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In that case, I will move on to introduce
Colonel Gordon Fullerton who got is bachelor's

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and master's degree from Caltech in mechanical
engineering, did ROTC and went on to the Air

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Force where, well, I guess he has flown, in
the course of his career about 135 different

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types of airplanes.

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16,000 flying hours.

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He flew F86 interceptors, B47 Bombers before
going to Air Force test pilot school in the

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mid `60s.

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In '66, he was chosen by the Air Force for
the Manned Orbiting Laboratory which was going

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to be the Air Force's Space Station.

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That program was cancelled in 1969 and the
MOL, well, some of the MOL astronauts came

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over to NASA and became NASA astronauts.

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That was in the heyday of Apollo.

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And Gordon was support crew on the last four
Apollo missions.

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Then went on to be the test pilot on three
of the first five approach and landing tests.

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If you remember, that is when the Shuttle
Enterprise, which was not designed for orbital

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flight but was designed to test basically
the last 50,000 feet down to the ground, was

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dropped from the 747.

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Went onto pilot the third Shuttle flight,
which was one of the orbital flight tests.

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That was the flight which landed in New Mexico.

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And then commanded STS-51F which was the first
flight of the instrument pointing system.

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That was also the flight, I am trying to think,
where you lost the engine, which we talked

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about.

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That was the one flight where we had an engine
shutdown.

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And we went over that in some detail.

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I think they should hear about it from what
it seemed like inside the cockpit, now that

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they have heard kind of the technical details.

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In any case, after leaving the Astronautic
Office, Gordon has moved into pilot's heaven

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which is Edwards Air Force Base, the Dryden
Test Flight Center where he basically spends

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all his time.

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Well, not all of his time because there is
management stuff as well.

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Unfortunately, that is the price you pay.

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But basically he gets to fly airplanes for
a living.

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And lots of different kinds, including the
career aircraft and the B52 which launches

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various test aircraft and a whole bunch of
other airplanes.

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If you remember in the whole systems engineering
approach to things, we talk about the conceived

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design, manufacture, test and operation.

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So this is basically the final lecture and
this is the test and operation of the Space

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Shuttle from a pilot's point of view.

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So, with that, I will give it to you, Gordon.

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Thanks.

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I was sitting at your place back in 1958 when
I was a grad student at Caltech for a year

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before heading off to the Air Force.

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Wow, almost 50 years ago.

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But the real blessing of my life is to be
able to do what I love to do for as long as

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I have done it, beyond all reason.

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Anyway, I hope to share some of that with
you this morning.

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This is my first time through this pitch.

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Feel free to holler out any questions as we
go and we will stumble through it together.

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I planned to talk about three different phases
of the orbiter test program.

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The first were called ALT, the Approach and
Landing Test, that consisted of really 13

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flights, five captive inert flights where
the enterprise was flown on top of the 747

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but nobody in the cockpit.

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The controls were locked.

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That was to clear the envelope for the kind
of unlikely looking combination of a 747 with

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an orbiter on top.

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And then there were three "captive active"
flights where we were manned up in the orbiter

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with the systems running, the electronics,
the hydraulics were active.

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The controls were free to move a little bit,
not full throw.

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And we also determined how high the combination
could get.

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Because altitude was not 50,000 feet, it was
more like 28,000 feet max even with the 747

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engines over boosted.

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Followed by three "free flights" were we actually
pushed the button, munched off the top and

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glided to a landing.

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The orbital flight test, prior to the Shuttle
Program, OFT consisted of four flights.

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STS 1 through 4 of varying durations.

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STS-1 was planned for just a couple days to
get up and get down and have a look at how

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things looked after it flew.

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STS-2 was supposed to be five days.

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They had a fuel cell problem that cut their
flight short, unfortunately for the crew.

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Then I was on STS-3.

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We were scheduled for seven days.

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And, because of a raging dust storm at the
planned landing site, we got an extra day.

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A real blessing.

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With no tests to do, we had a free day on
orbit.

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And ended up with eight days.

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STS-4 planned and flew seven days, landing
on the fourth of July with President Reagan

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out there to watch.

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And then we got into operational flights of
which there had been a lot.

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Something over a hundred.

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The last flight to fly, the return to flight
was STS-114, but the number system went through

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a couple of phases.

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There have not been 114 flights.

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I don't know how many it has been, but there
had been a bunch.

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I will talk about three, well, more than three
flights, but the ALT flights.

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If you have to have a crew patch, that is
a major hurdle that you have to overcome.

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When you are assigned to a crew, get the patch
designed and then get it approved by upper

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management.

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Part of the OFT, STS-3 in 1982 and finally
then an operational flight 51F in 1985.

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Prior to any of these flights, I worked into
a dream job for really systems engineering,

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I guess, and for a pilot.

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I had been to test pilot school.

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I was intrigued with all the airplanes I flew
with a cockpit design and was very aware of

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the flaws of cockpit design.

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It seems like sometimes engineers lie awake
nights trying to make it hard to operate subsystems.

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I got in at the beginning of the orbiter crew
interface and became, before it was over,

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sort of the Czar who was responsible to sign
off all the drawings, lots of reviews.

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It was a great responsibility because I was
immediately and early into subsystem design

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because you have to know what the subsystem
does to make any intelligent choice of what

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the controls and displays should be.

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This is a view of, not the Enterprise, but
probably, I don't know whether it is a simulator

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or the real airplane, they look alike, but
one of the orbital capable shuttles.

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This is like the little old ladies always
say when you're out on display for Armed Forces

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Day and look at all the things, how do you
remember what they all do?

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Well, that really is a challenge to make things
straightforward.

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And I became painfully aware, especially later
on when we had a lot of experiments coming

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in, that engineers in their little ivory tower
building a system in the lab are so totally,

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personally familiar with how their stuff works
that it doesn't bother them that the switches

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are unlabeled or labeled illogically.

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And they bring that all in and want to put
it in the orbiter.

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And when the crew says wait a minute, I have
to remember, before I turn on switch A, switch

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C and D have got to be turned on in this order
or the whole thing will blow up?

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And they say oh, yeah, that is the way it
is.

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And they know it so well personally.

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And, yet, when you are overwhelmed with a
whole lot of experiments, I am sure you ran

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into it on your flight, that all the stuff
that is just totally familiar to the guy that

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invented it becomes a challenge when you are
faced with a whole lot of them and a limited

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amount of time to learn it.

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And so, standardization of what the scheme,
especially in the software.

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While there are a lot of gadgets, in fact,
if you count all the switches, gauges, circuit

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breakers, upstairs, downstairs and the mid
deck, there are about 2,100 total in the orbiter

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cockpit.

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But the real challenge is what shows up on
the screens here.

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So the software was a bigger thing in making
them all play together.

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Here is a higher view in the overhead panel
above your head.

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And the forward cockpit has a lot of other
switches.

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An example of what I am talking about, this
array of switches right here controls the

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reaction control system valving and then the
orbital maneuvering system.

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Back in Apollo, which I worked on when I first
came to Johnson Space Center, I learned, while

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lying many hours in the Apollo crew simulator,
that that had the worst cockpit every designed

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by man.

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As an example, it had a helium pressurization
system to push the propellants for the reaction

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control jets out of the tanks and then the
valves that went to the various arrays of

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thrusters all around the command module.

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And one would think logically, if you have
something to turn on the helium, you label

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that helium on/off.

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And then the manifold, the next branch in
the Christmas tree manifold would be system

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A versus system B or something like that.

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And, in fact, it had names like that.

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But they put the switches in a long room and
labeled them A through H, right there on the

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panel.

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No clue as to what you were throwing, so every
move you made in the cockpit, some of these

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things were critical, required you to either
be a metal giant or open a checklist and say

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to pressurize system B, I have got to throw
B on and then A next and then H last or something

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like that.

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Obviously, unacceptable.

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It became my career and mania to try to improve
that.

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The first orbiter simulator built was called
the OAS, Orbiter Aeroflight Simulator.

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It was on a moving based platform like the
standard airline simulators you see today.

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This is Fred Hayes and I sitting in the cockpit.

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This one was built originally to be the Enterprise.

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And the Enterprise was OV-101 in the scheme
of things, a numbering of orbiters as they

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were built.

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101 had only the systems it needed to fly
the approach and landing test.

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The plan was to retrofit it later to make
it into orbit capable.

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But before the ALT program it had just what
you needed and only that to fly in the atmosphere

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very short flights.

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But this is our first chance to look at what
we had and what we were getting into as far

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as pilot concerns.

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Now, I guess you have had all the subsystems,
right?

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You were all completely briefed and experts
on subsystems by the people that had preceded

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me here in the course.

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I will give you, though, a quick review here,
the avionics system.

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The Shuttle is build with inside the outer
mole line as the pressure vessel that is roughly

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back to the forward bulkhead of the payload
bay and is imbedded inside basically aluminum

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structure with a thermal protection system
applied to the outside.

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And most of the avionics are in racks right
up here, right in there with you in the cockpit

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on the middeck.

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The stowage lockers are aft of the racks full
of black boxes and lots of wires.

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And the other place there were avionics is
back here just after the aft bulkhead of the

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payload bay.

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And there are some areas where they put items
like rate gyros and accelerometers.

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A lot way back.

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From a systems engineering standpoint, Fred
Hayes and I were out at Palmdale where they

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built all the orbiters.

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It seems like the testing always happens after
2:00 AM, tests would run around the clock.

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And we were out there way after midnight in
the cockpit participating in the first time

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they were going to close the loop between
the rate gyros and the flight control system

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which is contained back up here in the nose
and the general purpose computers.

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The whole orbiter was suspended on some big
airfield bag so it had compliance to move.

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And the hydraulic system was on powered by
a facility hydraulic source.

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The elevons were powered and the rudder speed
brake was powered and the process let us down

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for the very first time that we were going
to close the loop between the software up

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here and the rate gyros particularly and accelerometers
mounted in the back.

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And it was a milestone.

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And we had people stationed around the back
to see if anything spit out hydraulic fluid

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or whatever.

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00:17:39,240 --> 00:17:44,290
Anyway, we went up to the glass shield and
pushed the button to go into CSS, Control

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Stick Steering, which hooked the stick up
now to the flight control system.

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00:17:51,270 --> 00:17:55,540
I will never forget.

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00:17:55,540 --> 00:18:01,120
We pushed the button and a rumble started.

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00:18:01,120 --> 00:18:04,360
And the rumble built very rapidly to a violent
rumble.

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00:18:04,360 --> 00:18:07,620
I mean we were being bounced around the cockpit.

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00:18:07,620 --> 00:18:14,620
This is 150,000 pounds of airplane dancing
on these rubber bags.

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00:18:15,059 --> 00:18:19,640
And it didn't take us long to say this doesn't
feel good.

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00:18:19,640 --> 00:18:25,440
We pulled the button that downloads back to
direct control so there is no feedback.

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00:18:25,440 --> 00:18:30,809
And the upshot of it was that these rate gyros
are mounted on this flexible bulkhead.

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00:18:30,809 --> 00:18:35,890
And that had been taken into account properly.

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00:18:35,890 --> 00:18:41,380
And so there was a structural resonance that
was just diversion.

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00:18:41,380 --> 00:18:48,380
In spite of all the Grounds tests down at
Downy and the Iron Bird mockups and everything,

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when we put it in the real airplane it tried
to jump off the supports.

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00:18:58,190 --> 00:19:05,190
And Fred and I were in the cockpit, our eyes
were big, and we called the control room which

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00:19:06,160 --> 00:19:08,370
were people back in an adjacent room.

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00:19:08,370 --> 00:19:14,600
It seems like most spacecraft tests, traditionally,
are done with engineers all locked up in windowless

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room, no view of the real hardware.

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00:19:16,850 --> 00:19:23,390
Down at the Cape they are miles away when
the spacecraft is either out on the pad or

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00:19:23,390 --> 00:19:26,030
in the main checkout building.

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00:19:26,030 --> 00:19:33,030
And so they said no, the procedure says this
is OK and we want you to re-engage.

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00:19:34,030 --> 00:19:37,370
We tried one more time.

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00:19:37,370 --> 00:19:42,630
And this time the guy stationed in back that
were watching said this doesn't look good.

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00:19:42,630 --> 00:19:46,030
They started hollering on the loop so we pitched
it off.

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00:19:46,030 --> 00:19:50,670
And we went into a raging argument.

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00:19:50,670 --> 00:19:53,400
We need to complete this test, the engineers
were saying.

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00:19:53,400 --> 00:19:56,420
And we were saying we don't want to break
something.

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00:19:56,420 --> 00:20:01,080
And they got people out of bed down in California,
controls engineers.

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00:20:01,080 --> 00:20:07,530
And so, it was a memorable night.

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00:20:07,530 --> 00:20:14,530
The resolution was finally a redesign of the
mounting area back there and reanalysis of

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00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:21,700
the vibrational modes of the aft bulkhead
sorted all out.

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00:20:21,700 --> 00:20:28,700
Here is what we had for a crew interface.

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00:20:31,540 --> 00:20:38,540
You saw in the earlier picture, upfront three
CRTs, monochrome, green, it was either green

220
00:20:38,780 --> 00:20:45,530
or nothing on the screen, and we had two keyboards,
three CRTs.

221
00:20:45,530 --> 00:20:49,710
There was always this little concern, when
you are punching on a keyboard, you want to

222
00:20:49,710 --> 00:20:55,220
be sure it is selected to the CRT you think
you are doing something on.

223
00:20:55,220 --> 00:20:58,799
Another marginal design, but that is what
we ended up with.

224
00:20:58,799 --> 00:21:02,650
You notice we have a hexadecimal keyboard
here.

225
00:21:02,650 --> 00:21:09,650
We have some strange keys called item and
electric and ops which had to do with this

226
00:21:13,030 --> 00:21:17,790
truly unique way you cause things to happen
through software.

227
00:21:17,790 --> 00:21:21,380
And lots of things were critical through software.

228
00:21:21,380 --> 00:21:24,530
And then this rather dim green screen.

229
00:21:24,530 --> 00:21:30,710
This was way before the days, I guess, Bill
Gates was still here at MIT or maybe even

230
00:21:30,710 --> 00:21:32,270
hadn't registered yet.

231
00:21:32,270 --> 00:21:32,970
I don't know.

232
00:21:32,970 --> 00:21:36,630
It was way before Windows 1.0.

233
00:21:36,630 --> 00:21:43,630
And so it seems almost comical now when you
compare it to even modern airliner crew interface

234
00:21:45,170 --> 00:21:51,049
with glass cockpits, but we were breaking
new ground here.

235
00:21:51,049 --> 00:21:58,049
And it, even at the time, seemed antiquated
because that is all they were willing to embrace

236
00:21:58,059 --> 00:22:03,290
in the way of computer control and design.

237
00:22:03,290 --> 00:22:04,620
And it was unique.

238
00:22:04,620 --> 00:22:11,620
And it causes lots of headaches and delays.

239
00:22:13,250 --> 00:22:20,250
The big thing about the orbiter with its data
process system, the decision was made that

240
00:22:23,410 --> 00:22:29,190
everything is going to be done with these
all powerful general purpose computers in

241
00:22:29,190 --> 00:22:33,120
which there were five in an array that worked
together.

242
00:22:33,120 --> 00:22:40,120
Flight control, system management, navigation,
inertial subsystem control of everything.

243
00:22:41,940 --> 00:22:48,940
And so, the result was the software loads,
as they were built, had lots of flaws when

244
00:22:50,880 --> 00:22:54,490
they came down, yet we couldn't fix them.

245
00:22:54,490 --> 00:23:01,490
We had cases as dumb as a display that showed
the Freon loop A pump on.

246
00:23:04,000 --> 00:23:09,600
And, when it got through the entire software
belt, it was backwards.

247
00:23:09,600 --> 00:23:12,650
It would say off when it was really on.

248
00:23:12,650 --> 00:23:14,250
Seems like a simple fix, right?

249
00:23:14,250 --> 00:23:20,120
Go back to the programmer and rewrite the
code.

250
00:23:20,120 --> 00:23:21,730
But we couldn't do it.

251
00:23:21,730 --> 00:23:25,850
We had to live with it for a long period of
time through training until another whole

252
00:23:25,850 --> 00:23:27,640
load was built.

253
00:23:27,640 --> 00:23:34,640
Because the load that would fix this dumb
little bi-level mistake was also the one that

254
00:23:35,400 --> 00:23:38,210
steered you during ascent.

255
00:23:38,210 --> 00:23:42,679
So everything was frozen and there was great
fear of changing anything that would ricochet

256
00:23:42,679 --> 00:23:45,179
through to something truly critical.

257
00:23:45,179 --> 00:23:52,179
And so, even when we got to STS-3, we flew
with a book about this thick of program notes

258
00:23:57,070 --> 00:24:04,070
that told you, line after line, what was wrong,
what was backwards, what was a trap.

259
00:24:06,590 --> 00:24:12,540
And really a big challenge to the crew to
embrace and live with because there just wasn't

260
00:24:12,540 --> 00:24:19,540
time in the program to build another load,
check it out through all the different labs

261
00:24:19,730 --> 00:24:26,730
that had to certify it.

262
00:24:26,880 --> 00:24:32,860
That is load for modular software where you
can change something here and be assured you

263
00:24:32,860 --> 00:24:39,860
are not bollixing up something else in the
same machine.

264
00:24:40,260 --> 00:24:41,049
OMS, RCS.

265
00:24:41,049 --> 00:24:43,090
These are the two pods.

266
00:24:43,090 --> 00:24:50,010
On either side of the vertical tail are a
couple big OMS, propellant tanks, oxidizer

267
00:24:50,010 --> 00:24:51,860
and fuel hypergolic.

268
00:24:51,860 --> 00:24:53,419
We didn't need any ignition system.

269
00:24:53,419 --> 00:24:59,890
As soon as these came together in a thruster
you had thrust.

270
00:24:59,890 --> 00:25:04,140
And there were, I think, 44 main thrusters.

271
00:25:04,140 --> 00:25:08,410
Here are four yaw jets firing out to the side.

272
00:25:08,410 --> 00:25:11,120
S&B pitch jets.

273
00:25:11,120 --> 00:25:13,590
The same thing repeated on the other side.

274
00:25:13,590 --> 00:25:16,910
And up in the nose are the forward RCS.

275
00:25:16,910 --> 00:25:20,610
They had jets that fired up and out to the
side and down.

276
00:25:20,610 --> 00:25:26,919
And I mentioned the controls in the cockpit,
which we did.

277
00:25:26,919 --> 00:25:33,919
One of my great successes was getting the
orbiter panels to be arranged in a plumbing

278
00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:40,650
layout so that you could see what you were
pressurizing when you turned on the helium

279
00:25:40,650 --> 00:25:44,190
for a given let and that sort of thing.

280
00:25:44,190 --> 00:25:51,190
Helium tanks are what pressurized in a really
cleaver system of OH control.

281
00:25:53,340 --> 00:26:00,340
That is when you are in zero G and you have
propellant floating around randomly.

282
00:26:00,679 --> 00:26:04,720
And you turn on the helium to push it toward
the outlet.

283
00:26:04,720 --> 00:26:10,510
If the outlet is uncovered, the helium is
going to squirt right out.

284
00:26:10,510 --> 00:26:17,059
But they had an elaborate system of surface
tension kind of baffles that kept and trapped

285
00:26:17,059 --> 00:26:24,059
fuel near the outlet of the tank so that when
the thrust came on and all the propellant

286
00:26:24,730 --> 00:26:31,730
went down where it should, it sort of recharged
this chamber at the bottom of the tanks to

287
00:26:32,419 --> 00:26:38,669
keep it flowing smoothly and not lose all
the pressurization.

288
00:26:38,669 --> 00:26:45,669
I remember my first impression of what reaction
control jets would be like was based on science

289
00:26:53,660 --> 00:27:00,169
fiction movies where you would see the spacecraft
out there and there were little squirts of

290
00:27:00,169 --> 00:27:02,640
jets that nudge you around.

291
00:27:02,640 --> 00:27:09,640
And we went out to the Ground test facility
at White Sands on a fieldtrip out there where

292
00:27:09,740 --> 00:27:16,070
they actually had the forward RCS setup, and
they were going to do real firings of the

293
00:27:16,070 --> 00:27:19,049
main jets out there.

294
00:27:19,049 --> 00:27:24,250
And we were probably a couple hundred feet
away from the test setup.

295
00:27:24,250 --> 00:27:31,250
We were out there waiting for this sequence
of jet firing to start on a test.

296
00:27:33,309 --> 00:27:40,309
And the first firing of one of the main jets,
which are right up around 900 pounds thrust,

297
00:27:41,770 --> 00:27:42,860
was just this short pulse.

298
00:27:42,860 --> 00:27:46,470
And everybody went about three feet off the
ground.

299
00:27:46,470 --> 00:27:49,770
I mean it was like you fired a howitzer.

300
00:27:49,770 --> 00:27:51,440
It was just stunning.

301
00:27:51,440 --> 00:27:56,000
Wham, wham, and it just blew you away.

302
00:27:56,000 --> 00:27:59,380
And the realization of we are going to be
in the cockpit here, and these things are

303
00:27:59,380 --> 00:28:03,750
firing right outside the windshield.

304
00:28:03,750 --> 00:28:04,520
They did.

305
00:28:04,520 --> 00:28:09,490
In space, the ignition transient ricochets
through the structure.

306
00:28:09,490 --> 00:28:12,580
You can hear this kind of bombing effect.

307
00:28:12,580 --> 00:28:18,190
But once they are on, if it is a long duration
firing, it is silent.

308
00:28:18,190 --> 00:28:25,190
And the same way visually, you can see a flash
when the fuel is led a little bit in front

309
00:28:25,390 --> 00:28:28,429
of the oxidizer to make sure you don't overheat
something.

310
00:28:28,429 --> 00:28:31,270
And so, there is incomplete combustion at
the ignition.

311
00:28:31,270 --> 00:28:32,789
You can see a flash go out there.

312
00:28:32,789 --> 00:28:38,880
But what is on during an OMS burn, for instance,
when these OMS engines are firing and you

313
00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:42,929
are looking back at the aft, you see the flash
and they are on and they are pushing and you

314
00:28:42,929 --> 00:28:43,470
can feel it.

315
00:28:43,470 --> 00:28:48,600
But otherwise invisible is the way I remember.

316
00:28:48,600 --> 00:28:51,850
On the other hand, there are vernier jets,
little guys.

317
00:28:51,850 --> 00:28:53,750
I don't know if they are shown here.

318
00:28:53,750 --> 00:29:00,750
But there are little 25 pound thrusters or
something used 98% of the time on orbit.

319
00:29:00,750 --> 00:29:05,179
You really are doing that kind of thing with
the vernier jets.

320
00:29:05,179 --> 00:29:09,179
And you cannot hear those or see anything
when they are going off.

321
00:29:09,179 --> 00:29:16,179
In fact, we got everybody quiet and kind of
held onto the walls just trying to see if

322
00:29:16,179 --> 00:29:22,880
we could barely detect when a vernier jet
fired physically in a cockpit.

323
00:29:22,880 --> 00:29:29,570
Interesting.

324
00:29:29,570 --> 00:29:36,570
The orbiter is one giant heat transfer machine.

325
00:29:36,660 --> 00:29:43,660
Lots of calories of heat energy pumped around
from one end to the other.

326
00:29:45,470 --> 00:29:52,470
And so, there are water loops within the cabin
that transfer the heat to Freon loops.

327
00:29:53,870 --> 00:30:00,190
The fluid is pumped through the radiators
to reject heat.

328
00:30:00,190 --> 00:30:07,190
In spite of all these heat rejection systems
then there are heaters everywhere, whole banks

329
00:30:08,480 --> 00:30:10,150
of heaters to keep stuff from freezing.

330
00:30:10,150 --> 00:30:17,150
Then for the landing and takeoff phases, there
are flash evaporators that flash water and/or

331
00:30:19,900 --> 00:30:23,299
ammonia.

332
00:30:23,299 --> 00:30:30,299
When you are down in the atmosphere you use
ammonia to cool the loops.

333
00:30:32,590 --> 00:30:35,580
And, of course, the payload bay doors are
closed.

334
00:30:35,580 --> 00:30:42,580
And it turns out STS-3, a major test of it
was test all these loops and how the structure

335
00:30:44,860 --> 00:30:51,710
responded to long durations of given attitudes
with the sun shining on one side and cold

336
00:30:51,710 --> 00:30:58,710
space on the other side and how the structure
would distort or hopefully not distort and

337
00:30:58,910 --> 00:31:00,740
how all that system would work.

338
00:31:00,740 --> 00:31:07,740
As it turned out, if you like lots of redundancy,
this is probably the weak point I thought

339
00:31:07,750 --> 00:31:12,049
in the whole orbiter design, we've got three
engines.

340
00:31:12,049 --> 00:31:16,140
We proved that you can get there with only
two.

341
00:31:16,140 --> 00:31:22,860
But the Freon loops, there were two redundant
through the radiators.

342
00:31:22,860 --> 00:31:28,320
And if one Freon loop pumped quick you are
in a severe emergency.

343
00:31:28,320 --> 00:31:31,549
That means stop everything and power down
severely.

344
00:31:31,549 --> 00:31:38,549
Turn off all the computers except one, get
in a proper attitude and go into a panic reconfiguration

345
00:31:44,200 --> 00:31:45,620
to come back and land.

346
00:31:45,620 --> 00:31:49,850
Originally, the design had three Freon loops.

347
00:31:49,850 --> 00:31:56,370
It could use one and go on with no concern.

348
00:31:56,370 --> 00:32:03,370
But, as it turned out, the heat loads were
so high and the weight criticality determined

349
00:32:07,559 --> 00:32:13,820
that all we had electrical power to run were
two loops.

350
00:32:13,820 --> 00:32:19,590
And so we ended up with a single Freon loop
which fortunately, as far as I know, never

351
00:32:19,590 --> 00:32:20,809
failed.

352
00:32:20,809 --> 00:32:27,809
But if it had it would have been a crash deorbit
landing under severely powered down conditions.

353
00:32:30,030 --> 00:32:37,030
While it is kind of mundane and people don't
think about it as a primary system, the thermal

354
00:32:38,120 --> 00:32:42,049
control really was critical.

355
00:32:42,049 --> 00:32:49,049
Payload bay doors, this is a busy chart but
indicates these are really complicated.

356
00:32:50,230 --> 00:32:57,230
60 feet long and something like 120 little
motor driven latches to latch them closed.

357
00:33:03,289 --> 00:33:10,289
And you don't just go chunk close like the
bomb bay on a B52 and it is closed.

358
00:33:10,690 --> 00:33:17,200
To close the payload bay doors you get them
close and then the latches along the bulked,

359
00:33:17,200 --> 00:33:20,549
all in a zipper fashion, have to sequentially
close.

360
00:33:20,549 --> 00:33:27,549
And then you go down the center section to
latch the two left and right doors together.

361
00:33:29,559 --> 00:33:33,179
All software controlled.

362
00:33:33,179 --> 00:33:39,950
And there was a lot of concern that we address
on STS-3 particularly about whether this is

363
00:33:39,950 --> 00:33:41,210
all going to work.

364
00:33:41,210 --> 00:33:47,820
If you have been floating around with these
pointed to dark space, would they distort

365
00:33:47,820 --> 00:33:50,830
to where the zipper scheme would work?

366
00:33:50,830 --> 00:33:57,830
We worried about it enough that part of our
emergency training, contingency training,

367
00:34:00,500 --> 00:34:07,500
a lot of time was spent underwater in the
neutral buoyancy tank looking at a system

368
00:34:07,799 --> 00:34:14,799
going out EVA with a series of come-alongs,
you know, the kind of things you use to pull

369
00:34:18,129 --> 00:34:25,129
the motor out a car, that kind of thing, that
we could go down there and hookup and latch

370
00:34:28,518 --> 00:34:35,518
the doors shut to actually manually get them
shut and then latch them shut with these.

371
00:34:37,739 --> 00:34:39,190
Fortunately, that has never been used.

372
00:34:39,190 --> 00:34:46,190
And this complex system has worked good, but
it was scary the first time we flew it on

373
00:34:46,839 --> 00:34:47,728
STS-3.

374
00:34:47,728 --> 00:34:50,199
That was a big concern.

375
00:34:50,199 --> 00:34:57,200
What I have got here is hydraulic system.

376
00:34:58,819 --> 00:35:05,819
Hydraulics are hydrazine powered turbines
that run at some ridiculous RPM, like 200,000

377
00:35:08,269 --> 00:35:12,950
RPM to drive hydraulic pumps back here in
the backend.

378
00:35:12,950 --> 00:35:19,890
And then they are crucial during launch because
they have got to hold the elevons in position.

379
00:35:19,890 --> 00:35:26,890
But they also have to provide the muscle to
gimbal the main engines and keep you steering

380
00:35:28,019 --> 00:35:31,400
straight during launch.

381
00:35:31,400 --> 00:35:37,160
During entry they are what you use to fly
when you get into a dynamic pressure situation.

382
00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:40,969
Control the rudder speed brake and the body
flap.

383
00:35:40,969 --> 00:35:47,969
The body flap is a big surface that sticks
out underneath the main engine bells and is

384
00:35:48,369 --> 00:35:50,859
a slow moving trem device.

385
00:35:50,859 --> 00:35:52,900
The body flat is always moved.

386
00:35:52,900 --> 00:35:59,869
You go through this mach 25 to mach zero envelope.

387
00:35:59,869 --> 00:36:06,869
And the trem conditions necessary with these
big elevons varies a lot.

388
00:36:07,200 --> 00:36:14,150
So, to desaturate the elevons and keep them
basically faired with the wing, the body flap

389
00:36:14,150 --> 00:36:16,460
is your trim device.

390
00:36:16,460 --> 00:36:21,839
And it is like this row of tables long and
this wide.

391
00:36:21,839 --> 00:36:25,440
I remember asking to see the motor.

392
00:36:25,440 --> 00:36:31,099
It is driven by a whole lot of mechanical
advantage by a hydraulic motor.

393
00:36:31,099 --> 00:36:34,119
A guy took me around.

394
00:36:34,119 --> 00:36:36,869
I couldn't find the actuator for the body
flap.

395
00:36:36,869 --> 00:36:37,349
He showed me.

396
00:36:37,349 --> 00:36:41,119
The motor was this big around and this long,
a little hydraulic motor.

397
00:36:41,119 --> 00:36:45,130
So you can do anything with mechanical advantage.

398
00:36:45,130 --> 00:36:47,009
But it didn't have to move very fast.

399
00:36:47,009 --> 00:36:54,009
Finally, on the system pictures here, the
RMS.

400
00:36:54,710 --> 00:36:56,519
Hopefully, you have heard about this.

401
00:36:56,519 --> 00:36:59,450
It was built by Spara up in Canada.

402
00:36:59,450 --> 00:37:03,440
The Canadians main contribution to the orbiter
program.

403
00:37:03,440 --> 00:37:05,380
A pretty magical device.

404
00:37:05,380 --> 00:37:12,380
It can go on either side, but for our flights
mounted on the left-hand side or the right

405
00:37:13,859 --> 00:37:16,640
if you're looking out the back windows at
it.

406
00:37:16,640 --> 00:37:23,640
And it had joints logically called the shoulder
joint, elbow, wrist joint.

407
00:37:25,799 --> 00:37:29,969
All electric motor driven.

408
00:37:29,969 --> 00:37:32,279
But the interesting thing was a control.

409
00:37:32,279 --> 00:37:39,249
You had hand controllers mounted in the aft
part on the right console in the back where

410
00:37:39,249 --> 00:37:40,160
you looked out.

411
00:37:40,160 --> 00:37:46,900
And you could work in the mode where you actually
drive in the end left, right, up, down, in,

412
00:37:46,900 --> 00:37:50,059
out without regard to whatever joint was done.

413
00:37:50,059 --> 00:37:52,390
That is all resolved by the software.

414
00:37:52,390 --> 00:37:54,229
And worked well.

415
00:37:54,229 --> 00:38:00,960
The end effector was a cleaver kind of a hallow
cylindrical device.

416
00:38:00,960 --> 00:38:07,960
It would rotate inside and three cables that
would be curved around the periphery inside

417
00:38:12,259 --> 00:38:15,950
this cavity when activated.

418
00:38:15,950 --> 00:38:22,369
I put this over a post on whatever you wanted
to grab onto with a knob on the end.

419
00:38:22,369 --> 00:38:27,420
You go over the post and then rotate the inner
barrel and the cables would wrap up and grab

420
00:38:27,420 --> 00:38:28,930
onto the post.

421
00:38:28,930 --> 00:38:31,880
And then they would retract in to rigidize.

422
00:38:31,880 --> 00:38:34,549
And that was the grabber on the RMS.

423
00:38:34,549 --> 00:38:38,079
And we flew this on STS-3.

424
00:38:38,079 --> 00:38:39,109
I will show you later.

425
00:38:39,109 --> 00:38:45,729
Anyway, that is the subsystem review.

426
00:38:45,729 --> 00:38:51,339
Let me show you how things went during approach
and landing tests.

427
00:38:51,339 --> 00:38:52,150
Now, let's see.

428
00:38:52,150 --> 00:38:59,150
I have never figured out how to imbed video
and PowerPoint so I am going to be doing it

429
00:39:01,170 --> 00:39:01,660
manually.

430
00:39:01,660 --> 00:39:08,660
Any questions while we are waiting on this
to come up?

431
00:39:21,180 --> 00:39:28,180
Well, this is the desert around where I live
and a Gila monster and a Joshua tree to set

432
00:39:28,489 --> 00:39:29,049
the scene.

433
00:39:29,049 --> 00:39:33,999
And here you have OV-101.

434
00:39:33,999 --> 00:39:38,789
The numbering system, as it turned out, is
kind of interesting.

435
00:39:38,789 --> 00:39:42,589
They built OV-99 as the structural test article.

436
00:39:42,589 --> 00:39:49,589
It was strictly built to be in the lab and
do all the structural testing on it.

437
00:39:49,710 --> 00:39:56,710
101 then was the first orbiter build, the
Enterprise, being hauled from Palmdale across

438
00:39:58,839 --> 00:40:03,739
the backgrounds and the desert roads to get
over to Edwards in these scenes.

439
00:40:03,739 --> 00:40:06,910
And 101 was the ALT airplane.

440
00:40:06,910 --> 00:40:10,910
You can see kind of phony looking RCS.

441
00:40:10,910 --> 00:40:17,910
It has, as I mentioned, only the systems that
you needed to fly atmospheric flight.

442
00:40:18,349 --> 00:40:23,440
This was a big thing getting it across the
country.

443
00:40:23,440 --> 00:40:26,640
It had a Pitot boom on it.

444
00:40:26,640 --> 00:40:30,420
It has just simulated thermal protection.

445
00:40:30,420 --> 00:40:37,009
Styrofoam painted to look kind of like they
thought the space vehicles would look but

446
00:40:37,009 --> 00:40:38,029
wasn't real.

447
00:40:38,029 --> 00:40:45,029
It was put in the mating and docking device
which is at NASA Dryden where I work now.

448
00:40:46,089 --> 00:40:46,880
Hoisted it up.

449
00:40:46,880 --> 00:40:53,880
And then the 747 and 905, the first Shuttle
carrier aircraft, was pulled under and they

450
00:40:54,479 --> 00:40:55,119
mated them up.

451
00:40:55,119 --> 00:41:00,709
I remember flying out to Edwards and seeing
this unlikely combination.

452
00:41:00,709 --> 00:41:06,809
And the first time I saw the two together,
I thought they cannot be serious.

453
00:41:06,809 --> 00:41:10,239
But then I realized I was going to be in it.

454
00:41:10,239 --> 00:41:14,559
There were 13 total flights.

455
00:41:14,559 --> 00:41:17,469
This is a taxi test.

456
00:41:17,469 --> 00:41:21,450
When you have an aerodynamic test you can
sneak up, and so you do baby steps.

457
00:41:21,450 --> 00:41:26,650
This was just a high speed down the runway
to see if it would rotate and if anything

458
00:41:26,650 --> 00:41:29,489
would shake alarmingly.

459
00:41:29,489 --> 00:41:34,150
And that will look good.

460
00:41:34,150 --> 00:41:39,489
Preparations proceeded for the first of the
captive inert flights.

461
00:41:39,489 --> 00:41:45,410
This is Fitz Fulton and Tom McMurtry, both
real good friends, and they were the crew

462
00:41:45,410 --> 00:41:49,269
on the 747 for this first milestone flight.

463
00:41:49,269 --> 00:41:55,940
A lot of people were out watching and wondering
if it would fly, which it did very well.

464
00:41:55,940 --> 00:41:57,609
And off it went.

465
00:41:57,609 --> 00:42:03,109
You notice a longer front attached structure
there.

466
00:42:03,109 --> 00:42:10,109
And the orbiter is purposely on there at angle
of attack to produce lift.

467
00:42:12,019 --> 00:42:19,019
I flew a 747 for ferry flights now and to
haul orbiters back to the Cape when they land

468
00:42:19,989 --> 00:42:22,559
at Edwards, as the last one did.

469
00:42:22,559 --> 00:42:29,559
And the nose, that front bipod is much shorter
so that the orbiter is down for less drag

470
00:42:30,650 --> 00:42:33,119
for the combination.

471
00:42:33,119 --> 00:42:40,119
But this setup here was so that we could get
the orbiter off the top and not the tail.

472
00:42:44,410 --> 00:42:44,950
There is a rumble.

473
00:42:44,950 --> 00:42:46,829
The crew noticed a shaking.

474
00:42:46,829 --> 00:42:49,400
It is still the case when you fly.

475
00:42:49,400 --> 00:42:55,640
These vertical fins were added onto the horizontal
stabs to increase directional stability because

476
00:42:55,640 --> 00:42:58,400
the orbiter blanks a lot of flow over the
normal vertical.

477
00:42:58,400 --> 00:43:01,749
In fact, they overdid it a little bit.

478
00:43:01,749 --> 00:43:08,749
There is too much structural stability which
has resulted in the weird situation.

479
00:43:08,969 --> 00:43:15,969
Your cross-wind limit, when you have an orbiter
onboard, is greater than when it is not because

480
00:43:19,099 --> 00:43:21,609
you have so much directional stability and
a crosswind.

481
00:43:21,609 --> 00:43:26,509
There is a strong weathervaning and you run
out of normal rudder without an orbiter, so

482
00:43:26,509 --> 00:43:31,630
you are good only to 15 knots crosswind with
the orbiter on.

483
00:43:31,630 --> 00:43:33,729
The limit is 20 knots.

484
00:43:33,729 --> 00:43:35,109
And it is a good limit.

485
00:43:35,109 --> 00:43:37,569
I have flown them both ways in cross winds.

486
00:43:37,569 --> 00:43:42,619
And, indeed, at those numbers you run out
of rudder as you land and are rolling out.

487
00:43:42,619 --> 00:43:49,339
The strong weathervane intensity is leading
you out this side of the runway.

488
00:43:49,339 --> 00:43:50,440
Anyway, that looked good.

489
00:43:50,440 --> 00:43:55,549
And so I came back and we had a big post-flight
party.

490
00:43:55,549 --> 00:43:56,979
ALT was great for parties.

491
00:43:56,979 --> 00:43:59,099
We had 13 post-flight parties.

492
00:43:59,099 --> 00:44:06,099
And, at the same time we were doing the ALT
flights, we are developing a Shuttle training

493
00:44:11,700 --> 00:44:12,259
aircraft.

494
00:44:12,259 --> 00:44:19,259
This is Gulfstream II with big side force
generators on the belly.

495
00:44:19,279 --> 00:44:21,640
That is an airborne simulator.

496
00:44:21,640 --> 00:44:25,200
The left seat is set up with orbiter instruments.

497
00:44:25,200 --> 00:44:32,200
And the right seat was the standard gulfstream
cockpit that had flown thousands of dives

498
00:44:34,160 --> 00:44:41,160
at the ground in the SGA preparing for the
whole idea of first time for sure unpowered

499
00:44:47,549 --> 00:44:49,999
landing that you have to do right the first
time.

500
00:44:49,999 --> 00:44:56,999
And back in the simulator here for lots more
runs.

501
00:44:58,979 --> 00:45:05,150
And it was a great time because everything
was brand new, very interesting.

502
00:45:05,150 --> 00:45:08,299
This is a camera and an actual model.

503
00:45:08,299 --> 00:45:13,630
This is before the days of computer generated
video.

504
00:45:13,630 --> 00:45:16,630
It flew the little camera down to landing.

505
00:45:16,630 --> 00:45:19,869
And we learned a lot about [NOISE OBSCURES]

506
00:45:19,869 --> 00:45:21,269
characteristics.

507
00:45:21,269 --> 00:45:28,269
One that we really wondered about, when you
made a lateral input to roll the orbiter in

508
00:45:30,609 --> 00:45:32,969
the simulator, it would bang you.

509
00:45:32,969 --> 00:45:37,089
It was this lateral lurch, we call it.

510
00:45:37,089 --> 00:45:38,579
It would jolt you sideways.

511
00:45:38,579 --> 00:45:40,420
And we thought this cannot be real.

512
00:45:40,420 --> 00:45:41,130
It doesn't make any sense.

513
00:45:41,130 --> 00:45:43,569
No airplane we ever flew does that.

514
00:45:43,569 --> 00:45:45,430
We squawked it.

515
00:45:45,430 --> 00:45:51,049
They came back and said the equations are
all worked out so we live with it and thought

516
00:45:51,049 --> 00:45:57,130
it was just an artifact that snuck in there
and didn't worry about it.

517
00:45:57,130 --> 00:46:04,130
Now, the captive-active started where we actually
got in and cranked things up.

518
00:46:10,700 --> 00:46:14,369
On the second flight, I was chasing in a T-38.

519
00:46:14,369 --> 00:46:15,890
And Engle and Truly were in the cockpit.

520
00:46:15,890 --> 00:46:22,539
And I noticed a shiny look on the side.

521
00:46:22,539 --> 00:46:28,619
That big X on the CRT is what happens when
the computer that is driving that CRT quits.

522
00:46:28,619 --> 00:46:34,420
That is sort of the panic symbol when the
X shows up.

523
00:46:34,420 --> 00:46:38,910
Anyway, I noticed a leak, as it turned out
to be.

524
00:46:38,910 --> 00:46:40,930
We had that severe hydrazine leak.

525
00:46:40,930 --> 00:46:43,920
Hydrazine is bad stuff to have leaking.

526
00:46:43,920 --> 00:46:49,969
And one of the APU supply tanks let go.

527
00:46:49,969 --> 00:46:53,920
Plus, they had an over temp.

528
00:46:53,920 --> 00:46:59,819
We found things that were wrong that made
these captive flights worthwhile.

529
00:46:59,819 --> 00:47:06,819
If we had just gone and launched off on the
first one, it could have been more exciting

530
00:47:06,930 --> 00:47:10,089
than it needed to be.

531
00:47:10,089 --> 00:47:11,479
We had five of those.

532
00:47:11,479 --> 00:47:16,459
And Fred Hayes and I got the odd numbered
flights, one, three and five.

533
00:47:16,459 --> 00:47:17,869
Five more post-flight parties.

534
00:47:17,869 --> 00:47:24,469
And then we decided we were ready to go.

535
00:47:24,469 --> 00:47:27,130
Well, this is the last of the captive-active
flights.

536
00:47:27,130 --> 00:47:34,130
The scheme by which we plan to get off of
here and not take off the tail of the 747

537
00:47:34,369 --> 00:47:37,130
was that the 747 would go as high as it could
go.

538
00:47:37,130 --> 00:47:43,069
It could get up to around 27,000 feet with
engines over-boosted.

539
00:47:43,069 --> 00:47:47,829
Pratt & Whitney said you could go this long
with extra power.

540
00:47:47,829 --> 00:47:52,900
And then nose over and speed up to 240 knots.

541
00:47:52,900 --> 00:47:57,289
It was climbing maybe to 190, 200 knots.

542
00:47:57,289 --> 00:48:00,959
With a little downhill push, we got up to
240.

543
00:48:00,959 --> 00:48:07,959
At 240 the SEA pilots would go to idle power
and air brakes up to put drag on the carrier.

544
00:48:11,089 --> 00:48:18,089
At that condition of 240 knots and the angle
of attack of the orbiter, it was actually

545
00:48:19,410 --> 00:48:22,089
lifting more than its own weight.

546
00:48:22,089 --> 00:48:27,779
So the result is we really dropped the carrier,
as it turns out.

547
00:48:27,779 --> 00:48:31,199
There is three-quarters of a G difference
between the two.

548
00:48:31,199 --> 00:48:33,959
And so, we got a lot of use.

549
00:48:33,959 --> 00:48:39,109
For some reason Fred's left shoulder, he is
in the left seat and he mashed the separation

550
00:48:39,109 --> 00:48:45,479
button after Fitz on the carrier aircraft
hollered "carrier ready," that is they were

551
00:48:45,479 --> 00:48:52,479
back at idle with the speed brakes up, pushed
the go button and bang, all seven explosive

552
00:48:55,309 --> 00:48:58,509
bolts would blow.

553
00:48:58,509 --> 00:49:00,259
Control Room was in Houston, strange enough.

554
00:49:00,259 --> 00:49:07,259
We are talking to people back in the old JSC
Control Room when we are out at Edwards flying

555
00:49:07,589 --> 00:49:08,609
these flights.

556
00:49:08,609 --> 00:49:09,599
It was just like they were there.

557
00:49:09,599 --> 00:49:13,549
And we were coming up on a condition.

558
00:49:13,549 --> 00:49:17,599
And this was in August of '77.

559
00:49:17,599 --> 00:49:20,209
All the ALT flights happened in 1977.

560
00:49:20,209 --> 00:49:26,239
You notice there is a tail cone on here.

561
00:49:26,239 --> 00:49:29,170
The tail cone was flown on the first three
flights.

562
00:49:29,170 --> 00:49:32,949
That makes a big difference.

563
00:49:32,949 --> 00:49:39,749
It smoothes the flow s that the buffet on
the tail, the carrier aircraft was less, and

564
00:49:39,749 --> 00:49:43,079
it just about doubled the L/D of the orbiter.

565
00:49:43,079 --> 00:49:50,079
We are going to arm.

566
00:49:51,440 --> 00:49:58,440
And we had two chases, one off to the right
and in trail separation.

567
00:50:04,999 --> 00:50:11,999
Just like the engineer said and the load cells
that we had on there, testing exactly which

568
00:50:12,839 --> 00:50:16,650
was the thing tugging before we did it, said
we could do straight up.

569
00:50:16,650 --> 00:50:18,209
This is slow motion.

570
00:50:18,209 --> 00:50:19,180
Nothing is leaking.

571
00:50:19,180 --> 00:50:26,180
The vortex is out at the wing tips causing
condensation and away we went.

572
00:50:27,839 --> 00:50:32,910
And simultaneous with this bang that shutters
through the airplane with all these explosive

573
00:50:32,910 --> 00:50:39,319
volts a big X on the CRT in front of me.

574
00:50:39,319 --> 00:50:44,410
We had cue cards and we had practiced this.

575
00:50:44,410 --> 00:50:51,410
My job, while Fred flew, he actually got a
vertical clear from this chase pilot and then

576
00:50:53,640 --> 00:50:58,650
rolled into a bank and a lateral clear from
the guy that was chasing from behind and knew

577
00:50:58,650 --> 00:51:00,199
that it was OK to push over.

578
00:51:00,199 --> 00:51:04,259
Because we are only now at 200 knots and we
wanted to get to 300.

579
00:51:04,259 --> 00:51:09,859
And it took a considerable pushover to get
up to speed.

580
00:51:09,859 --> 00:51:14,779
Meanwhile, I am pulling circuit breakers on
rate gyros and turning off accelerometers

581
00:51:14,779 --> 00:51:21,779
at our preplanned procedure to accommodate
flaws in the redundancy management.

582
00:51:25,299 --> 00:51:31,279
When you lose one computer you also take out
part of the sensors in the flight control

583
00:51:31,279 --> 00:51:31,529
system.

584
00:51:31,449 --> 00:51:36,660
And, to be sure that a subsequent failure
wouldn't put you in worse shape, it took about

585
00:51:36,660 --> 00:51:39,650
a minute's worth of manual reconfiguration
on my part.

586
00:51:39,650 --> 00:51:42,109
And I kind of missed the whole first part
of the flight.

587
00:51:42,109 --> 00:51:46,559
When I turned around I realized hey, this
thing is flying good, it is smooth and is

588
00:51:46,559 --> 00:51:47,819
on speed.

589
00:51:47,819 --> 00:51:49,789
And Fred was flying.

590
00:51:49,789 --> 00:51:55,349
We flew a rectangular pattern out of a downwind
leg here as we nosed over.

591
00:51:55,349 --> 00:52:01,199
And I got my chance to roll into a left 90
degree turn and fly base leg.

592
00:52:01,199 --> 00:52:07,009
And, as I put the stick over to roll, we got
this big lateral arch just like the simulator

593
00:52:07,009 --> 00:52:10,900
said.

594
00:52:10,900 --> 00:52:11,559
It just stunned me.

595
00:52:11,559 --> 00:52:13,869
Son of a gun, they were right after all.

596
00:52:13,869 --> 00:52:20,869
It was just the nature of something flying
at high alpha and rotating about a stability

597
00:52:21,180 --> 00:52:23,759
axis and the cockpit gets slid sideways.

598
00:52:23,759 --> 00:52:26,890
It has big elevons so it flies like a fighter.

599
00:52:26,890 --> 00:52:27,299
It really does.

600
00:52:27,299 --> 00:52:31,279
And you are doing it all with a little stick
that doesn't move much.

601
00:52:31,279 --> 00:52:38,219
Anyway, we came down final at 290, I think
it was, flared out.

602
00:52:38,219 --> 00:52:40,890
My job was to put the gear down, a critical
function.

603
00:52:40,890 --> 00:52:47,890
And we are landing on lakebed 1-7 on the dry
lake at Edwards which is something like ten

604
00:52:50,469 --> 00:52:54,509
miles long, so we have pretty good margins
there.

605
00:52:54,509 --> 00:53:00,440
And Fred took the airplane back from ALT and
I got to fly base leg.

606
00:53:00,440 --> 00:53:06,299
But we touched down at about 185, I think
it was, nice and smooth.

607
00:53:06,299 --> 00:53:07,049
It was beautiful.

608
00:53:07,049 --> 00:53:14,049
The speed brake comes out to help cushion
the de-rotation, nose gear down and he raised

609
00:53:16,489 --> 00:53:18,180
a little dust as he rolled to a stop.

610
00:53:18,180 --> 00:53:20,170
So it was a good day.

611
00:53:20,170 --> 00:53:27,170
Now, we had a really good post-flight party
after this one.

612
00:53:28,699 --> 00:53:35,699
And see the rudder speed brake flared there
and the elevons fold up.

613
00:53:39,219 --> 00:53:43,239
And so, now Fred truly did it again.

614
00:53:43,239 --> 00:53:50,239
A couple weeks later or thereabouts they got
their turn and they did much the same flight,

615
00:53:56,420 --> 00:53:57,059
repeated it.

616
00:53:57,059 --> 00:54:00,369
Oh, one thing.

617
00:54:00,369 --> 00:54:03,630
You see the Pitot boom out there.

618
00:54:03,630 --> 00:54:07,910
The Pitot boom is strictly on the Enterprise,
put out there to get good air data out in

619
00:54:07,910 --> 00:54:14,249
front of this big blivit of an airplane which
is hard to get good measurements.

620
00:54:14,249 --> 00:54:21,249
Let me get the next one going here, if I can
figure out how to get out of this.

621
00:54:30,369 --> 00:54:32,319
The excitement came later.

622
00:54:32,319 --> 00:54:39,319
On STS-1, I looked out there when were on
final, I had to look out and look at the Pitot

623
00:54:49,319 --> 00:54:54,829
boom, and it is going through an arch of about
three feet.

624
00:54:54,829 --> 00:54:59,189
It was built with the perfect resonance of
everything else with the airplane, and it

625
00:54:59,189 --> 00:55:02,209
was just a blur out there going back and forth.

626
00:55:02,209 --> 00:55:04,759
And I really thought it was going to break
off.

627
00:55:04,759 --> 00:55:11,759
Was that your only Pitot source or did you
have the normal ones [OVERLAPPING VOICES]?

628
00:55:13,689 --> 00:55:15,920
Good question.

629
00:55:15,920 --> 00:55:18,269
Somehow we had at least inertially derived
ones.

630
00:55:18,269 --> 00:55:20,469
Everything looked good.

631
00:55:20,469 --> 00:55:24,279
And, actually, it still put out good airspeed,
even though it was a blur.

632
00:55:24,279 --> 00:55:26,759
And I think the beta averaged out.

633
00:55:26,759 --> 00:55:33,759
Anyway, it wasn't a problem we noticed other
than visually it looked like it was going

634
00:55:35,459 --> 00:55:36,469
to break off.

635
00:55:36,469 --> 00:55:40,969
They changed and stiffened it up so it wasn't
a problem on subsequent flights.

636
00:55:40,969 --> 00:55:47,920
Now, you can see here we are at free flight
four now which was the other crew's turn.

637
00:55:47,920 --> 00:55:54,920
The tail cone is off and our final pressure
glide slope with the tail cone on was 11 degrees.

638
00:55:59,569 --> 00:56:05,449
With tail cone off it was 23 degrees, halves
your L/D.

639
00:56:05,449 --> 00:56:11,189
So you really are in a steep dive.

640
00:56:11,189 --> 00:56:18,189
Normal ILS into Logan out here would be 2.5
degrees so you are coming down gangbusters.

641
00:56:20,739 --> 00:56:27,739
And it is even worse in ALT than it was in
the orbital missions which were coming down

642
00:56:27,910 --> 00:56:30,439
with the same configuration but much heavier.

643
00:56:30,439 --> 00:56:33,989
Heavier you've got more gravity working for
you and you can fly shallower.

644
00:56:33,989 --> 00:56:36,339
It doesn't seem to figure, but that is the
way it is.

645
00:56:36,339 --> 00:56:41,289
So 19 degrees is a normal return from orbit.

646
00:56:41,289 --> 00:56:44,670
Final pressure glide slope we were up in the
20s.

647
00:56:44,670 --> 00:56:51,009
Kind of catching up a little.

648
00:56:51,009 --> 00:56:57,180
One of our jobs on the flight preceding this
was to try the braking.

649
00:56:57,180 --> 00:57:00,170
We just let it roll out on the first couple
flights.

650
00:57:00,170 --> 00:57:02,829
They wanted to do brake tests.

651
00:57:02,829 --> 00:57:08,969
And Fred jumped on the brakes after we touched
down and another resonance problem, interaction

652
00:57:08,969 --> 00:57:15,969
between the structure and the anti-skid, and
I thought it was going to break the airplane.

653
00:57:19,339 --> 00:57:24,749
It was just violent shuttering, shaking, everything
rattling in the cockpit.

654
00:57:24,749 --> 00:57:27,930
And I hollered to Fred, get off the brakes,
we are going to brake something.

655
00:57:27,930 --> 00:57:30,910
He said no, the card says we have got to do
max braking.

656
00:57:30,910 --> 00:57:33,969
I was pleading with him to get off the brakes,
which he did.

657
00:57:33,969 --> 00:57:34,900
Easy fix.

658
00:57:34,900 --> 00:57:40,109
When they flew the next flight here they did
hard braking, and it was smooth.

659
00:57:40,109 --> 00:57:47,109
They went in to change the resister and the
feedback electrons, and that did it.

660
00:57:47,140 --> 00:57:50,549
I mean it was instant fix.

661
00:57:50,549 --> 00:57:57,549
So there still is reason to do flight tests
because surprises happen.

662
00:58:02,519 --> 00:58:09,519
Now free flight five, it turns out there was
a little brake here.

663
00:58:09,529 --> 00:58:16,529
We are back at Houston and Prince Charles,
who wasn't married yet at that time, came

664
00:58:17,459 --> 00:58:19,299
by on a visit.

665
00:58:19,299 --> 00:58:24,920
And we gave him a ride in the simulator.

666
00:58:24,920 --> 00:58:26,209
He had some flying time.

667
00:58:26,209 --> 00:58:28,819
And he got into a horrendous PIO.

668
00:58:28,819 --> 00:58:33,380
I mean he was out of control and crashed in
the simulator.

669
00:58:33,380 --> 00:58:34,229
And felt bad.

670
00:58:34,229 --> 00:58:37,109
And we said that is because you're not used
to the stick and everything.

671
00:58:37,109 --> 00:58:38,299
And that was his tour.

672
00:58:38,299 --> 00:58:43,039
Now, for this flight, he was actually out
along the runway.

673
00:58:43,039 --> 00:58:46,859
They had him out there so he could watch.

674
00:58:46,859 --> 00:58:51,150
The objective here was to land on the concrete
runway, put it right on the line, there is

675
00:58:51,150 --> 00:58:57,869
a white line 5,000 feet down, and Fred was
really working at it, putting in a lot of

676
00:58:57,869 --> 00:58:58,119
inputs.
Look at the elevons going there.

677
00:58:59,749 --> 00:59:02,170
You see them?

678
00:59:02,170 --> 00:59:06,880
And he is making roll commands.

679
00:59:06,880 --> 00:59:13,880
And so we logged a couple landings.

680
00:59:16,349 --> 00:59:23,349
And down and rolled to a stop.

681
00:59:24,209 --> 00:59:26,849
Afterwards, we called out and he came up to
say hello.

682
00:59:26,849 --> 00:59:28,150
He said oh, you made me feel good.

683
00:59:28,150 --> 00:59:31,069
You guys did as bad as I did.

684
00:59:31,069 --> 00:59:35,849
There he is right there with his binoculars.

685
00:59:35,849 --> 00:59:38,199
Well, that scared everybody to death.

686
00:59:38,199 --> 00:59:40,769
It looked worse from outside than it did in
the cockpit.

687
00:59:40,769 --> 00:59:45,199
And the flight control flaw that we found,
though, was serious.

688
00:59:45,199 --> 00:59:50,390
You've got elevons that do both pitch and
roll.

689
00:59:50,390 --> 00:59:54,829
So, in the software, when you are asking for
both pitch and roll at the same time, it has

690
00:59:54,829 --> 00:59:58,819
got to decide which one do I move?

691
00:59:58,819 --> 01:00:05,819
This is just a supposition of what would come.

692
01:00:08,009 --> 01:00:10,549
The software had to give priority.

693
01:00:10,549 --> 01:00:13,630
And they decided to give priority to pitch.

694
01:00:13,630 --> 01:00:20,630
And roll was taken second priority when you
had to limit the commands to the elevons to

695
01:00:22,039 --> 01:00:27,329
within the capability of the hydraulic system.

696
01:00:27,329 --> 01:00:32,689
The result was a lag in roll response when
you are working pitch hard.

697
01:00:32,689 --> 01:00:36,549
And the lag was up around two-tenths to three-tenths
of a second.

698
01:00:36,549 --> 01:00:40,539
You may be aware if you studied flight control
systems.

699
01:00:40,539 --> 01:00:47,539
Any kind of system that has a quarter second
delay between input and response is asking

700
01:00:50,949 --> 01:00:55,239
for a PIO, Pilot Induced Oscillation.

701
01:00:55,239 --> 01:00:57,400
And we had a big time in roll.

702
01:00:57,400 --> 01:01:01,529
Fred was clanking back and forth to stop and
roll trying to level the wings out there that

703
01:01:01,529 --> 01:01:02,749
first skip.

704
01:01:02,749 --> 01:01:06,759
I heard the controller banging over there.

705
01:01:06,759 --> 01:01:10,420
And I suggested if you get off maybe it will
damp.

706
01:01:10,420 --> 01:01:15,119
We're doing this and, sure enough, that is
what he did.

707
01:01:15,119 --> 01:01:21,150
He stopped the inputs, the airplane damped
right away and then it went OK.

708
01:01:21,150 --> 01:01:28,150
But it was something we had to fix, obviously.

709
01:01:30,869 --> 01:01:37,869
Here is a picture just a micro-second after
liftoff on one of the last two.

710
01:01:40,890 --> 01:01:46,549
Well, there was a decision with a lot of debate
about do we go back and fix the flight control

711
01:01:46,549 --> 01:01:48,199
and fly some more ALT?

712
01:01:48,199 --> 01:01:52,289
But this is a huge production and it was costing
time and we weren't getting into orbit.

713
01:01:52,289 --> 01:01:58,869
A decision was made now we will do it in simulators
and in-flight simulators and fix the problem,

714
01:01:58,869 --> 01:01:59,819
but press on.

715
01:01:59,819 --> 01:02:04,479
That was the end of ALT, at the end of which,
when you do flight tests, you talk about opening

716
01:02:04,479 --> 01:02:05,819
the envelope of an airplane.

717
01:02:05,819 --> 01:02:12,279
Well, the envelope of the Space Shuttle is
400 nautical miles altitude and mach 25.

718
01:02:12,279 --> 01:02:16,069
And in ALT we got the four miles and 0.3 mach.

719
01:02:16,069 --> 01:02:23,069
It is really down in the lower left corner,
but worth doing.

720
01:02:23,299 --> 01:02:25,729
Test results.

721
01:02:25,729 --> 01:02:28,779
I mentioned as we went we had that APU fuel
leak.

722
01:02:28,779 --> 01:02:29,429
Fixed it.

723
01:02:29,429 --> 01:02:32,099
Didn't come back.

724
01:02:32,099 --> 01:02:37,009
The buffet lifter drag was right on what we
expected, no surprises there.

725
01:02:37,009 --> 01:02:40,619
Handling qualities were good, even with the
lurch.

726
01:02:40,619 --> 01:02:43,150
It was not a problem.

727
01:02:43,150 --> 01:02:46,670
I mentioned the Pitot boom, the anti-skid.

728
01:02:46,670 --> 01:02:51,150
SCA did the job, although it struggled to
get up.

729
01:02:51,150 --> 01:02:55,689
With the tail coming off, it could only get
to about 18,000 feet.

730
01:02:55,689 --> 01:03:00,670
So this was not a good program to build up
your flying time.

731
01:03:00,670 --> 01:03:07,670
It was about a total, in three flights, of
about 12 minutes of flying time.

732
01:03:09,630 --> 01:03:16,630
And the biggie I mentioned was the handling
qualities and the PIO tendency that we fixed

733
01:03:18,160 --> 01:03:25,160
with lots of studies later and changes in
the way the control equations were written.

734
01:03:25,160 --> 01:03:30,369
And, as a final thing, they did some more
flights with the nose lowered down and determine

735
01:03:30,369 --> 01:03:34,788
what the ferry flight performance of the combination
is.

736
01:03:34,788 --> 01:03:41,439
I, later after flying in space, checked out
on the 747 and still fly it on the ferry flights.

737
01:03:41,439 --> 01:03:44,559
And it does the job.

738
01:03:44,559 --> 01:03:46,890
It burns lots of gas.

739
01:03:46,890 --> 01:03:53,890
I figured out that the combination across
the country, the mileage is about 300 feet

740
01:03:56,549 --> 01:04:00,549
per gallon, so a football field per gallon
of fuel.

741
01:04:00,549 --> 01:04:04,519
40,000 pounds an hour is the field flow.

742
01:04:04,519 --> 01:04:11,519
It goes about 1.5 times its own length when
we get on the gas, but it gets there.

743
01:04:15,059 --> 01:04:17,819
I don't have to buy the fuel.

744
01:04:17,819 --> 01:04:20,979
A lot of people said wasn't this scary, ALT?

745
01:04:20,979 --> 01:04:25,609
Actually, from a risk standpoint, we had ejection
seats.

746
01:04:25,609 --> 01:04:31,709
If anything had gone wrong, anywhere along
the line, we could have pulled the handle

747
01:04:31,709 --> 01:04:33,140
and jumped out.

748
01:04:33,140 --> 01:04:39,660
The scariest part of it was when we got in,
and during the captive flights, we would just

749
01:04:39,660 --> 01:04:41,959
walk up a stairway and crawl through the hatch.

750
01:04:41,959 --> 01:04:43,380
And the same way getting out.

751
01:04:43,380 --> 01:04:50,380
But after the captive active flights, we would
land still on the orbiter.

752
01:04:52,979 --> 01:04:56,849
And they had this cherry picker to get us
out.

753
01:04:56,849 --> 01:05:00,890
Now, the situation here is it's a round hatch
hedged at the bottom.

754
01:05:00,890 --> 01:05:07,769
They only wanted on person at a time on the
end of this thing.

755
01:05:07,769 --> 01:05:13,849
You open a round hatch and then they bring
this up, the guy on the ground.

756
01:05:13,849 --> 01:05:19,410
And he doesn't want to get too close and ding
so he leaves about this much of a gap from

757
01:05:19,410 --> 01:05:24,670
this round hatch which is 60 feet above the
ground that you have got to crawl out on your

758
01:05:24,670 --> 01:05:31,670
knees, then stand up and then make the leap
across the thing onto this wobbly cage up

759
01:05:31,929 --> 01:05:32,880
there.

760
01:05:32,880 --> 01:05:37,519
That is how our captive actives went.

761
01:05:37,519 --> 01:05:44,519
Where you wearing flight suits for all these
tests?

762
01:05:44,999 --> 01:05:51,999
Yeah, we were wearing flight suits and helmets
like you would in a 518 or any fighter.

763
01:05:52,509 --> 01:05:53,219
Not pressure suits.

764
01:05:53,219 --> 01:06:00,219
We didn't have a severe cabin pressure risk
at 25,000 feet.

765
01:06:02,219 --> 01:06:08,719
Let me get into the full screen mode here.

766
01:06:08,719 --> 01:06:15,049
I put in some thoughts about what is different
when you test an aircraft versus a spacecraft.

767
01:06:15,049 --> 01:06:18,589
With an airplane you can do little baby steps,
incremental tests.

768
01:06:18,589 --> 01:06:24,699
You can do static runs of the propulsion up
to the full power in the airplane itself.

769
01:06:24,699 --> 01:06:28,420
Then you taxi it slow and then faster and
faster down the runway.

770
01:06:28,420 --> 01:06:31,739
You can rotate the nose a little bit.

771
01:06:31,739 --> 01:06:36,729
The first flight you will fly slow and leave
the gear down and then land it soon and check

772
01:06:36,729 --> 01:06:37,249
everything.

773
01:06:37,249 --> 01:06:40,049
And you could hold off for a perfect day to
do it.

774
01:06:40,049 --> 01:06:44,179
And then you go faster and faster to expand
the envelope.

775
01:06:44,179 --> 01:06:50,288
If anything goes wrong you can peel off and
get back on the ground quick.

776
01:06:50,288 --> 01:06:55,579
And, as I mentioned, you can always pull the
handle and bail out if things go really bad.

777
01:06:55,579 --> 01:07:01,299
When you have a spacecraft it is all or nothing.

778
01:07:01,299 --> 01:07:05,880
You have got to use the propulsion at its
full power.

779
01:07:05,880 --> 01:07:11,788
All the critical systems and subsystems have
got to work.

780
01:07:11,788 --> 01:07:14,819
You cannot make a quick abort.

781
01:07:14,819 --> 01:07:19,038
Long delays like days are sometimes required
to get back to the conditions where you can

782
01:07:19,038 --> 01:07:21,459
make an appropriate landing.

783
01:07:21,459 --> 01:07:27,788
And the weather could turn sour at the time.

784
01:07:27,788 --> 01:07:34,420
When you are going to flight test the spacecraft
you have got to have a lot of redundancy in

785
01:07:34,420 --> 01:07:41,420
the design to allow for the bad day that has
to carry it through in a considerable amount

786
01:07:41,509 --> 01:07:41,910
of time.

787
01:07:41,910 --> 01:07:48,910
You necessarily have got to test everything
to the limit, wind tunnels, CVD, thermal vacuum

788
01:07:50,819 --> 01:07:54,479
because the environment is lots more stressful.

789
01:07:54,479 --> 01:07:59,359
You have got to have a lot of instrumentation
so that you can tell what did go wrong or

790
01:07:59,359 --> 01:08:00,788
be sure that everything went right.

791
01:08:00,788 --> 01:08:07,788
You are talking about an army of controllers
in a control room to pull it off with a complex

792
01:08:08,839 --> 01:08:10,359
system like the Shuttle.

793
01:08:10,359 --> 01:08:14,380
And lots of simulation to get everybody trained.

794
01:08:14,380 --> 01:08:16,310
A biggie is to verify the software.

795
01:08:16,310 --> 01:08:22,120
I mentioned the software is guaranteed to
be wrong on the first release and several

796
01:08:22,120 --> 01:08:22,729
subsequent.

797
01:08:22,729 --> 01:08:27,600
It is just the nature of building software.

798
01:08:27,600 --> 01:08:32,899
And so getting that checked out is a major
one.

799
01:08:32,899 --> 01:08:33,149
Procedures.

800
01:08:33,040 --> 01:08:40,040
When we flew the orbital flight, the stack
of checklists just laid on top of each other

801
01:08:44,460 --> 01:08:49,109
was about this high, for 51F, and it weighed
210 pounds.

802
01:08:49,109 --> 01:08:55,059
It was called the Flight Data File.

803
01:08:55,059 --> 01:09:02,059
And then lots of time and expense getting
everybody really ready to go.

804
01:09:03,940 --> 01:09:10,549
And being sure that when you're going into
an unknown part of the envelope that the margins

805
01:09:10,549 --> 01:09:12,279
on the flight control are adequate.

806
01:09:12,279 --> 01:09:17,979
So the surprises and the aeroderivatives that
hit you can be accommodating.

807
01:09:17,979 --> 01:09:22,830
I have rambled on a long time here.

808
01:09:22,830 --> 01:09:27,210
We can take the five-minute break, I can answer
questions, however you want to do it.

809
01:09:27,210 --> 01:09:28,559
Maybe it's time for a stretch.

810
01:09:28,559 --> 01:09:32,529
Let's do a two-minute break.

811
01:09:32,529 --> 01:09:36,359
These people are tough.

812
01:09:36,359 --> 01:09:38,279
All right.

813
01:09:38,279 --> 01:09:40,200
Break is over.

814
01:09:40,200 --> 01:09:47,200
The next assignment for me was being put on
an orbital flight test, and specifically STS-3.

815
01:09:58,309 --> 01:10:05,309
A two man crew, Jack Lousma, a Marine, and
myself from the Air Force, we were in pressure

816
01:10:11,980 --> 01:10:16,220
suits, you will notice there, and on ejection
seats in the Columbia.

817
01:10:16,220 --> 01:10:19,100
This is OV-102.

818
01:10:19,100 --> 01:10:22,180
101 was the Enterprise.

819
01:10:22,180 --> 01:10:24,630
102 was the Columbia.

820
01:10:24,630 --> 01:10:28,170
And our countdown went smoothly.

821
01:10:28,170 --> 01:10:30,210
This was in March of '82.

822
01:10:30,210 --> 01:10:37,210
And this is a signature moment in your life
when the SRBs light.

823
01:10:37,290 --> 01:10:44,290
I mean it looks smooth and nice as we are
flying through a cloud here on launch, logging

824
01:10:46,400 --> 01:10:53,400
weather time I might add, but it is rough
and noisy and rattley.

825
01:10:57,580 --> 01:11:03,090
And the acceleration is right away, and it
builds up to 3Gs.

826
01:11:03,090 --> 01:11:06,020
When the main engines are throttled back,
the whole 3Gs.

827
01:11:06,020 --> 01:11:10,670
And so, it is no doubt you are on your way
somewhere really fast wherever the solids

828
01:11:10,670 --> 01:11:14,020
want to go.

829
01:11:14,020 --> 01:11:17,040
Everything worked good right up to MECO.

830
01:11:17,040 --> 01:11:20,510
And the external tank, as you saw, drifted
away.

831
01:11:20,510 --> 01:11:27,510
And then here come the first order of business,
opening the payload bay doors so we can start

832
01:11:28,960 --> 01:11:33,240
rejecting heat with the radiators that are
mounted on the inside.

833
01:11:33,240 --> 01:11:35,440
We are tailed down.

834
01:11:35,440 --> 01:11:41,770
And as you watch here, we are going right
over Los Angeles at the time.

835
01:11:41,770 --> 01:11:43,480
This is just north of LA.

836
01:11:43,480 --> 01:11:47,920
You can see LA.

837
01:11:47,920 --> 01:11:54,920
Sorry, this is Santa Monica, LAX and
Palos Verdes right there.

838
01:12:02,370 --> 01:12:09,370
Anyway, the first thing we had to do is get
out of Theodolite, that is a sighting device

839
01:12:09,620 --> 01:12:16,620
that surveyors use, and take a daunting number
of readings on little targets that were pasted

840
01:12:19,750 --> 01:12:23,980
around inside the payload bay and on the doors
to measure where they were.

841
01:12:23,980 --> 01:12:27,200
And we did that through the flight all the
way along.

842
01:12:27,200 --> 01:12:30,309
It wasn't fast enough.

843
01:12:30,309 --> 01:12:32,800
Out in front of the nose there were some dark
patches.

844
01:12:32,800 --> 01:12:36,470
That is where tile were, white tile, and fell
off during launch.

845
01:12:36,470 --> 01:12:38,350
They actually found some washed up on the
beach.

846
01:12:38,350 --> 01:12:44,870
Fortunately, none of the black tile on the
bottom fell off but we did lose some on the

847
01:12:44,870 --> 01:12:45,120
top.
Zero G is really one of the delights.

848
01:12:51,490 --> 01:12:58,490
There are two really good things about flying
in orbit, weightlessness and the view out

849
01:12:59,010 --> 01:12:59,330
the window.

850
01:12:59,330 --> 01:13:06,330
And that is like nothing that you experience,
even flying high-performance airplanes.

851
01:13:06,880 --> 01:13:09,809
We had the RMS cranked up.

852
01:13:09,809 --> 01:13:12,210
That was my job as RMS operator.

853
01:13:12,210 --> 01:13:18,460
And we had a package in the back, the plasma
diagnostic package to grab and move out there.

854
01:13:18,460 --> 01:13:20,940
There are some things that show you the housekeeping
area.

855
01:13:20,940 --> 01:13:27,940
In the corner there is the john.

856
01:13:31,290 --> 01:13:34,250
And long duration spaceflight exercise is
important.

857
01:13:34,250 --> 01:13:39,040
It is really not a big deal on a seven-day
flight.

858
01:13:39,040 --> 01:13:46,040
Jack is a Marine, as I mentioned.

859
01:13:47,380 --> 01:13:51,610
He has got to have his daily ration of pushups,
so here we go.

860
01:13:51,610 --> 01:13:54,210
How about a one-handed pushup, Jack?

861
01:13:54,210 --> 01:14:01,210
How about a no-handed pushup?

862
01:14:07,900 --> 01:14:09,130
This is a quick summary.

863
01:14:09,130 --> 01:14:11,610
We went our seven days.

864
01:14:11,610 --> 01:14:18,570
And the lakebed at Edwards, they had a really
wet spring, was unusable, so we went to White

865
01:14:18,570 --> 01:14:20,580
Sands, New Mexico.

866
01:14:20,580 --> 01:14:27,580
The first day, right as we are about to light
the OMS engines to start deorbit, they said

867
01:14:28,480 --> 01:14:32,750
hold off because this terrible dust storm
is going on.

868
01:14:32,750 --> 01:14:39,750
And then we waited a delightful day with nothing
in the flight plane much to enjoy ourselves,

869
01:14:40,630 --> 01:14:42,250
and then came down the next day.

870
01:14:42,250 --> 01:14:49,250
Now we find another gotcha in handling quantities
here.

871
01:14:49,850 --> 01:14:54,400
Right here Jack thought the nose might be
coming down too fast and tried to stop it,

872
01:14:54,400 --> 01:14:58,080
and ended up doing a little wheelie.

873
01:14:58,080 --> 01:15:03,400
Subsequent analysis showed that the whole
response of the vehicle changes when you are

874
01:15:03,400 --> 01:15:05,790
down on the main gear only.

875
01:15:05,790 --> 01:15:07,630
And nobody thought of that.

876
01:15:07,630 --> 01:15:14,630
It would seem like, well, they are worried
about pitch in the air but not while you are

877
01:15:16,920 --> 01:15:18,650
rolling on the main gear trying to de-rotate.

878
01:15:18,650 --> 01:15:21,920
So it resulted in more software changes.

879
01:15:21,920 --> 01:15:28,920
Another thing we learned, they were pushing
for auto-land.

880
01:15:31,250 --> 01:15:36,530
We flew the whole turn onto final and down
final hands off in auto-land.

881
01:15:36,530 --> 01:15:43,530
The program wanted to take this out of the
hands of the crew, so here on the third flight

882
01:15:45,730 --> 01:15:49,940
they had us sitting there watching the airplane
fly down to pre-flare.

883
01:15:49,940 --> 01:15:55,210
And then the first chance Jack got to grab
the stick was at the last minute to do the

884
01:15:55,210 --> 01:15:57,230
flare and landing.

885
01:15:57,230 --> 01:15:59,410
And that was dumb when you look back, really
dumb.

886
01:15:59,410 --> 01:16:06,410
And so, now all flight commanders, if it has
been auto down to 40,000 feet where you go

887
01:16:07,020 --> 01:16:11,150
subsonic, we will fly manually all the way
down to get a feel for the airplane.

888
01:16:11,150 --> 01:16:13,630
It makes a lot more sense.

889
01:16:13,630 --> 01:16:14,870
That is the way flights are done now.

890
01:16:14,870 --> 01:16:18,370
Here is where we started from orbit.

891
01:16:18,370 --> 01:16:21,850
This is how Cape Canaveral looks.

892
01:16:21,850 --> 01:16:24,460
Right here is the shuttle landing strip that
is down there.

893
01:16:24,460 --> 01:16:25,340
You can see it.

894
01:16:25,340 --> 01:16:28,850
And the launch pads are these two dots.

895
01:16:28,850 --> 01:16:34,490
And so, that is where usually a shuttle flight
starts and ends.

896
01:16:34,490 --> 01:16:37,210
Here is a picture of our payload bay on STS-3.

897
01:16:37,210 --> 01:16:40,220
And we did have a payload.

898
01:16:40,220 --> 01:16:47,220
Previous crews had pretty much empty payload
bay, but we had an environmental measurement

899
01:16:48,460 --> 01:16:51,670
thing, a lot of instrumentation.

900
01:16:51,670 --> 01:16:58,670
Then this PDP, Plasma Diagnostic Package that
we actually had something to grab with the

901
01:16:59,020 --> 01:17:00,630
manipulator arm, as you see here.

902
01:17:00,630 --> 01:17:07,630
I looked around and found, I don't know if
you can recognize this, but that is Cape Cod

903
01:17:08,150 --> 01:17:08,400
back there.

904
01:17:08,320 --> 01:17:13,120
A picture of MIT.

905
01:17:13,120 --> 01:17:14,180
Not a good picture.

906
01:17:14,180 --> 01:17:16,130
There have got to be lots of better ones.

907
01:17:16,130 --> 01:17:22,160
And here is where we ended up, the White Sands
area near Alamogordo, New Mexico.

908
01:17:22,160 --> 01:17:29,160
What we learned, this is a pretty cryptic
summary.

909
01:17:31,130 --> 01:17:33,190
Training was a real problem.

910
01:17:33,190 --> 01:17:40,190
The first two crews that flew STS-1 and STS-2
had all the attention of the training people

911
01:17:43,970 --> 01:17:44,970
in the simulators.

912
01:17:44,970 --> 01:17:48,030
They had priority, properly so.

913
01:17:48,030 --> 01:17:55,030
We, on the third flight, had low priority
and really struggled.

914
01:17:55,230 --> 01:18:00,350
And what we found, when we got in the simulators,
is when they didn't work right nobody could

915
01:18:00,350 --> 01:18:03,540
explain why.

916
01:18:03,540 --> 01:18:06,840
Many times we try on ascent and crash and
burn.

917
01:18:06,840 --> 01:18:09,130
And you always were scratching your head is
this real?

918
01:18:09,130 --> 01:18:12,940
Is this the way the orbiter flies or is it
some flaw in the simulator?

919
01:18:12,940 --> 01:18:19,940
Early on you are developing not only the orbiter
but the training facilities.

920
01:18:20,950 --> 01:18:22,850
And the people didn't understand the system.

921
01:18:22,850 --> 01:18:28,640
We had more exposure from ALT to subsystems
than the people that were supposed to be the

922
01:18:28,640 --> 01:18:29,040
experts.

923
01:18:29,040 --> 01:18:36,040
It was a group learning process and a long
way from what happens now when crews go in.

924
01:18:36,520 --> 01:18:40,309
And they get the straight word right from
the beginning on how things are.

925
01:18:40,309 --> 01:18:43,210
The tiles fell off.

926
01:18:43,210 --> 01:18:43,850
Not good.

927
01:18:43,850 --> 01:18:50,850
They changed the bonding scheme, improved
the quality control and, fortunately for the

928
01:18:52,260 --> 01:18:55,610
program, no critical tiles fell off.

929
01:18:55,610 --> 01:18:57,090
But that was alarming.

930
01:18:57,090 --> 01:19:04,090
We looked out there, we reported it, took
pictures of it looking at these gaps in the

931
01:19:04,420 --> 01:19:06,670
system right out in front of the windshield.

932
01:19:06,670 --> 01:19:13,670
But Ground said don't worry, that is a cool
area during entry.

933
01:19:13,790 --> 01:19:18,710
Entry is at 40 degrees angle of attack so
it is cool on top.

934
01:19:18,710 --> 01:19:19,410
They were right.

935
01:19:19,410 --> 01:19:23,900
Everything was fine.

936
01:19:23,900 --> 01:19:29,290
Another tile thing was after the flight, actually,
delay that.

937
01:19:29,290 --> 01:19:32,350
It was really more after the next flight.

938
01:19:32,350 --> 01:19:36,080
I mentioned how the ride is.

939
01:19:36,080 --> 01:19:40,100
The first two minutes were rough and exciting.

940
01:19:40,100 --> 01:19:47,100
The next six or seven are unbelievably smooth
when you get on the main engines, and then

941
01:19:49,380 --> 01:19:52,460
more vibration that you are getting sitting
in the chairs now.

942
01:19:52,460 --> 01:19:54,480
And it is just a steady relentless push.

943
01:19:54,480 --> 01:19:58,309
It is just a spectacular right.

944
01:19:58,309 --> 01:20:03,030
But you are back in the seat.

945
01:20:03,030 --> 01:20:09,630
Had an APU oil overheat during that 3G part.

946
01:20:09,630 --> 01:20:15,460
Actually, about two minutes before MECO, Ground
called and said we needed to shut down one

947
01:20:15,460 --> 01:20:15,910
APU.

948
01:20:15,910 --> 01:20:21,270
We were up past the point where we could live
without all three APUs running.

949
01:20:21,270 --> 01:20:28,270
I had a chance to test what I worked on years
previously with the cockpit design.

950
01:20:28,460 --> 01:20:35,290
You are concerned about visibility when you
are squashed in the seat at 3Gs and access.

951
01:20:35,290 --> 01:20:40,360
And the APU switches, we had to put them down
here.

952
01:20:40,360 --> 01:20:47,360
And, I remember worrying specifically, if
we have got to get to the APU switches, the

953
01:20:48,190 --> 01:20:52,920
guy on the right seat under 3Gs, can he lift
the helmet and look over there and find the

954
01:20:52,920 --> 01:20:53,690
correct switch?

955
01:20:53,690 --> 01:20:58,380
And you do not want to shut down the wrong
one, one of the good ones.

956
01:20:58,380 --> 01:21:05,380
And it turned out, I guess with the adrenaline
lifting this heavy helmet at 3Gs, I did it

957
01:21:08,000 --> 01:21:10,280
without even thinking about it and went right
to the switch.

958
01:21:10,280 --> 01:21:17,190
So it worked.

959
01:21:17,190 --> 01:21:19,920
General habitability was good in the orbiter.

960
01:21:19,920 --> 01:21:26,059
The first time anybody lived there for eight
days.

961
01:21:26,059 --> 01:21:30,309
A good way to think about living in the orbiter,
think of it as a camping trip.

962
01:21:30,309 --> 01:21:37,309
You go on a camping trip you don't worry about
hot water, showers and all the niceties of

963
01:21:37,930 --> 01:21:39,020
home.

964
01:21:39,020 --> 01:21:41,240
You get in that frame of mind and it is fine.

965
01:21:41,240 --> 01:21:48,240
The food is adequate, the facilities are OK,
although in our case the toilet ground to

966
01:21:51,470 --> 01:21:52,740
a halt.

967
01:21:52,740 --> 01:21:59,740
It is a drum that rotates to centrifugally
sling all fecal material out and contain it.

968
01:22:00,830 --> 01:22:02,760
And it ground to a halt.

969
01:22:02,760 --> 01:22:09,760
We were in a real camping trip for a while
on that, although it worked out.

970
01:22:13,000 --> 01:22:16,440
The arm worked great, RMS.

971
01:22:16,440 --> 01:22:19,210
The main jets I mentioned earlier.

972
01:22:19,210 --> 01:22:23,690
Of course, you don't use the main jets much.

973
01:22:23,690 --> 01:22:27,770
It would be hard to sleep with them booming
away, but you use the Verniers most of the

974
01:22:27,770 --> 01:22:28,020
time.

975
01:22:27,880 --> 01:22:32,809
Verniers are critical to smooth operation
over long periods of time.

976
01:22:32,809 --> 01:22:39,520
We spent a lot of time, for instance, tail
sun.

977
01:22:39,520 --> 01:22:45,620
For like three days we put the tail right
at the sun and stayed in that inertial attitude.

978
01:22:45,620 --> 01:22:51,390
And so it cooked the backend while the front
end of the orbiter is cold.

979
01:22:51,390 --> 01:22:56,580
We took all the Theodolite measurements, opened
and closed the doors.

980
01:22:56,580 --> 01:22:58,380
All of that worked fine.

981
01:22:58,380 --> 01:22:59,930
The systems handled it.

982
01:22:59,930 --> 01:23:01,670
A lot of it was ground analysis.

983
01:23:01,670 --> 01:23:06,140
And how the temperatures were, were extensively
instrumented.

984
01:23:06,140 --> 01:23:12,940
And we did notice a strange thing.

985
01:23:12,940 --> 01:23:15,880
Not strange but it became apparent.

986
01:23:15,880 --> 01:23:22,880
When you are in orbit, when you are on the
sunny side of the earth, as soon as the sun

987
01:23:24,480 --> 01:23:31,309
comes up it is high noon bright, but there
is no atmosphere around to diffuse the light.

988
01:23:31,309 --> 01:23:38,309
When we were at tail sun, it is hidden behind
perfectly eclipsed by the aft structure.

989
01:23:38,740 --> 01:23:45,740
And so, there is no sun ball to be seen anywhere,
even though it is bright sunny from just the

990
01:23:46,740 --> 01:23:50,980
reflections of the structure you can see out
the window.

991
01:23:50,980 --> 01:23:57,980
I noticed, looking at the radiators, which
are very, very smooth concave surfaces out

992
01:23:58,370 --> 01:24:01,190
there and shiny silver colored.

993
01:24:01,190 --> 01:24:08,190
It looked like there were bright diamonds
all along the surface when we were tail sun.

994
01:24:09,250 --> 01:24:14,990
And I finally figured out it was just little
specks of dust on the radiators, which you

995
01:24:14,990 --> 01:24:16,730
wouldn't even notice normally.

996
01:24:16,730 --> 01:24:23,730
But exactly tail sun, the sun's rays are coming
right down exactly tangent to that surface.

997
01:24:24,550 --> 01:24:28,650
And the least little thing on it would flare.

998
01:24:28,650 --> 01:24:35,650
And interesting effect which took me a while
to figure out what all these bright spots

999
01:24:36,460 --> 01:24:43,460
on the radiators are.

1000
01:24:44,590 --> 01:24:51,590
Entry on STS-3 was done to an about 1:00 in
the morning landing at White Sands, New Mexico.

1001
01:24:53,150 --> 01:24:54,100
We started the entry.

1002
01:24:54,100 --> 01:25:00,440
Halfway around the world it is dark, and most
of the entry was in the dark.

1003
01:25:00,440 --> 01:25:05,809
The plasma light show that happens, as you
get down in the atmosphere, the ionization

1004
01:25:05,809 --> 01:25:11,420
that happens produces a spectacular scene
out the windshield.

1005
01:25:11,420 --> 01:25:18,420
I mean it also had us thinking about the missing
tiles that are going.

1006
01:25:19,059 --> 01:25:24,150
But a night entry is really a show.

1007
01:25:24,150 --> 01:25:29,360
The next flight was a day entry which was
not nearly as spectacular.

1008
01:25:29,360 --> 01:25:36,360
I mentioned about grabbing the stick too late,
unfair to Jack, and then the de-rotation.

1009
01:25:41,980 --> 01:25:43,850
Now onto part three.

1010
01:25:43,850 --> 01:25:45,050
How am I doing?

1011
01:25:45,050 --> 01:25:46,059
I might make it yet.

1012
01:25:46,059 --> 01:25:53,059
STS-51F was a whole different situation than
the earlier test flights.

1013
01:26:00,720 --> 01:26:05,050
One big difference is there were seven people
instead of two.

1014
01:26:05,050 --> 01:26:09,410
With seven we had to add a little bit on the
patch to put the extra two names.

1015
01:26:09,410 --> 01:26:12,440
This is the ninth flight.

1016
01:26:12,440 --> 01:26:15,059
There are nineteen stars.

1017
01:26:15,059 --> 01:26:15,780
Primary experiments.

1018
01:26:15,780 --> 01:26:16,960
This was a science flight.

1019
01:26:16,960 --> 01:26:19,970
It was a space lab but without the laboratory.

1020
01:26:19,970 --> 01:26:25,900
All equipment in the payload bay full stem
to stern with telescopes mostly.

1021
01:26:25,900 --> 01:26:31,650
And all the telescopes mounted on the pointing
system we had were solar telescopes.

1022
01:26:31,650 --> 01:26:37,570
So we had the sun in the accurate part of
the sky.

1023
01:26:37,570 --> 01:26:44,570
Here is Orion and Leo, the backwards question
mark.

1024
01:26:46,680 --> 01:26:51,320
Nineteen stars.

1025
01:26:51,320 --> 01:26:58,320
A lot of symbology here.

1026
01:27:01,070 --> 01:27:08,070
A short entertaining video.

1027
01:27:13,230 --> 01:27:20,230
We had seven people, including three mission
specialists, which Dr.

1028
01:27:22,220 --> 01:27:25,920
Hoffman was when he was down in Houston.

1029
01:27:25,920 --> 01:27:31,530
And we had two payload specialists, guys who
were not full time astronauts.

1030
01:27:31,530 --> 01:27:33,030
They were solar physicists.

1031
01:27:33,030 --> 01:27:39,740
And they were the experts on the solar telescopes
that we had and went along to fly.

1032
01:27:39,740 --> 01:27:43,780
First try here at main engine ignition ended
three seconds after ignition.

1033
01:27:43,780 --> 01:27:50,780
We felt the spacecraft rock around, the noise
and then nothing.

1034
01:27:51,600 --> 01:27:58,600
And we had a pad shutdown because the left
engine, the automatic system detected a failure,

1035
01:28:00,760 --> 01:28:02,980
a slow-acting valve and it shut us off.

1036
01:28:02,980 --> 01:28:07,400
So we are there wondering if we are on fire
and whether we ought to race out and so forth.

1037
01:28:07,400 --> 01:28:13,280
It was tense for a while but there wasn't
a fire, just this automatic shutdown.

1038
01:28:13,280 --> 01:28:15,790
We crawled out.

1039
01:28:15,790 --> 01:28:22,790
We were told there would be a two-week delay,
so we took the kids to Disneyland and had

1040
01:28:24,570 --> 01:28:28,260
a good time, went back home and started the
whole training cycle again.

1041
01:28:28,260 --> 01:28:34,840
And came back two weeks later and got a good
start this time.

1042
01:28:34,840 --> 01:28:41,270
But not after lying on our back on the pads
strapped in for five hours because of some

1043
01:28:41,270 --> 01:28:48,040
software glitches that had to be fixed and
computers reloaded and tested.

1044
01:28:48,040 --> 01:28:52,490
And one of our reports was five hours is the
limit.

1045
01:28:52,490 --> 01:28:58,490
I mean you are lying on your back with your
feet up in a pressure suit strapped in.

1046
01:28:58,490 --> 01:29:05,490
That is more than is reasonable to ask prior
to launch.

1047
01:29:08,710 --> 01:29:10,740
On the way up, well, I will mention that later.

1048
01:29:10,740 --> 01:29:12,910
Here is the instrument system.

1049
01:29:12,910 --> 01:29:15,040
This baby was built in Germany.

1050
01:29:15,040 --> 01:29:22,040
It is this gimbal device that held these four
solar telescopes and the star trackers.

1051
01:29:23,150 --> 01:29:25,380
Here is a physics experiment.

1052
01:29:25,380 --> 01:29:30,340
The OMS engines are lit and produces one-sixteenth
of a G.

1053
01:29:30,340 --> 01:29:33,920
The thrust of the orbital maneuvering engines.

1054
01:29:33,920 --> 01:29:37,020
If you are trying to sleep, that is what happens
when the OMS engines come on.

1055
01:29:37,020 --> 01:29:44,020
And you saw the water going across.

1056
01:29:44,290 --> 01:29:46,870
It is déjà vu.

1057
01:29:46,870 --> 01:29:52,270
We had the same old PDP package on this, but
with a difference this time.

1058
01:29:52,270 --> 01:29:54,940
We took it out of the payload bay and brought
it up here.

1059
01:29:54,940 --> 01:29:59,559
That is my right ear you are looking at in
profile out the window.

1060
01:29:59,559 --> 01:30:05,240
It is crowded up there with seven people up
on the flight deck all trying to get a view

1061
01:30:05,240 --> 01:30:07,220
here, but we let go of it.

1062
01:30:07,220 --> 01:30:13,370
And it had a momentum wheel in there to cause
it to spin up slowly.

1063
01:30:13,370 --> 01:30:20,370
And we backed away from it and flew a couple
of very challenging loops around it.

1064
01:30:22,620 --> 01:30:26,080
Here is a sequel to the hairbrush.

1065
01:30:26,080 --> 01:30:26,760
This is not me.

1066
01:30:26,760 --> 01:30:33,540
It is Story Musgrave who has the same hairdo
as I do.

1067
01:30:33,540 --> 01:30:37,740
And he is getting spiffed up for the TV show.

1068
01:30:37,740 --> 01:30:44,740
That is all we did is horse around for seven
days.

1069
01:31:00,300 --> 01:31:04,380
It got extended a day to eight days again.

1070
01:31:04,380 --> 01:31:11,380
And this landing was back at Edwards, runway
23 on August 6th when it was 105 degrees,

1071
01:31:13,240 --> 01:31:17,670
lots of heat waves.

1072
01:31:17,670 --> 01:31:22,960
This landing was by far the most forward CG
because we still had all that equipment in

1073
01:31:22,960 --> 01:31:24,650
the payload bay.

1074
01:31:24,650 --> 01:31:31,650
And we were almost the heaviest orbiter landing,
so getting the nose down before it fell down,

1075
01:31:32,170 --> 01:31:39,170
crashed and broke the nose gear was one of
my primary concerns on this one.

1076
01:32:01,230 --> 01:32:04,420
More about the actual launch itself.

1077
01:32:04,420 --> 01:32:05,850
There is the customary view.

1078
01:32:05,850 --> 01:32:12,850
They put a camera right in close and got this
really close-up view, but it was about 5.5

1079
01:32:18,590 --> 01:32:21,610
minutes after this picture.

1080
01:32:21,610 --> 01:32:22,820
We had delayed five hours.

1081
01:32:22,820 --> 01:32:29,820
It is late afternoon so very quickly heading
out over the Atlantic we were in darkness.

1082
01:32:30,690 --> 01:32:31,980
And then, bang.

1083
01:32:31,980 --> 01:32:38,559
Remember the left engine got us on the pad
abort?

1084
01:32:38,559 --> 01:32:42,110
Well, the center engine shut down.

1085
01:32:42,110 --> 01:32:47,090
We were at 3Gs and all of a sudden we are
at 2Gs or something like that.

1086
01:32:47,090 --> 01:32:53,660
Instant square wave cutoff and acceleration.

1087
01:32:53,660 --> 01:32:56,370
Looking there and confirming the center engine
shut down.

1088
01:32:56,370 --> 01:33:01,860
What happened was there are a number of sensors
on the main engines.

1089
01:33:01,860 --> 01:33:08,860
The particular one that got us was the fuel
high pressure turbo pump.

1090
01:33:09,240 --> 01:33:16,240
A piece of machinery running at 75,000 RPM
high pressures.

1091
01:33:19,130 --> 01:33:26,130
The high-tech gear that makes the main engine
so efficient, IISP, but really run at the

1092
01:33:26,150 --> 01:33:31,610
limits of metallurgy and technology.

1093
01:33:31,610 --> 01:33:36,880
The sensor that senses the output temperature
was a series of four platinum wires in the

1094
01:33:36,880 --> 01:33:42,550
cavity in the output of that turbo pump.

1095
01:33:42,550 --> 01:33:45,730
They had some tendency for the wires to burn
through.

1096
01:33:45,730 --> 01:33:52,730
When they burn through, they showed over-temp
was the electrical result of a burn through,

1097
01:33:53,280 --> 01:33:54,280
one of these sensors.

1098
01:33:54,280 --> 01:33:56,910
Well, we had two burn throughs.

1099
01:33:56,910 --> 01:34:03,360
And the software said that must mean there
are two sensors that say you are too hot,

1100
01:34:03,360 --> 01:34:04,809
I will shut the motor off.

1101
01:34:04,809 --> 01:34:06,850
And it did.

1102
01:34:06,850 --> 01:34:13,850
With no reaction we just kept going straight
and smooth, but it now put us into what is

1103
01:34:20,809 --> 01:34:21,490
called an abort.

1104
01:34:21,490 --> 01:34:24,340
Well, here is the crew.

1105
01:34:24,340 --> 01:34:26,960
There are seven of us.

1106
01:34:26,960 --> 01:34:33,750
I need to practice this more.

1107
01:34:33,750 --> 01:34:35,620
But, anyway, it was a two shift operation.

1108
01:34:35,620 --> 01:34:39,550
We were going to work around the clock, so
we had a red team and a blue team.

1109
01:34:39,550 --> 01:34:44,210
And I was the commander so I had a striped
shirt.

1110
01:34:44,210 --> 01:34:44,710
Abort to orbit.

1111
01:34:44,710 --> 01:34:49,980
We had to call from the ground, confirm what
we knew already, which means turning that

1112
01:34:49,980 --> 01:34:54,040
rotary knob to ATO, abort to orbit, kind of
an oxymoron in a way.

1113
01:34:54,040 --> 01:34:55,290
It is not really an abort.

1114
01:34:55,290 --> 01:34:58,500
It is pressing on and pushing the button behind
it.

1115
01:34:58,500 --> 01:35:04,059
It loads the software in to do a couple of
things, lower the insertion target.

1116
01:35:04,059 --> 01:35:11,059
We had tried to get as high orbit as performance
would permit, but now we are going lower.

1117
01:35:11,219 --> 01:35:15,760
Engine down costs you total performance.

1118
01:35:15,760 --> 01:35:20,170
And we also started dumping OMS fuel.

1119
01:35:20,170 --> 01:35:26,010
We had to turn on the OMS engines, and we
ended up dumping 4500 pounds of OMS fuel,

1120
01:35:26,010 --> 01:35:33,010
a little bit of extra thrust but a significant
loss of weight to allow the remaining performance

1121
01:35:34,469 --> 01:35:38,469
to get us to an acceptable orbit.

1122
01:35:38,469 --> 01:35:44,980
And, interestingly, the last sim we did in
training in Houston, before we went to the

1123
01:35:44,980 --> 01:35:51,780
Cape to fly about two days before, was an
integrated sim where we are tied into all

1124
01:35:51,780 --> 01:35:53,730
the controllers and everybody is working as
a team.

1125
01:35:53,730 --> 01:35:59,650
And the very last run we had was an ATO, abort
to orbit.

1126
01:35:59,650 --> 01:36:01,650
And, son of a gun, that is what we did.

1127
01:36:01,650 --> 01:36:05,110
We always had trouble starting a watch.

1128
01:36:05,110 --> 01:36:09,219
And you try to do everything internally on
the crew so that if you lose communication

1129
01:36:09,219 --> 01:36:15,530
with the ground you can complete the emergency
properly on your own.

1130
01:36:15,530 --> 01:36:22,530
On ATOs before, we had to start a stopwatch
at the time we started the OMS dump.

1131
01:36:22,630 --> 01:36:27,400
And we had a chart to go in to find out how
many minutes of OMS dump we needed to do given

1132
01:36:27,400 --> 01:36:31,200
at what velocity we lost the engine.

1133
01:36:31,200 --> 01:36:33,650
And Story's job was to do the watch.

1134
01:36:33,650 --> 01:36:39,110
In the excitement of all the other stuff we
had to do to get the OMS on, we would always

1135
01:36:39,110 --> 01:36:39,469
forget the watch.

1136
01:36:39,469 --> 01:36:43,300
But this time he got the watch going so we
actually did it right.

1137
01:36:43,300 --> 01:36:50,300
And we knew that when we got to where we burned
out all the available fuel, which we did,

1138
01:36:51,670 --> 01:36:58,670
we went to a fuel depletion cutoff, that we
would be really close to having to do right

1139
01:37:01,350 --> 01:37:04,450
away another OMS burn to get an acceptable
orbit.

1140
01:37:04,450 --> 01:37:09,000
We are right on the boundary, as it turned
out.

1141
01:37:09,000 --> 01:37:16,000
We dumped the right amount of OMS, every last
drop of main propellant gone, we were just

1142
01:37:16,790 --> 01:37:23,790
on the boundary of not having to do the first
OMS burn and we could relax 45 minutes later

1143
01:37:26,030 --> 01:37:29,940
halfway around the world to do the final circularization.

1144
01:37:29,940 --> 01:37:35,860
So it worked out good, except we were in a
lot lower orbit than we had planned.

1145
01:37:35,860 --> 01:37:40,770
And everything about this space lab flight
depended on the orbit, so we were into a giant

1146
01:37:40,770 --> 01:37:41,170
re-plan.

1147
01:37:41,170 --> 01:37:45,719
Here is a nice picture of the IPS.

1148
01:37:45,719 --> 01:37:52,719
Gordon, I also explain the situation of the
inhibit switch on and off.

1149
01:37:55,170 --> 01:38:02,170
I don't know how much you were aware of what
was going on there in the cockpit.

1150
01:38:02,200 --> 01:38:08,610
There is a switch in the cockpit.

1151
01:38:08,610 --> 01:38:13,400
You have a lot of parameters that are monitored
in the software on the main engines which,

1152
01:38:13,400 --> 01:38:17,210
if they go out of tolerance, will shut the
engine off.

1153
01:38:17,210 --> 01:38:24,130
In fact, that is exactly why we lost the center
engine.

1154
01:38:24,130 --> 01:38:28,830
But, right after that engine shutdown, we
were in a state where we really don't want

1155
01:38:28,830 --> 01:38:29,740
to lose another engine.

1156
01:38:29,740 --> 01:38:35,530
Because if, with only one left, we did not
have the performance to get to orbit, we would

1157
01:38:35,530 --> 01:38:42,440
have had to have gone to Zaragoza, Spain and
land in the middle of the night where it was

1158
01:38:42,440 --> 01:38:45,059
a 10,000 foot overcast and raining.

1159
01:38:45,059 --> 01:38:51,880
I mean if we pulled that off we would have
deserved some kind of metal.

1160
01:38:51,880 --> 01:38:58,880
And so, as a preplanned procedure, when you
lose one engine before, the point where you

1161
01:38:59,510 --> 01:39:05,360
can stagger into orbit on one remaining engine
you inhibit the limits.

1162
01:39:05,360 --> 01:39:12,360
You throw a switch that says you're telling
the engines to keep running regardless of

1163
01:39:13,420 --> 01:39:18,500
over-temps or anything because you take the
chance, which is a big one if something let

1164
01:39:18,500 --> 01:39:25,500
go, to not be susceptible that got us for
the first engine, that is a sensor failure.

1165
01:39:28,770 --> 01:39:29,780
And so we did that.

1166
01:39:29,780 --> 01:39:35,790
We inhibited the limits until we got to a
point in the energy profile where we were

1167
01:39:35,790 --> 01:39:37,719
"press to MECO." That is the call.

1168
01:39:37,719 --> 01:39:44,719
Press to MECO means that you are now at a
velocity where you can make it into acceptable

1169
01:39:45,870 --> 01:39:51,790
low orbit on one engine if you should lose
another one.

1170
01:39:51,790 --> 01:39:58,790
Press to MECO then the plan was we will re-enable
the limits so we are not hanging it out on

1171
01:39:59,800 --> 01:40:03,510
a possible second engine failure.

1172
01:40:03,510 --> 01:40:07,570
And we would accept a second engine failure
because we knew we could make it on one engine.

1173
01:40:07,570 --> 01:40:12,690
So we did that, the call came up, we went
to enable.

1174
01:40:12,690 --> 01:40:17,059
And then, before we got there, we got another
call from the ground that said go back to

1175
01:40:17,059 --> 01:40:18,870
inhibit.

1176
01:40:18,870 --> 01:40:21,719
Well, it wasn't time to get a full explanation.

1177
01:40:21,719 --> 01:40:23,990
We dutifully did it.

1178
01:40:23,990 --> 01:40:28,490
What they saw on the ground is more failures
on the right engine.

1179
01:40:28,490 --> 01:40:30,570
Remember the left got us on the pad abort?

1180
01:40:30,570 --> 01:40:32,740
The center engine shut down on the way up.

1181
01:40:32,740 --> 01:40:39,610
And, to make everything equal, the right engine,
the same sensors they can see on the ground,

1182
01:40:39,610 --> 01:40:45,650
it is not visible in the cockpit, each of
those four platinum wires they saw starting

1183
01:40:45,650 --> 01:40:47,820
to go.

1184
01:40:47,820 --> 01:40:50,059
Clearly a design problem here.

1185
01:40:50,059 --> 01:40:55,790
And they could tell those were going to go
and get us that second engine, so that is

1186
01:40:55,790 --> 01:40:58,940
why we went back to inhibit for the rest of
the way.

1187
01:40:58,940 --> 01:41:04,650
It made a good war story, but we got there.

1188
01:41:04,650 --> 01:41:10,630
We started operating the IPS.

1189
01:41:10,630 --> 01:41:15,990
A platform built in Germany with all the telescopes.

1190
01:41:15,990 --> 01:41:19,460
These are start trackers to align where it
is.

1191
01:41:19,460 --> 01:41:22,150
And this baby could point.

1192
01:41:22,150 --> 01:41:26,260
The spec was one arch second of accuracy.

1193
01:41:26,260 --> 01:41:29,330
An arch second is the size of a dime.

1194
01:41:29,330 --> 01:41:36,330
If you are standing at the capital and looking
at dime at the Lincoln Memorial, that is how

1195
01:41:36,900 --> 01:41:38,080
much.

1196
01:41:38,080 --> 01:41:42,900
But, when we cranked it up, it didn't work
worth a hoot.

1197
01:41:42,900 --> 01:41:46,840
They just couldn't get it to stabilize or
point where it was supposed to.

1198
01:41:46,840 --> 01:41:52,350
And, for three days, the payload specialists
and the MSs were in constant communication

1199
01:41:52,350 --> 01:41:54,110
with the ground.

1200
01:41:54,110 --> 01:41:59,559
And they patched the software in a major way
and kept sending up new software loads to

1201
01:41:59,559 --> 01:42:01,620
get this thing to work.

1202
01:42:01,620 --> 01:42:08,620
And viola, on the third day they finally got
it right, then it worked well and got a lot

1203
01:42:09,790 --> 01:42:14,820
of good solar science.

1204
01:42:14,820 --> 01:42:21,820
Just an aside, when you are looking at pictures
from space, you tend to think you walk around

1205
01:42:23,630 --> 01:42:26,600
out here and the atmosphere is this big ocean
of air above you, right?

1206
01:42:26,600 --> 01:42:30,010
Lots of air way up there.

1207
01:42:30,010 --> 01:42:37,010
This little bitty blue line right there, barely
perceptible, there always appears on any sunlit

1208
01:42:37,340 --> 01:42:44,340
picture showing the limb of the earth, that
is the same blue as the scattering that causes

1209
01:42:46,130 --> 01:42:47,760
the sky to be blue.

1210
01:42:47,760 --> 01:42:50,200
And that is how thick it is.

1211
01:42:50,200 --> 01:42:54,920
It is just this little thin shell of atmosphere
around.

1212
01:42:54,920 --> 01:43:01,920
At 18,000 feet three miles up you have lost
half the atmospheric pressure.

1213
01:43:05,910 --> 01:43:10,000
And that is laying on an 8,000 mile diameter
globe.

1214
01:43:10,000 --> 01:43:17,000
And so that is where all of human history
has happened, in that little shell over there

1215
01:43:18,030 --> 01:43:19,940
laying around the globe.

1216
01:43:19,940 --> 01:43:25,690
A philosophical point for you engineers.

1217
01:43:25,690 --> 01:43:28,110
What is flying on orbit like?

1218
01:43:28,110 --> 01:43:34,430
Well, it is one of the 215 pounds of checklist.

1219
01:43:34,430 --> 01:43:39,980
Here I am checking propellant usage against
what we've got and where we are because we

1220
01:43:39,980 --> 01:43:46,980
dumped 4,500 pounds of crucial fuel that we
needed to make the planned most maneuvers

1221
01:43:49,059 --> 01:43:55,580
that ever been done in the orbit on our mission.

1222
01:43:55,580 --> 01:44:01,910
We didn't want an extra blip out of an RCS
thruster, and it worked very well.

1223
01:44:01,910 --> 01:44:07,150
We got through seven days and even had enough
to have another day of science on the eighth

1224
01:44:07,150 --> 01:44:07,400
day.

1225
01:44:07,230 --> 01:44:11,530
Flying is mostly watching the clock.

1226
01:44:11,530 --> 01:44:15,110
Everything happens according to time.

1227
01:44:15,110 --> 01:44:21,360
And, since you have 16 sunrises and sunsets
every 24 hours, you never know what time it

1228
01:44:21,360 --> 01:44:24,780
is without looking at a watch.

1229
01:44:24,780 --> 01:44:29,030
And you are looking at a crew activity plan
with everything laid out.

1230
01:44:29,030 --> 01:44:36,030
And we even had an alarm system you could
set in the CRT to make a tone to wake you

1231
01:44:40,090 --> 01:44:40,450
up.

1232
01:44:40,450 --> 01:44:45,219
It is a lot of clock watching to pull off
a complex mission like this.

1233
01:44:45,219 --> 01:44:47,400
It is just the way life is on orbit.

1234
01:44:47,400 --> 01:44:54,400
Now, here is one of our really serious high-level
scientific objectives.

1235
01:44:56,860 --> 01:44:59,440
This was the official name, the Carbonated
Beverage Test.

1236
01:44:59,440 --> 01:45:04,440
I don't know if it was an MIT guy or not.

1237
01:45:04,440 --> 01:45:09,980
He was a real serious academic type.

1238
01:45:09,980 --> 01:45:12,380
An Indian I think.

1239
01:45:12,380 --> 01:45:19,380
Anyway, he built a Coke can that had a lot
of pressure regulators in there and laminar

1240
01:45:23,590 --> 01:45:27,590
flow annular things.

1241
01:45:27,590 --> 01:45:31,050
So many that this Coke can only held four
ounces of Coke.

1242
01:45:31,050 --> 01:45:34,540
But he talked to the White House.

1243
01:45:34,540 --> 01:45:35,650
Reagan was president.

1244
01:45:35,650 --> 01:45:42,559
And somebody on the staff approved we are
going to fly these Coke cans and see if they

1245
01:45:42,559 --> 01:45:49,280
had a system to provide pop in orbit with
the regular kind of carbonation and dispense

1246
01:45:49,280 --> 01:45:51,760
OK.

1247
01:45:51,760 --> 01:45:55,050
We got the briefing and we had the four stowed
in a locker.

1248
01:45:55,050 --> 01:45:57,880
And I got them out at the start of the test.

1249
01:45:57,880 --> 01:46:03,809
But 30 days before launch, all of a sudden
this big thing came down.

1250
01:46:03,809 --> 01:46:10,670
Pepsi got wind of this experiment and went
to the White House staff and they got Pepsi

1251
01:46:10,670 --> 01:46:11,510
put on.

1252
01:46:11,510 --> 01:46:18,510
Pepsi went into a crash program to fly more
cans of Pepsi.

1253
01:46:19,139 --> 01:46:24,880
Here is Carl trying the Pepsi.

1254
01:46:24,880 --> 01:46:29,250
You notice that looks a lot like a shaving
cream can.

1255
01:46:29,250 --> 01:46:35,520
Well, that's how the Pepsi came out, just
like shaving cream, this frothy ball of stuff.

1256
01:46:35,520 --> 01:46:37,860
I mean theirs was the last minute deal.

1257
01:46:37,860 --> 01:46:41,180
It didn't have any pressure regulators in
it.

1258
01:46:41,180 --> 01:46:47,740
It just went out there.

1259
01:46:47,740 --> 01:46:51,340
Now we worried about having to make a judgment,
which tasted better.

1260
01:46:51,340 --> 01:46:58,340
Well, the problem was we didn't have any kind
of refrigerator so they are both warm.

1261
01:46:58,850 --> 01:47:04,550
Warm pop is not my favorite.

1262
01:47:04,550 --> 01:47:11,550
And so, they were not anything anybody fought
over, either kind.

1263
01:47:16,800 --> 01:47:23,800
If you let the Pepsi float around it would
coalesce a little CO2 in random fashion, but

1264
01:47:23,950 --> 01:47:30,950
the physics of it, Carl found by blowing very
carefully on the edge you could get it spinning

1265
01:47:31,280 --> 01:47:33,380
up.

1266
01:47:33,380 --> 01:47:40,380
And spinning Pepsi would have the froth at
the poles and the liquid around the equator.

1267
01:47:40,969 --> 01:47:47,969
And we always had a tall guy standing by in
case it drifted into something.

1268
01:47:51,050 --> 01:47:52,550
This is the end of the experiment here.

1269
01:47:52,550 --> 01:47:59,550
He got it into his mouth without touching
any of it.

1270
01:47:59,780 --> 01:48:06,550
We had the same PDP but, as I mentioned and
as you saw in the movie, we let go of it.

1271
01:48:06,550 --> 01:48:10,730
We actually maneuvered all around the orbit
and looked at the wake through the plasma,

1272
01:48:10,730 --> 01:48:11,850
let go of it.

1273
01:48:11,850 --> 01:48:18,520
The proximity ops were very extensive and
challenging and many, many maneuvers.

1274
01:48:18,520 --> 01:48:20,070
That is in the Caribbean.

1275
01:48:20,070 --> 01:48:21,690
The tongue of the ocean.

1276
01:48:21,690 --> 01:48:25,950
A spectacular coral reef around very deep
water.

1277
01:48:25,950 --> 01:48:28,880
Here is the Gibraltar.

1278
01:48:28,880 --> 01:48:32,630
The rock, I believe, is out on the point.

1279
01:48:32,630 --> 01:48:38,190
The Mediterranean here and the Atlantic here.

1280
01:48:38,190 --> 01:48:40,280
You've heard you cannot see borders in space.

1281
01:48:40,280 --> 01:48:41,620
Not true.

1282
01:48:41,620 --> 01:48:48,620
This is Israel this way and Egypt this way
and the Gaza strip along here, which has been

1283
01:48:49,330 --> 01:48:53,469
in the news as of late.

1284
01:48:53,469 --> 01:48:56,330
And in the same area the Dead Sea, the Sea
of Galilee.

1285
01:48:56,330 --> 01:48:58,300
Here is most of Israel in one picture.

1286
01:48:58,300 --> 01:49:04,219
A little closer to home.

1287
01:49:04,219 --> 01:49:06,900
This is most of New Jersey.

1288
01:49:06,900 --> 01:49:07,610
Long Island.

1289
01:49:07,610 --> 01:49:08,420
There is Manhattan.

1290
01:49:08,420 --> 01:49:11,389
Hudson River and East River.

1291
01:49:11,389 --> 01:49:18,389
There are about 10,000 copies of this picture.

1292
01:49:18,610 --> 01:49:20,219
This is Southern California.

1293
01:49:20,219 --> 01:49:21,809
This is San Diego right here.

1294
01:49:21,809 --> 01:49:23,880
Los Angeles.

1295
01:49:23,880 --> 01:49:29,719
And, in high rise print, you can see water
here which is San Francisco Bay.

1296
01:49:29,719 --> 01:49:36,719
And the center of it all is the Antelope Valley
right here where I live and where Edwards

1297
01:49:36,880 --> 01:49:38,400
is right here.

1298
01:49:38,400 --> 01:49:44,110
This is the San Andreas Fault right through
here.

1299
01:49:44,110 --> 01:49:51,110
Closer up of LA which, at the end of 51F,
we came right by Catalina Island, right up

1300
01:49:52,550 --> 01:49:54,830
the Harbor Freeway into Edwards.

1301
01:49:54,830 --> 01:50:01,830
And we went by Harbor Freeway at about mach
3.

1302
01:50:03,170 --> 01:50:06,000
And closer up of the dry lake at Edwards.

1303
01:50:06,000 --> 01:50:08,550
And the landing.

1304
01:50:08,550 --> 01:50:15,550
Flight test results most of which I have mentioned
already.

1305
01:50:15,790 --> 01:50:22,790
And, to finish up, I have reports on a memory
stick here, the pilot reports we wrote as

1306
01:50:24,219 --> 01:50:28,090
crews which you can take at your leisure.

1307
01:50:28,090 --> 01:50:30,739
If you are interested, copy it off.

1308
01:50:30,739 --> 01:50:32,900
They are available.

1309
01:50:32,900 --> 01:50:39,900
Not great works of art, but the specific things
that we learned on doing the flight test.

1310
01:50:41,380 --> 01:50:48,380
And these are just thoughts of transitioning
into operation from test mode, which I got

1311
01:50:50,139 --> 01:50:53,969
to see the whole gamut from beginning to full
operational.

1312
01:50:53,969 --> 01:50:56,750
I apologize for running over.

1313
01:50:56,750 --> 01:51:00,430
I don't think anybody minded.

1314
01:51:00,430 --> 01:51:04,230
As you see, everybody is listening very intently.

1315
01:51:04,230 --> 01:51:06,489
Thank you very much for taking the time.

1316
01:51:06,489 --> 01:51:06,739
[APPLAUSE]