:14:41,999 --> 00:14:44,569
And then I became Director of the Johnson
Space Center.

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00:14:44,569 --> 00:14:50,689
And then, for a while, I was the Acting Deputy
Administrator in Washington.

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00:14:50,689 --> 00:14:53,899
And then I retired and went to Texas A&M to
teach.

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00:14:53,899 --> 00:14:56,490
Then Jeff asked me to come to do this, and
I am very happy to be here.

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00:14:56,490 --> 00:15:03,490
Actually, one thing you mentioned reminded
me of something, not to divert the lecture

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00:15:04,790 --> 00:15:10,980
today, but the fact that there was specifically
a systems engineering group at the center

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00:15:10,980 --> 00:15:15,970
which was separate from the project offices
is something which is probably worth talking

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00:15:15,970 --> 00:15:16,499
about at some point.

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00:15:16,499 --> 00:15:16,749
That's right.

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00:15:16,720 --> 00:15:18,019
Well, let me just make a mention of that.

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00:15:18,019 --> 00:15:25,019
When we were in Apollo we sat around the table
for many days and months trying to figure

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00:15:25,649 --> 00:15:27,999
out how you define systems engineering.

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00:15:27,999 --> 00:15:29,540
We didn't even know what systems engineering
was.

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00:15:29,540 --> 00:15:34,079
In fact, today, I'm not sure you'll get a
clear definition of what it is.

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00:15:34,079 --> 00:15:35,730
I want to give you some examples.

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00:15:35,730 --> 00:15:38,850
As we go through the lecture, I am going to
give you some examples of what I think it

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00:15:38,850 --> 00:15:40,050
is and how it was used.

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00:15:40,050 --> 00:15:41,509
So we will do that.

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00:15:41,509 --> 00:15:46,319
Let me say just one other thing.

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Professor Cohen has these view graphs in electronic
form down in Texas and, when he gets back,

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he will send them to me and I will post them
on the website.

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00:15:54,949 --> 00:15:57,139
Well, I will give you this whole package because
there are also some pictures.

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I don't know what you want to do with the
photos.

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Something that is very key in any design and
something you really need to pursue, whenever

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00:16:06,129 --> 00:16:09,480
you do a design project, is understand the
requirements.

229
00:16:09,480 --> 00:16:14,559
Because, if you don't understand the requirements,
you might get a very good product that is

230
00:16:14,559 --> 00:16:14,809
useless.

231
00:16:14,759 --> 00:16:19,559
So you have to understand what your customer
wants, the top level requirements.

232
00:16:19,559 --> 00:16:22,809
One thing that was handed down to us is it
was supposed to be fully reusable.

233
00:16:22,809 --> 00:16:23,519
That was one requirement.

234
00:16:23,519 --> 00:16:25,930
14-day turnaround time.

235
00:16:25,930 --> 00:16:29,230
You were supposed to be able to turn the Shuttle
around in 14 days.

236
00:16:29,230 --> 00:16:32,420
Deploy and retrieve payloads.

237
00:16:32,420 --> 00:16:37,490
You had to deploy a payload and you had to
retrieve a payload.

238
00:16:37,490 --> 00:16:44,050
Design, development and test is estimated
to be $5.1 billion in 1971 dollars.

239
00:16:44,050 --> 00:16:47,220
Dale Myers didn't tell you the whole story,
but one reason Dale Myers and I are such good

240
00:16:47,220 --> 00:16:51,019
friends is he was Associate Administrator
of Manned Space Flight, I was the Orbiter

241
00:16:51,019 --> 00:16:57,899
Project Manager and they, they being headquarters,
headquarters was always there to help, actually

242
00:16:57,899 --> 00:16:59,829
took away two years of inflation.

243
00:16:59,829 --> 00:17:04,589
If they had given those two years of inflation,
we would have met the $5.1 billion in 1971

244
00:17:04,589 --> 00:17:04,910
dollars.

245
00:17:04,910 --> 00:17:06,459
And Dale fought for that but lost.

246
00:17:06,459 --> 00:17:08,699
Now, here is where we missed it.

247
00:17:08,699 --> 00:17:15,599
The original cost per flight for 65,000 pounds
was $10.5 million per flight in 1971 dollars

248
00:17:15,599 --> 00:17:18,648
but for a flight rate of 60 flights per year.

249
00:17:18,648 --> 00:17:21,919
When I told my wife I was doing that, and
she's been around the space program a long

250
00:17:21,919 --> 00:17:23,398
time, she said you never agreed to that, did
you?

251
00:17:23,398 --> 00:17:30,399
Sixty flights per year is pretty hard to do,
but that's what we came up with at the time.

252
00:17:35,559 --> 00:17:39,580
Now, Dale mentioned the Air Force requirements,
but here were the phase A studies.

253
00:17:39,580 --> 00:17:43,700
The phase A studies were conducted to determine
the basic requirements and their effects on

254
00:17:43,700 --> 00:17:46,779
design in 1969.

255
00:17:46,779 --> 00:17:53,779
The principle issues were the size and weight
of the payload, the cross-range of the Orbiter

256
00:17:53,840 --> 00:17:56,340
and what kind of heat material was going to
be used.

257
00:17:56,340 --> 00:18:01,940
You have to recognize are we going to use
heat-resistant structure or reusable insulating

258
00:18:01,940 --> 00:18:02,380
material?

259
00:18:02,380 --> 00:18:07,470
You have to recognize that our background
was Mercury, Gemini and Apollo, and they all

260
00:18:07,470 --> 00:18:09,580
used an ablative material.

261
00:18:09,580 --> 00:18:13,580
Ablative material cannot be reused because
basically the surface changes.

262
00:18:13,580 --> 00:18:19,090
You had to have some kind of insulated material
so the surface did not change.

263
00:18:19,090 --> 00:18:26,090
Let me now go through very quickly for you,
just for the sake of completeness, Dale showed

264
00:18:30,820 --> 00:18:31,649
you a few of the studies.

265
00:18:31,649 --> 00:18:36,750
I want to flash up a lot of phase A studies
just to let you take a look at what people

266
00:18:36,750 --> 00:18:38,610
were doing.

267
00:18:38,610 --> 00:18:41,279
And you don't have to read the words but you
might just look at the diagram.

268
00:18:41,279 --> 00:18:44,799
There was General Dynamic's phase A study.

269
00:18:44,799 --> 00:18:46,260
There was North American Rockwell.

270
00:18:46,260 --> 00:18:48,640
That is the one Dale was talking about because
that was where he was.

271
00:18:48,640 --> 00:18:51,860
And there was a phase B study for McDonnell
Douglas.

272
00:18:51,860 --> 00:18:53,960
So that is what they all looked like at the
time.

273
00:18:53,960 --> 00:18:57,870
Now, I am going to go through some just for
the sake of completeness here.

274
00:18:57,870 --> 00:19:04,870
There was, again, another McDonnell Douglas
study, Martin Marietta.

275
00:19:10,559 --> 00:19:12,840
So those were basically some of the studies.

276
00:19:12,840 --> 00:19:16,350
You can see they all had some kind of a wing-type
vehicle.

277
00:19:16,350 --> 00:19:23,350
Already most of those were delta wings so
the decision had already been made.

278
00:19:23,580 --> 00:19:30,279
Interestingly enough, and I am going to quote
some names to you, and you might go back and

279
00:19:30,279 --> 00:19:30,860
research it.

280
00:19:30,860 --> 00:19:33,630
Max Faget was like the lead engineer.

281
00:19:33,630 --> 00:19:40,049
He was sort of a man that was immortalized
in terms of the space program.

282
00:19:40,049 --> 00:19:41,960
He felt we ought to go with the straight wing.

283
00:19:41,960 --> 00:19:47,970
He felt very strongly about a straight wing,
but that eliminated the very large cost range

284
00:19:47,970 --> 00:19:49,080
the Air Force needed.

285
00:19:49,080 --> 00:19:54,399
Straight wing was easier to build, not as
high loads on it and so forth.

286
00:19:54,399 --> 00:20:00,340
Here, interestingly enough, if you look at
Chrysler.

287
00:20:00,340 --> 00:20:01,679
Chrysler had a study.

288
00:20:01,679 --> 00:20:08,679
And Chrysler actually had a capsule, but here
were more vehicles.

289
00:20:09,049 --> 00:20:12,980
And people were really thinking about this
time of a fly back booster where you actually

290
00:20:12,980 --> 00:20:16,279
had a booster that returned and came back
and landed.

291
00:20:16,279 --> 00:20:20,190
And they also had a land vehicle that landed.

292
00:20:20,190 --> 00:20:23,529
So that was what the real requirement was
at the time.

293
00:20:23,529 --> 00:20:26,990
Somebody sort of commented about Chrysler.

294
00:20:26,990 --> 00:20:30,820
There was also Ford.

295
00:20:30,820 --> 00:20:34,190
There were a lot of aerospace companies back
in those days.

296
00:20:34,190 --> 00:20:36,460
It has changed a lot, that's right.

297
00:20:36,460 --> 00:20:40,470
And here is McDonnell Douglas, of course Grumman.

298
00:20:40,470 --> 00:20:43,590
So a lot of these studies.

299
00:20:43,590 --> 00:20:47,090
Then you're getting to see something already
starting to look a little bit like the Shuttle.

300
00:20:47,090 --> 00:20:51,730
And I am almost through.

301
00:20:51,730 --> 00:20:53,340
And here are more.

302
00:20:53,340 --> 00:20:57,860
These are, I think, getting maybe in the phase
B studies.

303
00:20:57,860 --> 00:21:04,240
But you can see some of them are starting
to look like the existing Shuttle.

304
00:21:04,240 --> 00:21:04,630
Lockheed.

305
00:21:04,630 --> 00:21:11,630
Now, the principle issues in the Shuttle studies,
now we're starting to get a little bit more

306
00:21:21,429 --> 00:21:26,419
technical and a little more detailed, is should
the reaction control system, now, the reaction

307
00:21:26,419 --> 00:21:33,169
control system is basically a propulsion system
that controls the vehicle about its center

308
00:21:33,169 --> 00:21:33,419
of gravity.

309
00:21:33,200 --> 00:21:36,690
It's for alttitude control, basically.

310
00:21:36,690 --> 00:21:43,690
Should the reaction control system be liquid
oxygen/liquid hydrogen or should you use a

311
00:21:43,929 --> 00:21:47,880
hypergolic system where you know it is a storable
type system.

312
00:21:47,880 --> 00:21:48,640
That was a big issue.

313
00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:54,140
Does everybody here know what hypergolic fuel
is?

314
00:21:54,140 --> 00:21:55,929
Let's talk about it a little bit.

315
00:21:55,929 --> 00:22:00,890
Well, hypergolic fuel is a fuel like hydrazine.

316
00:22:00,890 --> 00:22:07,890
It actually has an oxidizer and a propellant
in the same fuel.

317
00:22:09,029 --> 00:22:12,090
Now, another issue was a fly-by-wire flight
control system.

318
00:22:12,090 --> 00:22:13,110
That was a big issue.

319
00:22:13,110 --> 00:22:15,490
Do we have a fly-by-wire flight control system?

320
00:22:15,490 --> 00:22:17,279
And now everything has a fly-by-wire.

321
00:22:17,279 --> 00:22:19,340
All the military jets have fly-by-wire.

322
00:22:19,340 --> 00:22:24,480
But basically was it going to be a computer
controlled system or are we going to have

323
00:22:24,480 --> 00:22:25,820
cables fly the machine?

324
00:22:25,820 --> 00:22:28,309
That was a very big issue at the time.

325
00:22:28,309 --> 00:22:31,990
Wind tunnel tests to determine wing size and
configuration.

326
00:22:31,990 --> 00:22:35,309
That is a very difficult thing to do.

327
00:22:35,309 --> 00:22:42,309
This is starting to get into what you might
say is systems engineering.

328
00:22:42,769 --> 00:22:49,769
Air breathing engines were considered for
fly back and later determined to be too heavy.

329
00:22:55,480 --> 00:23:02,480
And some Shuttle studies that still had to
be done was the entry techniques, landing

330
00:23:02,940 --> 00:23:06,010
speed, what type of landing speed were we
going to have and the approach pattern?

331
00:23:06,010 --> 00:23:12,480
So these were all some things that had to
be understood during the studies.

332
00:23:12,480 --> 00:23:19,480
The phase B
studies were performed in the mid 1970s to
determine the preliminary design.

333
00:23:24,809 --> 00:23:31,049
The results showed a fully recoverable Orbiter.

334
00:23:31,049 --> 00:23:34,159
Disposable fuel tank.

335
00:23:34,159 --> 00:23:35,659
Parachute recoverable solid rocket boosters.

336
00:23:35,659 --> 00:23:41,519
High performance hydrogen oxygen engines placed
in the Orbiter to recover.

337
00:23:41,519 --> 00:23:44,669
This was all systems engineering that lead
up to the design.

338
00:23:44,669 --> 00:23:48,779
So you have systems engineering in various
phases of the program.

339
00:23:48,779 --> 00:23:54,919
And usually systems engineering composes of
an interdisciplinary team that has been given

340
00:23:54,919 --> 00:23:57,899
some assumptions, some constraints.

341
00:23:57,899 --> 00:24:00,210
They have some top level requirements.

342
00:24:00,210 --> 00:24:07,210
They do an iterative process with some tools
such as computer tools for calculation of

343
00:24:08,070 --> 00:24:10,220
loads and flight mechanics.

344
00:24:10,220 --> 00:24:14,440
And they come up with an iteration of what
the design is going to be.

345
00:24:14,440 --> 00:24:19,350
So that is basically how it was done.

346
00:24:19,350 --> 00:24:22,929
Now, some of that was sort of like the ground
rules.

347
00:24:22,929 --> 00:24:26,320
Some of the things that came out of it, once
we started putting the total system together,

348
00:24:26,320 --> 00:24:33,169
we showed that the fully reusable with a fly
back booster was greater than $5.1 billion.

349
00:24:33,169 --> 00:24:35,340
So that was thrown out.

350
00:24:35,340 --> 00:24:40,130
Now, there is a question, and that's what
I asked Dale, should we have said, hey, we

351
00:24:40,130 --> 00:24:42,049
need to money to really have a fly back booster?

352
00:24:42,049 --> 00:24:49,049
But they gave us a constraint of $5.1 billion
in 1971 dollars and it didn't make it.

353
00:24:49,950 --> 00:24:53,649
I showed you, many configurations were studies.

354
00:24:53,649 --> 00:25:00,649
And the turnaround time of 14 days dictated
a landing with a winged vehicle on a runway.

355
00:25:02,059 --> 00:25:04,590
You weren't going to be able to land this
in the water or with parachutes.

356
00:25:04,590 --> 00:25:10,179
You wouldn't have to land it on a runway so
you could quickly turn it around in 14 days.

357
00:25:10,179 --> 00:25:14,500
The payload, deployment and retrieval requirement
determined the location of the Orbiter and

358
00:25:14,500 --> 00:25:16,190
the launch configuration.

359
00:25:16,190 --> 00:25:19,610
If you look at that large payload bay, it
would be very difficult to put that on top

360
00:25:19,610 --> 00:25:20,100
of the vehicle.

361
00:25:20,100 --> 00:25:25,950
One of the requirements that NASA has now
is the CEV should be on top of the stack.

362
00:25:25,950 --> 00:25:28,519
Well, if you're going to have that large a
vehicle, it is pretty hard to put it on top

363
00:25:28,519 --> 00:25:32,070
of the stack, particularly with wings.

364
00:25:32,070 --> 00:25:33,399
This is what we had to come up.

365
00:25:33,399 --> 00:25:34,919
These are some of the results.

366
00:25:34,919 --> 00:25:36,510
And these are all systems studies.

367
00:25:36,510 --> 00:25:39,659
This is systems engineering.

368
00:25:39,659 --> 00:25:46,659
Now you're getting to look at what the design
is starting to look like.

369
00:25:47,049 --> 00:25:50,909
This is the agency commitment in March of
1972.

370
00:25:50,909 --> 00:25:57,909
In May of 1972, you had the North American
Proposal.

371
00:25:59,179 --> 00:26:02,809
And then I became Orbiter Project Manager
in August of 1972.

372
00:26:02,809 --> 00:26:03,710
We did a study.

373
00:26:03,710 --> 00:26:08,019
And PRR is the preliminary requirements review.

374
00:26:08,019 --> 00:26:09,750
But that was the configuration.

375
00:26:09,750 --> 00:26:10,659
We made some changes.

376
00:26:10,659 --> 00:26:14,850
And the production commitment was made in
May of 1973.

377
00:26:14,850 --> 00:26:21,850
This chart, which was sort of the gee-whiz
chart at one point in time, showed the 1971

378
00:26:23,789 --> 00:26:29,960
dollars cost per flight for the Thor, the
Atlas, the Titan 3c, the Saturn 1b and the

379
00:26:29,960 --> 00:26:30,210
Shuttle.
And that is payload to orbit.

380
00:26:33,570 --> 00:26:38,760
So you can see that the thing that was really
missed in the Shuttle was the $10.5 million

381
00:26:38,760 --> 00:26:40,169
cost per flight.

382
00:26:40,169 --> 00:26:40,820
Yes, sir.

383
00:26:40,820 --> 00:26:47,820
What is the notch on top of the second two
that disappeared?

384
00:26:49,059 --> 00:26:49,309
That up there?

385
00:26:49,130 --> 00:26:50,470
That was their data probe.

386
00:26:50,470 --> 00:26:55,299
It was taken off because it wasn't needed.

387
00:26:55,299 --> 00:26:55,679
Good question.

388
00:26:55,679 --> 00:26:56,039
Thank you.

389
00:26:56,039 --> 00:26:59,970
And, by the way, do not hesitate to interrupt
me and ask me questions any time.

390
00:26:59,970 --> 00:27:03,860
And, if you don't understand what I'm saying,
please stop me, tell me slow down or ask me

391
00:27:03,860 --> 00:27:06,529
any questions you would like to ask me.

392
00:27:06,529 --> 00:27:08,600
There are data probes on the Shuttle.

393
00:27:08,600 --> 00:27:10,250
Major configuration decisions.

394
00:27:10,250 --> 00:27:17,250
And, by the way, you don't see them on the
Shuttle because they are inside the thermal

395
00:27:18,490 --> 00:27:18,919
protection system.

396
00:27:18,919 --> 00:27:24,039
And they are only sort of turned outwards
to take data when you get down to about mach

397
00:27:24,039 --> 00:27:25,490
3 and you're through the heating.

398
00:27:25,490 --> 00:27:26,799
Otherwise, they would burn off.

399
00:27:26,799 --> 00:27:30,220
In the approach and landing test they were
out front.

400
00:27:30,220 --> 00:27:36,070
When we separated from the 747, I am going
to tell you that story in a minute.

401
00:27:36,070 --> 00:27:37,440
Here are some of the major decisions.

402
00:27:37,440 --> 00:27:40,100
We were going to go with a hydrogen/oxygen
main engine.

403
00:27:40,100 --> 00:27:45,600
That is one of the system problems you have
to decide.

404
00:27:45,600 --> 00:27:52,600
Once you decide what kind of engine you are
going to use, that basically sizes the tankage.

405
00:27:54,600 --> 00:27:57,549
And I will show you that on another chart.

406
00:27:57,549 --> 00:28:03,899
As I said, this size, the liquid oxygen/hydrogen
tanks are not reusable, and I will make that

407
00:28:03,899 --> 00:28:06,980
point to you a little later on, but once you
decide what kind of engine you are going to

408
00:28:06,980 --> 00:28:12,519
use, that size of the tank because of using
the equations of motion you can figure out

409
00:28:12,519 --> 00:28:16,350
how much propellants you need, you get the
density of the propellant and now you know

410
00:28:16,350 --> 00:28:17,460
what size tank you are going to use.

411
00:28:17,460 --> 00:28:17,710
Yes, sir.

412
00:28:17,570 --> 00:28:24,370
A couple slides back you had said the main
engines of the Orbiter had to be recovered.

413
00:28:24,370 --> 00:28:24,769
Right.

414
00:28:24,769 --> 00:28:25,580
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

415
00:28:25,580 --> 00:28:27,950
It was a separate contract, but it was placed
inside the Orbiter.

416
00:28:27,950 --> 00:28:32,289
When the Orbiter came back the engines came
back with it.

417
00:28:32,289 --> 00:28:34,149
Was that your question?

418
00:28:34,149 --> 00:28:34,950
Yes.

419
00:28:34,950 --> 00:28:38,110
For example, the Johnson Space Center was
responsible for the Orbiter.

420
00:28:38,110 --> 00:28:43,080
And you're going to have the person talk that
was responsible for the engine, J.R. Thompson.

421
00:28:43,080 --> 00:28:45,809
He was at the Marshall Space Flight Center.

422
00:28:45,809 --> 00:28:52,809
But the engines were installed in the Orbiter
so the Orbiter brought them back.

423
00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:56,750
Solid rocket boosters provided the additional
propulsion required to get the Orbiter in

424
00:28:56,750 --> 00:29:01,429
orbit and the solid rocket boosters were designed
to be recoverable and reused.

425
00:29:01,429 --> 00:29:04,870
Those were some of the system studies that
led to the configuration.

426
00:29:04,870 --> 00:29:05,620
Yes, sir.

427
00:29:05,620 --> 00:29:11,759
At that period, was there any discussion of
the environmental impact of solids being used

428
00:29:11,759 --> 00:29:13,789
at 60 flights a year?

429
00:29:13,789 --> 00:29:14,380
Yes there was.

430
00:29:14,380 --> 00:29:15,039
There was quite a bit.

431
00:29:15,039 --> 00:29:21,200
I don't recall the details, but I do know
there was a lot of work on that many solids

432
00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:21,789
being used.

433
00:29:21,789 --> 00:29:26,549
And I guess we basically put that to rest,
but there was a lot.

434
00:29:26,549 --> 00:29:27,799
I don't know the details of it.

435
00:29:27,799 --> 00:29:29,279
In fact, that might be a good question.

436
00:29:29,279 --> 00:29:30,980
If you are not here, we will ask J.R.

437
00:29:30,980 --> 00:29:31,840
Thompson because J.R.

438
00:29:31,840 --> 00:29:33,100
should know that.

439
00:29:33,100 --> 00:29:40,100
I met with some of the Russians who worked
on the Buran which was the Russian comparable

440
00:29:41,720 --> 00:29:42,509
to the Shuttle.

441
00:29:42,509 --> 00:29:45,909
One of the big changes was that they said
how could the Americans have used solids for

442
00:29:45,909 --> 00:29:46,649
that many flights?

443
00:29:46,649 --> 00:29:49,679
It was studied and actually put to bed, or
put to rest, should I say?

444
00:29:49,679 --> 00:29:52,179
I don't know the details, but that is a very
good question.

445
00:29:52,179 --> 00:29:57,120
There are going to be various speakers, as
I said, and J.R.

446
00:29:57,120 --> 00:29:58,179
should have that answer.

447
00:29:58,179 --> 00:30:05,179
Solid rockets recovered and reused.

448
00:30:06,159 --> 00:30:13,159
Well, some of the things I have said before,
the Orbiter entry cross-range required delta

449
00:30:15,990 --> 00:30:16,409
wings.

450
00:30:16,409 --> 00:30:20,159
To go 1100 nautical miles cross-range you
needed delta wings.

451
00:30:20,159 --> 00:30:25,639
Deletion of the air breathing engines for
moving the Orbiter required the Boeing 747

452
00:30:25,639 --> 00:30:26,409
to carry the Orbiter.

453
00:30:26,409 --> 00:30:27,990
Let me tell you that story.

454
00:30:27,990 --> 00:30:33,070
All of you are very familiar now that when
we land at Edwards Air Force Space, we put

455
00:30:33,070 --> 00:30:38,750
the Orbiter on top of the 747 and we fly it
back to Kennedy.

456
00:30:38,750 --> 00:30:44,779
Well, I was the Orbiter Project Manager, I
became Orbiter Project Manager August of 1972,

457
00:30:44,779 --> 00:30:46,149
and I was having all sorts of problems.

458
00:30:46,149 --> 00:30:49,190
The first thing they did to me was cut my
budget in half.

459
00:30:49,190 --> 00:30:50,090
The OMB cut my budget in half.

460
00:30:50,090 --> 00:30:51,809
That was the first thing that happened.

461
00:30:51,809 --> 00:30:55,169
And then I just had a lot of problems.

462
00:30:55,169 --> 00:30:56,500
But I had worked on the Apollo Program.

463
00:30:56,500 --> 00:30:59,950
I had a lot of friends in the organization,
although I was Orbiter Project Manager.

464
00:30:59,950 --> 00:31:04,210
Three of my friends came into the office one
afternoon, I forget, maybe two or three months

465
00:31:04,210 --> 00:31:06,590
after we started, and said Aaron, we have
a great idea.

466
00:31:06,590 --> 00:31:07,860
I said what's that?

467
00:31:07,860 --> 00:31:14,860
They said we can put the Orbiter on top of
a 747 or a DC10 and ferry it back to Kennedy

468
00:31:15,399 --> 00:31:16,909
from Edwards Air Force Base.

469
00:31:16,909 --> 00:31:18,960
We may have to make one or two stops and ferry
it back.

470
00:31:18,960 --> 00:31:23,320
I look at him for a moment and said that is
absolutely the dumbest idea I heard in my

471
00:31:23,320 --> 00:31:26,250
life, and I basically threw the people out
of my office.

472
00:31:26,250 --> 00:31:27,210
And these were my friends.

473
00:31:27,210 --> 00:31:29,289
Well, these people will not take no for answer.

474
00:31:29,289 --> 00:31:32,330
It happened to be they had another very good
quality.

475
00:31:32,330 --> 00:31:35,590
They were all world-class model airplane builders.

476
00:31:35,590 --> 00:31:39,429
And these guys had won competition all over
the world, three of them.

477
00:31:39,429 --> 00:31:41,159
So they came back about ten days later.

478
00:31:41,159 --> 00:31:44,789
And I don't know how many of you have seen
the Johnson Space Center but we have a lot

479
00:31:44,789 --> 00:31:47,220
of acreage out there in Texas.

480
00:31:47,220 --> 00:31:49,159
They said come out, we want to show you something.

481
00:31:49,159 --> 00:31:54,809
They had built a radio controlled model of
the 747 and an Orbiter and actually flew it

482
00:31:54,809 --> 00:31:57,480
for me and separated the Orbiter from the
747.

483
00:31:57,480 --> 00:31:59,250
That is how it got started.

484
00:31:59,250 --> 00:32:01,610
And so we eliminated the air breathing engines.

485
00:32:01,610 --> 00:32:04,769
But I remember throwing them out of the office.

486
00:32:04,769 --> 00:32:06,480
Fly-by-wire with a digital autopilot.

487
00:32:06,480 --> 00:32:07,419
Yes, sir.

488
00:32:07,419 --> 00:32:13,220
Are you saying that you had air breathing
engines and the Orbiter itself would fly back

489
00:32:13,220 --> 00:32:14,269
to Edwards Air Force Base?

490
00:32:14,269 --> 00:32:15,019
That's a good question.

491
00:32:15,019 --> 00:32:16,120
I missed that point.

492
00:32:16,120 --> 00:32:17,259
Let me explain it to you.

493
00:32:17,259 --> 00:32:18,970
That is exactly right.

494
00:32:18,970 --> 00:32:24,350
If you recall, when the Orbiter lands, the
nose gear is very short.

495
00:32:24,350 --> 00:32:30,129
What we had to do, he asked a very pertinent
question, we had to actually replace the landing

496
00:32:30,129 --> 00:32:34,090
gear with a different landing gear that caused
the Orbiter to have an attitude like this.

497
00:32:34,090 --> 00:32:36,519
It wasn't like this.

498
00:32:36,519 --> 00:32:37,259
It was like this.

499
00:32:37,259 --> 00:32:43,009
We put air breathing engines on and took off
and had to have five in-flight refuelings

500
00:32:43,009 --> 00:32:44,559
to get to California.

501
00:32:44,559 --> 00:32:47,659
Strap on air breathing engines.

502
00:32:47,659 --> 00:32:50,309
And, plus, a different landing gear.

503
00:32:50,309 --> 00:32:52,230
And we took off horizontally.

504
00:32:52,230 --> 00:32:55,220
And five in-flight refuelings to get from
California to Florida.

505
00:32:55,220 --> 00:32:59,600
And you brought up an important point that
I left out, that's the reason why we changed

506
00:32:59,600 --> 00:32:59,850
it.

507
00:32:59,710 --> 00:33:03,690
Thank you very much.

508
00:33:03,690 --> 00:33:06,759
And, of course, we went with the fly-by-wire
with a digital autopilot.

509
00:33:06,759 --> 00:33:09,419
This was a very fundamental change.

510
00:33:09,419 --> 00:33:14,090
The astronauts at that time did not like this
very much.

511
00:33:14,090 --> 00:33:19,200
Now, when you get all these new pilots in,
they wouldn't know what you were talking about.

512
00:33:19,200 --> 00:33:22,029
Why not have a fly-by-wire system?

513
00:33:22,029 --> 00:33:25,529
They didn't like it at one time, but we went
with a fly-by-wire with a digital autopilot.

514
00:33:25,529 --> 00:33:30,809
Even though you are going to have a special
briefing on the guidance navigation control

515
00:33:30,809 --> 00:33:33,480
system, I am going to talk a little bit more
in detail about that because that happens

516
00:33:33,480 --> 00:33:34,610
to be my expertise.

517
00:33:34,610 --> 00:33:40,320
So I am going to talk about that a little
bit in more detail.

518
00:33:40,320 --> 00:33:40,620
Yes, sir.

519
00:33:40,620 --> 00:33:41,710
What does fly-by-wire mean?

520
00:33:41,710 --> 00:33:47,669
It means that you actually have a computer
which actually controls the surfaces.

521
00:33:47,669 --> 00:33:54,669
Whereas, in past airplanes, your stick actually
had cables that controlled the surfaces.

522
00:33:54,940 --> 00:33:57,350
So you get a lot more performance.

523
00:33:57,350 --> 00:34:02,759
It is a little bit confusing in the sense
of a wire.

524
00:34:02,759 --> 00:34:09,759
Don't think of it as a hard wire which is
like the old type of airplanes where there

525
00:34:09,889 --> 00:34:11,110
was a cable.

526
00:34:11,110 --> 00:34:16,130
When you pulled on the stick there was actually
a cable that went back to the ailerons and

527
00:34:16,130 --> 00:34:18,750
the rudder and everything.

528
00:34:18,750 --> 00:34:24,330
And, as professor Cohen says, everything now
has a computer in the middle.

529
00:34:24,330 --> 00:34:26,560
And what you're really doing is flying the
computer.

530
00:34:26,560 --> 00:34:30,370
And the computer then issues the commands
to the hydraulic system.

531
00:34:30,370 --> 00:34:37,370
But the Shuttle, I guess, was the first vehicle
that really had that system.

532
00:34:37,739 --> 00:34:44,739
There were no commercial planes flying with
that system or military planes flying.

533
00:34:46,500 --> 00:34:50,610
And the real concern was safety and reliability.

534
00:34:50,610 --> 00:34:55,170
Suppose you have a computer problem, what
are you going to do?

535
00:34:55,170 --> 00:34:56,780
I will talk about that in detail.

536
00:34:56,780 --> 00:34:57,360
That's a good question.

537
00:34:57,360 --> 00:34:58,050
Any other questions.

538
00:34:58,050 --> 00:34:58,970
Those are very good questions.

539
00:34:58,970 --> 00:34:59,360
I appreciate them.

540
00:34:59,360 --> 00:34:59,610
Yes, sir.

541
00:34:59,460 --> 00:35:03,860
Can you just explain cross-range for a moment?

542
00:35:03,860 --> 00:35:04,410
Cross-range.

543
00:35:04,410 --> 00:35:08,520
Realize the Orbiter is a glider so-to-speak.

544
00:35:08,520 --> 00:35:10,540
Not much of a glider but a glider.

545
00:35:10,540 --> 00:35:16,400
And, actually, downrange would be going in
this direction.

546
00:35:16,400 --> 00:35:21,020
Cross-range would be out of plane direction,
so you could actually maneuver out of plane.

547
00:35:21,020 --> 00:35:22,860
We have a nice globe here.

548
00:35:22,860 --> 00:35:25,920
I am not going to carry it up to the front
and I don't have a piece of chalk either.

549
00:35:25,920 --> 00:35:31,840
These are very good questions, by the way.

550
00:35:31,840 --> 00:35:33,470
Thank you very much.

551
00:35:33,470 --> 00:35:36,630
Here is the United State roughly.

552
00:35:36,630 --> 00:35:41,090
This was designed for the military requirements.

553
00:35:41,090 --> 00:35:45,590
They wanted to be able to, for reconnaissance
satellites, basically, you want to be in polar

554
00:35:45,590 --> 00:35:51,030
orbit because you are going around, let's
say this is an orbit here, then the earth

555
00:35:51,030 --> 00:35:57,070
turns underneath it, and so you basically
fly over all parts of the earth.

556
00:35:57,070 --> 00:35:58,950
That was the basic military requirement.

557
00:35:58,950 --> 00:36:05,670
They wanted to be able to launch out of Vandenberg
on the West Coast into a polar orbit.

558
00:36:05,670 --> 00:36:12,670
And, because of security reasons, this sounds
a little bit strange when we think back on

559
00:36:13,090 --> 00:36:18,950
it, but in a time of crisis, remember we were
in the Cold War and everything, you wanted

560
00:36:18,950 --> 00:36:25,950
to be able to put a satellite up without necessarily
giving the other side a chance to make all

561
00:36:26,670 --> 00:36:30,570
the radar measurements on the Shuttle and
everything and figure out right away where

562
00:36:30,570 --> 00:36:32,100
the satellite is.

563
00:36:32,100 --> 00:36:35,150
And also there might be hostilities.

564
00:36:35,150 --> 00:36:36,920
The Shuttle was a strategic asset.

565
00:36:36,920 --> 00:36:42,680
So basically they wanted the Shuttle to be
able to land the very next orbit.

566
00:36:42,680 --> 00:36:48,450
Well, all right, you take off from California,
you fly over the pole and you deploy your

567
00:36:48,450 --> 00:36:49,690
satellite.

568
00:36:49,690 --> 00:36:54,120
And, by the way, we have never, with all the
satellites we have deployed, ever deployed

569
00:36:54,120 --> 00:36:55,550
a satellite on the first orbit.

570
00:36:55,550 --> 00:36:59,010
That would be an incredible feat, but that
was the requirement.

571
00:36:59,010 --> 00:37:02,650
So you fly over the pole, you come back around.

572
00:37:02,650 --> 00:37:04,870
Now you're ready to land in California.

573
00:37:04,870 --> 00:37:11,870
But, during that time, the earth has turned
by a thousand miles, 24,000 mile circumference

574
00:37:13,790 --> 00:37:17,170
in 24 hours.

575
00:37:17,170 --> 00:37:23,530
Actually, 1500 miles because an orbit is 90
minutes, 1.5 hours.

576
00:37:23,530 --> 00:37:27,660
Your orbit now would put you right over the
Pacific Ocean.

577
00:37:27,660 --> 00:37:33,100
If you just burn your engines, slow down and
come down through the atmosphere, that is

578
00:37:33,100 --> 00:37:34,220
where you are going to land.

579
00:37:34,220 --> 00:37:41,220
So instead, as you're flying through the atmosphere,
you basically have to come down banked on

580
00:37:41,510 --> 00:37:43,170
your side.

581
00:37:43,170 --> 00:37:45,990
So, essentially, you're generating a lift
vector.

582
00:37:45,990 --> 00:37:49,570
And, instead of turning your lift vector up,
you turn your lift vector to the side and

583
00:37:49,570 --> 00:37:51,270
that pushes you over.

584
00:37:51,270 --> 00:37:55,730
And delta wings can generate a higher lift
vector than the straight wings, and that was

585
00:37:55,730 --> 00:38:02,730
the determining factor.

586
00:38:04,940 --> 00:38:05,330
Very good.

587
00:38:05,330 --> 00:38:09,200
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

588
00:38:09,200 --> 00:38:10,130
Well, I think that's right.

589
00:38:10,130 --> 00:38:11,200
Can you address that, Jeff?

590
00:38:11,200 --> 00:38:18,200
My recollection at the time was that even
coming in over the Pacific, yes, there were

591
00:38:19,680 --> 00:38:26,570
some places where you could land on land but
it would mean landing in hostile territory,

592
00:38:26,570 --> 00:38:33,570
the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, and we
didn't want to do that.

593
00:38:34,250 --> 00:38:35,830
So the cross-range initially was to be able
to make Australia.

594
00:38:35,830 --> 00:38:36,410
Well, I'm sure that's right.

595
00:38:36,410 --> 00:38:38,300
Certainly, there were landing sites that we
had all over the world.

596
00:38:38,300 --> 00:38:45,300
It could have been a much smaller cross-range
if we were willing [OVERLAPPING VOICES].

597
00:38:48,670 --> 00:38:55,670
And, I will say, continue to remind us if
we don't explain some basic things.

598
00:38:56,620 --> 00:39:01,840
Because we've been dealing with this for so
long that some of these things just seem like

599
00:39:01,840 --> 00:39:04,850
second-nature.

600
00:39:04,850 --> 00:39:08,310
You weren't even born when the Shuttle started
flying.

601
00:39:08,310 --> 00:39:12,730
And so the level of backgrounds is going to
be very different.

602
00:39:12,730 --> 00:39:15,670
We want to bring everybody along with us.

603
00:39:15,670 --> 00:39:21,050
So if there is something that we say the same
thing, you know, the question about hypergolic

604
00:39:21,050 --> 00:39:26,520
fuel, if we use a term and you don't understand
it, we will try not to use a lot of acronyms.

605
00:39:26,520 --> 00:39:30,020
I cannot guaranty that the speakers won't
use acronyms.

606
00:39:30,020 --> 00:39:34,610
Don't be embarrassed to just stop and say
what does that mean, what are you talking

607
00:39:34,610 --> 00:39:34,860
about?

608
00:39:34,830 --> 00:39:37,140
But, as we go through the course, you are
going to get more detail, more detail.

609
00:39:37,140 --> 00:39:42,750
For example, you have a total lecture by a
man named Henry Pole who is going to talk

610
00:39:42,750 --> 00:39:43,790
about the reaction control system.

611
00:39:43,790 --> 00:39:46,880
He will give you all the details you want
to know about hypergolics and storables, more

612
00:39:46,880 --> 00:39:48,290
than you ever wanted to know.

613
00:39:48,290 --> 00:39:49,920
So you are going to get more details as you
go through.

614
00:39:49,920 --> 00:39:52,150
But don't hesitate to ask questions because
it's good for us.

615
00:39:52,150 --> 00:39:58,340
Let me tell you another satellite story.

616
00:39:58,340 --> 00:40:00,780
My wife and I moved to College Station.

617
00:40:00,780 --> 00:40:05,060
My wife was working at a junior college in
the registrar's office.

618
00:40:05,060 --> 00:40:08,250
She was working with a young lady and Apollo
13 came out.

619
00:40:08,250 --> 00:40:15,250
Well, Apollo 13 happened to be my first mission
when I was Manager of Command and Service

620
00:40:17,650 --> 00:40:19,970
Module so I know a little bit about it.

621
00:40:19,970 --> 00:40:24,030
In fact, I am going to give a lecture in Dick
Batten's course on the 26th on Apollo 13.

622
00:40:24,030 --> 00:40:31,030
But my wife talked to this young lady and
said I went to see Apollo 13 yesterday.

623
00:40:32,120 --> 00:40:34,460
And she said it was so exciting.

624
00:40:34,460 --> 00:40:37,810
I didn't know how it was going to end.

625
00:40:37,810 --> 00:40:42,520
[LAUGHTER] So it is a frame of reference.

626
00:40:42,520 --> 00:40:43,640
Well, we've talked about this.

627
00:40:43,640 --> 00:40:46,930
The size of the payload bay is 60 feet long
by 15 feet diameter.

628
00:40:46,930 --> 00:40:50,150
Size of the crew cabin defined to be over
2600 cubic feet.

629
00:40:50,150 --> 00:40:56,250
The payload, as you know, is 65,000 pounds
at liftoff, 35 pounds at landing.

630
00:40:56,250 --> 00:41:03,250
And what you need to understand is the Orbiter
is a launch vehicle, it's a spacecraft and

631
00:41:04,150 --> 00:41:05,840
it's an aircraft.

632
00:41:05,840 --> 00:41:11,950
And when you look at the two different systems,
I worked on Apollo, as I said, very much and

633
00:41:11,950 --> 00:41:16,990
on the Shuttle, and there is no question that
the Shuttle is much more complicated than

634
00:41:16,990 --> 00:41:17,240
Apollo.

635
00:41:17,140 --> 00:41:20,050
On the other hand, the Apollo mission is much
more complicated than the Shuttle mission.

636
00:41:20,050 --> 00:41:24,290
But this is something that makes it very,
very interesting.

637
00:41:24,290 --> 00:41:26,170
This is a very old chart.

638
00:41:26,170 --> 00:41:28,330
And, in fact, this is the original chart.

639
00:41:28,330 --> 00:41:30,610
It comes out yellow.

640
00:41:30,610 --> 00:41:37,610
This was the original cost estimate and how
they totaled up the $5.15 billion.

641
00:41:40,140 --> 00:41:41,500
We talked about that.

642
00:41:41,500 --> 00:41:47,530
And that was the very original cost estimate
done on a cost analyst chart.

643
00:41:47,530 --> 00:41:51,080
There were no personal computers at the time.

644
00:41:51,080 --> 00:41:56,380
In fact, I found that in my files.

645
00:41:56,380 --> 00:41:58,190
That's a very old yellow chart.

646
00:41:58,190 --> 00:42:01,620
It's hard to believe some of those numbers.

647
00:42:01,620 --> 00:42:07,010
On the other hand, I had a gentleman who worked
for me who got his PhD at the University of

648
00:42:07,010 --> 00:42:10,020
Colorado and his subject was the cost of the
shuttle Orbiter.

649
00:42:10,020 --> 00:42:14,300
And it turns out that if we had those two
years of inflation we really would have made

650
00:42:14,300 --> 00:42:21,150
that cost on the $5.15 in 1971 dollars.

651
00:42:21,150 --> 00:42:23,900
It only ran over by about 10%.

652
00:42:23,900 --> 00:42:24,150
That's right.

653
00:42:24,090 --> 00:42:26,820
Let's now talk a little bit about configuration.

654
00:42:26,820 --> 00:42:27,910
I don't know if you can see this chart or
not.

655
00:42:27,910 --> 00:42:34,910
Now, you might say how did you go from that
conception in August of 1972 to something

656
00:42:40,620 --> 00:42:43,040
with all these numbers on it?

657
00:42:43,040 --> 00:42:46,780
Now, this is really a case in systems engineering.

658
00:42:46,780 --> 00:42:50,730
And let me explain to you what I mean by that.

659
00:42:50,730 --> 00:42:54,180
Certain assumptions had been made.

660
00:42:54,180 --> 00:43:01,180
One assumption was that in the Orbiter it
was going to weigh about 175,000 pounds without

661
00:43:02,160 --> 00:43:07,580
payload and you were going to have a 65,000
pound payload.

662
00:43:07,580 --> 00:43:09,020
You had to make that assumption.

663
00:43:09,020 --> 00:43:16,020
You also had to make an assumption that you
were going to use a liquid oxygen liquid hydrogen

664
00:43:19,710 --> 00:43:20,290
engine.

665
00:43:20,290 --> 00:43:21,640
And why did you select that?

666
00:43:21,640 --> 00:43:26,700
Today I'm not quite sure it was a good decision,
but we did.

667
00:43:26,700 --> 00:43:26,950
Why?
Because of specific impulse, the ISP or the
performance of the engine was the highest

668
00:43:31,980 --> 00:43:36,120
for the liquid oxygen liquid hydrogen chemical
compulsion that we know today.

669
00:43:36,120 --> 00:43:37,700
So we selected that.

670
00:43:37,700 --> 00:43:44,250
Well, when you use the equations of motion,
you integrate the equations of motion or any

671
00:43:44,250 --> 00:43:50,430
other techniques you may want to use, you
then show how much propellant you're going

672
00:43:50,430 --> 00:43:53,430
to need to get that into orbit.

673
00:43:53,430 --> 00:44:00,010
Then you know that liquid hydrogen has a density
of about 4 pounds per cubic foot, very low

674
00:44:00,010 --> 00:44:01,050
density.

675
00:44:01,050 --> 00:44:04,590
That means this big external tank is mostly
hydrogen.

676
00:44:04,590 --> 00:44:07,230
It's a very, very big volume.

677
00:44:07,230 --> 00:44:11,030
And liquid oxygen is about 70 pounds per cubic
foot.

678
00:44:11,030 --> 00:44:14,030
That basically sizes your external tank.

679
00:44:14,030 --> 00:44:19,530
It's a very simplified approach but that systems
engineering.

680
00:44:19,530 --> 00:44:24,700
You get much iteration because there is an
old adage that the devil is in the details.

681
00:44:24,700 --> 00:44:30,040
So you keep iterating on that with this expert
team.

682
00:44:30,040 --> 00:44:36,210
You then say, well, that's still not going
to be the most efficient way to get you to

683
00:44:36,210 --> 00:44:36,520
orbit.

684
00:44:36,520 --> 00:44:40,890
You say you need really a stage system, so
you put the solid rocket boosters on.

685
00:44:40,890 --> 00:44:44,870
You don't have what they call a single-stage-to-orbit,
you really have more like a two-staged orbit

686
00:44:44,870 --> 00:44:49,620
and you size the solid rocket boosters and
determine when they have to come off.

687
00:44:49,620 --> 00:44:55,440
Basically, that is how you go about doing
the systems approach using systems engineering

688
00:44:55,440 --> 00:44:57,660
to come up with a configuration.

689
00:44:57,660 --> 00:45:03,070
Now, that is a very over-simplified way of
doing it, the statement I made, but that's

690
00:45:03,070 --> 00:45:04,310
basically how you do it.

691
00:45:04,310 --> 00:45:08,170
And these are some of the dimensions that
then come out of the vehicle.

692
00:45:08,170 --> 00:45:10,240
And I think they're in that handout we gave
you also.

693
00:45:10,240 --> 00:45:11,550
And it looks like I am going to take off.

694
00:45:11,550 --> 00:45:16,060
I did know that this chart tries to lift off
on me.

695
00:45:16,060 --> 00:45:23,060
I don't know what the best way to do it is.

696
00:45:26,930 --> 00:45:29,650
You can find those dimensions, I believe,
in that paper that was handed out.

697
00:45:29,650 --> 00:45:36,650
But this shows you all the dimensions of the
Space Shuttle system, the solid rocket boosters,

698
00:45:37,720 --> 00:45:40,970
the external tank and the Orbiter.

699
00:45:40,970 --> 00:45:47,340
Now, an interesting sideline in this, which
I got to thinking about after the Columbia

700
00:45:47,340 --> 00:45:49,360
accident where the foam came off.

701
00:45:49,360 --> 00:45:56,280
Of course, the reason why we put foam on was
because with liquid oxygen, liquid hydrogen,

702
00:45:56,280 --> 00:45:59,930
at those temperatures you are going to have
a lot of ice form.

703
00:45:59,930 --> 00:46:05,060
And when ice forms and comes down and hits
the Orbiter with the thermal protection system,

704
00:46:05,060 --> 00:46:08,160
I am going to talk about that in more detail,
you are going to do some damage.

705
00:46:08,160 --> 00:46:12,530
So one solution would be to put foam on the
tank to eliminate the ice.

706
00:46:12,530 --> 00:46:16,180
And, of course, you would assume that foam
could stay on the tank.

707
00:46:16,180 --> 00:46:20,330
Another solution would have been to not go
with the liquid oxygen, liquid hydrogen engine

708
00:46:20,330 --> 00:46:21,770
and go with what we call storables.

709
00:46:21,770 --> 00:46:26,020
Of course, they wouldn't have gotten as much
performance and you probably couldn't put

710
00:46:26,020 --> 00:46:29,080
65,000 pounds of payload into orbit.

711
00:46:29,080 --> 00:46:33,840
But the point of bringing this to you, those
are some of the decisions, as you go into

712
00:46:33,840 --> 00:46:38,770
various projects, you need to challenge the
requirements because the requirements are

713
00:46:38,770 --> 00:46:43,840
really going to decide what kind of system
you are going to have.

714
00:46:43,840 --> 00:46:45,230
That's really the point I wanted to make.

715
00:46:45,230 --> 00:46:46,410
Are there any questions?

716
00:46:46,410 --> 00:46:46,660
Yes.
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

717
00:46:53,790 --> 00:46:54,610
That's a good question.

718
00:46:54,610 --> 00:47:01,610
One thought at one time was to put the liquid
hydrogen tank in the Orbiter and that would

719
00:47:04,370 --> 00:47:04,990
basically isolate it.

720
00:47:04,990 --> 00:47:05,700
You'd put it inside.

721
00:47:05,700 --> 00:47:10,390
Or, put insulation on the inside, as you pointed
out.

722
00:47:10,390 --> 00:47:14,360
Those were thought about.

723
00:47:14,360 --> 00:47:15,550
The decision, obviously, was not to do it.

724
00:47:15,550 --> 00:47:17,480
I don't recall the reason why.

725
00:47:17,480 --> 00:47:17,970
But, when J.R.

726
00:47:17,970 --> 00:47:20,800
Thomas comes, I will ask him that question.

727
00:47:20,800 --> 00:47:22,430
That is a very good question.

728
00:47:22,430 --> 00:47:24,930
Yes, it was two things.

729
00:47:24,930 --> 00:47:26,550
Could you put some of this propellant inside
the tank?

730
00:47:26,550 --> 00:47:32,980
And the other is could you put insulation
inside the tank itself?

731
00:47:32,980 --> 00:47:33,950
And that was looked at.

732
00:47:33,950 --> 00:47:39,970
And I guess it was complicated and very costly
to do it that way, but it was looked at.

733
00:47:39,970 --> 00:47:40,590
That's a very good question.

734
00:47:40,590 --> 00:47:42,300
By the way, these are very good questions.

735
00:47:42,300 --> 00:47:49,300
One thing, when you look at this external
tank, only the very upper part is for oxygen

736
00:47:51,500 --> 00:47:54,820
because the density of hydrogen is so low.

737
00:47:54,820 --> 00:47:58,670
I mean all of this part of the tank is for
hydrogen.

738
00:47:58,670 --> 00:48:04,700
So, to have put all the hydrogen inside the
Orbiter, you would have a very different looking

739
00:48:04,700 --> 00:48:05,000
Orbiter.

740
00:48:05,000 --> 00:48:06,060
You wouldn't have been able to do it.

741
00:48:06,060 --> 00:48:11,060
But she really said could you put insulation
inside the tank [OVERLAPPING VOICES].

742
00:48:11,060 --> 00:48:12,520
Any other questions?

743
00:48:12,520 --> 00:48:15,110
But that's basically how the system evolved.

744
00:48:15,110 --> 00:48:20,450
Now, I oversimplified it to quite an extent
but you have to realize there were a lot of

745
00:48:20,450 --> 00:48:21,210
iterations.

746
00:48:21,210 --> 00:48:27,120
One other key thing, though, when you have
new systems engineering, you do it in a team.

747
00:48:27,120 --> 00:48:33,670
You usually have different capabilities on
the team, arrows, mechanical engineers, electrical

748
00:48:33,670 --> 00:48:37,480
engineers, so you have different types of
disciplines on the systems engineering team

749
00:48:37,480 --> 00:48:38,740
that can help you do that.

750
00:48:38,740 --> 00:48:43,110
And then you have a systems engineer that
sort of heads it up.

751
00:48:43,110 --> 00:48:45,690
But we're going to concentrate more on the
Orbiter.

752
00:48:45,690 --> 00:48:50,650
And we have one of the speakers who is going
to concentrate on the engine and so forth.

753
00:48:50,650 --> 00:48:51,450
That's what the system looked like.

754
00:48:51,450 --> 00:48:56,680
The other thing that is interesting, I think,
is what the mission profile essentially looked

755
00:48:56,680 --> 00:48:57,150
like.

756
00:48:57,150 --> 00:49:04,150
And this happens to be for STS-5, but this
is the basic mission profile.

757
00:49:04,310 --> 00:49:08,360
Now, before I start that, let me say this
gentleman right here has flown that profile

758
00:49:08,360 --> 00:49:10,870
five times.

759
00:49:10,870 --> 00:49:12,040
And so he's done that five times.

760
00:49:12,040 --> 00:49:14,250
He can talk much more about it than I can.

761
00:49:14,250 --> 00:49:18,720
One time, I will tell the story, I'm just
about tired of hearing it, but when I was

762
00:49:18,720 --> 00:49:22,980
Director of the Johnson Space Center we had
a lot of visitors.

763
00:49:22,980 --> 00:49:23,950
One time I had Mr.

764
00:49:23,950 --> 00:49:27,530
James Baker, who at that time was Secretary
of the State, and Eduard Shevardnadze from

765
00:49:27,530 --> 00:49:30,990
Russia who had the same position in Russia
at the time.

766
00:49:30,990 --> 00:49:35,260
And I took them over to Mission Control as
a visit and put Mr.

767
00:49:35,260 --> 00:49:40,900
Shevardnadze down in the flight controller
seat and was going to let him talk to the

768
00:49:40,900 --> 00:49:42,990
crew.

769
00:49:42,990 --> 00:49:49,040
Not knowing that Jeff Hoffman was on duty
at the time, Edward Shevardnadze spoke in

770
00:49:49,040 --> 00:49:50,410
Russian up to the crew.

771
00:49:50,410 --> 00:49:54,800
And, before the interpreter could answer it,
down comes this beautiful answer in Russian

772
00:49:54,800 --> 00:49:55,830
from Jeff Hoffman.

773
00:49:55,830 --> 00:49:59,990
So that really floored both Mr.

774
00:49:59,990 --> 00:50:02,020
Baker and Edward Shevardnadze, and me.

775
00:50:02,020 --> 00:50:04,870
That was an interesting story.

776
00:50:04,870 --> 00:50:10,030
Here gives you a little profile of the Shuttle
mission.

777
00:50:10,030 --> 00:50:10,570
You lift off.

778
00:50:10,570 --> 00:50:14,770
You've reached max dynamic pressure in about
one minute.

779
00:50:14,770 --> 00:50:17,400
About 3800 feet is where you reach dynamic
pressure.

780
00:50:17,400 --> 00:50:19,970
You have the SRB sep in about two minutes.

781
00:50:19,970 --> 00:50:24,810
You remember in the Challenger action, I believe
it happened at about 60 seconds.

782
00:50:24,810 --> 00:50:27,900
But in two minutes you get SRB sep.

783
00:50:27,900 --> 00:50:32,460
And it lands the SRB by parachutes.

784
00:50:32,460 --> 00:50:34,650
You have MECO, which is main engine cutoff.

785
00:50:34,650 --> 00:50:35,580
The main engine cuts off.

786
00:50:35,580 --> 00:50:38,640
And that, to me, is the biggest issue.

787
00:50:38,640 --> 00:50:44,210
When that main engine has to burn for over
eight minutes that is taking all the propellant

788
00:50:44,210 --> 00:50:51,210
out of that big tank, the liquid oxygen, liquid
hydrogen firing the main engines.

789
00:50:52,490 --> 00:50:56,550
What's the velocity of the main engine cutoff,
do you know?

790
00:50:56,550 --> 00:50:59,400
It's within a few hundred feet per second
of [OVERLAPPING VOICES].

791
00:50:59,400 --> 00:51:01,700
And then you get external tank separation.

792
00:51:01,700 --> 00:51:08,700
The external tank comes down about 9000 miles
downrange and lands in the Indian Ocean.

793
00:51:09,410 --> 00:51:13,510
Then you use the orbital maneuvering system,
the OMS engine, the pods on the back of the

794
00:51:13,510 --> 00:51:14,320
Orbiter.

795
00:51:14,320 --> 00:51:19,520
You use that for a very short period of time
to get into orbit.

796
00:51:19,520 --> 00:51:23,650
Then you have your operations, whatever you're
going to do, go out and service the Hubble

797
00:51:23,650 --> 00:51:24,740
or whatever.

798
00:51:24,740 --> 00:51:28,180
You de-orbit with the orbital maneuvering
system engine.

799
00:51:28,180 --> 00:51:29,890
You have entry interface at 400,000 feet.

800
00:51:29,890 --> 00:51:31,740
And why do you pick 400,000 feet?

801
00:51:31,740 --> 00:51:34,410
Because that's where you start sensing gravity.

802
00:51:34,410 --> 00:51:38,540
You get about 0.05 Gs at 400,000 feet.

803
00:51:38,540 --> 00:51:43,320
And then you reenter and land either at Edwards
or Kennedy.

804
00:51:43,320 --> 00:51:46,100
[AUDIENCE QUESTION].

805
00:51:46,100 --> 00:51:46,350
Yes?
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

806
00:51:49,520 --> 00:51:49,970
Why does it turn?

807
00:51:49,970 --> 00:51:55,070
Yes.

808
00:51:55,070 --> 00:51:56,270
You mean liftoff?

809
00:51:56,270 --> 00:51:56,880
Yes.

810
00:51:56,880 --> 00:52:00,000
Well, that's a very good question.

811
00:52:00,000 --> 00:52:02,940
Let's see if I can repeat that very accurately.

812
00:52:02,940 --> 00:52:09,940
The fact is that we used the Apollo launch
pad and the ditches for the flame bucket,

813
00:52:11,490 --> 00:52:12,800
where the engine goes.

814
00:52:12,800 --> 00:52:18,280
So, in order to get it to the right alttitude,
we had to make that maneuver.

815
00:52:18,280 --> 00:52:20,140
You had to make that roll maneuver during
liftoff.

816
00:52:20,140 --> 00:52:21,510
Is that what you're talking about, the roll
maneuver during liftoff?

817
00:52:21,510 --> 00:52:21,760
Yes.

818
00:52:21,660 --> 00:52:24,240
We had to make that roll maneuver because
we weren't in the right orientation.

819
00:52:24,240 --> 00:52:29,400
We had to make the roll maneuver because it
wasn't oriented correctly on the pad.

820
00:52:29,400 --> 00:52:31,860
Now, let me answer your question.

821
00:52:31,860 --> 00:52:35,520
The Buron was a Russian vehicle.

822
00:52:35,520 --> 00:52:42,430
Well, Dan Brandenstein who was an astronaut
headed the Astronaut Office saw that the Russians

823
00:52:42,430 --> 00:52:44,680
made this roll maneuver.

824
00:52:44,680 --> 00:52:48,000
And he asked the Russians why they made that
roll maneuver?

825
00:52:48,000 --> 00:52:50,690
I mean they didn't have to do it, he said,
because you do.

826
00:52:50,690 --> 00:52:52,150
[LAUGHTER] That's true.

827
00:52:52,150 --> 00:52:53,530
Did you hear that story?

828
00:52:53,530 --> 00:52:55,100
Did I say it correctly?

829
00:52:55,100 --> 00:52:56,610
I think so.

830
00:52:56,610 --> 00:52:58,450
He said because you do.

831
00:52:58,450 --> 00:52:59,300
That is a good question.

832
00:52:59,300 --> 00:53:04,750
There may be one other aspect to it, and that's
the question of why does the Shuttle actually

833
00:53:04,750 --> 00:53:07,160
fly upside down on the way up?

834
00:53:07,160 --> 00:53:13,880
And I believe the original decision was aerodynamics
because the thrust is asymmetric.

835
00:53:13,880 --> 00:53:20,880
You have the external tank, and the Shuttle
is sitting on the external tank, so the thrust

836
00:53:21,490 --> 00:53:24,640
actually has to be through the center of mass
of the whole system.

837
00:53:24,640 --> 00:53:29,930
So it is actually flying not straight but
is a little bit screwed.

838
00:53:29,930 --> 00:53:33,830
And, for aerodynamic purposes, I guess they
figured there was less stress.

839
00:53:33,830 --> 00:53:40,830
Although, recently they've started partway
through the launch doing another roll maneuver.

840
00:53:42,860 --> 00:53:46,030
And I think that's for communications.

841
00:53:46,030 --> 00:53:51,390
I'm not 100% sure when they started doing
that again.

842
00:53:51,390 --> 00:53:52,510
I'm not sure either.

843
00:53:52,510 --> 00:53:59,020
But the early part of the launch, when you're
riding the solids aerodynamically, you go

844
00:53:59,020 --> 00:54:05,880
through max Q you're in much better shape
if you're upside down.

845
00:54:05,880 --> 00:54:09,700
Yes?

846
00:54:09,700 --> 00:54:16,700
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

847
00:54:17,340 --> 00:54:24,340
Well, to use a big solid rocket booster, it's
not very efficient.

848
00:54:27,990 --> 00:54:30,180
Many people have studied single-stage-to-orbits.

849
00:54:30,180 --> 00:54:34,890
Let me just ask a question.

850
00:54:34,890 --> 00:54:41,170
I know we've got a mixture of aero-astro and
TPP, ESD.

851
00:54:41,170 --> 00:54:47,570
Are there people here who have not seen the
rocket equation?

852
00:54:47,570 --> 00:54:48,180
Everybody.

853
00:54:48,180 --> 00:54:48,600
Well, OK.

854
00:54:48,600 --> 00:54:49,390
That's very important.

855
00:54:49,390 --> 00:54:56,390
Let me just very briefly If you have a rocket
and you want to increase the velocity of the

856
00:54:59,890 --> 00:55:06,890
rocket, I mean that's a critical thing, by
a certain delta V, you can take the mass of

857
00:55:08,840 --> 00:55:15,840
the rocket when you start the burn, which
we call M sub i, the initial mass, and the

858
00:55:19,170 --> 00:55:21,730
final mass.

859
00:55:21,730 --> 00:55:27,340
And, of course, the initial mass equals the
final mass plus the mass of the propellant.

860
00:55:27,340 --> 00:55:34,340
And that equals an exponential
to the negative power of the velocity decrement,
which you're trying to put in, divided by

861
00:55:45,690 --> 00:55:49,730
the exhaust velocity of the propellant that's
coming out.

862
00:55:49,730 --> 00:55:56,730
Now, this is usually phrased in terms of what
we call the specific impulse times gravity

863
00:56:00,150 --> 00:56:04,330
because it's done by engineers.

864
00:56:04,330 --> 00:56:04,670
That's right.

865
00:56:04,670 --> 00:56:11,670
So you will hear reference to the specific
impulse and the units of that are seconds.

866
00:56:12,470 --> 00:56:16,740
But, if you multiply that by the gravitational
acceleration, it will actually give you the

867
00:56:16,740 --> 00:56:17,890
exhaust velocity.

868
00:56:17,890 --> 00:56:24,890
Because this is in an exponential it is extremely
sensitive to the exhaust velocity.

869
00:56:25,050 --> 00:56:32,050
Whatever delta V you are trying to get out,
if you can add a few more seconds to the specific

870
00:56:34,530 --> 00:56:40,180
impulse then the actual mass of propellant
that you have to burn in order to create that

871
00:56:40,180 --> 00:56:43,170
delta V goes down substantially.

872
00:56:43,170 --> 00:56:50,170
Now, for hydrogen/oxygen, the specific impulse
is about 450 seconds.

873
00:56:56,770 --> 00:57:03,770
For solid rocket motors, the specific impulse
is on the order of about 250, something like

874
00:57:07,420 --> 00:57:07,670
that.
That's what I thought it was, about 250.

875
00:57:10,410 --> 00:57:12,060
That's almost a factor of two.

876
00:57:12,060 --> 00:57:19,060
And you put that into an exponent, if you
try to get into orbit with purely a solid

877
00:57:19,730 --> 00:57:24,750
rocket motor, you need a lot more propellant.

878
00:57:24,750 --> 00:57:31,750
And that means the payload mass you can take
into orbit is reduced.

879
00:57:31,770 --> 00:57:38,410
That's why, in addition to using hydrogen
and oxygen, and we will have a lecture specifically

880
00:57:38,410 --> 00:57:45,410
on the main engine, they got every last ounce
of performance out of it by running it.

881
00:57:45,430 --> 00:57:52,260
You'll hear references to running it at 104%
abraded thrust, 109% abraded thrust.

882
00:57:52,260 --> 00:57:59,260
And all of these have engineering consequences
because, in order to increase the exhaust

883
00:58:00,140 --> 00:58:04,310
velocity -- Which, of course, if you do that,
that's in the denominator so that's going

884
00:58:04,310 --> 00:58:09,160
in the right direction, you have to increase
the chamber pressure, the temperature and

885
00:58:09,160 --> 00:58:10,640
all of the design problems.

886
00:58:10,640 --> 00:58:14,600
He is going to ask you the question why don't
you use liquids all the way?

887
00:58:14,600 --> 00:58:20,560
I knew what your question was.

888
00:58:20,560 --> 00:58:22,930
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

889
00:58:22,930 --> 00:58:29,930
He is asking why don't you use the liquid
hydrogen engine all the way rather than using

890
00:58:32,740 --> 00:58:33,550
solid rocket boosters?

891
00:58:33,550 --> 00:58:40,550
Well, first of all, why not just have a bigger
fuel tank, one big fuel tank and just use

892
00:58:43,740 --> 00:58:44,510
the Shuttle engine?

893
00:58:44,510 --> 00:58:45,080
That's what he's saying.

894
00:58:45,080 --> 00:58:47,930
That would be essentially single-stage-to-orbit.

895
00:58:47,930 --> 00:58:54,930
And I'm not going to spend a lot of time with
the rocket equation, but the delta V that

896
00:58:56,100 --> 00:59:03,040
you need to get into orbit is, well, orbital
velocity is just under 8 kilometers per second.

897
00:59:03,040 --> 00:59:08,600
But to that you have to add the gravity loss
[OVERLAPPING VOICES].

898
00:59:08,600 --> 00:59:14,420
And so the overall delta V is effectively
about 9 kilometers per second.

899
00:59:14,420 --> 00:59:21,420
If you put that into the equation, you actually
can get the ratio of the final to the initial

900
00:59:21,880 --> 00:59:22,140
masses.

901
00:59:22,140 --> 00:59:29,140
And even for a hydrogen/oxygen engine you
can basically almost 95% of the mass sitting

902
00:59:32,630 --> 00:59:36,070
on the launch pad has to be propellant.

903
00:59:36,070 --> 00:59:40,770
Which means that all of your structure can
only be about 5%.

904
00:59:40,770 --> 00:59:47,770
Now, if we could make super strong, super
light structures, like an eggshell, then,

905
00:59:48,230 --> 00:59:52,260
in principle, we could get to orbit without
staging.

906
00:59:52,260 --> 00:59:59,260
Now, the first thing you learn in Rockets
101 is why you cannot do single-stage-to-orbit.

907
01:00:00,490 --> 01:00:02,840
It is because right now we do not have the
technology to do that.

908
01:00:02,840 --> 01:00:05,220
Well, see, many people have studied single-stage-to-orbit.

909
01:00:05,220 --> 01:00:11,210
In fact, NASA tried to build one the X-23
and we failed.

910
01:00:11,210 --> 01:00:16,900
What they say is really what you need is to
be as smart or as high-tech as an eggshell,

911
01:00:16,900 --> 01:00:20,630
be able to make the structure as thin as an
eggshell, hold all the fluid in it and have

912
01:00:20,630 --> 01:00:23,250
very low density.

913
01:00:23,250 --> 01:00:25,140
Some day maybe we will do it.

914
01:00:25,140 --> 01:00:32,140
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

915
01:00:33,740 --> 01:00:40,740
Basically, by using the boosters or, in a
more traditional rocket, a first stage, once

916
01:00:46,140 --> 01:00:51,240
you've exhausted the fuel then you drop all
of that structural mass.

917
01:00:51,240 --> 01:00:56,310
And so, for the second stage, this initial
mass becomes much lower.

918
01:00:56,310 --> 01:01:03,310
[OVERLAPPING VOICES] The other thing that's
interesting is that if you go back to Apollo,

919
01:01:04,010 --> 01:01:06,990
during Apollo there were three ways to go
to the moon.

920
01:01:06,990 --> 01:01:08,470
One was direct.

921
01:01:08,470 --> 01:01:12,960
Von Braun wanted to build a large vehicle
called the Nova where you actually lifted

922
01:01:12,960 --> 01:01:15,850
off from the Cape and sent the whole vehicle
right to the moon.

923
01:01:15,850 --> 01:01:17,400
The other was to do earth orbital rendezvous.

924
01:01:17,400 --> 01:01:21,130
And the other way was to do Lunar orbital
rendezvous like we did.

925
01:01:21,130 --> 01:01:27,310
It turns out that that Nova vehicle had to
be so big that that was ruled out, so we wound

926
01:01:27,310 --> 01:01:30,590
up with earth orbital rendezvous.

927
01:01:30,590 --> 01:01:30,840
Yes, sir.

928
01:01:30,790 --> 01:01:35,510
How much did the role of geography play in
the design considerations?

929
01:01:35,510 --> 01:01:41,170
Because just looking at that, I mean, you
have to have the external tank separate at

930
01:01:41,170 --> 01:01:45,780
a specific [OVERLAPPING VOICES] talking about
launching in Vandenberg.

931
01:01:45,780 --> 01:01:50,280
Originally we thought about launching out
of New Mexico.

932
01:01:50,280 --> 01:01:57,280
Actually, when you're doing flight design,
depending on whether you're going into a due

933
01:02:00,500 --> 01:02:07,500
east launch to go into a 28 degree orbit or
a high inclination orbit, the placement of

934
01:02:09,910 --> 01:02:14,400
the external tank reentry is a major factor
in flight design.

935
01:02:14,400 --> 01:02:15,400
We spent a lot of time on that.

936
01:02:15,400 --> 01:02:22,400
And, in fact, often the trajectory has to
be shaped to be not quite efficient as it

937
01:02:23,230 --> 01:02:27,300
otherwise might be because you have to control
the landing of the external tank.

938
01:02:27,300 --> 01:02:29,300
But your question is a good one.

939
01:02:29,300 --> 01:02:35,660
I did some consulting for a company, after
I retired, and we were looking at a commercial

940
01:02:35,660 --> 01:02:36,800
launch vehicle.

941
01:02:36,800 --> 01:02:42,770
And we were trying to launch the vehicle out
of various places in the United States.

942
01:02:42,770 --> 01:02:48,820
And it's very difficult to get approval because
of the concerns they had for types of failures

943
01:02:48,820 --> 01:02:50,810
or anything that you're going to do.

944
01:02:50,810 --> 01:02:51,060
Yes, sir.

945
01:02:50,930 --> 01:02:57,930
I'm not sure why I thought this, but I was
under the impression that the external tank

946
01:03:01,130 --> 01:03:01,680
burned up in the atmosphere.

947
01:03:01,680 --> 01:03:01,930
No.
It didn't hit down.
It breaks up in the atmosphere.

948
01:03:02,350 --> 01:03:04,320
It didn't come down as one big glob.

949
01:03:04,320 --> 01:03:09,080
Some of it burns up, but some of it does get
back to the ground.

950
01:03:09,080 --> 01:03:09,730
OK.

951
01:03:09,730 --> 01:03:15,670
Is there any talk about a need to clean up
all that?

952
01:03:15,670 --> 01:03:16,030
Well, they haven't yet.

953
01:03:16,030 --> 01:03:16,390
I'm not an astronaut.

954
01:03:16,390 --> 01:03:17,080
That's mainly aluminum.

955
01:03:17,080 --> 01:03:23,130
Remember, the liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen
inside evaporate and are non-toxic.

956
01:03:23,130 --> 01:03:24,460
They question that Dr.

957
01:03:24,460 --> 01:03:30,090
Young asked about the solid rocket booster
environmental problem is a real problem that

958
01:03:30,090 --> 01:03:32,260
had to be solved.

959
01:03:32,260 --> 01:03:37,920
The other problem I had, I worked on trying
to get the Galileo cleared because it had

960
01:03:37,920 --> 01:03:40,360
a radio thermal nuclear generator on it.

961
01:03:40,360 --> 01:03:43,320
To get that cleared going into orbit is a
big job.

962
01:03:43,320 --> 01:03:46,990
I worked on that and thought I would never
finish it, but we finally got it cleared.

963
01:03:46,990 --> 01:03:48,580
But it was a very tough job.

964
01:03:48,580 --> 01:03:51,600
We had RTGs cleared to be launched.

965
01:03:51,600 --> 01:03:57,160
I don't remember specifically all the noxious
chemicals that come out of the solid rocket

966
01:03:57,160 --> 01:03:59,280
boosters, but it is pretty nasty stuff.

967
01:03:59,280 --> 01:04:00,150
Yeah, it is.

968
01:04:00,150 --> 01:04:06,860
I remember one of my launched, the families
and guests are taken to a launch site viewing

969
01:04:06,860 --> 01:04:11,950
area about three miles inland from the launch
pad.

970
01:04:11,950 --> 01:04:18,300
And it just so happened that the wind was
blowing onshore that day, it was an afternoon

971
01:04:18,300 --> 01:04:25,300
launch, and my brother is a real space nut
who always liked to watch as the rocket went.

972
01:04:26,160 --> 01:04:30,070
After about seven and a half minutes it just
sort of disappears over the horizon.

973
01:04:30,070 --> 01:04:37,070
But, after about five minutes, the solid rocket
exhaust was actually approaching the spectator

974
01:04:38,240 --> 01:04:40,340
area because of the wind blowing in.

975
01:04:40,340 --> 01:04:46,220
And they made everyone get on the buses and
drove them away so that nobody got injured.

976
01:04:46,220 --> 01:04:49,750
And my brother was really annoyed because
he didn't want to leave.

977
01:04:49,750 --> 01:04:55,279
If we have time, I would like to talk to you
a little bit about the Challenger accident,

978
01:04:55,279 --> 01:04:56,300
talk to you about the O ring seal.

979
01:04:56,300 --> 01:04:58,550
I would like to talk to you about that.

980
01:04:58,550 --> 01:05:01,040
I don't want to sweep those things under the
rug, but I would like to talk to you about

981
01:05:01,040 --> 01:05:05,900
that because I've got my own thoughts on the
problem that I would like you to hear.

982
01:05:05,900 --> 01:05:06,200
OK.

983
01:05:06,200 --> 01:05:07,740
Any other questions on the mission profile?

984
01:05:07,740 --> 01:05:08,670
Shall we keep going?

985
01:05:08,670 --> 01:05:09,250
Yeah.

986
01:05:09,250 --> 01:05:11,000
Tell you what.

987
01:05:11,000 --> 01:05:15,120
Let's take a two-minute break, stand up and
turn around.

988
01:05:15,120 --> 01:05:22,120
An hour is a long enough time to sit for a
bit.

989
01:05:22,850 --> 01:05:28,790
I am assuming that everybody is aware that
the Russians, at one time, had a space Shuttle

990
01:05:28,790 --> 01:05:30,790
program.

991
01:05:30,790 --> 01:05:35,770
And they manufactured a vehicle which looked
almost identical.

992
01:05:35,770 --> 01:05:37,920
Not exactly but almost identical.

993
01:05:37,920 --> 01:05:40,480
And it was no accident because they used our
plans.

994
01:05:40,480 --> 01:05:44,190
They used our thermal protection system, too.

995
01:05:44,190 --> 01:05:46,510
And they only ended up flying it once.

996
01:05:46,510 --> 01:05:48,700
And they actually flew it unmanned.

997
01:05:48,700 --> 01:05:55,700
And, despite a little bit of nail-biting during
the landing, they did recover it successfully.

998
01:05:59,980 --> 01:06:04,700
And then they discovered, just what we had
discovered, that it was a lot more expensive

999
01:06:04,700 --> 01:06:07,840
to operate than they had anticipated.

1000
01:06:07,840 --> 01:06:09,770
And they had a lot less money than we did.

1001
01:06:09,770 --> 01:06:13,390
And so it basically never flew again.

1002
01:06:13,390 --> 01:06:19,290
They had crews of cosmonauts who had been
training to fly the Buran, but there were

1003
01:06:19,290 --> 01:06:21,330
actually two differences.

1004
01:06:21,330 --> 01:06:28,330
The first was that they put the engines on
the external tank.

1005
01:06:29,570 --> 01:06:30,420
This did two things.

1006
01:06:30,420 --> 01:06:32,529
First of all, it did improve the performance.

1007
01:06:32,529 --> 01:06:39,529
And also the Russians were turning out engines
on assembly lines basically.

1008
01:06:43,580 --> 01:06:46,310
They turn out a tremendous amount of rocket
engines.

1009
01:06:46,310 --> 01:06:52,140
And I guess, from their point of view, and
I don't know the details of the performance

1010
01:06:52,140 --> 01:06:58,790
of their engine, how their main engine is
compared to ours, I think they actually had

1011
01:06:58,790 --> 01:07:00,310
four engines, if I remember.

1012
01:07:00,310 --> 01:07:07,310
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

1013
01:07:11,430 --> 01:07:14,990
The Orbiter was just a glider, and it was
no difference.

1014
01:07:14,990 --> 01:07:17,950
It was an unpowered glider.

1015
01:07:17,950 --> 01:07:24,950
They did learn one thing from us that when
you have a delta wing vehicle you are very,

1016
01:07:25,830 --> 01:07:30,890
very sensitive to the center of mass of the
system.

1017
01:07:30,890 --> 01:07:35,200
And it was a problem because the Orbiter,
when it flies back through the atmosphere,

1018
01:07:35,200 --> 01:07:42,200
it hits the top of the atmosphere at mach
25 and then flies all the way down to subsonic.

1019
01:07:44,090 --> 01:07:51,050
And the control characteristics and stability
characteristics change throughout that flight

1020
01:07:51,050 --> 01:07:51,520
envelope.

1021
01:07:51,520 --> 01:07:57,529
And we will have a lecture specifically on
the aerodynamics of the Shuttle, but it turns

1022
01:07:57,529 --> 01:08:04,340
out that the Shuttle is extremely sensitive
to the forward CG.

1023
01:08:04,340 --> 01:08:09,930
And I think it was around the mach 3 flight
regime, if you're just an inch or two forward

1024
01:08:09,930 --> 01:08:14,570
of the critical area in the CG, you can lose
control.

1025
01:08:14,570 --> 01:08:21,569
And so we actually, on many flights, they
always do a weight and balance on the Shuttle

1026
01:08:22,960 --> 01:08:29,960
before a launch, have had to be put lead ballast
in the aft engine compartment of the Shuttle

1027
01:08:30,578 --> 01:08:36,238
just to get the CG far enough back to get
mach 3 stability.

1028
01:08:36,238 --> 01:08:41,658
I hate to tell you how many tons of lead we've
launched into orbit over the course of the

1029
01:08:41,658 --> 01:08:43,889
Shuttle program because of the CG.

1030
01:08:43,889 --> 01:08:49,779
And, if you look, the delta wing profile of
Buran is slight different from the Orbiter

1031
01:08:49,779 --> 01:08:51,658
because I guess they learned the lesson.

1032
01:08:51,658 --> 01:08:54,469
And so they were not as sensitive to the CG.

1033
01:08:54,469 --> 01:09:01,229
But, of course, once you build an Orbiter
you cannot really change it.

1034
01:09:01,229 --> 01:09:04,559
And so we were sort of stuck with it.

1035
01:09:04,559 --> 01:09:09,988
To add on, one of the other concerns was having
the Orbiter with the thrust behind the Orbiter

1036
01:09:09,988 --> 01:09:16,139
and this large mass in the tank you could
get a pogo-type activity.

1037
01:09:16,139 --> 01:09:21,328
And so one concept that Max Faget had early
in the program was to have a swing engine,

1038
01:09:21,328 --> 01:09:27,578
actually have the engines fire on the back
of the tank and then, when you get ready to

1039
01:09:27,578 --> 01:09:30,649
separate the tanks, swing the engines back
into the Orbiter and bring them back into

1040
01:09:30,649 --> 01:09:31,649
the Orbiter.

1041
01:09:31,649 --> 01:09:32,940
And we threw that out.

1042
01:09:32,940 --> 01:09:33,799
That was a little complicated.

1043
01:09:33,799 --> 01:09:37,799
You're going to have a discussion on mechanism
in mechanical systems.

1044
01:09:37,799 --> 01:09:44,799
And, mechanisms in mechanical systems, everybody
can design but everybody has a hard time making

1045
01:09:45,549 --> 01:09:45,899
them work.

1046
01:09:45,899 --> 01:09:48,649
When you put up an electrical schematic everybody
accepts it.

1047
01:09:48,649 --> 01:09:54,099
When you put up a mechanical drawing of a
mechanical system everybody has an idea of

1048
01:09:54,099 --> 01:09:56,000
how it is supposed to work.

1049
01:09:56,000 --> 01:09:56,949
Let's move on.

1050
01:09:56,949 --> 01:09:58,900
I've got some pictures now just to show you.

1051
01:09:58,900 --> 01:10:01,320
It is showing a profile.

1052
01:10:01,320 --> 01:10:06,340
And then, of course, you've seen the vehicle
when it gets to roll out of the assembly building.

1053
01:10:06,340 --> 01:10:08,699
There it is stacked.

1054
01:10:08,699 --> 01:10:12,690
And then it's on a crawler.

1055
01:10:12,690 --> 01:10:17,119
This crawler basically was used for Apollo,
and the crawler takes the vehicle out the

1056
01:10:17,119 --> 01:10:17,440
pad.

1057
01:10:17,440 --> 01:10:22,460
Just one thing so that people notice the difference
here.

1058
01:10:22,460 --> 01:10:28,440
Is anyone familiar enough with Apollo to be
able to say what the fundamental difference

1059
01:10:28,440 --> 01:10:34,030
is with the crawler mechanism here and the
crawler in the pad?

1060
01:10:34,030 --> 01:10:41,030
Well, if you look at the picture of a Saturn
rocket being rolled on the crawler, the whole

1061
01:10:41,849 --> 01:10:44,519
launch tower was on the crawler.

1062
01:10:44,519 --> 01:10:48,900
And so they rolled the whole thing out.

1063
01:10:48,900 --> 01:10:50,550
With the Shuttle it's a little different.

1064
01:10:50,550 --> 01:10:57,550
I will be bringing in some pictures at some
point to show you some of these details, but

1065
01:10:58,519 --> 01:11:05,170
they actually cut off the top part of the
Saturn launch tower because the shuttle stack

1066
01:11:05,170 --> 01:11:06,440
isn't quite as tall.

1067
01:11:06,440 --> 01:11:12,929
And they added a movable what's called a payload
change-out fixture.

1068
01:11:12,929 --> 01:11:19,929
And so once the shuttle actually gets on the
pad, there are actually railroad tracks here.

1069
01:11:20,289 --> 01:11:22,489
Is this a better picture of it?

1070
01:11:22,489 --> 01:11:23,199
OK.

1071
01:11:23,199 --> 01:11:23,780
Yeah.

1072
01:11:23,780 --> 01:11:30,780
This whole enclosure rolls over and forms
a kind of hermetic seal around the shuttle

1073
01:11:34,130 --> 01:11:39,010
so that you can open the cargo bay doors which,
by the way, cannot support their own weight

1074
01:11:39,010 --> 01:11:39,469
in one G.

1075
01:11:39,469 --> 01:11:42,289
So you have to put an external strong back
on them.

1076
01:11:42,289 --> 01:11:49,289
And, in the meantime, you put the payload
that is going to be installed, this payload

1077
01:11:49,869 --> 01:11:54,130
canister here, that is installed in the change-out
room.

1078
01:11:54,130 --> 01:12:00,619
And then it is swung over, the doors are open,
the payload is installed in the bay.

1079
01:12:00,619 --> 01:12:04,380
And then this forms a protective enclosure
over the shuttle.

1080
01:12:04,380 --> 01:12:08,900
And it is not swung back usually until the
day before launch.

1081
01:12:08,900 --> 01:12:13,409
See, now this is again another detail in systems
engineering.

1082
01:12:13,409 --> 01:12:20,269
You go in for that schematic or that little
plan form of the Orbiter, and you did iterations

1083
01:12:20,269 --> 01:12:25,699
of the size and then you had to do iterations
of the launch complex, how it was going to

1084
01:12:25,699 --> 01:12:26,840
put payloads in.

1085
01:12:26,840 --> 01:12:32,090
And that's all systems engineering, certain
levels of systems engineering.

1086
01:12:32,090 --> 01:12:37,699
I mean it's very easy to say, well, we will
just put the payload in on the pad.

1087
01:12:37,699 --> 01:12:44,670
But the actual development of the mechanisms
to do that is extremely complicated to say

1088
01:12:44,670 --> 01:12:51,670
nothing of which, I mean what kind of amazes
me is that it has to be done essentially in

1089
01:12:52,179 --> 01:12:54,059
a clean-room environment.

1090
01:12:54,059 --> 01:13:00,519
You're up there crawling around the pad inside
the payload change-out room in white coats,

1091
01:13:00,519 --> 01:13:03,820
bunny suits and gloves on.

1092
01:13:03,820 --> 01:13:07,159
And outside the wind is blowing and it could
be raining.

1093
01:13:07,159 --> 01:13:08,889
There is sand blowing by.

1094
01:13:08,889 --> 01:13:13,239
So the whole thing has to be done in a clean-room
environment, but it's on the scale of a naval

1095
01:13:13,239 --> 01:13:14,659
shipyard.

1096
01:13:14,659 --> 01:13:15,780
This is a huge vehicle.

1097
01:13:15,780 --> 01:13:17,369
So it's really a challenge.

1098
01:13:17,369 --> 01:13:24,179
Of course, that's one of the reasons, in all
honesty why the cost per flight has gone up.

1099
01:13:24,179 --> 01:13:29,400
The original concept, when Dale Myers was
Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight,

1100
01:13:29,400 --> 01:13:31,900
the man who spoke to you, I went up to him,
seeing I was the Orbiter Project Manager.

1101
01:13:31,900 --> 01:13:34,000
And we concluded this will be very simple.

1102
01:13:34,000 --> 01:13:36,579
We were going to make very standard payloads.

1103
01:13:36,579 --> 01:13:41,820
You went, put the payload in, fixed it in,
we were going to launch it, deploy it, come

1104
01:13:41,820 --> 01:13:46,110
back, fail the computer on the pad, we'd go
anyway, wouldn't replace the computer.

1105
01:13:46,110 --> 01:13:47,219
Of course, that all changed.

1106
01:13:47,219 --> 01:13:51,389
The missions became very complicated and we
didn't do that.

1107
01:13:51,389 --> 01:13:54,099
That is another important point, though.

1108
01:13:54,099 --> 01:13:59,550
You better be sure, when you get to be a project
manager or manager, you understand your requirements,

1109
01:13:59,550 --> 01:14:01,210
understand your customer's need.

1110
01:14:01,210 --> 01:14:07,030
But, if the ground rules change, your performance
is going to change.

1111
01:14:07,030 --> 01:14:09,059
So you need to understand that.

1112
01:14:09,059 --> 01:14:10,559
Any other point you want to make, Jeff?

1113
01:14:10,559 --> 01:14:11,469
Any other questions?

1114
01:14:11,469 --> 01:14:13,280
I've just got some other pictures.

1115
01:14:13,280 --> 01:14:16,829
Here is the liftoff, as you see, everything
burning.

1116
01:14:16,829 --> 01:14:23,289
Have we had a case where we hit a bird on
launch?

1117
01:14:23,289 --> 01:14:25,099
Yes, I believe we have.

1118
01:14:25,099 --> 01:14:31,469
Of course, in the Orbiter windows, one of
the things we did, I hate to say this, is

1119
01:14:31,469 --> 01:14:36,219
fired dead chickens into the window to see
if you could break the window in the system.

1120
01:14:36,219 --> 01:14:38,420
I think we did an aircraft also.

1121
01:14:38,420 --> 01:14:45,420
And we actually did, I remember, one simulation
where in the simulator, right at liftoff,

1122
01:14:48,280 --> 01:14:52,670
the instructor came in and threw a rubber
bird in the commander's lap and said you've

1123
01:14:52,670 --> 01:14:55,400
just been incapacitated by a bird strike.

1124
01:14:55,400 --> 01:15:01,219
And so the copilot had to take over flying.

1125
01:15:01,219 --> 01:15:07,130
You should realize that Kennedy Space Center
is actually a wildlife sanctuary, and so there

1126
01:15:07,130 --> 01:15:09,800
are a lot of birds.

1127
01:15:09,800 --> 01:15:15,780
There's a National Wildlife Sanctuary, park
rangers and a lot of eagles.

1128
01:15:15,780 --> 01:15:21,960
There are eagles and a lot of turkey buzzards.

1129
01:15:21,960 --> 01:15:26,010
There is a landing strip that is right in
the middle of the bird sanctuary.

1130
01:15:26,010 --> 01:15:31,650
And so often, before the shuttle gets ready
to come in, they will send planes to sort

1131
01:15:31,650 --> 01:15:36,429
of buzz the runway to scare the birds away.

1132
01:15:36,429 --> 01:15:39,170
They also had a problem at one point with
owls.

1133
01:15:39,170 --> 01:15:40,710
No, woodpeckers, excuse me.

1134
01:15:40,710 --> 01:15:47,710
Woodpeckers were decided that the external
tank insulation was a good place to find bugs.

1135
01:15:48,349 --> 01:15:55,349
It sounds funny, but think of what that actually
potentially could mean.

1136
01:15:57,929 --> 01:16:04,929
They had to go down and had loudspeakers and
stuffed owls and everything, which they ended

1137
01:16:05,010 --> 01:16:08,519
up putting around to scare away the woodpeckers.

1138
01:16:08,519 --> 01:16:12,500
These are things, again, which I think the
original systems engineering never took into

1139
01:16:12,500 --> 01:16:13,690
account.

1140
01:16:13,690 --> 01:16:15,780
We were worried about F equals MA.

1141
01:16:15,780 --> 01:16:22,780
And there is a typical deployment of [OBSCURED],
if I'm not mistaken, to get the payload into

1142
01:16:24,210 --> 01:16:24,989
orbit.

1143
01:16:24,989 --> 01:16:31,880
Here is a picture of the crew at their station
with their CRTs.

1144
01:16:31,880 --> 01:16:33,219
And, of course, then you de-orbit.

1145
01:16:33,219 --> 01:16:36,170
And this is, of course, not a real picture.

1146
01:16:36,170 --> 01:16:38,590
Do I have that right?

1147
01:16:38,590 --> 01:16:45,000
This is right.

1148
01:16:45,000 --> 01:16:52,000
And then, of course, landing on the runway.

1149
01:16:54,219 --> 01:16:58,030
That's a typical profile that we've gone through
in terms of showing.

1150
01:16:58,030 --> 01:17:03,170
Now, let me talk a little bit more about systems
engineering.

1151
01:17:03,170 --> 01:17:10,170
When I took over in August of 1972, we had
what we called Space Shuttle Orbiter Management

1152
01:17:11,630 --> 01:17:11,880
Reviews.

1153
01:17:11,780 --> 01:17:12,710
That's North American.

1154
01:17:12,710 --> 01:17:14,739
This was one of September 1972.

1155
01:17:14,739 --> 01:17:20,769
And I think it might be interesting to look
at the agenda in September of 1972 what we

1156
01:17:20,769 --> 01:17:22,199
were talking about.

1157
01:17:22,199 --> 01:17:23,090
And here was the agenda.

1158
01:17:23,090 --> 01:17:28,210
I'm not going to go through all the paperwork
but here was the agenda.

1159
01:17:28,210 --> 01:17:33,050
Basic resizing of the vehicle because of certain
problems we had in the iteration.

1160
01:17:33,050 --> 01:17:34,769
Cabin configuration and docking location.

1161
01:17:34,769 --> 01:17:38,820
The Space Shuttle main engine interface control
document.

1162
01:17:38,820 --> 01:17:44,269
It turns out interface control documents are
probably one of the most systems integration

1163
01:17:44,269 --> 01:17:50,480
tool because interface control document defines
how you're going to put the main engine into

1164
01:17:50,480 --> 01:17:51,900
the Orbiter.

1165
01:17:51,900 --> 01:17:53,000
What is interface?

1166
01:17:53,000 --> 01:17:55,389
An interface could be this plug.

1167
01:17:55,389 --> 01:18:00,019
If you had a plug in a socket, it would be
bad if you couldn't plug that in.

1168
01:18:00,019 --> 01:18:01,300
But that's an interface.

1169
01:18:01,300 --> 01:18:05,949
When you change your tire, if those bolt hole
patterns don't match you'd be very frustrated.

1170
01:18:05,949 --> 01:18:06,650
So that's an interface.

1171
01:18:06,650 --> 01:18:10,130
Interfaces can be as simple as that or they
can be very, very complicated.

1172
01:18:10,130 --> 01:18:16,820
And so this was the SSME interface control
document, how we actually get the main engine

1173
01:18:16,820 --> 01:18:23,199
in terms of mechanical propulsion put into
the Orbiter.

1174
01:18:23,199 --> 01:18:25,659
Integrated asset control, abort requirements.

1175
01:18:25,659 --> 01:18:32,659
And now we're talking about just procurement,
RCS and OMS procurement.

1176
01:18:33,889 --> 01:18:35,989
The rocket motor's procurement package.

1177
01:18:35,989 --> 01:18:40,199
Avionics definition, leading edge TPS and
emergency risk.

1178
01:18:40,199 --> 01:18:42,869
These were some of the problems we started
talking about.

1179
01:18:42,869 --> 01:18:45,989
Now, these are lower level systems engineering
problems.

1180
01:18:45,989 --> 01:18:52,739
But they are systems engineering to make the
definition of the total launch configuration.

1181
01:18:52,739 --> 01:18:57,829
Here is an interesting chart.

1182
01:18:57,829 --> 01:18:59,349
This is dollars.

1183
01:18:59,349 --> 01:19:06,349
Why this is interesting is you see on this
chart Rockwell's proposal.

1184
01:19:07,920 --> 01:19:10,510
These are $1 million.

1185
01:19:10,510 --> 01:19:15,659
$123 million the first year, but when I became
Orbiter Project Manager that was Rockwell's

1186
01:19:15,659 --> 01:19:16,429
proposal.

1187
01:19:16,429 --> 01:19:20,849
The first thing they did to me, they told
me I only had $73 million that year, so I

1188
01:19:20,849 --> 01:19:22,630
had to re-phase the whole program.

1189
01:19:22,630 --> 01:19:29,599
I had to rephrase the whole program to fit
the funding curve that the Office of Management

1190
01:19:29,599 --> 01:19:34,190
Budget gave me.

1191
01:19:34,190 --> 01:19:35,469
This was a major perturbation.

1192
01:19:35,469 --> 01:19:41,900
When you do that and you don't get your money
as the proposal, it comes out to be a cost

1193
01:19:41,900 --> 01:19:42,340
increase.

1194
01:19:42,340 --> 01:19:49,340
Right away we went a little bit cost increase
to 4.6, but as you don't get the funding requirements

1195
01:19:50,440 --> 01:19:54,210
you then essentially lose your momentum, you
lose your schedule.

1196
01:19:54,210 --> 01:19:57,460
And once you lose schedule you start costing.

1197
01:19:57,460 --> 01:19:58,769
As Dr.

1198
01:19:58,769 --> 01:20:03,429
Hoffman mentioned, you have the three-ledged
stool, cost, schedule and performance.

1199
01:20:03,429 --> 01:20:08,559
And that is a continual tradeoff as you go
through a systems engineering program.

1200
01:20:08,559 --> 01:20:15,559
And the things you have to look at, the things
that cause project managers to lose their

1201
01:20:15,849 --> 01:20:22,519
job is first you're going to recognize that
you have a weight increase in the vehicle.

1202
01:20:22,519 --> 01:20:26,869
Whatever you build is going to cause to have
your weight increase.

1203
01:20:26,869 --> 01:20:31,789
The next thing you're going to have is a schedule
slip.

1204
01:20:31,789 --> 01:20:34,679
And then, when you put those together, you're
going to have a cost increase.

1205
01:20:34,679 --> 01:20:36,969
And then you're going to have technical problems.

1206
01:20:36,969 --> 01:20:41,510
And those are disastrous cases for a project
manager.

1207
01:20:41,510 --> 01:20:43,429
Those are reasons to firing somebody.

1208
01:20:43,429 --> 01:20:45,719
Luckily I made it.

1209
01:20:45,719 --> 01:20:49,280
I made it because of a man that you are going
to hear talk, Chris Kraft, because he was

1210
01:20:49,280 --> 01:20:52,260
my immediate boss and he ran interference
for me.

1211
01:20:52,260 --> 01:20:53,219
And you're going to hear Dr.

1212
01:20:53,219 --> 01:20:53,710
Kraft talk.

1213
01:20:53,710 --> 01:20:56,150
He's a good man to have on your side running
interference for you.

1214
01:20:56,150 --> 01:20:57,289
You're going to hear him talk.

1215
01:20:57,289 --> 01:20:58,159
He's a great guy.

1216
01:20:58,159 --> 01:21:00,289
And he's going to tell you what he thinks.

1217
01:21:00,289 --> 01:21:02,210
And he'll tell you what he thinks.

1218
01:21:02,210 --> 01:21:09,210
But that's a little bit about cost.

1219
01:21:09,360 --> 01:21:15,900
Further systems engineering questions in the
Orbiter Management Review is Orbiter maximum

1220
01:21:15,900 --> 01:21:16,320
wing size.

1221
01:21:16,320 --> 01:21:18,650
ATP is our authority to proceed.

1222
01:21:18,650 --> 01:21:19,980
Wing size is very important.

1223
01:21:19,980 --> 01:21:23,219
You've got to get the aerodynamic model wing
load squared away.

1224
01:21:23,219 --> 01:21:28,880
We said no major line change after program
requirement is reviewed.

1225
01:21:28,880 --> 01:21:32,659
Controlled dry weight was 170,000 pounds including
margin.

1226
01:21:32,659 --> 01:21:35,570
And I don't think we made that, did we?

1227
01:21:35,570 --> 01:21:37,369
No, we didn't.

1228
01:21:37,369 --> 01:21:39,159
More like 200,000.

1229
01:21:39,159 --> 01:21:42,760
No ejection seats on vertical flights.

1230
01:21:42,760 --> 01:21:45,159
Top located docking port.

1231
01:21:45,159 --> 01:21:47,909
Wing area for landing speeds of 150 knots.

1232
01:21:47,909 --> 01:21:49,539
Wing stiffness criteria.

1233
01:21:49,539 --> 01:21:50,449
Flutter margins.

1234
01:21:50,449 --> 01:21:52,460
Control effectiveness for entry and ferry.

1235
01:21:52,460 --> 01:21:53,949
Elevon design concepts.

1236
01:21:53,949 --> 01:21:56,599
[OBSCURED] crew cabin.

1237
01:21:56,599 --> 01:22:00,760
These were some of the systems engineering
problems that had to be resolved before you

1238
01:22:00,760 --> 01:22:01,630
could start manufacturing.

1239
01:22:01,630 --> 01:22:08,469
One of the interesting things, I forgot who
was head of the astronaut office at the time.

1240
01:22:08,469 --> 01:22:09,889
I don't know if it was Brandon Stein.

1241
01:22:09,889 --> 01:22:10,820
I don't know who it was.

1242
01:22:10,820 --> 01:22:12,519
At which time?

1243
01:22:12,519 --> 01:22:14,860
Well, at about the time of the design of the
Shuttle.

1244
01:22:14,860 --> 01:22:15,699
About this time.

1245
01:22:15,699 --> 01:22:18,179
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

1246
01:22:18,179 --> 01:22:23,079
I forgot who I asked, but we were trying to
get the cockpit laid out.

1247
01:22:23,079 --> 01:22:25,309
It was very important to get the cockpit laid
out.

1248
01:22:25,309 --> 01:22:29,360
And I wanted the crew to have their inputs
on how they wanted the cockpit.

1249
01:22:29,360 --> 01:22:31,710
You want the crew to be a part of laying out
the cockpit.

1250
01:22:31,710 --> 01:22:38,710
I called the head of the Astronaut Office
over and said we need to lay out this cockpit

1251
01:22:39,400 --> 01:22:42,599
and you need to come back to me with a decision
of how you want the cockpit.

1252
01:22:42,599 --> 01:22:43,840
He said I cannot do it.

1253
01:22:43,840 --> 01:22:46,050
I've got 100 astronauts over there and they
won't agree.

1254
01:22:46,050 --> 01:22:47,489
I said I'll tell you what you do.

1255
01:22:47,489 --> 01:22:50,550
You tell them that I will give two weeks and
then I'm going to do it.

1256
01:22:50,550 --> 01:22:53,920
And that really scared them because I didn't
know anything about laying out a cockpit.

1257
01:22:53,920 --> 01:22:55,400
And we had the cockpit laid out.

1258
01:22:55,400 --> 01:23:02,400
So that's sometimes how you have to use management
techniques.

1259
01:23:08,320 --> 01:23:15,320
Now we're going to get more into the details
of what you're going to hear in some detail.

1260
01:23:16,920 --> 01:23:20,320
And I'm going to start if off a little bit.

1261
01:23:20,320 --> 01:23:24,639
Here are basically the hardware subsystems.

1262
01:23:24,639 --> 01:23:31,090
You're going to hear a technical briefing
on the thermal protection system and the structures.

1263
01:23:31,090 --> 01:23:37,539
You will see in your syllabus when that is,
but you're going to hear a very detailed discussion

1264
01:23:37,539 --> 01:23:44,289
of the thermal protection system, the structures
by Tom Moser who actually did the work.

1265
01:23:44,289 --> 01:23:49,590
He was actually what I call my subsystem manager
on the Shuttle in the early days of the program.

1266
01:23:49,590 --> 01:23:54,969
You are going to hear a technical briefing
on the Space Shuttle main engines and a very

1267
01:23:54,969 --> 01:23:56,389
detailed briefly by J.R.

1268
01:23:56,389 --> 01:23:56,690
Thompson.

1269
01:23:56,690 --> 01:23:56,980
J.R.

1270
01:23:56,980 --> 01:24:01,630
Thompson, a little background about him, he
was Project Manager of the main engine at

1271
01:24:01,630 --> 01:24:02,699
Marshall Space Flight Center.

1272
01:24:02,699 --> 01:24:05,909
Then he became Director of the Marshall Space
Flight Center.

1273
01:24:05,909 --> 01:24:07,980
Then he was Deputy Administrator at NASA.

1274
01:24:07,980 --> 01:24:11,079
Now he is Vice President of Orbital Sciences.

1275
01:24:11,079 --> 01:24:18,079
You are going to have a detailed briefing
on the hydraulic system, the auxiliary power

1276
01:24:18,320 --> 01:24:22,650
system, fuel cells, orbital maneuvering system
and the reaction control systems.

1277
01:24:22,650 --> 01:24:24,010
That is going to be by Henry Pohl.

1278
01:24:24,010 --> 01:24:31,010
Guidance, navigation and control is going
to be by Phil Hattis from the Draper Laboratories.

1279
01:24:32,550 --> 01:24:36,800
Environment control and life support of the
crew cabin, that is going to be a man who

1280
01:24:36,800 --> 01:24:41,599
is currently working at the Johnson Space
Center, Walt Guy who actually did this job

1281
01:24:41,599 --> 01:24:42,480
for the Apollo.

1282
01:24:42,480 --> 01:24:47,090
Most of these people, by the way, did the
same thing for the Apollo that they did for

1283
01:24:47,090 --> 01:24:48,980
Shuttle.

1284
01:24:48,980 --> 01:24:52,860
Very similar jobs, so you can ask these people
about the Apollo program.

1285
01:24:52,860 --> 01:24:56,119
Landing and mechanical systems by Al Louviere.

1286
01:24:56,119 --> 01:24:58,550
Communications and electrical power we're
really not going to brief, although we will

1287
01:24:58,550 --> 01:25:01,760
talk electrical power when we talk fuel cells,
but we're not going to really have a discussion

1288
01:25:01,760 --> 01:25:05,039
on communications and fuel cells.

1289
01:25:05,039 --> 01:25:12,039
And then we're going to have some analytical
studies on aerodynamics and aerothermodynamics.

1290
01:25:15,920 --> 01:25:22,739
These will probably be detailed technical
discussions when we get into aerodynamics

1291
01:25:22,739 --> 01:25:23,800
and aerothermodynamics.

1292
01:25:23,800 --> 01:25:28,849
Again, these people did the same on Apollo
as they did on Shuttle.

1293
01:25:28,849 --> 01:25:35,199
That is going to be your details of what you're
going to see.

1294
01:25:35,199 --> 01:25:42,199
What I'd like to do now, with the few minutes
we have remaining, is talk to you a little

1295
01:25:42,909 --> 01:25:47,610
bit and give you a little bit of flavor of
some of these subsystems, a little bit more

1296
01:25:47,610 --> 01:25:50,880
detail than that we've previously given you,
but not as much detail as you're going to

1297
01:25:50,880 --> 01:25:52,239
see.

1298
01:25:52,239 --> 01:25:59,239
Let's start off a little bit with the Orbiter
and just show you what the Orbiter looks like.

1299
01:26:00,070 --> 01:26:07,070
And talk a little bit about some of the subsystems
in the Orbiter.

1300
01:26:08,969 --> 01:26:13,840
The forward reaction control systems is up
in the far nose of the vehicle.

1301
01:26:13,840 --> 01:26:20,090
And then you have the reaction control system
back in what is called the OMS pod, orbital

1302
01:26:20,090 --> 01:26:20,800
maneuvering system pod.

1303
01:26:20,800 --> 01:26:22,969
You have reaction control systems here and
here.

1304
01:26:22,969 --> 01:26:24,889
That's reaction control systems.

1305
01:26:24,889 --> 01:26:28,219
You have your Orbiter maneuvering system back
in these OMS pods.

1306
01:26:28,219 --> 01:26:35,219
Of course, you have the main landing gear
and the nose landing gear.

1307
01:26:35,789 --> 01:26:41,110
The wing, faring and the leading edge, which
is the carbon material.

1308
01:26:41,110 --> 01:26:43,929
This wing edge is carbon material.

1309
01:26:43,929 --> 01:26:48,400
And the side hatch.

1310
01:26:48,400 --> 01:26:50,300
And the overhead windows.

1311
01:26:50,300 --> 01:26:53,110
And then the side windows and the far windows.

1312
01:26:53,110 --> 01:26:58,550
The payload bay doors are made out of graphite
epoxy.

1313
01:26:58,550 --> 01:27:03,409
They were originally made out of aluminum.

1314
01:27:03,409 --> 01:27:05,929
We made it out of graphite epoxy because of
the weight growth.

1315
01:27:05,929 --> 01:27:10,659
We could say quite a bit of weight if we went
from aluminum to graphite epoxy.

1316
01:27:10,659 --> 01:27:15,010
That was the largest, probably at that time,
composite material used in an airplane.

1317
01:27:15,010 --> 01:27:18,849
It was made out of graphite epoxy.

1318
01:27:18,849 --> 01:27:24,760
And then the main engines, of course, are
in the aft end of the Orbiter.

1319
01:27:24,760 --> 01:27:27,999
And then you have the vertical tail stabilizer.

1320
01:27:27,999 --> 01:27:29,630
And, of course, you've got your elevons.

1321
01:27:29,630 --> 01:27:33,489
And you've got the body flap.

1322
01:27:33,489 --> 01:27:38,239
The body flap was actually put on originally
to deflect some of the heat from the engine,

1323
01:27:38,239 --> 01:27:41,409
but it actually turned out to be a control
surface also.

1324
01:27:41,409 --> 01:27:44,889
It actually turned out to be both the focus
of a control surface.

1325
01:27:44,889 --> 01:27:46,619
That's sort of the layout.

1326
01:27:46,619 --> 01:27:52,210
And you can visualize where you use these
systems, these active systems.

1327
01:27:52,210 --> 01:27:56,769
The reaction control system is used primarily
in orbit getting ready to de-orbit.

1328
01:27:56,769 --> 01:28:00,860
The OMS is used to help you get into orbit
and get out of orbit or maneuvering you want

1329
01:28:00,860 --> 01:28:01,849
to do.

1330
01:28:01,849 --> 01:28:08,849
The body flaps and the elevons are actually
used primarily during entry, a little big

1331
01:28:10,409 --> 01:28:12,139
during assent, during entry.

1332
01:28:12,139 --> 01:28:15,150
We do use the RCS system a little bit during
entry.

1333
01:28:15,150 --> 01:28:21,170
In the high altitude of entry you use the
RCS system, but eventually during entry the

1334
01:28:21,170 --> 01:28:25,760
load just becomes so high the RCS system or
reaction control system does not become very

1335
01:28:25,760 --> 01:28:26,119
effective.

1336
01:28:26,119 --> 01:28:32,710
I guess that's about all I want to say.

1337
01:28:32,710 --> 01:28:35,079
Any questions on that?

1338
01:28:35,079 --> 01:28:35,329
Yes, sir.

1339
01:28:35,190 --> 01:28:38,150
I was wondering why the nose gear was so short.

1340
01:28:38,150 --> 01:28:41,269
Well, it actually saves weight making it shorter.

1341
01:28:41,269 --> 01:28:44,289
It was easier to put in and it saved weight.

1342
01:28:44,289 --> 01:28:51,289
And I think also when you land, by having
the nose down you actually have an aerodynamic

1343
01:28:56,079 --> 01:29:00,739
force pushing the Orbiter down on the runway
which increases your stability.

1344
01:29:00,739 --> 01:29:05,809
And since you don't have to worry about eventually
taking off.

1345
01:29:05,809 --> 01:29:10,769
Like Professor Cohen said, if they had wanted
the Shuttle to be able to take off horizontally

1346
01:29:10,769 --> 01:29:16,670
from the runway they would have had to raise
the nose.

1347
01:29:16,670 --> 01:29:18,440
Yes, sir.

1348
01:29:18,440 --> 01:29:20,210
[AUDIENCE QUESTION]

1349
01:29:20,210 --> 01:29:25,420
Well, when you say under-designed, I mean
I would call it a minimum design.

1350
01:29:25,420 --> 01:29:30,039
I mean if it were under-designed it would
break.

1351
01:29:30,039 --> 01:29:32,440
I mean there are landing limits.

1352
01:29:32,440 --> 01:29:39,440
As I said, for a planned nominal landing,
and you have to realize there are different

1353
01:29:41,380 --> 01:29:46,920
kinds, there are emergency limits and limits
for nominal operations, you can take off with

1354
01:29:46,920 --> 01:29:49,269
65,000 pounds.

1355
01:29:49,269 --> 01:29:55,599
That means if you have a launch abort and
you have to return and land with your payload,

1356
01:29:55,599 --> 01:29:59,659
you will be landing with 65,000 pounds.

1357
01:29:59,659 --> 01:30:02,909
But you don't plan to do that.

1358
01:30:02,909 --> 01:30:04,969
That's a one off deal.

1359
01:30:04,969 --> 01:30:07,909
If you're planning to do it, it means you
can do it over and over again and then the

1360
01:30:07,909 --> 01:30:09,559
limit is 35,000 pounds.

1361
01:30:09,559 --> 01:30:12,400
They don't build it like a Navy carrier landing
airplane, I will tell you that.

1362
01:30:12,400 --> 01:30:17,159
Not just landing gear, I found the tires are
just really small.

1363
01:30:17,159 --> 01:30:20,489
The tires are small.

1364
01:30:20,489 --> 01:30:24,269
They have no treads either.

1365
01:30:24,269 --> 01:30:25,659
And the brakes were small.

1366
01:30:25,659 --> 01:30:31,030
Actually, the original brakes were under-designed
and we kept having brake failures.

1367
01:30:31,030 --> 01:30:35,539
In fact, I took the drag shoots off and then
we put them back on.

1368
01:30:35,539 --> 01:30:40,420
I took them off because of weight and put
them back on.

1369
01:30:40,420 --> 01:30:40,900
Tires are very interesting.

1370
01:30:40,900 --> 01:30:45,889
We're going to have a very detailed discussion
on tires, but tires are very, very complicated.

1371
01:30:45,889 --> 01:30:52,889
You think by putting more plies on the tires
you make it stronger, but not necessarily

1372
01:30:52,949 --> 01:30:59,949
because when you cycle them they got hot and
the more plies tend to hold the heat in and

1373
01:31:00,210 --> 01:31:01,670
weakens the tire.

1374
01:31:01,670 --> 01:31:03,789
Tires are not a very simple thing to design.

1375
01:31:03,789 --> 01:31:05,820
They are only used once then.

1376
01:31:05,820 --> 01:31:06,159
No.

1377
01:31:06,159 --> 01:31:10,179
I think we used these tires, I think, five
times, or could use them up to five times.

1378
01:31:10,179 --> 01:31:11,499
The brakes are used five times.

1379
01:31:11,499 --> 01:31:13,280
I don't know about the tires.

1380
01:31:13,280 --> 01:31:16,230
I don't know.

1381
01:31:16,230 --> 01:31:19,460
Let me talk about weight and margin.

1382
01:31:19,460 --> 01:31:20,510
Let me go back to Apollo.

1383
01:31:20,510 --> 01:31:24,559
We had Apollo designed.

1384
01:31:24,559 --> 01:31:31,300
And we found that on the Lunar module taking
off from the Lunar surface it was too heavy.

1385
01:31:31,300 --> 01:31:32,840
We couldn't lift off.

1386
01:31:32,840 --> 01:31:36,349
The engines were already built, the tanks
were already sized and we couldn't get off

1387
01:31:36,349 --> 01:31:37,210
the Lunar surface.

1388
01:31:37,210 --> 01:31:39,300
And that's not a very good deal.

1389
01:31:39,300 --> 01:31:42,440
The astronauts didn't like that too well.

1390
01:31:42,440 --> 01:31:46,929
George Low was the program manager at the
time.

1391
01:31:46,929 --> 01:31:53,889
We were spending, in those year dollars, $24,000
a pound to get weight out of the Lunar module.

1392
01:31:53,889 --> 01:32:00,889
And they scraped, they did everything they
could to get any [OVERLAPPING VOICES].

1393
01:32:00,940 --> 01:32:06,389
You're basically offering them $24,000 for
every pound that they could scrub out because

1394
01:32:06,389 --> 01:32:08,139
we couldn't resize the engine.

1395
01:32:08,139 --> 01:32:08,739
The engine was there.

1396
01:32:08,739 --> 01:32:15,739
They were literally in there with emery cloth
shaving down the aluminum from the inside.

1397
01:32:16,099 --> 01:32:18,070
So weight can be very critical.

1398
01:32:18,070 --> 01:32:25,070
I don't think most people realize how close
the margins were there.

1399
01:32:25,199 --> 01:32:32,199
I mean the Lunar module was only certified
for, I think, five pressurizations.

1400
01:32:32,349 --> 01:32:33,829
And then it was beyond its structure limits.

1401
01:32:33,829 --> 01:32:38,159
My statement to many people is the next time
we go to the moon we are going to find out

1402
01:32:38,159 --> 01:32:45,159
how hard it really was because, to tell you
the truth, we went to the moon with one computer

1403
01:32:48,099 --> 01:32:53,730
in the service module and one computer in
the Lunar module.

1404
01:32:53,730 --> 01:32:54,070
Excuse me.

1405
01:32:54,070 --> 01:32:57,869
We did have two computers in the Lunar module.

1406
01:32:57,869 --> 01:33:04,730
We had the MIT computer and then we had a
strap-down system built by TRW.

1407
01:33:04,730 --> 01:33:07,969
That's an interesting point.

1408
01:33:07,969 --> 01:33:10,139
I think somebody asked the question last time.

1409
01:33:10,139 --> 01:33:15,420
Let me talk about the aft end of the Orbiter
a little bit because we did not have CAD/CAM

1410
01:33:15,420 --> 01:33:16,199
systems at the time.

1411
01:33:16,199 --> 01:33:22,920
And let me show you some pictures taken.

1412
01:33:22,920 --> 01:33:29,920
I don't know what vehicle it is, but that's
the aft end of the Orbiter.

1413
01:33:30,320 --> 01:33:31,519
That's where the big engines go into.

1414
01:33:31,519 --> 01:33:38,280
This looks like it is going to take off.

1415
01:33:38,280 --> 01:33:41,699
If you crawled in the back of the aft end
of the Orbiter there is plumbing, there is

1416
01:33:41,699 --> 01:33:43,719
wiring, there is structure.

1417
01:33:43,719 --> 01:33:50,719
Now, had we had computer-aided design at that
time, I am convinced we would have a much

1418
01:33:51,280 --> 01:33:53,760
neater, better design than we have today.

1419
01:33:53,760 --> 01:33:55,139
We had to mark everything up.

1420
01:33:55,139 --> 01:33:57,659
We marked it up and we changed it.

1421
01:33:57,659 --> 01:33:58,920
People bumped their heads on it.

1422
01:33:58,920 --> 01:34:04,650
If you go to the aft end of the Orbiter you'd
wonder how they can do anything, but that

1423
01:34:04,650 --> 01:34:10,769
was done because we did not have computer-aided
design.

1424
01:34:10,769 --> 01:34:13,610
Like airplanes now have virtual markups.

1425
01:34:13,610 --> 01:34:17,079
You can actually build a virtual markup right
on your computer.

1426
01:34:17,079 --> 01:34:19,269
We didn't have any of that.

1427
01:34:19,269 --> 01:34:25,920
And this, again, is just to show you what
the crew module looks like in a structural

1428
01:34:25,920 --> 01:34:28,679
point of view.

1429
01:34:28,679 --> 01:34:30,329
That was the pressure vessel.

1430
01:34:30,329 --> 01:34:32,780
That's basically a pressure vessel going together.

1431
01:34:32,780 --> 01:34:33,599
And there were the windows.

1432
01:34:33,599 --> 01:34:39,530
But the thing that's interesting about that,
it had very intricate welding techniques.

1433
01:34:39,530 --> 01:34:44,309
And these techniques were very good and actually
proved to be a very, very satisfactory design

1434
01:34:44,309 --> 01:34:51,309
in a pressure vessel.

1435
01:34:51,599 --> 01:34:57,539
I would like to now talk a little bit about
a couple of subsystems that you're going to

1436
01:34:57,539 --> 01:34:59,389
hear much more detail about.

1437
01:34:59,389 --> 01:35:03,320
But now venture into some systems and tell
you a little bit about them.

1438
01:35:03,320 --> 01:35:08,880
It's probably going to be the thermal protection
system and the guidance and navigation system.

1439
01:35:08,880 --> 01:35:10,460
I will talk to you a little bit about that.

1440
01:35:10,460 --> 01:35:17,460
Here is an old chart that shows, now, unfortunately
I use English units, maximum heat rate and

1441
01:35:21,440 --> 01:35:28,440
BTUs per foot second squared, integrated heat
load and radiative equilibrium temperature.

1442
01:35:29,499 --> 01:35:36,499
And then you see the Apollo return as number
four.

1443
01:35:37,228 --> 01:35:43,860
And the Apollo design was about 100 BTUs per
foot squared integrated heat load, if I read

1444
01:35:43,860 --> 01:35:50,860
the chart right, and a heat flux of about
300 BTUs per foot squared second with a radiative

1445
01:35:52,670 --> 01:35:59,670
equilibrium temperature of about a little
over 5000 degrees Fahrenheit.

1446
01:36:00,510 --> 01:36:02,949
On Apollo that was our baseline.

1447
01:36:02,949 --> 01:36:04,599
We used an ablative head shield.

1448
01:36:04,599 --> 01:36:11,599
Now, the ablative heat shield has a density
of about 130 to 140 pounds per cubic foot

1449
01:36:13,420 --> 01:36:15,510
and is not reusable.

1450
01:36:15,510 --> 01:36:22,510
On the Shuttle it was about 40,000 BTUs per
foot squared integrated heat load and 50 BTUs

1451
01:36:25,269 --> 01:36:31,179
per foot squared second for heat flux with
a radiative equilibrium temperature of about

1452
01:36:31,179 --> 01:36:32,159
3000 degrees Fahrenheit.

1453
01:36:32,159 --> 01:36:39,159
Now, at that point of time we had to come
down from our baseline knowledge of an ablative

1454
01:36:39,860 --> 01:36:46,860
material to what we could use and make it
reusable and light.

1455
01:36:48,860 --> 01:36:53,619
And there were several competitors at the
time.

1456
01:36:53,619 --> 01:37:00,619
One was a metal insulation, Rene-41, I believe,
shingle-type material, very thin, very high

1457
01:37:03,710 --> 01:37:07,999
temperature, and it had pretty low density.

1458
01:37:07,999 --> 01:37:13,449
And then, of course, there was the ceramic
material or the so-called tiles which was

1459
01:37:13,449 --> 01:37:14,710
basically a ceramic material.

1460
01:37:14,710 --> 01:37:16,780
It is made out of silica.

1461
01:37:16,780 --> 01:37:20,550
In fact, interesting enough, it's made out
of what we call gopher sand that comes from

1462
01:37:20,550 --> 01:37:21,019
Minnesota.

1463
01:37:21,019 --> 01:37:22,989
Why is it gopher sand?

1464
01:37:22,989 --> 01:37:26,499
I'm not quite sure, but it's got a very high
pure silica content.

1465
01:37:26,499 --> 01:37:32,130
And you make it into a mulch and then you
actually bake it and it comes out in these

1466
01:37:32,130 --> 01:37:32,510
tiles.

1467
01:37:32,510 --> 01:37:34,639
And, of course, tiles sometimes are hard to
bond to the vehicle.

1468
01:37:34,639 --> 01:37:38,170
How many people knew the tiles were hard to
stay on the vehicle?

1469
01:37:38,170 --> 01:37:44,300
Well, I was the Orbiter Project Manager and
my home town is San Antonio, Texas.

1470
01:37:44,300 --> 01:37:47,460
We would go back to San Antonio to visit my
family.

1471
01:37:47,460 --> 01:37:52,039
My little old aunts would say their nephew
is in charge of the shuttle program and he

1472
01:37:52,039 --> 01:37:54,300
was having trouble making the tiles stay on
the vehicle.

1473
01:37:54,300 --> 01:37:57,570
They couldn't understand that because they
had tiles in their kitchen and their bathroom

1474
01:37:57,570 --> 01:37:59,679
and had no trouble at all having those tiles
stay.

1475
01:37:59,679 --> 01:38:03,690
So they couldn't understand why I was having
so much trouble having the tiles stay on the

1476
01:38:03,690 --> 01:38:04,400
vehicle.

1477
01:38:04,400 --> 01:38:05,030
We had a problem.

1478
01:38:05,030 --> 01:38:06,019
What would we use?

1479
01:38:06,019 --> 01:38:08,739
There were two competitions on it.

1480
01:38:08,739 --> 01:38:14,110
One was the competition from two of the research
centers.

1481
01:38:14,110 --> 01:38:18,309
The Langley Research Center wanted to go with
the metallic version and the Ames Research

1482
01:38:18,309 --> 01:38:20,579
Center wanted to go with the ceramic version.

1483
01:38:20,579 --> 01:38:25,199
And at JSC we're trying to figure out which
one to go with, and we decided to go with

1484
01:38:25,199 --> 01:38:26,760
the ceramic version.

1485
01:38:26,760 --> 01:38:33,079
Of course, Tom Moser is going to give us some
detail because Tom was the guy really in charge

1486
01:38:33,079 --> 01:38:33,360
of it.

1487
01:38:33,360 --> 01:38:40,360
But just to give you a little background,
and he'll go into more details of it,
the problem we had with the tiles
is that when you bonded the tiles, of course,

1488
01:38:55,079 --> 01:38:58,329
they were basically a ceramic material.

1489
01:38:58,329 --> 01:39:03,340
Forget about this layer called densified for
a moment.

1490
01:39:03,340 --> 01:39:08,400
When you bonded the tiles to the room temperature
vulcanizing material, which is basically a

1491
01:39:08,400 --> 01:39:15,239
high temperature glue, to the strained isolator
pad, you got stress risers set up and the

1492
01:39:15,239 --> 01:39:18,079
tile became very weak.

1493
01:39:18,079 --> 01:39:22,320
It broke really at the bond line of the tile
because it became very weak.

1494
01:39:22,320 --> 01:39:26,869
The stress risers were such that because it
was ceramic it broke at the interface.

1495
01:39:26,869 --> 01:39:33,869
We had one very cleaver engineer that saved
my day because tiles were falling off and

1496
01:39:37,300 --> 01:39:40,050
I couldn't get the vehicle built.

1497
01:39:40,050 --> 01:39:46,460
He said if we densified below a quarter of
an inch of the tiles, and tiles could be anywhere

1498
01:39:46,460 --> 01:39:53,460
from two inches to four inches thick, and
by that I mean put liquid glass inside that

1499
01:39:54,599 --> 01:40:01,599
tile, the bottom became like really a hard
surface, no stress riser, you could bond it

1500
01:40:03,269 --> 01:40:07,780
like this and basically have the inherent
strength of the tile.

1501
01:40:07,780 --> 01:40:13,849
It no longer broke at the bond line, it broke
at the tile, which had a very high load.

1502
01:40:13,849 --> 01:40:18,880
So, after we did that, we really did solve
the tile problem to a large extent.

1503
01:40:18,880 --> 01:40:25,880
That was the day we really solved the tile
problem, but I remember this so distinctly

1504
01:40:26,389 --> 01:40:31,219
that we were doing all these tests and all
these analyses and all of a sudden they called

1505
01:40:31,219 --> 01:40:36,039
me one day and said Aaron, we're just doing
a very simple flat-wise tension test and tiles

1506
01:40:36,039 --> 01:40:40,269
were just coming off the vehicle.

1507
01:40:40,269 --> 01:40:42,289
So that is what saved the day.

1508
01:40:42,289 --> 01:40:48,239
I think it's another good example of problems
in system engineering if you just leave it

1509
01:40:48,239 --> 01:40:49,309
there for a moment.

1510
01:40:49,309 --> 01:40:50,749
Sure.

1511
01:40:50,749 --> 01:40:56,690
We worked so hard figuring out how to make
these tiles, and they are extraordinary.

1512
01:40:56,690 --> 01:41:03,690
You can take one of these tiles, put one side
of it into a kiln, heat it red hot and you

1513
01:41:04,989 --> 01:41:07,289
can hold the other side of it in your fingers.

1514
01:41:07,289 --> 01:41:10,460
I mean that's how good the insulation is.

1515
01:41:10,460 --> 01:41:13,690
And I guess everybody just sort of figured
we know how to glue things on.

1516
01:41:13,690 --> 01:41:18,019
You brought up another very good point that
I left out.

1517
01:41:18,019 --> 01:41:24,530
The problem is we spent so much time figuring
out the efficiency of the tiles to do the

1518
01:41:24,530 --> 01:41:25,789
thermal protection.

1519
01:41:25,789 --> 01:41:31,699
In other words, this is fantastic tile.

1520
01:41:31,699 --> 01:41:37,639
It weighs about like balsawood, so it is anywhere
from 10 to 12 pounds per cubic foot compared

1521
01:41:37,639 --> 01:41:39,010
to 130 pounds per cubic foot.

1522
01:41:39,010 --> 01:41:43,478
It can take the higher temperature ablative
material and be reused.

1523
01:41:43,478 --> 01:41:47,670
So it answered all the questions we had about
thermal protection.

1524
01:41:47,670 --> 01:41:51,249
What we didn't do, though, was figure out
how we're going to attach it to the vehicle.

1525
01:41:51,249 --> 01:41:57,389
But everybody, I think, just assumed, I mean
it's almost like your relatives, we glue tiles

1526
01:41:57,389 --> 01:41:59,420
in the bathroom all the time.

1527
01:41:59,420 --> 01:42:01,559
Anybody can glue stuff onto something else.

1528
01:42:01,559 --> 01:42:03,099
But we really did a bad job.

1529
01:42:03,099 --> 01:42:06,440
In fact, that's an example I use in my course
at A&M.

1530
01:42:06,440 --> 01:42:07,849
We come up with a function structure.

1531
01:42:07,849 --> 01:42:09,440
What functions does this have to perform?

1532
01:42:09,440 --> 01:42:12,228
Well, it doesn't actually have to thermally
protect the vehicle.

1533
01:42:12,228 --> 01:42:13,599
It has got to stay on.

1534
01:42:13,599 --> 01:42:16,139
And we forgot about the staying on part.

1535
01:42:16,139 --> 01:42:17,889
We talked about the thermal protection part.

1536
01:42:17,889 --> 01:42:24,249
And this thing is so good, its thermal diffusivity
is so good that, like Professor Hoffman says,

1537
01:42:24,249 --> 01:42:27,219
you could get the surface temperature to 2000
degrees Fahrenheit and hold it in the palm

1538
01:42:27,219 --> 01:42:28,478
of your hand.

1539
01:42:28,478 --> 01:42:33,960
And so it turned out it was a very, very good
solution but we almost blew the day by not

1540
01:42:33,960 --> 01:42:35,050
coming up with this design.

1541
01:42:35,050 --> 01:42:38,599
Why does it have to be individual tiles rather
than big long panels?

1542
01:42:38,599 --> 01:42:41,499
Well, because of the coefficient expansion.

1543
01:42:41,499 --> 01:42:45,380
Now, that's the point of this strain isolation.

1544
01:42:45,380 --> 01:42:49,179
And it's another interface problem which is
part of the system's engineering.

1545
01:42:49,179 --> 01:42:54,978
The structure of the shuttle is aluminum.

1546
01:42:54,978 --> 01:42:59,728
Thermally, it expands and contracts by several
inches every time you go from night to day.

1547
01:42:59,728 --> 01:43:04,860
I mean the Orbiter, we've done these measurements.

1548
01:43:04,860 --> 01:43:06,590
One side of the Orbiter is pointed towards
the sun.

1549
01:43:06,590 --> 01:43:08,599
The other side is cold.

1550
01:43:08,599 --> 01:43:12,760
The Orbiter actually bananas by a couple of
degrees.

1551
01:43:12,760 --> 01:43:19,760
And they did thermal tests in some of the
orbital flight tests where the payload bay,

1552
01:43:21,150 --> 01:43:25,519
the clearances could change by a couple of
inches depending on the thermal conditions

1553
01:43:25,519 --> 01:43:29,929
and designing mechanisms to latch them closed
with those tolerances.

1554
01:43:29,929 --> 01:43:36,349
So the orbiter is flexible and expands and
contracts as a metal.

1555
01:43:36,349 --> 01:43:37,679
The tiles don't.

1556
01:43:37,679 --> 01:43:39,659
They are rigid.

1557
01:43:39,659 --> 01:43:46,010
And so, if you have too large a tile area,
the aluminum is going to bend under it and

1558
01:43:46,010 --> 01:43:47,478
the tiles will crack.

1559
01:43:47,478 --> 01:43:53,619
And even with the small tiles, between the
aluminum and the tile there is this strain

1560
01:43:53,619 --> 01:43:54,039
isolation pad.

1561
01:43:54,039 --> 01:43:57,999
This of it as sort of like a felt type material.

1562
01:43:57,999 --> 01:44:02,400
It kind of eases the interface between the
two.

1563
01:44:02,400 --> 01:44:09,099
And, of course, if you look at the tile installation
on the vehicle, in between the tiles, remember

1564
01:44:09,099 --> 01:44:15,150
on the last mission we went EVA to fix the
gap fillers between each one of those tiles

1565
01:44:15,150 --> 01:44:18,900
mainly for problems during liftoff to keep
the tiles from vibrating and damaging each

1566
01:44:18,900 --> 01:44:19,539
other.

1567
01:44:19,539 --> 01:44:24,969
And those gap fillers, I'm not concerned about
going EVA to fix it.

1568
01:44:24,969 --> 01:44:28,820
Well, on the other hand, once you see the
problem you cannot let it go so you've got

1569
01:44:28,820 --> 01:44:29,610
to do something about it.

1570
01:44:29,610 --> 01:44:33,190
They went EVA and pulled the gap fillers out,
but those are the tile installations.

1571
01:44:33,190 --> 01:44:34,690
But your question is a very pertinent one.

1572
01:44:34,690 --> 01:44:35,719
Why are there so many?

1573
01:44:35,719 --> 01:44:37,749
And that's the reason, because of the coefficient
expansion.

1574
01:44:37,749 --> 01:44:42,389
Then you put gap fillers in between those
tiles to keep it from damaging during liftoff.

1575
01:44:42,389 --> 01:44:49,389
It does turn out that one of our biggest concerns
is going to be how fragile the tiles were.

1576
01:44:52,519 --> 01:44:55,989
And they really turned out to be a pretty
good system.

1577
01:44:55,989 --> 01:45:00,550
We were concerned about losing a tile and
then getting heat and having an unzippering

1578
01:45:00,550 --> 01:45:02,429
effect where you lose a bunch of tiles.

1579
01:45:02,429 --> 01:45:04,820
And we really alleviated that problem.

1580
01:45:04,820 --> 01:45:11,800
I will tell you another funny story.

1581
01:45:11,800 --> 01:45:14,869
This is probably not so funny but it was a
story anyway.

1582
01:45:14,869 --> 01:45:21,869
I've forgotten what mission it was but these
tiles are actually waterproof.

1583
01:45:23,570 --> 01:45:27,889
We actually put Scotchgard on them because
the waterproofing is in the tile.

1584
01:45:27,889 --> 01:45:31,179
And after a certain mission the waterproofing
boils out so we had to waterproof the tile.

1585
01:45:31,179 --> 01:45:33,289
STS-4 was the hailstorm.

1586
01:45:33,289 --> 01:45:37,800
That was the first one where they recognized
the problem.

1587
01:45:37,800 --> 01:45:43,280
Well, anyway, Rockwell International was my
contractor.

1588
01:45:43,280 --> 01:45:50,280
The head engineer at Rockwell was a brilliant
guy, but he ran a test where he put a densified

1589
01:45:50,360 --> 01:45:57,360
tile panel in a bucket of this Scotchgard
or this rain repellant material.

1590
01:45:57,800 --> 01:46:01,800
And he called me about 11:00 at night.

1591
01:46:01,800 --> 01:46:05,269
And I was getting ready to go in because we
were [OBSCURED].

1592
01:46:05,269 --> 01:46:09,840
We just ran this test and all the tiles came
off.

1593
01:46:09,840 --> 01:46:12,260
I said what do you want me to do with that
information?

1594
01:46:12,260 --> 01:46:13,659
We're getting ready to back the de-orbit burn.

1595
01:46:13,659 --> 01:46:16,570
I mean they were coming down.

1596
01:46:16,570 --> 01:46:17,789
I said what do you want me to do?

1597
01:46:17,789 --> 01:46:19,949
I said that was sort of a dumb test, wasn't
it?

1598
01:46:19,949 --> 01:46:21,940
I said is that what happened on the vehicle?

1599
01:46:21,940 --> 01:46:27,559
Did you actually put the tiles in a bucket
of water repellent material?

1600
01:46:27,559 --> 01:46:28,179
He said no.

1601
01:46:28,179 --> 01:46:29,380
I said that's a dumb test.

1602
01:46:29,380 --> 01:46:34,739
I took it upon myself, after talking to the
man you're going to hear, Tom Moser, what

1603
01:46:34,739 --> 01:46:35,210
do we do with it?

1604
01:46:35,210 --> 01:46:36,119
We didn't tell anybody.

1605
01:46:36,119 --> 01:46:38,420
Now, I took a big risk on that.

1606
01:46:38,420 --> 01:46:40,699
But what could you do about it?

1607
01:46:40,699 --> 01:46:43,840
There was absolutely nothing you could do
about it on that test.

1608
01:46:43,840 --> 01:46:48,630
So that's an interesting case in discretionary
project management.

1609
01:46:48,630 --> 01:46:49,960
But you will hear more.

1610
01:46:49,960 --> 01:46:54,789
Let me just mention the question of waterproofing
because, again, that was something that I

1611
01:46:54,789 --> 01:46:57,030
think at first slipped through the systems
engineering.

1612
01:46:57,030 --> 01:46:59,929
And it was the fourth shuttle flight STS-4.

1613
01:46:59,929 --> 01:47:03,409
I was down at the Cape for some other activity.

1614
01:47:03,409 --> 01:47:07,650
The night before a launch they had rolled
back the payload change-out room, the whole

1615
01:47:07,650 --> 01:47:08,789
shuttle was exposed.

1616
01:47:08,789 --> 01:47:15,789
Well, a thunderstorm with hail came through,
and it pelted the bottom of the shuttle.

1617
01:47:17,869 --> 01:47:19,320
There were pox marks all over it.

1618
01:47:19,320 --> 01:47:21,199
And, of course, it was raining.

1619
01:47:21,199 --> 01:47:28,199
And people realized that the tiles actually
were absorbing material.

1620
01:47:28,728 --> 01:47:35,300
The outside of the tile is kind of impervious,
but once you crack that the rain can get in.

1621
01:47:35,300 --> 01:47:42,300
And they actually brought a tile expert down
from the Cape and did some calculations.

1622
01:47:46,190 --> 01:47:51,690
It was an early flight so we didn't have a
maximum payload luckily because we ended up

1623
01:47:51,690 --> 01:47:58,690
carrying, they figured, probably a few hundred,
many over a thousand pounds of water into

1624
01:47:59,159 --> 01:47:59,429
orbit.

1625
01:47:59,429 --> 01:48:04,860
And there was so much water in the tiles that
the orbital dynamicists were able to measure

1626
01:48:04,860 --> 01:48:09,429
the perturbation of the Shuttle's orbit because
of all of the water that was evaporating.

1627
01:48:09,429 --> 01:48:13,530
And, of course, it was evaporating from the
bottom so that it effectively was asymmetrical

1628
01:48:13,530 --> 01:48:14,940
and had a propulsive force.

1629
01:48:14,940 --> 01:48:19,920
And after that was when they came up with
the idea of Scotchgarding.

1630
01:48:19,920 --> 01:48:25,579
And, if you look closely at each of the tiles,
there's a little hole where every tile before

1631
01:48:25,579 --> 01:48:32,159
every flight they go through with a hypodermic
syringe and just inject a little bit of Scotchgard.

1632
01:48:32,159 --> 01:48:35,469
And think how critical it is.

1633
01:48:35,469 --> 01:48:38,079
You've got over 30,000 tiles.

1634
01:48:38,079 --> 01:48:44,789
If you add one ounce to every tile, you do
the math, that's a lot of extra weight.

1635
01:48:44,789 --> 01:48:51,219
So you want to put in as little as possible
Scotchgard but enough to do the job.

1636
01:48:51,219 --> 01:48:55,260
This might be a very good subject for you
to decide to redesign.

1637
01:48:55,260 --> 01:48:58,960
You might think about what are the technologies,
what are the differences, how would you do

1638
01:48:58,960 --> 01:49:03,139
it differently because their technology has
changed.

1639
01:49:03,139 --> 01:49:04,199
That's why I brought this one up.

1640
01:49:04,199 --> 01:49:07,280
And you will hear a much more detailed discussion
by Tom Moser, but you might think about this

1641
01:49:07,280 --> 01:49:09,090
as one of the subsystems to look at.

1642
01:49:09,090 --> 01:49:09,989
I guess that's all for today.

1643
01:49:09,989 --> 01:49:10,239
OK.

1644
01:49:10,139 --> 01:49:11,039
We will see you on Thursday.