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A couple things.

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First of all, this is for those of you who
are working on GN&C for your projects.

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I have spoken with Phil Hattis from Draper
Lab, who is going to be giving the lecture

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on GN&C, but he is not giving the lecture
until the third of November.

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Now, that is kind of late.

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And so I asked him if he would be willing
to meet with all of you who are working on

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GN&C just so you could talk with him and ask
questions.

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If you want him to give you a short version
of his presentation that he's going to give

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in November, he can do that.

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But he is our in-house resident expert.

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And I figured it's better if you get a chance
to talk to him early.

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He has some time free tomorrow and he has
some time next week.

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He is out of town through today.

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I know we have two teams working on GN&C.

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If you guys want to get together and find
out if there is some time when you could all

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meet with Phil, I will give you his contact
information.

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He says he is happy to do it.

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It would be much more convenient, from his
point of view, if you could all see him at

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the same time and talk about it together.

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Let me know what you come up with.

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But, as I say, he is happy to do it.

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Second thing.

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There was an interview printed in US Today,
which I have posted on the class website with

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Mike Griffin, the administrator.

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And it says NASA administrator says space
shuttle was a mistake.

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And so the question was what do we intend
to do about that in this class?

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Well, let me actually read the specific words
that Griffin uses because I think that's important.

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Griffin said my opinion is that the Shuttle
was a design which was extremely aggressive

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and just barely possible.

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And that's actually, I think, a slightly different
way of looking at this.

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I mean I would also say that Apollo was a
project that was extremely aggressive and

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just barely possible.

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And I think that it is actually NASA's business
to do things which are aggressive and just

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barely possible.

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Now, whether it was the right decision for
the country to abandon the Exploration Program

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after Apollo and do the Shuttle and then later
on the Space Station that's more, I think,

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in the political realm.

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And, as I think you've heard both from Dale
Myers and John Logsdon, that, in fact, there

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were political determining factors which didn't
really give NASA a lot of choice.

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Just to remind you, the basic point of this
course is not the political and economic history

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of the shuttle.

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It's a technical exploration of how we did
the shuttle.

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I think we would all agree that the concept
of the Shuttle was extremely aggressive and

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the technology was being stretched and it
was just barely possible.

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And, yet, we did it.

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And the idea of this course is to understand
how we did it and how the systems work.

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I think it will be interesting, when we get
towards the end of the course, maybe we'll

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sit down and relax and instead of having,
I think there are two kinds of open sessions

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towards the end that I've been thinking about
what we want to do there.

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And in one of them I think we may just talk
a little bit and reflect on what we've learned,

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and that will give us an opportunity to discuss
issues like this.

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That's all I'm going to say about this.

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I don't propose that we discuss this further
today because we really are fortunate to have

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Bass Redd.

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And Aaron Cohen is going to introduce him
formally.

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I will just say that when I was at Johnston
Space Center last spring and I met one of

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the older managers there and I was telling
him about our plans for this course and how

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Aaron was going to be a visiting professor
here and we were inviting some of the experts

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in the early design of the Shuttle, he said,
well, there is one guy you absolutely have

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to get, and that's Bass Redd.

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Well, we've got him.

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We're very fortunate.

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And, Aaron, I will turn it over to you and
let you explain a little bit more why we're

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so fortunate.

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Well, first I have to tell you how I found
Bass.

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I had a hard time finding Bass.

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He lives in a placed called Smithville, Texas.

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And, when people ask him where Smithville,
Texas is, he said it's about a few minutes

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after you pass resume speed.

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So, it's not a very well known place.

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But I finally found Bass.

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And he is truly an outstanding aerodynamicist.

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And the thing that is so important is that
aerodynamics, to me, from my vantage point,

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is really the linchpin, you might say, of
putting a system together.

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Aerodynamics makes the system come alive.

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And as you could hear from the various speakers,
from Tom Moser, and we talked a little bit

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about the guidance, navigation and control,
it's important for the structures.

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Aerodynamics is important for the structures,
it's important for the flight control system,

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it's important for the hydraulic system and
it's important for the heating system.

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So, you have to understand the aerodynamics
before you can make the vehicle actually come

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alive.

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And Bass Redd is the man to do it.

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He is absolutely one of the great aerodynamicists
of our times.

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And he started out before there was computational
fluid dynamics and the old wind tunnel testing.

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And now there is computational fluid dynamics,
so you're going to be in for a real treat

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today to hear how Bass Redd put both the Apollo
together, he did the Apollo aerodynamics,

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and he also did the Shuttle aerodynamics.

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And he is also now consulting to help NASA
do their future work.

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Let me now turn it over to Bass.

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Thank you, Aaron.

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It's a great honor to be with you this morning.

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And you sure do look young.

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[LAUGHTER] We will try to cover basically
-- [STATIC OBSCURES] And with that overview

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then of the Orbiter is how the program requirements
drove the aerodynamic configuration, probably

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the biggest thing in what the aerodynamic
characteristics are driven by the program

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requirements.

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And that will make a little more sense after
we get into the briefing.

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Then the aerodynamic considerations, those
that aren't due to program requirements but

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just due to the basic fundamentals of aerodynamics
and the configuration that is being evaluated.

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We will do that for both the Orbiter and the
Integrated Vehicle.

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Then I'll try to tell you how the aerodynamic
design was accomplished through each of those

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phases, a lot of ways to work problems.

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Early on having powerful tools or sometimes
a curse to you because you can produce more

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data than the system can consume.

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And I remember when we first got started on
the Shuttle design, the people from structures

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had just finished the NASTRAN on the Apollo
and they immediately wanted enough data to

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put into the NASTRAN for every configuration
that was being conceived.

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That's not really a smart thing to do when
you have literally hundreds of configurations

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to be considered.

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We will try to talk to you about phases, phase
A, B and C, and defining the problem areas.

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And then defining the aerodynamic characteristics
and do just a quick summary of the wind tunnel

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test program.

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And with some comments on how CFD might have
driven that were it available.

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Through the `60s and `80s these design studies
were accomplished in phases.

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Phase A is primarily in-house civil service
design.

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I don't know how well you understand the NASA
part, what the contractor part, what the civil

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service part is, but phase A is primarily
in-house civil service.

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Whenever the contractors began to feel that
this might be a real program, they began to

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do their in-house studies and they began to
visit and give us recommendations and ideas

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on their own to drive that.

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None of that is paid for.

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That's a gratuitous kind of a thing.

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And contractors have a bit of change set aside
to do those kinds of studies, but it's a freebee

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and really a super way to do things.

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And that's still going on today.

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Phase B is then you give contracts for generic
studies.

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Scopes out the concept feasibilities and the
program requirements and does those trades,

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does projected cost and timelines.

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By the way, before I forget it, Humboldt Mandell
on costing would be excellent.

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We worked quite close hand-in-hand on trying
to get those requirements and cost run together

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along with the weight.

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NASA then, after they get through this phase
B, they produce a detailed statement of work

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that
is required for the phase C and D.

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And then phase C and D is the design and development.

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The Air Force separated those two.

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NASA always sort of put those together.

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So the design, development and construction.

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And the contractors do the detail work.

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NASA manages and checks it.

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Usually the way we operate, at least in our
area, the aerodynamic area, we had a crack

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team that would go back in and define the
problem, a potential solution to that problem

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and then suggest to the contractor they might
look at this way or that way.

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But they really put the muscle to it.

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They put the final studies.

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They have the design documentation.

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And we try to steer that train as those things
happen.

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In the Shuttle now, phase A, we started in
1969, just shortly after the Lunar landing,

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they put together a small team.

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And this is at Johnson Space Craft Center.

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And that's through my knothole and the way
that I look at things.

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But we did end up being the lead center in
the shuttle.

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But we started with a small E&D group that
was headed by a fellow by the name of Jim

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Chamberlain.
Jim Chamberlain was the one that was responsible
for the Gemini Space Craft, a very unique

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individual gone to heaven to be with the Lord
now, reviewed by Max Faget who was head of

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E&D and Bob Gilruth who was center director,
but that was a real privilege to work with

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him.

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What came out of that initial phase A study
is what the vehicle should be, is a small

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personnel vehicle with a four man crew, 10k
payload landing on the runway with about 200

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nautical miles cross-range.

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Quite different from the shuttle that we have
today, but that was during the phase A.

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Strong design modules in this time were developed.

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And, showing how the other program requirements
go with the design, the size and the program

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cost, there were individuals who had in their
databank, which consisted of books that they

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kept on their tables, were all of the aircraft,
all of the spacecraft, all of the missiles,

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what the weight of every individual subsystem
was based upon plots with ECLS's on how much

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heat they took out, on the avionics as to
how many computations they made.

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Well, not to chase that rabbit too far, but
basically they were down to the subsystem

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kind of level.

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And then with the primary structure, secondary
structure, how that was affected by landed

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weights or entry weights, the thermal protection
system.

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And it was amazing what a good job that kind
of approach would do.

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And then we had point designs that were being
looked at both in-house at Johnson Space Craft

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Center, at Marshall and by all the contractors.

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And then all that data was fed into the system.

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So, that was a designed database.

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Some of those have been automated now and
pretty good.

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And they don't give you the right answers,
but the answers they give you aren't very

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far wrong either.

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They get into the ballpark for you.

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Phase B started in 1971.

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Something happened.

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The requirements were not dictated by NASA.

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The requirements were dictated by the Air
Force, at least the driving requirements.

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If we had our own, a small vehicle it would
have satisfied that.

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The Air Force requirements were 55,000 pound
payload, 60 foot long payload bay, 15 foot

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in diameter, it had to be returned with a
1200 nautical mile cross-range.

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At least 32,000 pounds of it had to be returned.

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It was classified at that time.

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It is no longer classified.

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You can use your imagination to figure out
what kind of payload that you would want to

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go up into a high inclination orbit and bring
back in one pass.

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Where that would take you and why you'd have
to get back that quickly.

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But those were the requirements that were
fed into phase B.

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Maximum reusability did not come from the
Air Force.

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That came from the NASA side as that was part
of technology.

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NASA has two basic jobs to do.

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One is the design of the vehicle, the delivering
of the hardware, accomplishing the mission,

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but the other requirement for NASA is that
it increased the technology.

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Going where no man has gone before, yes, but
doing things that man has not done before

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in a better, faster way.

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And so maximum reusability was a goal that
the engineers were handed.

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Soft ride.

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They wanted to be able to a congressman or
a senator up in it.

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[LAUGHTER] A neat thing.

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Multi-center participation.

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If you ever get Hum up here, that cost you.

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Any time you break a job down and give it
to more than one center or more than one contractor,

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it's like Humpty-Dumpty, you break him apart,
you've got to put him back together again.

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And it takes a lot of eyes and elbows on both
sides to accomplish that.

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And basically, once you break something down,
you've increased your cost by 30% to 40% to

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put it back together again.

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Now, NASA has to have, under congressional
mandate, contracts in every state in the union.

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Multi-center participation drives a great
number of things so I felt it needed to be

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on the chart.

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But the big thing that you need to know as
engineers, sometimes you cannot set your own

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program requirements.

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They are dictated to you for strange reasons.

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And you have to play the hand that you're
dealt.

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Phase C and D, we had four contractors that
bid on phase C and D.

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The interesting thing is Rockwell was the
only contractor that bid within the allocated

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funds.

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They also had the best proposal, but that
was very interesting.

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00:17:52,720 --> 00:17:59,419
What they did was use the aerodynamic database
that was developed in phase A and in phase

224
00:17:59,419 --> 00:18:01,820
B for their design analysis.

225
00:18:01,820 --> 00:18:05,789
They augmented that, they did some in-house
testing, and Rockwell said we can do it for

226
00:18:05,789 --> 00:18:11,450
that amount of money but only if you don't
change anything, NASA.

227
00:18:11,450 --> 00:18:15,520
And we changed things.

228
00:18:15,520 --> 00:18:19,460
They had a smaller orbiter, and we rejected
that very early on.

229
00:18:19,460 --> 00:18:21,880
It had no capability for weight growth.

230
00:18:21,880 --> 00:18:27,809
And we showed that every program that has
ever existed grew in weight by at least 5%,

231
00:18:27,809 --> 00:18:29,179
10%, 15%.

232
00:18:29,179 --> 00:18:34,309
And so the Orbiter was sized up just a little
bit larger than the one that they had proposed

233
00:18:34,309 --> 00:18:36,580
with their agreement.

234
00:18:36,580 --> 00:18:40,640
Aaron probably had a contract change authorization
because of that.

235
00:18:40,640 --> 00:18:43,280
But, anyway, we did that right at the beginning.

236
00:18:43,280 --> 00:18:50,280
What we did also aerodynamically during that
phase B is we developed a complete database

237
00:18:53,270 --> 00:18:58,740
in the nation's best facility to be used for
what we call verification analysis.

238
00:18:58,740 --> 00:19:05,740
And that database is very well documented,
and we will talk about that a little bit more.

239
00:19:09,200 --> 00:19:09,710
Program requirements.

240
00:19:09,710 --> 00:19:16,400
May I ask, before you go onto program requirements,
could you say something about kind of, you

241
00:19:16,400 --> 00:19:18,970
talked about the aerodynamic database, but
nowadays we've got a lot of information about

242
00:19:18,970 --> 00:19:19,320
hypersonic aerodynamics?

243
00:19:19,320 --> 00:19:26,320
Can you say a little bit about the state of
the art?

244
00:19:29,720 --> 00:19:29,970
What did people really know?
Yeah.
As a matter of fact, I'm going to do that
when we go through it by phases specifically.

245
00:19:33,100 --> 00:19:36,350
I'm kind of telling it to you like a mystery
story.

246
00:19:36,350 --> 00:19:43,169
[LAUGHTER] The program requirements dictated
the basic orbiter configuration, payload size,

247
00:19:43,169 --> 00:19:48,390
crew size and returning the payload bay, the
engine.

248
00:19:48,390 --> 00:19:53,960
Now, if you just visualize in your mind, and
it's kind of a two-chart thing, let me just

249
00:19:53,960 --> 00:19:58,210
jump over to that since I know how to go back
now.

250
00:19:58,210 --> 00:20:04,000
If you've got a payload that's got to be that
long and you've got a crew size and the crew

251
00:20:04,000 --> 00:20:08,010
takes at least one telephone booth's worth
of volume per crew takes at least one telephone

252
00:20:08,010 --> 00:20:11,500
booths worth of volume per crew, Even Superman
needed something that big.

253
00:20:11,500 --> 00:20:15,059
[LAUGHTER] You've got the volume of this.

254
00:20:15,059 --> 00:20:15,850
Engines in the back.

255
00:20:15,850 --> 00:20:18,640
You want to return that because engines are
very, very expensive.

256
00:20:18,640 --> 00:20:20,720
The avionics, of course, you want to bring
those back.

257
00:20:20,720 --> 00:20:22,870
They are very, very expensive.

258
00:20:22,870 --> 00:20:28,840
And you've got to have it pointy end first.

259
00:20:28,840 --> 00:20:33,309
You looked at that and said, boy, you didn't
have much choice as far as the fuselage was

260
00:20:33,309 --> 00:20:33,559
concerned.

261
00:20:33,510 --> 00:20:37,059
And that's right, you really don't.

262
00:20:37,059 --> 00:20:41,929
Now, that's pretty well set.

263
00:20:41,929 --> 00:20:48,929
Now, the wing size is required to augment
the body lift.

264
00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:53,799
Now, if you just had the body on there, it
would have to land about 300 knots.

265
00:20:53,799 --> 00:20:57,850
We didn't have wheel tires and breaks to land
at that those speeds so we had to have some

266
00:20:57,850 --> 00:20:58,909
more lift.

267
00:20:58,909 --> 00:21:05,289
And that was accommodated with a wing.

268
00:21:05,289 --> 00:21:06,520
Figure out what CL max is.

269
00:21:06,520 --> 00:21:07,750
They're all about the same.

270
00:21:07,750 --> 00:21:12,679
You like a delta wing because it's a little
more nice from a heat transfer standpoint.

271
00:21:12,679 --> 00:21:16,270
Sure a whole lot nicer if you've got to go
through supersonic and transonic conditions

272
00:21:16,270 --> 00:21:19,070
at low angles of attack.

273
00:21:19,070 --> 00:21:21,960
So, you've got a delta wing that you want
to have on there.

274
00:21:21,960 --> 00:21:25,110
You don't have much choice on the size of
that.

275
00:21:25,110 --> 00:21:27,700
Airflow by the way 12% thick.

276
00:21:27,700 --> 00:21:30,070
That makes it nice for the structures people.

277
00:21:30,070 --> 00:21:34,520
Still does a super job aerodynamically, too.

278
00:21:34,520 --> 00:21:38,690
And so that's pretty well dictated.

279
00:21:38,690 --> 00:21:44,960
Then the entry angle of attack is dictated
by the hypersonic L/D required for the cross-range.

280
00:21:44,960 --> 00:21:50,980
And you can go through your equations, Newtonian
aerodynamics sign or the exposed area, and

281
00:21:50,980 --> 00:21:53,450
the then L/D, the tangents.

282
00:21:53,450 --> 00:21:59,030
And so you've got the hypersonic aerodynamics
from that angle of attack required for the

283
00:21:59,030 --> 00:21:59,870
cross-range.

284
00:21:59,870 --> 00:22:06,870
The wing shape to balance the configuration
for the aft CG and acceptable wing leading

285
00:22:07,120 --> 00:22:08,429
edge heating.

286
00:22:08,429 --> 00:22:13,950
In other words, we can position that wing
at the right place for the center of gravity

287
00:22:13,950 --> 00:22:18,659
that we have which, by the way, even in phase
A is known pretty well didn't change much.

288
00:22:18,659 --> 00:22:24,890
The control services was the magic thing.

289
00:22:24,890 --> 00:22:31,200
With the payload in and out 1.5% CG changed.

290
00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:35,059
There has only been one other aerodynamic
vehicle that has ever been built that has

291
00:22:35,059 --> 00:22:37,510
a CG of 1.5% of body length.

292
00:22:37,510 --> 00:22:40,130
That was a B-36.

293
00:22:40,130 --> 00:22:44,630
And this vehicle had to have the 1.5% change
in the center of gravity because of payload

294
00:22:44,630 --> 00:22:46,500
in/ payload out.

295
00:22:46,500 --> 00:22:50,010
And you can try to stack it together in many
different ways.

296
00:22:50,010 --> 00:22:53,350
That's just as good as you can do.

297
00:22:53,350 --> 00:22:58,549
That dictated the size of the control services
to accommodate that.

298
00:22:58,549 --> 00:23:00,320
They are very big.

299
00:23:00,320 --> 00:23:02,500
They are barn doors.

300
00:23:02,500 --> 00:23:06,929
It makes it nice for controlling the vehicle.

301
00:23:06,929 --> 00:23:10,049
Oh, and the vertical tail, we'll talk about
that.

302
00:23:10,049 --> 00:23:11,700
That's for crosswind landings.

303
00:23:11,700 --> 00:23:17,330
But the way, most all the vehicles that you've
seen from overseas that have been proposed

304
00:23:17,330 --> 00:23:18,690
cannot land in a crosswind.

305
00:23:18,690 --> 00:23:20,190
I don't know what they are going to do.

306
00:23:20,190 --> 00:23:24,240
They don't have enough control service to
land in the crosswind.

307
00:23:24,240 --> 00:23:26,179
But that dictated the vertical tail size.

308
00:23:26,179 --> 00:23:33,179
Now, as you kind of go around the loop on
those things, some potential items that we

309
00:23:35,539 --> 00:23:37,620
probably want to point out here is the body
shape.

310
00:23:37,620 --> 00:23:39,809
We've already basically talked about it.

311
00:23:39,809 --> 00:23:43,419
Nose shape, that's pretty straight forward.

312
00:23:43,419 --> 00:23:50,419
The basic Orbiter shape didn't really change
from phase A through phase C and D.

313
00:23:54,030 --> 00:23:58,860
We blended the OMS pot a little bit because
we didn't want it to interfere with the payload

314
00:23:58,860 --> 00:24:04,500
bay door which was built by a different set
of groups.

315
00:24:04,500 --> 00:24:11,320
The delta wing, we put a little crank in it,
a double delta, and got a little more subsonic

316
00:24:11,320 --> 00:24:12,380
lift.

317
00:24:12,380 --> 00:24:17,929
And we didn't have the body flap moving to
start with, but we found that it was a very

318
00:24:17,929 --> 00:24:24,929
powerful control of which assisted the center
of gravity movement.

319
00:24:27,900 --> 00:24:34,900
The full-spanned elevons were needed to control
the center of pressure for hypersonics.

320
00:24:37,130 --> 00:24:40,260
And there are other little things there, and
you can read those through at your convenience,

321
00:24:40,260 --> 00:24:43,610
but those are just basic things that you have
to do.

322
00:24:43,610 --> 00:24:48,799
And we will comment on some of those a little
bit later.

323
00:24:48,799 --> 00:24:53,470
The Integrated Vehicle, the launch vehicle,
if you please, what do the program requirements

324
00:24:53,470 --> 00:24:54,799
do to it?

325
00:24:54,799 --> 00:24:58,970
Well, the Orbiter was sized for that payload
bay weight.

326
00:24:58,970 --> 00:24:59,590
It had to land.

327
00:24:59,590 --> 00:25:00,320
It had to enter.

328
00:25:00,320 --> 00:25:03,990
We knew the weights pretty well.

329
00:25:03,990 --> 00:25:10,710
The 150k pound Orbiter, the 65k pound payload
dictated the requirements of the Orbiter injected

330
00:25:10,710 --> 00:25:10,960
weight.

331
00:25:10,950 --> 00:25:11,919
You add them up.

332
00:25:11,919 --> 00:25:14,429
You've got to get it into orbit.

333
00:25:14,429 --> 00:25:19,700
Once around at the high inclination and return
to the launch site set the Orbiter performance

334
00:25:19,700 --> 00:25:19,950
requirements.

335
00:25:19,860 --> 00:25:23,990
We had to have a certain amount of energy
available from the propulsion system.

336
00:25:23,990 --> 00:25:30,990
Maximum hardware reusability mixed with a
cost consideration yielded a stage and a half

337
00:25:31,990 --> 00:25:32,240
vehicle.

338
00:25:32,120 --> 00:25:35,080
And I will talk to you about that in just
a minute.

339
00:25:35,080 --> 00:25:42,000
But the cost constraints, there was a great
move afoot to have a return to the launch

340
00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:47,460
site booster, manned booster, if you please,
but the cost and constraints and the size

341
00:25:47,460 --> 00:25:51,890
of the vehicle got pretty big.

342
00:25:51,890 --> 00:25:58,890
The wing vehicle loads were significantly
reduced by the parallel burn.

343
00:26:01,260 --> 00:26:08,260
You've got the orbiter tucked in between the
solid rocket boosters and the external tank

344
00:26:09,120 --> 00:26:11,840
versus an orbiter that would be on the end.

345
00:26:11,840 --> 00:26:18,110
It makes a great difference in the structural
loads that the aerodynamics produces.

346
00:26:18,110 --> 00:26:23,940
Solid rocket booster mismatch decreased or
dictated an increased beta dispersion.

347
00:26:23,940 --> 00:26:30,270
Typically on an end-to-end vehicle you've
got everything kind of tucked in pretty tightly.

348
00:26:30,270 --> 00:26:34,659
On this one the SRBs are spread, any mismatch
at burnout and we had some big beta dispersions

349
00:26:34,659 --> 00:26:37,700
that still haunt us a little bit today.

350
00:26:37,700 --> 00:26:39,080
Soft ride requirement.

351
00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:40,169
Yes, I'm sorry.

352
00:26:40,169 --> 00:26:42,250
I just don't know what a beta dispersion is.

353
00:26:42,250 --> 00:26:44,669
You don't know what a beta dispersion is.

354
00:26:44,669 --> 00:26:46,220
All right.

355
00:26:46,220 --> 00:26:48,659
[LAUGHTER] Angle of attack.

356
00:26:48,659 --> 00:26:52,230
Angle the size of it, beta.

357
00:26:52,230 --> 00:26:58,400
Alpha, beta, standard aerodynamic definition.

358
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:03,070
Which, by the way, brings me to a comment.

359
00:27:03,070 --> 00:27:06,070
We've been asked to chase a rabbit with you
here.

360
00:27:06,070 --> 00:27:13,070
I would suggest very highly that you get yourself
a NASA dictionary where standard terms that

361
00:27:15,260 --> 00:27:20,730
your bosses will use because they've been
using them for years.

362
00:27:20,730 --> 00:27:21,960
[LAUGHTER] That you do that.

363
00:27:21,960 --> 00:27:25,080
And I'm not fussing at you at all.

364
00:27:25,080 --> 00:27:29,279
You can get a little gray book that's called
the NASA Dictionary.

365
00:27:29,279 --> 00:27:31,559
And you will know what alpha and betas are.

366
00:27:31,559 --> 00:27:33,400
CMQ plus CM alpha dots.

367
00:27:33,400 --> 00:27:36,080
All those standards terms are defined.

368
00:27:36,080 --> 00:27:37,240
Flutter.

369
00:27:37,240 --> 00:27:38,399
Buffet.

370
00:27:38,399 --> 00:27:43,149
And you will really look sharp when you know
what he's saying.

371
00:27:43,149 --> 00:27:44,960
[LAUGHTER] All right.

372
00:27:44,960 --> 00:27:46,179
Go ahead.

373
00:27:46,179 --> 00:27:53,179
I know there are some people here who didn't
go through aero-astro, and so may have actually

374
00:27:55,590 --> 00:27:57,480
not had a full course in aerodynamics.

375
00:27:57,480 --> 00:27:58,070
Hopefully most of you have had it.

376
00:27:58,070 --> 00:27:59,710
But any time there are expressions or terms
you don't understand just do ask and we'll

377
00:27:59,710 --> 00:28:01,690
bring you up to speed.

378
00:28:01,690 --> 00:28:06,360
And that NASA dictionary, by the way, covers
not just aerodynamics.

379
00:28:06,360 --> 00:28:12,990
It covers all kinds of other vocabulary kinds
of things that your peers will be using and

380
00:28:12,990 --> 00:28:17,110
your supervisors will be using and you will
know what they're talking about.

381
00:28:17,110 --> 00:28:23,330
Soft ride requirements, that caused us to
go to a real low dynamic pressure which is

382
00:28:23,330 --> 00:28:24,000
nice.

383
00:28:24,000 --> 00:28:28,000
Most vehicles are up around 1200 pounds per
square foot dynamic pressure.

384
00:28:28,000 --> 00:28:30,200
This one is down around 800.

385
00:28:30,200 --> 00:28:35,370
And the reason that came about is lesser G
loads early on.

386
00:28:35,370 --> 00:28:38,520
SRB flare angle, no big deal there.

387
00:28:38,520 --> 00:28:44,090
Plume effects have really ate up aerodynamics.

388
00:28:44,090 --> 00:28:50,570
To this day that is the only thing aerodynamically
that we still don't know how to predict or

389
00:28:50,570 --> 00:28:55,740
the base pressure due to plume effects through
the subsonic and supersonic speed regime.

390
00:28:55,740 --> 00:28:59,679
CFD gets it right every now and then.

391
00:28:59,679 --> 00:29:03,220
Sometimes it doesn't get it right.

392
00:29:03,220 --> 00:29:07,750
And the wind tunnel test still hadn't got
it right with solid plumes.

393
00:29:07,750 --> 00:29:14,750
All the scaling parameters that you use still
don't produce, to me, what a real valid answer

394
00:29:14,750 --> 00:29:15,000
is.

395
00:29:14,980 --> 00:29:17,470
The flight data is used, and we update that.

396
00:29:17,470 --> 00:29:18,590
Yes, sir.

397
00:29:18,590 --> 00:29:22,130
When you say flare angle, do you mean like
in the stack away from the Orbiter?

398
00:29:22,130 --> 00:29:22,380
Yes, sir.
This flare angle right back here.

399
00:29:25,039 --> 00:29:32,039
We found that if you set that right, it pretty
well sets the flow and the plumes behave themselves.

400
00:29:33,490 --> 00:29:39,440
If you set that too small the plumes will
change greatly with mach numbers, sometimes

401
00:29:39,440 --> 00:29:46,440
in an unpredictable fashion, so that SRB skirt
size was primarily from that consideration.

402
00:29:52,919 --> 00:29:57,460
This is real precious to Aaron's heart.

403
00:29:57,460 --> 00:30:02,250
We changed the tank shape early in phase C
and D.

404
00:30:02,250 --> 00:30:08,309
And remember I told you that we had developed
a database during phase B that would suffice

405
00:30:08,309 --> 00:30:14,090
and we could go immediately into the design
and development of the total stack?

406
00:30:14,090 --> 00:30:19,529
By the way, I like the ogive.

407
00:30:19,529 --> 00:30:22,789
It's a lot prettier than the cone that we
had on the front end.

408
00:30:22,789 --> 00:30:27,020
But basically what that did, that changed
the aerodynamics of the whole stack.

409
00:30:27,020 --> 00:30:30,539
And the data that was delivered to structure
for their structural analysis, the data that

410
00:30:30,539 --> 00:30:34,450
was delivered to the heating people for their
heat transfer analysis had to be done all

411
00:30:34,450 --> 00:30:36,480
over again.

412
00:30:36,480 --> 00:30:41,860
That's a year and a half cycle from the time
you say let's go build a model, let's get

413
00:30:41,860 --> 00:30:48,860
the data, let's analyze it.

414
00:30:49,179 --> 00:30:56,179
The other thing that happened when we changed
the tank, everybody took note of that, and

415
00:31:01,429 --> 00:31:04,980
there are all kinds of other small changes
that jumped on.

416
00:31:04,980 --> 00:31:11,980
[LAUGHTER] On the Orbiter a little bit, on
the external tank, on the SRBs and on the

417
00:31:14,230 --> 00:31:20,519
inclination that we had between the Orbiter
and the tank.

418
00:31:20,519 --> 00:31:27,519
Let me just hit some things I think that you
want to take note of on this one.

419
00:31:29,909 --> 00:31:35,130
I guess the nose shape, we mentioned that
one already, reduces the drag.

420
00:31:35,130 --> 00:31:37,480
It also reduces the loads.

421
00:31:37,480 --> 00:31:41,340
We have to worry about the punch loads between
the SRB and the tank.

422
00:31:41,340 --> 00:31:45,950
And those aerodynamics are driven quite a
bit by that nose shape.

423
00:31:45,950 --> 00:31:51,470
The SRB locations fore and aft, there is some
adjustment that you can have in that, and

424
00:31:51,470 --> 00:31:58,140
those are all optimized that whenever we do
the aerodynamics that puts a minimum amount

425
00:31:58,140 --> 00:32:02,090
of load into the system.

426
00:32:02,090 --> 00:32:07,260
Orbiter instance angle, that's the angle between
the Orbiter and the external tank.

427
00:32:07,260 --> 00:32:11,600
It drives the stability of the configuration
to some degree.

428
00:32:11,600 --> 00:32:14,539
But, more than that, it drove the loads quite
a bit into the program.

429
00:32:14,539 --> 00:32:17,480
And that was optimized.

430
00:32:17,480 --> 00:32:24,480
Full span elevators, we use those to adjust
the pitching moments so we get minimum change

431
00:32:25,230 --> 00:32:31,700
required to trim the vehicle from the SRBs,
solid rocket boosters, and the SSMEs, the

432
00:32:31,700 --> 00:32:35,110
main shuttle engines.

433
00:32:35,110 --> 00:32:42,110
SSME, plume effects and the plume effects
from the SRB, that's the only thing that we

434
00:32:44,549 --> 00:32:51,549
got a bad grade on as far as predicting aerodynamics
on either the Orbiter or the Integrated Vehicle.

435
00:32:54,230 --> 00:32:59,970
All the rest of the stuff came out just about
as we had predicted.

436
00:32:59,970 --> 00:33:04,429
Now, getting back to where you asked the question.

437
00:33:04,429 --> 00:33:05,929
Phase A.

438
00:33:05,929 --> 00:33:06,630
Go back now.

439
00:33:06,630 --> 00:33:07,559
What is a phase A?

440
00:33:07,559 --> 00:33:10,309
That is the conceptual design.

441
00:33:10,309 --> 00:33:13,570
We had all kinds of configurations because
we had all kinds of requirements.

442
00:33:13,570 --> 00:33:18,399
We really didn't know what those were, and
so that analysis had to be done.

443
00:33:18,399 --> 00:33:20,419
Many, many vehicles.

444
00:33:20,419 --> 00:33:22,350
A lot of considerations.

445
00:33:22,350 --> 00:33:27,740
The analytical techniques we used to identify
problem areas.

446
00:33:27,740 --> 00:33:31,529
Hypersonics, quite frankly in phase A.

447
00:33:31,529 --> 00:33:38,529
Newtonian vehicle shape was approximated with
flat plates.

448
00:33:40,600 --> 00:33:43,919
Works great on a configuration.

449
00:33:43,919 --> 00:33:50,760
[LAUGHTER] That's pretty much like a vehicle
that is kind of trimmed out of a piece of

450
00:33:50,760 --> 00:33:54,899
a sphere, if you please.

451
00:33:54,899 --> 00:34:01,899
And those aerodynamic characteristics were
very good.

452
00:34:05,190 --> 00:34:12,190
As a matter of fact, the thing is laid out
on graph paper and you counted the squares

453
00:34:13,469 --> 00:34:16,850
and saw where the CG was and what things had
to be.

454
00:34:16,850 --> 00:34:17,940
And it worked.

455
00:34:17,940 --> 00:34:18,649
It worked.

456
00:34:18,649 --> 00:34:21,040
Now, we didn't know that it was working at
that time.

457
00:34:21,040 --> 00:34:22,679
But we found out later that it did.

458
00:34:22,679 --> 00:34:24,250
But that's what we used.

459
00:34:24,250 --> 00:34:27,780
[LAUGHTER] NASA documentation.

460
00:34:27,780 --> 00:34:33,329
NASA had pretty good TNs on vehicles that
were somewhat similar.

461
00:34:33,329 --> 00:34:36,918
And the characteristics of those, we made
the adjustments because of the difference

462
00:34:36,918 --> 00:34:38,489
in configuration.

463
00:34:38,489 --> 00:34:43,589
The Air Force had a document called Dataman.

464
00:34:43,589 --> 00:34:47,639
It was unpublished at that time, but we got
a preliminary draft that we worked through

465
00:34:47,639 --> 00:34:48,179
by hand.

466
00:34:48,179 --> 00:34:49,349
By the way, this is a published thing.

467
00:34:49,349 --> 00:34:54,040
I would suggest very highly if aerodynamics
is going to be your forte is that you learn

468
00:34:54,040 --> 00:34:55,659
how to use that program.

469
00:34:55,659 --> 00:34:58,680
It's Dataman Aerodynamics Handbook.

470
00:34:58,680 --> 00:35:00,599
Navel Ordinance had a handbook out.

471
00:35:00,599 --> 00:35:06,849
They've never computerized theirs, but it's
the Handbook of Supersonic Aerodynamics and

472
00:35:06,849 --> 00:35:10,470
good-old Horner's fluid dynamics lift and
drag.

473
00:35:10,470 --> 00:35:17,470
It is still around today, still use it, but
those were the aerodynamic methods that we

474
00:35:19,740 --> 00:35:21,920
used during phase day.

475
00:35:21,920 --> 00:35:27,000
And we also did small scale wind tunnel tests
and those things that were the problem areas.

476
00:35:27,000 --> 00:35:30,690
And the problem areas were primarily in the
transition.

477
00:35:30,690 --> 00:35:31,740
Yes, sir.

478
00:35:31,740 --> 00:35:35,869
I can understand how you can do wind tunnel
testing.

479
00:35:35,869 --> 00:35:36,810
What about plume effects?

480
00:35:36,810 --> 00:35:40,430
You said you didn't understand those.

481
00:35:40,430 --> 00:35:43,849
How do you test that experimentally?

482
00:35:43,849 --> 00:35:50,849
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE] No, that's done in
a wind tunnel.

483
00:35:51,589 --> 00:35:58,589
Some people said you need to match momentum
on a scale vehicle.

484
00:36:00,390 --> 00:36:07,390
Certain other characteristics.

485
00:36:07,460 --> 00:36:12,230
What you'd like to do is be able to simulate
it with a solid plume, so we did solid plume

486
00:36:12,230 --> 00:36:13,300
testing.

487
00:36:13,300 --> 00:36:15,089
We had method of characteristics back then.

488
00:36:15,089 --> 00:36:19,839
It took it about three weeks to run, to get
the plume sizes, and they did a pretty good

489
00:36:19,839 --> 00:36:20,760
job.

490
00:36:20,760 --> 00:36:24,660
But when you have the plume sizes you still
after the base effects change in the pitching

491
00:36:24,660 --> 00:36:25,000
moment.

492
00:36:25,000 --> 00:36:26,460
And so we did the solid plumes.

493
00:36:26,460 --> 00:36:28,900
And we did gaseous plumes at Ames Research
Center.

494
00:36:28,900 --> 00:36:31,420
We did cold gas and hot gas.

495
00:36:31,420 --> 00:36:36,220
But none of those met all the scaling parameters.

496
00:36:36,220 --> 00:36:41,510
When you rolled all that up and you did the
best you could, we still missed base pressure.

497
00:36:41,510 --> 00:36:45,200
Base pressure was missed on Saturn 5.

498
00:36:45,200 --> 00:36:48,200
Base pressure was missed on Mercury.

499
00:36:48,200 --> 00:36:53,770
Base pressure was missed on Little Joe II
and Little Joe I.

500
00:36:53,770 --> 00:36:56,900
Every launch vehicle that I could find we
missed base pressure on.

501
00:36:56,900 --> 00:37:01,250
We missed base pressure on the Shuttle also.

502
00:37:01,250 --> 00:37:07,410
Not a big effect, but it is embarrassing that
you cannot get it right.

503
00:37:07,410 --> 00:37:14,410
But this was done primarily more in phase
C and D than in the phase A time period.

504
00:37:15,530 --> 00:37:21,079
We just kind of said plumes are going to be
about that much based upon data from other

505
00:37:21,079 --> 00:37:21,780
vehicles.

506
00:37:21,780 --> 00:37:28,210
And then making sure that it was not a design
driver or design stopper, if you please, that

507
00:37:28,210 --> 00:37:32,579
it wasn't going to be a problem that was so
big that it changed things so greatly that

508
00:37:32,579 --> 00:37:34,599
your performance wasn't adequate.

509
00:37:34,599 --> 00:37:36,609
And we had margins and everything.

510
00:37:36,609 --> 00:37:40,020
Anyway, we did some small scale testing.

511
00:37:40,020 --> 00:37:42,130
Phase B.

512
00:37:42,130 --> 00:37:43,839
What did we do on the Shuttle on phase B?

513
00:37:43,839 --> 00:37:48,609
We went into phase B with four major configurations.

514
00:37:48,609 --> 00:37:51,790
Three externally identical configurations
with swing wings.

515
00:37:51,790 --> 00:37:52,790
It was called the Triamese.

516
00:37:52,790 --> 00:37:56,240
And I think General Dynamics was the one that
proposed that one.

517
00:37:56,240 --> 00:38:01,119
They have all bought on another, and it's
hard to find out who is who any longer.

518
00:38:01,119 --> 00:38:03,880
But, anyway, that was one of the concepts.

519
00:38:03,880 --> 00:38:05,930
Very, very expensive.

520
00:38:05,930 --> 00:38:09,750
The swing wings, never really solved those
problems.

521
00:38:09,750 --> 00:38:16,650
Lockheed had a large single stage blended
body, kind of an HL-10 looking thing with

522
00:38:16,650 --> 00:38:19,930
a flat bottom, and then with a large external
tank around.

523
00:38:19,930 --> 00:38:24,440
And I couldn't find pictures of all this to
show you, but that was one that came in.

524
00:38:24,440 --> 00:38:29,130
And then the two-stage fully reusable with
both the first and the second stages being

525
00:38:29,130 --> 00:38:32,230
runway landers, a very favorite of Marshall.

526
00:38:32,230 --> 00:38:37,230
And then, the one that we called the stage
and a half where you're literally burning

527
00:38:37,230 --> 00:38:42,670
the first stage boosters and the second stage
engines at the same time with the external

528
00:38:42,670 --> 00:38:48,680
tank, we referred to that as a stage and a
half with parallel burn which is the current

529
00:38:48,680 --> 00:38:49,150
shuttle.

530
00:38:49,150 --> 00:38:54,910
But those are the things that we started phase
B in and did aerodynamic designs on all those.

531
00:38:54,910 --> 00:38:57,540
How did we do that?

532
00:38:57,540 --> 00:38:59,730
Well, we had gotten a little smarter.

533
00:38:59,730 --> 00:39:04,540
A lot of the Newtonian programs had now been
automated.

534
00:39:04,540 --> 00:39:08,240
It was still pretty much a flat plate kind
of a program, though, were you divided the

535
00:39:08,240 --> 00:39:11,070
vehicle up into a number of flat plates.

536
00:39:11,070 --> 00:39:14,990
And then there was some contractor in-house
wind tunnel test.

537
00:39:14,990 --> 00:39:21,990
NASA did some limited tests on potential problem
areas post phase B and pre phase C and D.

538
00:39:26,060 --> 00:39:30,950
That was a gap between the time we put out
an RFP, request for proposal, and the time

539
00:39:30,950 --> 00:39:33,369
that the contractors came back with a proposal.

540
00:39:33,369 --> 00:39:36,589
We had narrowed it down that it would be a
stage and a half.

541
00:39:36,589 --> 00:39:40,010
That would be what we would write the RFP
for.

542
00:39:40,010 --> 00:39:47,010
We developed a large wind tunnel test program,
developed a full aerodynamic database and

543
00:39:48,260 --> 00:39:55,260
heating database for that shuttle that was
there at that time that was delivered to the

544
00:39:56,000 --> 00:39:58,329
contractors that were going to bid on that.

545
00:39:58,329 --> 00:40:00,430
Integrated Vehicle.

546
00:40:00,430 --> 00:40:06,220
We used the USF stability and control datcom.

547
00:40:06,220 --> 00:40:12,619
Some contractor wind tunnel tests were done
and limited NASA testing and analysis for

548
00:40:12,619 --> 00:40:15,000
potential problem areas.

549
00:40:15,000 --> 00:40:22,000
And also we did a post phase B, full aerodynamic
database for that vehicle.

550
00:40:22,630 --> 00:40:29,630
Now, with that, what we're trying to do is
eliminate configuration changes if at all

551
00:40:30,569 --> 00:40:31,550
possible.

552
00:40:31,550 --> 00:40:37,890
And we accomplished that to some degree, but
the change to the tank and other changes came

553
00:40:37,890 --> 00:40:40,260
back in that caused us some delay.

554
00:40:40,260 --> 00:40:42,710
But it was minimized.

555
00:40:42,710 --> 00:40:46,180
Phase C and D, configuration was baseline.

556
00:40:46,180 --> 00:40:49,990
A big word here, make work changes only.

557
00:40:49,990 --> 00:40:56,640
Nothing has changed because it looks better,
works better.

558
00:40:56,640 --> 00:40:59,599
You've got to change it or it will crash.

559
00:40:59,599 --> 00:41:00,500
That's what we said.

560
00:41:00,500 --> 00:41:02,339
That's not what we did.

561
00:41:02,339 --> 00:41:05,060
We made some changes because they were nice.

562
00:41:05,060 --> 00:41:11,050
Theoretical aerodynamic techniques were employed
to ensure you never get to test the right

563
00:41:11,050 --> 00:41:11,730
Reynolds number.

564
00:41:11,730 --> 00:41:14,700
Henceforth, your boundary layer is a little
bit wrong.

565
00:41:14,700 --> 00:41:17,640
Plume effects, they've got to be corrected.

566
00:41:17,640 --> 00:41:23,430
So there was a lot of analytical work that
was done during that phase C and D.

567
00:41:23,430 --> 00:41:25,280
Let me say this.

568
00:41:25,280 --> 00:41:32,280
That area of our technology was really improved.

569
00:41:34,700 --> 00:41:41,700
A lot of dollars that went into that, Aaron's
courtesy, that the program probably didn't

570
00:41:43,369 --> 00:41:45,359
need to fly the shuttle.

571
00:41:45,359 --> 00:41:48,069
Now I tell him.

572
00:41:48,069 --> 00:41:50,680
I didn't tell him back then, you're right.

573
00:41:50,680 --> 00:41:54,430
[LAUGHTER] But, for the benefit of technology,
we did that.

574
00:41:54,430 --> 00:42:00,430
We pumped great money into CFD, great money
into method of characteristics.

575
00:42:00,430 --> 00:42:07,430
A lot of money into other techniques that
were there.

576
00:42:07,589 --> 00:42:13,710
And once more NASA goal was not only to do
that mission but to help technology.

577
00:42:13,710 --> 00:42:18,119
And the reason you can do CFD today was because
the dollars that the shuttle program pumped

578
00:42:18,119 --> 00:42:18,660
into that.

579
00:42:18,660 --> 00:42:23,490
Had they not pumped that in you would still
be adding up flat plates.

580
00:42:23,490 --> 00:42:29,020
[LAUGHTER] Aerodynamic variations and uncertainty
were developed for all aerodynamic coefficients.

581
00:42:29,020 --> 00:42:32,500
No other vehicle had really done that.

582
00:42:32,500 --> 00:42:36,650
You sort of did the best that you could and
said these are my aerodynamics.

583
00:42:36,650 --> 00:42:39,800
This is my normal force versus angle of attack.

584
00:42:39,800 --> 00:42:46,800
This is my side force coefficients, yawing
moment coefficients versus beta.

585
00:42:47,160 --> 00:42:52,839
And that said you would analyze that, give
that to the flight control system, give that

586
00:42:52,839 --> 00:42:57,640
to the structures people and they would put
their margins of safety in and look at it.

587
00:42:57,640 --> 00:43:04,640
We were quite concerned on this vehicle, especially
when it starts out at a 45 degree angle of

588
00:43:04,660 --> 00:43:06,440
attack.

589
00:43:06,440 --> 00:43:13,109
And sometimes during the supersonic and transonic
regime it transists down to a low angle of

590
00:43:13,109 --> 00:43:14,240
attack.

591
00:43:14,240 --> 00:43:16,010
Flow is separated.

592
00:43:16,010 --> 00:43:17,430
Some place in there it reattaches.

593
00:43:17,430 --> 00:43:19,750
It cannot always make up its mind.

594
00:43:19,750 --> 00:43:23,329
You've got to be able to control the vehicle,
even though we weren't intentionally maneuvering

595
00:43:23,329 --> 00:43:25,000
at that time.

596
00:43:25,000 --> 00:43:27,790
And so we developed these variations.

597
00:43:27,790 --> 00:43:32,260
If you go back in the tunnel three times you
get what?

598
00:43:32,260 --> 00:43:33,109
Four different answers.

599
00:43:33,109 --> 00:43:37,970
[LAUGHTER] And they're all very, very close.

600
00:43:37,970 --> 00:43:42,930
If you change facilities you get slightly
different answers.

601
00:43:42,930 --> 00:43:47,190
We had some Reynolds level boundary layer
kinds of problems between the wind tunnel

602
00:43:47,190 --> 00:43:48,960
and the full scale.

603
00:43:48,960 --> 00:43:55,349
And so these uncertainties were developed
for all the aerodynamic coefficients.

604
00:43:55,349 --> 00:44:02,130
Then this data was delivered to the GN&C people
where they make for sure that they can fly

605
00:44:02,130 --> 00:44:03,890
their system with the uncertainties.

606
00:44:03,890 --> 00:44:10,890
The CN betas, yawing moment coefficient with
angle of side slip, the control moment coefficients,

607
00:44:12,190 --> 00:44:17,560
the delta yawing moments and rolling moments
due to elevon maneuvers, where the errors

608
00:44:17,560 --> 00:44:24,560
on those, that the control system wouldn't
go berserk with any combination of those.

609
00:44:25,109 --> 00:44:28,520
The same with structures and with flight dynamics.

610
00:44:28,520 --> 00:44:32,069
Now, we're not living with those today.

611
00:44:32,069 --> 00:44:36,740
We did flight tests to reduce the variations.

612
00:44:36,740 --> 00:44:43,740
The astronauts put in PTI, pilot test inputs,
where they would do it a certain way and we

613
00:44:44,790 --> 00:44:46,849
would pre-predict those characteristics.

614
00:44:46,849 --> 00:44:48,730
Then we'd look at them post-flight.

615
00:44:48,730 --> 00:44:55,730
We would pull the aerodynamic characteristics
out with regression analysis techniques to

616
00:44:57,030 --> 00:45:04,030
say this is the aerodynamic coefficients that
had to be there for that maneuver to look

617
00:45:04,440 --> 00:45:05,800
like it looked.

618
00:45:05,800 --> 00:45:10,150
That, within itself, has some plus or minus
stuff because you can change stuff a little

619
00:45:10,150 --> 00:45:12,319
bit and it still looks pretty good.

620
00:45:12,319 --> 00:45:16,160
Those two then were combined and we had a
set of reduced aerodynamics.

621
00:45:16,160 --> 00:45:20,069
But today when you go to the aerodynamic data
book, which we hope to be able to get you

622
00:45:20,069 --> 00:45:25,650
copies of, it will have not only the coefficients
for all mach numbers, angles of attack, angle

623
00:45:25,650 --> 00:45:30,180
to slide slip, it will tell you what the uncertainty
as a function of mach number angle of attack

624
00:45:30,180 --> 00:45:31,560
is for that.

625
00:45:31,560 --> 00:45:34,180
And your system should be able to work with
all those.

626
00:45:34,180 --> 00:45:39,869
I want to mention this aerodynamic design
substantiation report.

627
00:45:39,869 --> 00:45:45,630
You won't be able to get a copy of that any
place that I know of but we're going to try

628
00:45:45,630 --> 00:45:50,319
to get a copy to Jeff for you, and it should
be available in your files.

629
00:45:50,319 --> 00:45:56,089
But what that did, that goes back in, and
for every coefficient, every angle of attack,

630
00:45:56,089 --> 00:46:01,140
how we arrived at that specific value and
those specific variations using both wind

631
00:46:01,140 --> 00:46:03,560
tunnel and flight test.

632
00:46:03,560 --> 00:46:05,480
A super document.

633
00:46:05,480 --> 00:46:09,339
Not pretty but an excellent technical document.

634
00:46:09,339 --> 00:46:15,480
And that was done during the flight test program
and afterwards.

635
00:46:15,480 --> 00:46:19,849
I thought we would stick up there the Wind
Tunnel Testing Program.

636
00:46:19,849 --> 00:46:24,589
That's primarily the backbone of the aerodynamic
database of the shuttle both for the Orbiter

637
00:46:24,589 --> 00:46:27,640
and the Integrated Vehicle.

638
00:46:27,640 --> 00:46:31,339
149 entry tests on the entry vehicle.

639
00:46:31,339 --> 00:46:32,359
79 heating.

640
00:46:32,359 --> 00:46:33,380
40 structural.

641
00:46:33,380 --> 00:46:35,930
You can add them up.

642
00:46:35,930 --> 00:46:39,540
Hours of wind tunnel test time 17,000.

643
00:46:39,540 --> 00:46:41,890
Aaron asked me how that compared with the
Apollo.

644
00:46:41,890 --> 00:46:48,730
As best I remember, we did about 4,000 to
5,000 hours on the entry vehicle on Apollo.

645
00:46:48,730 --> 00:46:53,430
However, Apollo didn't have all of those moveable
surfaces.

646
00:46:53,430 --> 00:46:59,020
Moveable surfaces are nice, do a lot of things
for you, but you've got to test and make sure

647
00:46:59,020 --> 00:46:59,520
they're there.

648
00:46:59,520 --> 00:47:02,560
And those were through various wind tunnels
throughout the country?

649
00:47:02,560 --> 00:47:02,810
Yes, sir.

650
00:47:02,730 --> 00:47:04,589
These were the best facilities in the country.

651
00:47:04,589 --> 00:47:07,280
Do they still exist?

652
00:47:07,280 --> 00:47:10,300
Far up and away, yes, sir, they still exist.

653
00:47:10,300 --> 00:47:12,210
The ones at Ames are still usable.

654
00:47:12,210 --> 00:47:14,869
The ones at AEDC are still usable.

655
00:47:14,869 --> 00:47:21,040
Unfortunately, those at Langley, even though
they're there and they work, because of funding

656
00:47:21,040 --> 00:47:25,770
constraints, Langley has a hard time bringing
them up and using them.

657
00:47:25,770 --> 00:47:29,829
And that's unfortunate because they have some
excellent facilities there.

658
00:47:29,829 --> 00:47:32,400
And we surely used them.

659
00:47:32,400 --> 00:47:37,520
In this Wind Tunnel Test Program, you can
find out in a special wind tunnel testing

660
00:47:37,520 --> 00:47:38,800
program summary.

661
00:47:38,800 --> 00:47:44,220
By the way, you can get this document pretty
straightforwardly.

662
00:47:44,220 --> 00:47:48,480
Ascent vehicle.

663
00:47:48,480 --> 00:47:55,369
A few less hours, and that's because you don't
move as many surfaces primarily.

664
00:47:55,369 --> 00:47:57,530
Heating.

665
00:47:57,530 --> 00:48:00,180
That's something to work on.

666
00:48:00,180 --> 00:48:07,180
If you want a good project to work on, how
do you take heating data in a wind tunnel

667
00:48:10,910 --> 00:48:16,500
on a small scale vehicle and make full scale
predictions?

668
00:48:16,500 --> 00:48:21,579
The reason that's near and dear to my heart,
they ran a test not too long ago and they

669
00:48:21,579 --> 00:48:23,430
still cannot match those two.

670
00:48:23,430 --> 00:48:25,630
A good PhD thesis.

671
00:48:25,630 --> 00:48:28,930
Maybe you can figure out how to do that and
how to do it right.

672
00:48:28,930 --> 00:48:31,460
A lot of scaling parameters that are used,
kind of like plumes.

673
00:48:31,460 --> 00:48:37,490
You're not sure which scaling parameter really
works, but there is slide test data, calorimeters,

674
00:48:37,490 --> 00:48:43,750
and there is fly test data and wind tunnel
data.

675
00:48:43,750 --> 00:48:49,740
It doesn't bother us that much because we've
got enough conservatism in the system and

676
00:48:49,740 --> 00:48:55,180
uncertainties that we know we're safe to fly,
but it does hurt your pride when you said

677
00:48:55,180 --> 00:49:02,180
hey, that heating rate should be 9 BTU's per
foot squared per second and the fly test data

678
00:49:02,210 --> 00:49:06,349
said it's not but 2.

679
00:49:06,349 --> 00:49:11,410
You might look good one way, you look bad
another way, but if I was looking for something

680
00:49:11,410 --> 00:49:17,950
to get my plow into and I was interested in
theoretical stuff, that's probably what I'd

681
00:49:17,950 --> 00:49:18,730
pick.

682
00:49:18,730 --> 00:49:25,730
Total Wind Tunnel Test Program, Aaron paid
for that out of his budget, by the way.

683
00:49:25,750 --> 00:49:29,190
It was less than $100 million.

684
00:49:29,190 --> 00:49:32,589
[LAUGHTER] In those year dollars.

685
00:49:32,589 --> 00:49:35,619
But it was an excellent program.

686
00:49:35,619 --> 00:49:42,619
Every test that was conducted was documented,
analyzed, and we can make that available.

687
00:49:44,140 --> 00:49:49,490
That concludes the things that I had to tell
you.

688
00:49:49,490 --> 00:49:52,869
And we hit that hour, just about right.

689
00:49:52,869 --> 00:49:56,829
Do you have any questions that you'd like
to ask?

690
00:49:56,829 --> 00:50:03,490
If not, I'll give you a test.

691
00:50:03,490 --> 00:50:06,869
Yes, sir.

692
00:50:06,869 --> 00:50:13,869
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE] How do we affect the
trim?

693
00:50:17,390 --> 00:50:24,390
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE] Hypersonics, and when
I say hypersonic, let me take it down to mach

694
00:50:37,390 --> 00:50:44,390
5, was probably the best at prediction that
we had.

695
00:50:45,619 --> 00:50:52,619
A flat plate which the belly of the orbiter
has a little bit of surface bending both in

696
00:50:54,510 --> 00:50:58,700
the pitch plane and in the yaw plane for stability.

697
00:50:58,700 --> 00:51:05,460
If you put a big sphere or segment of a sphere,
you could place the Orbiter on that and you'd

698
00:51:05,460 --> 00:51:05,880
say, hey.

699
00:51:05,880 --> 00:51:10,020
And I know a sphere or segment of a sphere
has stability.

700
00:51:10,020 --> 00:51:17,020
Now, the uncertainties turn out not to be
in normal forces or in even side forces.

701
00:51:20,990 --> 00:51:25,329
Pitching moment is the one that you tend to
miss the most.

702
00:51:25,329 --> 00:51:29,359
And sometimes you don't know if you have a
wrong pitching moment or a wrong center of

703
00:51:29,359 --> 00:51:30,309
gravity.

704
00:51:30,309 --> 00:51:35,290
They both precipitate a delta pitching moment
coefficient change.

705
00:51:35,290 --> 00:51:41,950
The big barn doors, we have that into the
system where we control not only a rate control

706
00:51:41,950 --> 00:51:45,210
system but an attitude control system.

707
00:51:45,210 --> 00:51:52,210
And so it takes, with a 70 square foot, it
just takes a small amount of change to correct

708
00:51:53,130 --> 00:51:57,180
any error that you might have in either CGR
pitching moment.

709
00:51:57,180 --> 00:52:03,170
Your control mechanism is with the big elevators
and also the body flap a little bit, if you

710
00:52:03,170 --> 00:52:04,319
want to use that.

711
00:52:04,319 --> 00:52:07,930
The reaction control system is a rate system.

712
00:52:07,930 --> 00:52:09,300
And I didn't mention that.

713
00:52:09,300 --> 00:52:16,300
And we intentionally put the reaction control
system in the wake of the vehicle, even though,

714
00:52:17,119 --> 00:52:21,410
for orbital maneuvering, we have jets that
are the forward firing end.

715
00:52:21,410 --> 00:52:27,280
But so much uncertainty in how that changes
the aerodynamics in a surface that is not

716
00:52:27,280 --> 00:52:28,319
a hard surface.

717
00:52:28,319 --> 00:52:35,030
And that interaction, you can change things
in such a way that you amplify it or reduce

718
00:52:35,030 --> 00:52:35,420
it.

719
00:52:35,420 --> 00:52:39,930
And so we elected not to try to grapple with
that problem and use just the aft jets, but

720
00:52:39,930 --> 00:52:41,829
it's just for a rate control system.

721
00:52:41,829 --> 00:52:48,829
End pitch, that's the distance that separated
that, and yaw on both sides, and in roll.

722
00:52:51,980 --> 00:52:58,980
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE] X-15 was a low angle
of attack airplane type configuration from

723
00:53:05,470 --> 00:53:08,880
mach 25 to mach 5.

724
00:53:08,880 --> 00:53:14,470
You're flying a spacecraft kind of configuration
where you basically roll about the velocity

725
00:53:14,470 --> 00:53:16,500
vector.

726
00:53:16,500 --> 00:53:22,630
You want to maintain that pitch trim and roll
about the velocity vector for cross-range

727
00:53:22,630 --> 00:53:23,940
in either direction.

728
00:53:23,940 --> 00:53:29,079
Now, when you begin transition because you've
got to be down here when you're landing, you

729
00:53:29,079 --> 00:53:31,250
pick the best place to do that.

730
00:53:31,250 --> 00:53:38,250
And the best place to do that is back in the
mach below 5 and, of course, above the subsonic

731
00:53:38,680 --> 00:53:39,579
regime.

732
00:53:39,579 --> 00:53:45,180
And we try not to have any maneuvers that
are required during that time period.

733
00:53:45,180 --> 00:53:50,900
Any time you're going from a totally separated
flow on the back of the vehicle to one that

734
00:53:50,900 --> 00:53:56,480
is now attached, separated flow cannot make
its mind sometimes.

735
00:53:56,480 --> 00:53:57,630
Does it want to be separated?

736
00:53:57,630 --> 00:54:00,130
Does it want to be attached?

737
00:54:00,130 --> 00:54:03,730
Not only the whole vehicle but even on small
pieces of the vehicle.

738
00:54:03,730 --> 00:54:06,750
And so there are uncertainties that come in
there.

739
00:54:06,750 --> 00:54:11,069
But that's the area.

740
00:54:11,069 --> 00:54:11,849
But you've got to be sure.

741
00:54:11,849 --> 00:54:16,490
And that's where we did a lot of our PTIs,
by the way, as we became more and more brave

742
00:54:16,490 --> 00:54:17,849
to get those coefficients.

743
00:54:17,849 --> 00:54:24,380
And the wind tunnel did a pretty good job
on them.

744
00:54:24,380 --> 00:54:29,069
Yes.

745
00:54:29,069 --> 00:54:36,069
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE] What you're doing
is changing the Newtonian flow now on my flat

746
00:54:41,690 --> 00:54:44,200
plate 70 square foot per surface.

747
00:54:44,200 --> 00:54:46,569
You mean the rear-end?

748
00:54:46,569 --> 00:54:49,309
The rear-end, the big end, yeah.

749
00:54:49,309 --> 00:54:53,589
Now I've got a normal force coefficient sine
squared to the angle.

750
00:54:53,589 --> 00:54:59,329
Then I just change the angle up and reduce
the forces on that, and that gives me a nose

751
00:54:59,329 --> 00:54:59,579
up.

752
00:54:59,540 --> 00:55:00,319
I bring it down.

753
00:55:00,319 --> 00:55:02,049
That gives me a nose down.

754
00:55:02,049 --> 00:55:02,890
It works beautifully.

755
00:55:02,890 --> 00:55:05,079
This is the body flap we're talking about.

756
00:55:05,079 --> 00:55:09,680
Body flap and elevators, yeah, both.

757
00:55:09,680 --> 00:55:11,260
Body flap and aft control surfaces.

758
00:55:11,260 --> 00:55:11,559
Yes, sir.

759
00:55:11,559 --> 00:55:14,970
You talked about the flight test portion of
the aerodynamics.

760
00:55:14,970 --> 00:55:18,940
What sort of planes were you using to do that?

761
00:55:18,940 --> 00:55:21,960
The flight test was the shuttle itself.

762
00:55:21,960 --> 00:55:28,740
After we safely entered and everything then
we designed these pilot test inputs to extract

763
00:55:28,740 --> 00:55:30,270
aerodynamic characteristics.

764
00:55:30,270 --> 00:55:34,240
The same technique that Edwards developed.

765
00:55:34,240 --> 00:55:39,059
And they did develop that, by the way, on
the X-15 and on other vehicles, too.

766
00:55:39,059 --> 00:55:40,480
And we used that same technique.

767
00:55:40,480 --> 00:55:47,079
We sent one of our men out and he spent about
almost a half a year learning all their techniques,

768
00:55:47,079 --> 00:55:52,869
brought that back, developed that and worked
with the astronauts very, very closely.

769
00:55:52,869 --> 00:55:54,950
They trained for those maneuvers.

770
00:55:54,950 --> 00:55:57,280
We extracted data for those maneuvers.

771
00:55:57,280 --> 00:56:03,839
We would change the aerodynamic characteristics
and not tell them what they are in the simulators.

772
00:56:03,839 --> 00:56:07,900
And made sure that we didn't get any difficulty
and made sure that the aero people could extract

773
00:56:07,900 --> 00:56:10,710
that data right and tell us how we changed
it.

774
00:56:10,710 --> 00:56:12,240
They all got good As.

775
00:56:12,240 --> 00:56:14,359
And it worked very, very well.

776
00:56:14,359 --> 00:56:18,670
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE] No, sir.

777
00:56:18,670 --> 00:56:21,230
We did that one.

778
00:56:21,230 --> 00:56:23,410
That was for the approach and landing test.

779
00:56:23,410 --> 00:56:25,730
But for the entry vehicle, no, those were
supersonic.

780
00:56:25,730 --> 00:56:27,000
Yes, and we did hypersonic.

781
00:56:27,000 --> 00:56:30,599
We're talking about tests that were done during
the flights.

782
00:56:30,599 --> 00:56:34,700
The first four flights were designated orbital
flight tests.

783
00:56:34,700 --> 00:56:39,520
And I think the PTIs actually continued well
after that.

784
00:56:39,520 --> 00:56:40,020
Yes.

785
00:56:40,020 --> 00:56:47,020
Actually, what this has given us, in terms
of a hypersonic database for a winged vehicle,

786
00:56:52,010 --> 00:56:54,170
is incredible.

787
00:56:54,170 --> 00:56:59,410
At first they were called pilot test inputs
because the pilots were doing them automatically.

788
00:56:59,410 --> 00:57:03,609
And then I remember some of the pilots were
saying you've got to do it very precisely

789
00:57:03,609 --> 00:57:08,410
and so we really have got to be concentrating
on that.

790
00:57:08,410 --> 00:57:13,980
And there are so many other things we have
to concentrate on.

791
00:57:13,980 --> 00:57:16,109
Could we possibly computerize this?

792
00:57:16,109 --> 00:57:22,490
And so I don't remember which flight they
started doing that, but at that point the

793
00:57:22,490 --> 00:57:28,819
PTIs became known as the program test inputs
rather than the pilot test inputs.

794
00:57:28,819 --> 00:57:34,510
You basically put in a little pitch up, pitch
down and see how it affected the roll and

795
00:57:34,510 --> 00:57:38,730
the yaw and all these cross-coupling things
at lots of different mach numbers.

796
00:57:38,730 --> 00:57:45,730
And, over the course of a bunch of different
flights and a lot of different PTIs, it really

797
00:57:45,920 --> 00:57:52,920
built up the aerodynamic coefficients at all
these different mach numbers.

798
00:57:55,030 --> 00:58:00,510
You might say a little bit about how we collected
hypersonic test data in wind tunnels.

799
00:58:00,510 --> 00:58:06,460
I mean it's not like you can just have a fan
going and produce a mach 20 airflow for 20

800
00:58:06,460 --> 00:58:09,589
minutes and you can play with your little
thing.

801
00:58:09,589 --> 00:58:15,309
Hypersonic testing was done primarily at the
Ames Research Center three and a half foot

802
00:58:15,309 --> 00:58:17,770
facility.

803
00:58:17,770 --> 00:58:23,500
We also did some up at Calspan, also used
some of the Langley facilities, but the real

804
00:58:23,500 --> 00:58:27,000
workhorse was this three and a half foot hypersonic
tunnel.

805
00:58:27,000 --> 00:58:32,359
And basically you would have the air coming
through the tunnel at the required conditions.

806
00:58:32,359 --> 00:58:39,359
You would put the model of the vehicle, which
is usually a 1.5% to 3% model in the facility.

807
00:58:39,880 --> 00:58:44,799
You have what is called a six component balance
that fits into the model.

808
00:58:44,799 --> 00:58:47,200
That is a strain gauge relationship.

809
00:58:47,200 --> 00:58:54,200
It gives you force and moments in both directions,
or forces in both directions and some difference

810
00:58:55,420 --> 00:58:59,299
between the gauges so you can pull the pitching
moments and the yawing moments and the rolling

811
00:58:59,299 --> 00:59:01,369
moments out of that.

812
00:59:01,369 --> 00:59:08,020
You reduce it based primarily upon dynamic
pressure or you say CN is equal to the normal

813
00:59:08,020 --> 00:59:13,130
force divided by QS, the dynamic pressure
times a reference area.

814
00:59:13,130 --> 00:59:19,940
Standard aerodynamics, but once more a language
kind of thing where if you're in gas dynamics

815
00:59:19,940 --> 00:59:24,480
and not aerodynamics sometimes you don't get
back over to those coefficients.

816
00:59:24,480 --> 00:59:30,079
By the way, in that same document all of those
terms are defined pretty well.

817
00:59:30,079 --> 00:59:31,700
But you measure those with a balance.

818
00:59:31,700 --> 00:59:37,240
Then the question happens, well, I wasn't
at full scale Reynolds number.

819
00:59:37,240 --> 00:59:39,660
And then that's where you come up with your
theoretical techniques.

820
00:59:39,660 --> 00:59:44,430
And you come back in and you look at it and
you see that the boundary layer and the Reynolds

821
00:59:44,430 --> 00:59:49,400
number corrections theoretically make a very
little bit of difference.

822
00:59:49,400 --> 00:59:53,440
And then you go through today the CFD programs.

823
00:59:53,440 --> 00:59:55,410
You say it gets about the same answer.

824
00:59:55,410 --> 00:59:59,329
You go back to the flight test data and it
gets about the same answer.

825
00:59:59,329 --> 01:00:04,339
Basically, what you conclude is wind tunnels
do a super job hypersonically for this kind

826
01:00:04,339 --> 01:00:07,400
of a configuration.

827
01:00:07,400 --> 01:00:13,510
Now, it did good on the Apollo, it did good
on the Gemini, it did good on the Mercury

828
01:00:13,510 --> 01:00:18,730
and it did good on the Shuttle.

829
01:00:18,730 --> 01:00:22,180
Give me that configuration and I'll tell you
what the hypersonic aerodynamic characteristics

830
01:00:22,180 --> 01:00:22,500
are.

831
01:00:22,500 --> 01:00:26,520
I can tell you in phase A, and it's not going
to be too much different at the end of phase

832
01:00:26,520 --> 01:00:27,190
B.

833
01:00:27,190 --> 01:00:31,160
And maybe you don't want to hear that because
maybe you were going to do great things in

834
01:00:31,160 --> 01:00:32,230
the hypersonic area.

835
01:00:32,230 --> 01:00:37,799
But on a blunt body, which is what we're talking
about, it does a super job now.

836
01:00:37,799 --> 01:00:44,799
X-15, low angles of attack flying like an
airplane, a different story completely.

837
01:00:45,390 --> 01:00:47,260
[UNINTELLIGIBLE] configuration.

838
01:00:47,260 --> 01:00:52,119
No, I wouldn't want to use just Newtonian
to predict the aerodynamic characteristics

839
01:00:52,119 --> 01:00:53,579
hypersonically of that vehicle.

840
01:00:53,579 --> 01:00:55,920
On the other hand, I wouldn't want to fly
it there either.

841
01:00:55,920 --> 01:00:58,280
It would burn up.

842
01:00:58,280 --> 01:00:59,549
Blunt body is good.

843
01:00:59,549 --> 01:01:02,240
98% of the energy goes into the shockwave.

844
01:01:02,240 --> 01:01:08,660
98% of the energy goes into your vehicle when
you're flying low.

845
01:01:08,660 --> 01:01:12,799
A manned entry vehicle enters the earth's
atmosphere.

846
01:01:12,799 --> 01:01:19,799
You're going to be flying something like a
segment of a sphere or at worst a right elliptical

847
01:01:25,020 --> 01:01:25,859
cone.

848
01:01:25,859 --> 01:01:29,680
And Newtonian works good on that one, too,
by the way.

849
01:01:29,680 --> 01:01:31,980
We wind tunnel tested those for different
configurations.

850
01:01:31,980 --> 01:01:35,930
That gets your L/D on up to a 1.75 rather
than 1.5.

851
01:01:35,930 --> 01:01:36,710
Yes, sir.

852
01:01:36,710 --> 01:01:43,710
Why couldn't any sort of straight winged configuration
make the cross-range requirement?

853
01:01:45,890 --> 01:01:52,890
The cross-range requirement is primarily angle
of attack oriented.

854
01:01:53,069 --> 01:02:00,069
The relationship between the CG payload in
and payload out is a pretty good change.

855
01:02:05,480 --> 01:02:12,480
And, if you had a straight wing, your straight
wing cannot be placed in such a way that it

856
01:02:12,559 --> 01:02:16,130
trims subsonically and trims hypersonically.

857
01:02:16,130 --> 01:02:21,809
Now, it can,at higher angles of attack with
less L/D, you can make it work.

858
01:02:21,809 --> 01:02:28,069
But down at 45 degrees you end up with a delta
wing configuration.

859
01:02:28,069 --> 01:02:30,569
Does that answer your question?

860
01:02:30,569 --> 01:02:32,240
And that's a good exercise, though.

861
01:02:32,240 --> 01:02:38,809
But you can go through it on a couple of sheets
of paper and say ah-ha.

862
01:02:38,809 --> 01:02:45,740
Because hypersonically you've got that CG,
you've got your CP, you know where it has

863
01:02:45,740 --> 01:02:50,630
got to be placed, you get down to low angles
of attack, you know where your CP is for that

864
01:02:50,630 --> 01:02:56,339
body, you know your CP is up at the quarter
card and you know you've got 4.5 CGs.

865
01:02:56,339 --> 01:02:58,910
It doesn't quite work.

866
01:02:58,910 --> 01:03:00,359
It takes a delta to do that.

867
01:03:00,359 --> 01:03:04,788
So it was more CG related than heating?

868
01:03:04,788 --> 01:03:06,190
Yes, sir.

869
01:03:06,190 --> 01:03:10,500
Although, the one that we mentioned, the 200
nautical mile cross-range with a straight

870
01:03:10,500 --> 01:03:15,799
wing, Langley did some tests on that, even
at high angle of attack.

871
01:03:15,799 --> 01:03:22,799
And right in where that straight wing ties
back into the fuselage had super high heating

872
01:03:24,740 --> 01:03:25,210
rates.

873
01:03:25,210 --> 01:03:31,319
But we could put little fillets in there and
overcome that heating particular thing.

874
01:03:31,319 --> 01:03:36,579
But, if you're going to go real fast, delta
wings look better.

875
01:03:36,579 --> 01:03:37,319
[LAUGHTER] All right.

876
01:03:37,319 --> 01:03:37,809
Yes, ma'am.

877
01:03:37,809 --> 01:03:44,809
When you were doing all this aerodynamic analysis,
did you consider a perfect surface, or did

878
01:03:46,220 --> 01:03:53,220
you also do tests or analysis on what if the
TPS fails?

879
01:03:59,880 --> 01:04:00,680
Good question.

880
01:04:00,680 --> 01:04:03,690
First of all, we have an external insulator.

881
01:04:03,690 --> 01:04:06,930
And Bob Ried will talk to you about that,
and Tom Moser probably has too.

882
01:04:06,930 --> 01:04:13,930
Which meant that our main aluminum surface,
which we want to keep quite cool, is different

883
01:04:17,750 --> 01:04:20,579
than the one that we initially designed.

884
01:04:20,579 --> 01:04:26,329
We went back in, made models that simulated
those differences, made calculations that

885
01:04:26,329 --> 01:04:28,079
simulated those differences.

886
01:04:28,079 --> 01:04:31,710
They were very small corrections that needed
to be made.

887
01:04:31,710 --> 01:04:35,779
Then the other question that you had was suppose
you lose a piece of TPS?

888
01:04:35,779 --> 01:04:36,990
Which we did.

889
01:04:36,990 --> 01:04:42,450
We've lost some chunks of TPS early in the
program.

890
01:04:42,450 --> 01:04:47,160
And you cannot do much testing on that because
it's so little bitty and it's like a greased

891
01:04:47,160 --> 01:04:48,630
pencil kind of a thing.

892
01:04:48,630 --> 01:04:52,049
But you go back in.

893
01:04:52,049 --> 01:04:57,430
The first approach is we take some maximum
things.

894
01:04:57,430 --> 01:05:03,730
The pressure cannot be greater than total
and it cannot be less than zero.

895
01:05:03,730 --> 01:05:09,400
And so let's put those deltas into that area
and into a nice area around there and see

896
01:05:09,400 --> 01:05:13,069
if it makes any difference to the aerodynamic
coefficients.

897
01:05:13,069 --> 01:05:15,450
And they're quite small and so we feel quite
comfortable with that.

898
01:05:15,450 --> 01:05:17,210
Now, from a heating, a different answer.

899
01:05:17,210 --> 01:05:21,630
But, from an aerodynamic standpoint, does
it affect the aerodynamics?

900
01:05:21,630 --> 01:05:23,230
We scope it in that way.

901
01:05:23,230 --> 01:05:27,200
It's a pretty small area.

902
01:05:27,200 --> 01:05:28,788
Yes, sir.

903
01:05:28,788 --> 01:05:35,299
Where was the greatest risk on the aerodynamic
design?

904
01:05:35,299 --> 01:05:40,260
During the first flight, was there anything
you were particularly concerned about?

905
01:05:40,260 --> 01:05:40,740
Oh, yeah.

906
01:05:40,740 --> 01:05:42,049
[LAUGHTER] Getting it right.

907
01:05:42,049 --> 01:05:47,069
I guess my biggest pucker factor is in the
transitional phase.

908
01:05:47,069 --> 01:05:54,069
I'd just seen so many things go wrong transonically
that transonic wind tunnels miss.

909
01:05:54,359 --> 01:05:59,569
It's a dynamic situation where you're moving.

910
01:05:59,569 --> 01:06:04,950
And that was, personally, my greatest concern,
did we get that right?

911
01:06:04,950 --> 01:06:06,010
We did everything we could.

912
01:06:06,010 --> 01:06:10,450
And it turned out that we did a good job,
but I worried about that more than anything

913
01:06:10,450 --> 01:06:11,359
else.

914
01:06:11,359 --> 01:06:17,130
Launch vehicle.

915
01:06:17,130 --> 01:06:24,130
Primarily did we get the structural loads
right and did we put enough margin in?

916
01:06:24,839 --> 01:06:30,430
We did not use uncertainties in the pressure
distributions.

917
01:06:30,430 --> 01:06:34,170
Couldn't really figure out how to do that.

918
01:06:34,170 --> 01:06:36,119
We had to have balance loads.

919
01:06:36,119 --> 01:06:41,210
And if you said my CP can be higher or lower,
do you put it higher over the whole vehicle

920
01:06:41,210 --> 01:06:43,329
or higher here and lower there?

921
01:06:43,329 --> 01:06:46,170
And then you've got unbalanced loads.

922
01:06:46,170 --> 01:06:52,200
But we did measure the wing bending moments,
wing shears, wing torsion and also the attached

923
01:06:52,200 --> 01:06:53,760
loads in those.

924
01:06:53,760 --> 01:06:55,900
And so we put some uncertainties on those.

925
01:06:55,900 --> 01:06:57,630
And Tom has already been here.

926
01:06:57,630 --> 01:07:00,079
I don't know if he mentioned how they tried
to handle those.

927
01:07:00,079 --> 01:07:04,819
But at least they had some of those things.

928
01:07:04,819 --> 01:07:09,869
But we never figured out how to put uncertainties
and pressure distributions and still be able

929
01:07:09,869 --> 01:07:12,490
to get all the balance loads for NASTRAN.

930
01:07:12,490 --> 01:07:16,890
Maybe one of you all are sharp enough to figure
out how to do something like that.

931
01:07:16,890 --> 01:07:23,650
But that was the one on the ascent, had we
adequately covered the uncertainties in pressure

932
01:07:23,650 --> 01:07:30,650
distributions with the way that we accomplished
that by the uncertainties in the bending moments,

933
01:07:30,730 --> 01:07:34,109
torsion and shear?

934
01:07:34,109 --> 01:07:41,109
Let's take a couple minute break and then
we can resume with questions.

935
01:07:48,750 --> 01:07:52,788
I am going to go down to my office and get
one or two things which I think will be interesting

936
01:07:52,788 --> 01:07:53,038
that we can also talk about.

937
01:07:52,980 --> 01:07:53,549
Take a minute or two.

938
01:07:53,549 --> 01:08:00,279
Instead of one configuration, you've got one
configuration times 5 degrees, 10 degrees,

939
01:08:00,279 --> 01:08:01,960
minus 5 degrees.

940
01:08:01,960 --> 01:08:03,309
These split down the middle.

941
01:08:03,309 --> 01:08:05,670
The same way here, body flap.

942
01:08:05,670 --> 01:08:09,549
You've got one, two, three, four, five times
five.

943
01:08:09,549 --> 01:08:15,020
You've got 25 different configurations versus
one.

944
01:08:15,020 --> 01:08:18,520
And so it means more testing, but you're using
the same facility.

945
01:08:18,520 --> 01:08:21,920
It just means more hours of wind tunnel time,
more hours of plotting and looking.

946
01:08:21,920 --> 01:08:25,990
Say a few words about how you did the systems
engineering or the systems integration between

947
01:08:25,990 --> 01:08:32,990
the aerodynamics and the flight control system
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE].

948
01:08:34,500 --> 01:08:37,279
All right.

949
01:08:37,279 --> 01:08:39,390
Let's take flight control system.

950
01:08:39,390 --> 01:08:46,390
We, in our division, were responsible for
aerodynamics and flight dynamics.

951
01:08:47,960 --> 01:08:51,940
And flight dynamics wasn't very well defined.

952
01:08:51,940 --> 01:08:58,940
The Avionics Division was responsible for
the GN&C system control system and also flight

953
01:08:59,759 --> 01:09:01,068
dynamics.

954
01:09:01,068 --> 01:09:05,679
So, you've got to work together.

955
01:09:05,679 --> 01:09:08,198
And you're going to get in one another's bailiwick.

956
01:09:08,198 --> 01:09:09,899
That's part of good systems engineering.

957
01:09:09,899 --> 01:09:15,009
You're going to do what the other fellow is
going to redo, and he's going to do what you're

958
01:09:15,009 --> 01:09:16,250
going to redo.

959
01:09:16,250 --> 01:09:18,850
But our responsibility was two-fold.

960
01:09:18,850 --> 01:09:22,210
One is we had to have the right aerodynamic
characteristics.

961
01:09:22,210 --> 01:09:27,238
But, before we had the right aerodynamic characteristics,
we had to have a configuration that should

962
01:09:27,238 --> 01:09:30,488
be able to live with a GN&C system.

963
01:09:30,488 --> 01:09:35,710
The way we accomplished that is Ken Cox, is
Ken going to be here with you?

964
01:09:35,710 --> 01:09:36,399
No, OK.

965
01:09:36,399 --> 01:09:41,448
Ken Cox was head of the Avionics and GN&C
System.

966
01:09:41,448 --> 01:09:44,738
He gave us a functional GN&C system.

967
01:09:44,738 --> 01:09:50,649
It didn't have all the strings in it, didn't
have all of the relays and all the stuff there,

968
01:09:50,649 --> 01:09:57,650
but if we gave it a command to change that
we knew how much it would change and how long

969
01:09:58,309 --> 01:09:59,540
it would take it to change.

970
01:09:59,540 --> 01:10:01,850
An elevator position as a for instance.

971
01:10:01,850 --> 01:10:04,670
And so that was called a functional GN&C system.

972
01:10:04,670 --> 01:10:09,969
It did the right functions but it didn't do
it the same method that the real GN&C system

973
01:10:09,969 --> 01:10:10,820
did.

974
01:10:10,820 --> 01:10:15,080
We would take our aerodynamics and see that
it would work.

975
01:10:15,080 --> 01:10:18,000
And we would be able to make the maneuvers
that were required.

976
01:10:18,000 --> 01:10:18,909
And we would analyze it.

977
01:10:18,909 --> 01:10:23,309
Ad we would be pretty satisfied that with
those aerodynamics and with the variations

978
01:10:23,309 --> 01:10:25,659
that we were OK.

979
01:10:25,659 --> 01:10:27,540
But that didn't say the system was OK.

980
01:10:27,540 --> 01:10:30,330
That just said that we had a pretty high probability
of making it work.

981
01:10:30,330 --> 01:10:33,190
Then we sent that aerodynamic database.

982
01:10:33,190 --> 01:10:39,400
And all this is happening not ship it, throw
it over the fence, but over a period of time

983
01:10:39,400 --> 01:10:42,270
we sent them the aerodynamic characteristics
with the variations.

984
01:10:42,270 --> 01:10:48,210
And then they beat it bloody flying everything
they can think of with their GN&C system.

985
01:10:48,210 --> 01:10:50,110
Fortunately, that worked out pretty well.

986
01:10:50,110 --> 01:10:52,739
He would pick up a few things, but not anything
major.

987
01:10:52,739 --> 01:10:59,480
And, by the way, this is the only vehicle
I know that happened that way on the Orbiter.

988
01:10:59,480 --> 01:11:06,480
We didn't have any major configuration changes
that we had to make once we got well into

989
01:11:07,020 --> 01:11:07,820
the program.

990
01:11:07,820 --> 01:11:09,179
It stayed the same.

991
01:11:09,179 --> 01:11:12,480
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE] That's right, yes.

992
01:11:12,480 --> 01:11:14,679
And that was true.

993
01:11:14,679 --> 01:11:19,670
That whole thing, not only the GN&C system
but the hydraulics is when you give it the

994
01:11:19,670 --> 01:11:25,550
command, when you say I want a delta theta
so much or delta E of so much, that it takes

995
01:11:25,550 --> 01:11:27,739
it about a quarter of a second to get there.

996
01:11:27,739 --> 01:11:34,550
And that's a long time on a lag time when
you pile all those things end to end up.

997
01:11:34,550 --> 01:11:37,670
Now, structure is much the same way.

998
01:11:37,670 --> 01:11:42,650
They gave us load indicators where they said
we can take so much wing shear, so much wing

999
01:11:42,650 --> 01:11:48,100
torsion, so much wing bending, so much punch
loads into the tank from the attach point

1000
01:11:48,100 --> 01:11:54,969
in the front, so much punch loads into the
tank on the backend, SRB and we have all the

1001
01:11:54,969 --> 01:11:55,219
gimbling.

1002
01:11:55,219 --> 01:11:58,330
That's where we're doing the flight performance
calculations, through the wind shears and

1003
01:11:58,330 --> 01:11:59,840
the wind gust.

1004
01:11:59,840 --> 01:12:04,090
And we assure ourselves that we don't violate
any of the load indicators.

1005
01:12:04,090 --> 01:12:06,750
But that does not say the vehicle is safe.

1006
01:12:06,750 --> 01:12:10,540
Then GN&C flies that one through that and
gives all those conditions back over to the

1007
01:12:10,540 --> 01:12:15,059
structures people, and they analyze the hound
out of it.

1008
01:12:15,059 --> 01:12:18,830
They look at all the cracks and crevices.

1009
01:12:18,830 --> 01:12:25,830
And, if you have people that don't have a
cooperative spirit, it will not work.

1010
01:12:26,469 --> 01:12:27,699
It just doesn't work.

1011
01:12:27,699 --> 01:12:34,059
So, you've got to learn how to get along with
your buddies over on the other side.

1012
01:12:34,059 --> 01:12:38,230
Don't build your fiefdom up that your wall
is so big and you control your own destiny

1013
01:12:38,230 --> 01:12:40,320
because you don't.

1014
01:12:40,320 --> 01:12:44,080
And we had a super group of people to work
with.

1015
01:12:44,080 --> 01:12:47,040
And, to me, that's what really made it work.

1016
01:12:47,040 --> 01:12:49,150
The same thing on heating, by the way.

1017
01:12:49,150 --> 01:12:52,980
They would give us heating indicators and
we would fly it because that was a little

1018
01:12:52,980 --> 01:12:57,050
more straightforward where they would give
us the Q dot locals to Q dot references.

1019
01:12:57,050 --> 01:12:59,030
And we would look through all the Q dot references.

1020
01:12:59,030 --> 01:13:03,809
And we'd give them all the final set of trajectories
and they would analyze it in detail.

1021
01:13:03,809 --> 01:13:10,809
But I look at it as here is a problem and
I can work it like a piece of pie and go on

1022
01:13:11,460 --> 01:13:15,300
this problem, go all the way down to the center,
then go over and eat this piece and this piece.

1023
01:13:15,300 --> 01:13:16,870
It doesn't work that way.

1024
01:13:16,870 --> 01:13:22,659
You start around the edges and you cycle in
on it.

1025
01:13:22,659 --> 01:13:29,659
You eat all the pie, but you accomplished
it around the edges first and work out your

1026
01:13:30,010 --> 01:13:31,570
bigger problems and then get down to the smaller
problems.

1027
01:13:31,570 --> 01:13:31,820
Bass, I think the important point, too, is
that no matter what system you work on, whether

1028
01:13:31,750 --> 01:13:32,000
you work on the Apollo or you work on the
Shuttle or whether you work on the new CEV,

1029
01:13:31,949 --> 01:13:33,510
you're going to basically have to go through
the same process.

1030
01:13:33,510 --> 01:13:36,280
It may be simpler or harder but you're going
to have to go through the same process.

1031
01:13:36,280 --> 01:13:36,530
Absolutely.

1032
01:13:36,449 --> 01:13:36,770
Yes, sir.

1033
01:13:36,770 --> 01:13:43,770
You said there was no major configuration
changes like around the program, but is there

1034
01:13:44,840 --> 01:13:51,840
anything that you felt you were kind of stuck
with like I wish we could have changed this?

1035
01:13:53,920 --> 01:13:58,000
Like not having the OMS pods stick out in
the back like that?

1036
01:13:58,000 --> 01:14:05,000
What that a problem for aerodynamics?

1037
01:14:05,780 --> 01:14:08,170
No.

1038
01:14:08,170 --> 01:14:12,820
We lost the increased drag a little bit, but
not enough to hurt anything.

1039
01:14:12,820 --> 01:14:19,820
And aerodynamics, it didn't bother me any
that my L/D went down by 0.001.

1040
01:14:22,650 --> 01:14:28,159
But now the fellows that were flying it, they
got in there, they said I can still go around

1041
01:14:28,159 --> 01:14:31,670
the hack and I can still do all the things
I want to.

1042
01:14:31,670 --> 01:14:34,010
But all that was done.

1043
01:14:34,010 --> 01:14:37,510
And once more, systems integration, you've
got to include the crew.

1044
01:14:37,510 --> 01:14:43,309
GN&C system, it doesn't bother them in aero,
it doesn't bother them in structures, but

1045
01:14:43,309 --> 01:14:45,030
you've still got to fly.

1046
01:14:45,030 --> 01:14:52,030
And Dr.Gilvarry said you don't want the pilots
talking bad about your airplanes in the bars

1047
01:14:53,850 --> 01:14:57,550
so keep your crew happy.

1048
01:14:57,550 --> 01:15:04,120
[LAUGHTER] But, to answer your question, no,
not really.

1049
01:15:04,120 --> 01:15:09,880
To meet the requirements, it's going to look
pretty much the same.

1050
01:15:09,880 --> 01:15:14,440
If I designed it today, OK, let's go back,
the same requirements now.

1051
01:15:14,440 --> 01:15:18,860
If you give me a different set of requirements,
it's not going to look the same.

1052
01:15:18,860 --> 01:15:23,170
Bass, some people wanted to put some canards
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE].

1053
01:15:23,170 --> 01:15:26,199
canards, that's not a joke.

1054
01:15:26,199 --> 01:15:29,980
That was done, but it was a big argument.

1055
01:15:29,980 --> 01:15:34,980
A canard is an aerodynamic surface part of
the center of gravity.

1056
01:15:34,980 --> 01:15:38,670
And the beneficial part, let me tell you the
good parts about canards.

1057
01:15:38,670 --> 01:15:45,670
canards, subsonically, I can give a pitch
up moment and increase my lift.

1058
01:15:46,559 --> 01:15:52,610
If it's on the aft of the vehicle when I give
a pitch up moment, I decrease my lift.

1059
01:15:52,610 --> 01:15:54,909
So, canards are wonderful.

1060
01:15:54,909 --> 01:16:01,909
But what canards do is it fouls up the flow
over all of the rest of your vehicle.

1061
01:16:04,699 --> 01:16:10,150
And so, back to here, I've got one configuration.

1062
01:16:10,150 --> 01:16:11,830
Unsteady aerodynamics.

1063
01:16:11,830 --> 01:16:12,500
Heating.

1064
01:16:12,500 --> 01:16:13,840
Fixed configuration.

1065
01:16:13,840 --> 01:16:15,900
I put a canard out there.

1066
01:16:15,900 --> 01:16:21,520
Now I've got two more configurations, three
more configurations, four more, five more,

1067
01:16:21,520 --> 01:16:23,040
six more.

1068
01:16:23,040 --> 01:16:27,790
And it does a lot of grief with vortexes and
stuff like that.

1069
01:16:27,790 --> 01:16:32,400
Now, if you had to have it, you have to have
it.

1070
01:16:32,400 --> 01:16:36,780
Concorde had to have it, but that didn't mean
that Shuttle had to have it.

1071
01:16:36,780 --> 01:16:38,420
It operated fine without canards.

1072
01:16:38,420 --> 01:16:42,449
I sure wouldn't put canards on there, if we
had another shot at it.

1073
01:16:42,449 --> 01:16:44,320
Yes, ma'am.

1074
01:16:44,320 --> 01:16:51,320
Would it be easier, faster or cheaper to design
the Shuttle, the Orbiter [UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE]?

1075
01:16:58,370 --> 01:17:03,989
You ask good questions, young lady.

1076
01:17:03,989 --> 01:17:07,920
[LAUGHTER] Yes and no.

1077
01:17:07,920 --> 01:17:14,920
With the tools we have and the foreknowledge
that we have, having been there before, absolutely

1078
01:17:14,969 --> 01:17:15,280
yes.

1079
01:17:15,280 --> 01:17:22,280
And I don't want to be negative, but you don't
have the cooperative spirit going on that

1080
01:17:25,880 --> 01:17:28,100
you had then.

1081
01:17:28,100 --> 01:17:31,510
I don't know why either.

1082
01:17:31,510 --> 01:17:35,460
The young engineers are sharper, no ifs, and
or buts.

1083
01:17:35,460 --> 01:17:42,460
You all know a whole lot more than I ever
knew, but you don't get along as well.

1084
01:17:47,320 --> 01:17:49,690
[LAUGHTER] This is mine.

1085
01:17:49,690 --> 01:17:51,900
I don't need you here.

1086
01:17:51,900 --> 01:17:53,400
I don't want you here.

1087
01:17:53,400 --> 01:17:54,110
Get out of here.

1088
01:17:54,110 --> 01:17:55,540
I'm going to do it my way.

1089
01:17:55,540 --> 01:17:57,340
And that's just an observation I made.

1090
01:17:57,340 --> 01:18:01,290
It might be that my knothole is too restricted.

1091
01:18:01,290 --> 01:18:04,260
But it goes up to pretty high management,
too.

1092
01:18:04,260 --> 01:18:06,170
Not just at the working level.

1093
01:18:06,170 --> 01:18:11,760
A second thing is they asked me to come in
and consult with them.

1094
01:18:11,760 --> 01:18:14,320
And they had lost technical capability.

1095
01:18:14,320 --> 01:18:19,230
Didn't use any engineers much after a certain
time on the Shuttle.

1096
01:18:19,230 --> 01:18:23,460
And then, after the last accident, they had
to bring the engineers in.

1097
01:18:23,460 --> 01:18:30,460
And they said I've never looked at that and
I'm on the payroll.

1098
01:18:30,469 --> 01:18:37,469
The capability was greatly lacking, and so
we developed some ways to bring them to speed

1099
01:18:40,800 --> 01:18:43,320
in about a year and a half period of time
which happened.

1100
01:18:43,320 --> 01:18:43,920
Observation.

1101
01:18:43,920 --> 01:18:50,920
By the way, I was pleased that you all got
to class on time.

1102
01:18:52,020 --> 01:18:55,360
I told management to send them to ethics school.

1103
01:18:55,360 --> 01:18:59,550
Now, if there is a meeting and you tell somebody
you will be there at that time, you be there

1104
01:18:59,550 --> 01:19:00,670
at that time.

1105
01:19:00,670 --> 01:19:06,010
If you tell somebody you will make a deliverable
at that time, you make a deliverable at that

1106
01:19:06,010 --> 01:19:06,570
time.

1107
01:19:06,570 --> 01:19:10,540
Be a man or woman of your word.

1108
01:19:10,540 --> 01:19:12,620
And I found that lacking.

1109
01:19:12,620 --> 01:19:15,949
I don't know that ethics school helped too
much that we sent them all to.

1110
01:19:15,949 --> 01:19:22,370
Well, it did, too, because the second day
of class there were, I think, ten of them

1111
01:19:22,370 --> 01:19:22,900
late.

1112
01:19:22,900 --> 01:19:26,489
And he sent them back and wouldn't let them
in the class.

1113
01:19:26,489 --> 01:19:32,820
[LAUGHTER] But learn to get along with folks.

1114
01:19:32,820 --> 01:19:33,580
They are your friends.

1115
01:19:33,580 --> 01:19:34,159
They're your buddies.

1116
01:19:34,159 --> 01:19:36,150
They are going to be there for a lifetime.

1117
01:19:36,150 --> 01:19:38,040
And, yeah, you're going to have some grief.

1118
01:19:38,040 --> 01:19:41,150
And, yeah, he will give you some headaches
or she will give you some headaches.

1119
01:19:41,150 --> 01:19:46,210
But you're all on the same team, and work
hard towards that.

1120
01:19:46,210 --> 01:19:50,659
I know you've got to grit your teeth and spit
sometimes, but that's major.

1121
01:19:50,659 --> 01:19:57,659
And that didn't cost you anything.

1122
01:19:57,790 --> 01:20:00,520
About the wind tunnel testing, firstly, could
you have reduced that now with CFD?

1123
01:20:00,520 --> 01:20:02,489
And, secondly, you showed there were several
hundred tests.

1124
01:20:02,489 --> 01:20:02,739
Yes.

1125
01:20:02,710 --> 01:20:04,239
And several tens of thousands of hours.

1126
01:20:04,239 --> 01:20:04,489
Yes.

1127
01:20:04,460 --> 01:20:11,460
Does that mean each test ran for several hundred
hours?

1128
01:20:13,540 --> 01:20:15,300
Some tests ran for hundreds of hours.

1129
01:20:15,300 --> 01:20:18,900
That was the total number of hours for all
those tests, not a per hour basis.

1130
01:20:18,900 --> 01:20:21,330
But, yeah, there were some hundred hour tests
that went on.

1131
01:20:21,330 --> 01:20:26,340
To answer your question, does CFD reduce the
number of wind tunnel hours?

1132
01:20:26,340 --> 01:20:31,630
Three areas that we're working in right now.

1133
01:20:31,630 --> 01:20:37,110
One reason is to bring the engineers up to
technical speed where they can stand up and

1134
01:20:37,110 --> 01:20:37,800
be counted.

1135
01:20:37,800 --> 01:20:41,510
And you can ask them a technical question,
they can give you a technical answer and say

1136
01:20:41,510 --> 01:20:44,280
this is my analysis and this is how I got
that.

1137
01:20:44,280 --> 01:20:50,300
To do that we recommended back to Johnson
Spacecraft Center that you better get your

1138
01:20:50,300 --> 01:20:54,290
engineers knowing how to do wind tunnel tests
and you've got to get them to know how to

1139
01:20:54,290 --> 01:20:56,889
make the calculations to run these programs.

1140
01:20:56,889 --> 01:20:58,400
You've got to be able to do all that.

1141
01:20:58,400 --> 01:20:59,920
That's your integration contractor.

1142
01:20:59,920 --> 01:21:01,920
They need to have that capability.

1143
01:21:01,920 --> 01:21:04,920
And they've done that and they really came
up to speed.

1144
01:21:04,920 --> 01:21:06,820
In the midst of that, they've also increased
their CFD capabilities.

1145
01:21:06,820 --> 01:21:12,340
And I'm very envious of what you can do with
CFD.

1146
01:21:12,340 --> 01:21:17,270
However, it hasn't decreased the amount of
runs that they're requesting.

1147
01:21:17,270 --> 01:21:21,040
It's increasing the amount of runs that they're
requesting because they will do this little

1148
01:21:21,040 --> 01:21:25,790
bitty analysis and here is the cable tray
going down that, and they'll say does it go

1149
01:21:25,790 --> 01:21:27,309
sonic under the cable tray?

1150
01:21:27,309 --> 01:21:28,300
Well, I don't know.

1151
01:21:28,300 --> 01:21:30,370
What does the wind tunnel test say?

1152
01:21:30,370 --> 01:21:35,739
Well, we just have a data point here and a
data point here and our CFD shows that it

1153
01:21:35,739 --> 01:21:40,150
can go sonic under there, we need to test
that to make sure that's there.

1154
01:21:40,150 --> 01:21:44,350
[LAUGHTER] And so it could but I don't think
it will.

1155
01:21:44,350 --> 01:21:49,639
I think the better your tools get you want
to make sure they're right.

1156
01:21:49,639 --> 01:21:55,670
Now, one day I think yes, that's going to
happen, but right now there is still a lot

1157
01:21:55,670 --> 01:22:00,940
of question, even in the CFD-er's mind, am
I really right?

1158
01:22:00,940 --> 01:22:06,059
And they've always been accused of they can
tell you what the right answer is if you give

1159
01:22:06,059 --> 01:22:07,320
it to them.

1160
01:22:07,320 --> 01:22:10,590
[LAUGHTER] And that's really not true any
longer.

1161
01:22:10,590 --> 01:22:12,850
That was for a number of years.

1162
01:22:12,850 --> 01:22:15,409
But that CFD is so great.

1163
01:22:15,409 --> 01:22:18,550
And they used overflow, by the way, is the
one that's primary to the big workhorse right

1164
01:22:18,550 --> 01:22:20,570
now, and it does a super job.

1165
01:22:20,570 --> 01:22:23,550
Was there a question?

1166
01:22:23,550 --> 01:22:25,050
All right.

1167
01:22:25,050 --> 01:22:25,809
Any other question?

1168
01:22:25,809 --> 01:22:32,300
I would like to address the question that
was asked about [UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE].

1169
01:22:32,300 --> 01:22:37,389
Let me not talk necessarily about the Shuttle,
but let me talk about Apollo for a moment.

1170
01:22:37,389 --> 01:22:38,730
And I mentioned it before.

1171
01:22:38,730 --> 01:22:44,150
In Apollo, we went to the moon with a single
string avionic system.

1172
01:22:44,150 --> 01:22:49,420
We had one IMU, one computer on the Command
and Service Module.

1173
01:22:49,420 --> 01:22:54,150
We had one service propulsion system to get
you out of lunar orbit or to get you into

1174
01:22:54,150 --> 01:22:56,190
lunar orbit.

1175
01:22:56,190 --> 01:23:03,190
And I think today it would be very difficult
to do that.

1176
01:23:04,239 --> 01:23:07,889
I think you're probably going to have to have
multiple strings.

1177
01:23:07,889 --> 01:23:13,610
You're going to have an escape system.

1178
01:23:13,610 --> 01:23:16,270
I think, in that context, it may be more difficult.

1179
01:23:16,270 --> 01:23:22,370
I do think the tools you have today will make
it easier, but I do think what we know today,

1180
01:23:22,370 --> 01:23:27,409
just like Bass said on understanding a little
bit about the aerodynamics, you want more.

1181
01:23:27,409 --> 01:23:32,699
I think in some respects -- My comment is
that the next time we go to the moon we're

1182
01:23:32,699 --> 01:23:37,340
going to find out how hard it really was because
I do think it's going to be hard to do.

1183
01:23:37,340 --> 01:23:38,760
At least that's my personal feeling.

1184
01:23:38,760 --> 01:23:40,380
And I think a lot of people agree with me.

1185
01:23:40,380 --> 01:23:43,909
One of the toughest decisions we ever made
in the Space Program, and Bass and I were

1186
01:23:43,909 --> 01:23:47,989
talking about it at breakfast, is when we
decided to do Apollo 8.

1187
01:23:47,989 --> 01:23:53,469
Apollo 8 was probably the most fantastic mission
that we ever came up with.

1188
01:23:53,469 --> 01:23:58,150
That was the first time we left the influence
of earth's gravity, we went into orbit around

1189
01:23:58,150 --> 01:24:00,929
the moon and we got out of orbit of the moon.

1190
01:24:00,929 --> 01:24:05,489
Now, we didn't land on the moon but did everything
we had to do for the first time.

1191
01:24:05,489 --> 01:24:11,800
And I think that was probably the boldest
decision that NASA and the government ever

1192
01:24:11,800 --> 01:24:12,520
made.

1193
01:24:12,520 --> 01:24:16,440
Again, I look back, and I'm not sure how we
would make that decision today.

1194
01:24:16,440 --> 01:24:17,469
It was pretty tough.

1195
01:24:17,469 --> 01:24:23,510
And, of course, one man led that attack, George
Low who was Manager of the Apollo Program

1196
01:24:23,510 --> 01:24:27,630
Office at Johnson Space Center, then became
Deputy Administrator and then became President

1197
01:24:27,630 --> 01:24:30,929
of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

1198
01:24:30,929 --> 01:24:33,980
But that was really a fantastic project.

1199
01:24:33,980 --> 01:24:40,980
I will comment on the programs that I worked
on.

1200
01:24:42,800 --> 01:24:49,530
Aerodynamics on Dyna-Soar, which was a defunked
Air Force manned spacecraft program.

1201
01:24:49,530 --> 01:24:56,530
I worked on Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and Blue
Gemini.

1202
01:24:57,159 --> 01:25:04,159
And each time I would go onto the next program
and learn more, I would say we sure were lucky.

1203
01:25:04,159 --> 01:25:11,159
[LAUGHTER] When I was telling you about these
new young engineers now that are up to speed

1204
01:25:12,650 --> 01:25:14,400
where they didn't want to say anything.

1205
01:25:14,400 --> 01:25:20,170
Now that they're crunching numbers, they got
a lot of criticism for the way we did it.

1206
01:25:20,170 --> 01:25:21,920
[LAUGHTER] And rightfully so.

1207
01:25:21,920 --> 01:25:24,420
A lot of capability that is there.

1208
01:25:24,420 --> 01:25:29,460
And you're going to have more capability today
than you had yesterday, more capability on

1209
01:25:29,460 --> 01:25:32,489
the next program than you had on the last
program.

1210
01:25:32,489 --> 01:25:38,460
You're going to find some things to do and
be able to do it better than the last program

1211
01:25:38,460 --> 01:25:40,170
was done.

1212
01:25:40,170 --> 01:25:44,620
That's both good news and bad news.

1213
01:25:44,620 --> 01:25:49,900
Bad news is it will cost you more to do it
and the good news is it will be done a whole

1214
01:25:49,900 --> 01:25:51,880
lot better.

1215
01:25:51,880 --> 01:25:55,590
All right.

1216
01:25:55,590 --> 01:25:56,440
Any other question?

1217
01:25:56,440 --> 01:26:01,280
I thought it might be interesting, just to
make sure you really have an understanding

1218
01:26:01,280 --> 01:26:06,420
of what the Shuttle has to do, to sort of
take them through the entry.

1219
01:26:06,420 --> 01:26:09,739
And maybe, Bass, you'll make some comments
about the aerodynamics and I'll talk a little

1220
01:26:09,739 --> 01:26:14,760
bit about the operations.

1221
01:26:14,760 --> 01:26:21,760
You're in orbit a couple hundred miles above
the ground, and the first thing that you do

1222
01:26:22,730 --> 01:26:29,730
is basically put the Orbiter, after you get
everything stowed and ready for entry, so

1223
01:26:29,730 --> 01:26:33,699
you're essentially going backwards, face to
the ground.

1224
01:26:33,699 --> 01:26:37,080
And you burn the OMS engines.

1225
01:26:37,080 --> 01:26:41,860
And just, in terms of redundancy, we've got
two engines.

1226
01:26:41,860 --> 01:26:46,690
You can cross-feed the fuel that is inside
the OMS pod.

1227
01:26:46,690 --> 01:26:49,239
You can cross-feed from one side to the other.

1228
01:26:49,239 --> 01:26:54,880
So, even if you lose one OMS engine, you can
still do a de-orbit burn just on the other

1229
01:26:54,880 --> 01:26:55,130
engine.

1230
01:26:55,110 --> 01:27:01,960
Of course, you will have to turn a little
bit so that you can burn through the CG.

1231
01:27:01,960 --> 01:27:07,389
If you lose both OMS engines, you can cross-feed
the propellant into the reaction control system

1232
01:27:07,389 --> 01:27:10,880
aft jets and you can come back using those.

1233
01:27:10,880 --> 01:27:15,770
And if you're having a real bad day and you
run out, well, you know, you might have a

1234
01:27:15,770 --> 01:27:21,000
fuel leak, for instance, and so you don't
have enough propellant back there.

1235
01:27:21,000 --> 01:27:27,150
Actually, there was a procedure where you
then would flip over and burn the remainder

1236
01:27:27,150 --> 01:27:31,630
of your forward RCS propellant to just slow
yourself down as much as you could.

1237
01:27:31,630 --> 01:27:32,600
We never had to do that.

1238
01:27:32,600 --> 01:27:35,860
In fact, I don't think we ever lost an OMS
engine.

1239
01:27:35,860 --> 01:27:37,870
But we practice all these things.

1240
01:27:37,870 --> 01:27:44,870
Anyway, the point is, one way or the other,
you slow yourself down.

1241
01:27:46,889 --> 01:27:49,889
Here is the earth and here is your orbit.

1242
01:27:49,889 --> 01:27:51,280
This is grossly out of scale.

1243
01:27:51,280 --> 01:27:58,280
You realize that on this scale your orbit
is actually about like that.

1244
01:27:58,550 --> 01:28:05,550
In any case, you do your burn just enough
to lower your perigee just about two ground

1245
01:28:06,800 --> 01:28:09,969
level.

1246
01:28:09,969 --> 01:28:14,440
And now you're essentially in free-fall.

1247
01:28:14,440 --> 01:28:20,300
I mean you're in free-fall in orbit, but now
you're gradually getting closer to the earth.

1248
01:28:20,300 --> 01:28:27,300
And so what you do is you now flip over and
you put yourself in a position where when

1249
01:28:27,860 --> 01:28:34,860
you actually hit the top upper reaches of
the atmosphere -- And about 400,000 feet is

1250
01:28:35,250 --> 01:28:38,750
what we call entry interface.

1251
01:28:38,750 --> 01:28:45,750
And, actually, the flight control system changes
at that point and the computer actually goes

1252
01:28:46,260 --> 01:28:47,400
into a different mode.

1253
01:28:47,400 --> 01:28:51,580
So, at this point, you're now at a 40 degree
angle.

1254
01:28:51,580 --> 01:28:58,580
And, as Bass said, that gives you your blunt
surfaces approaching.

1255
01:28:59,309 --> 01:29:05,370
And basically the sensors feel the deceleration.

1256
01:29:05,370 --> 01:29:09,520
And that's really how you know where you are
in the entry.

1257
01:29:09,520 --> 01:29:11,260
You sense the deceleration.

1258
01:29:11,260 --> 01:29:15,480
That tells you what the dynamic pressure is.

1259
01:29:15,480 --> 01:29:19,840
During the early part of the entry, all of
your control is by the reaction control system

1260
01:29:19,840 --> 01:29:26,840
because you don't have enough dynamic pressure
on the aerodynamic surfaces to be effective.

1261
01:29:27,239 --> 01:29:34,239
As you get down further and further into the
atmosphere -- Let's see.

1262
01:29:34,639 --> 01:29:38,840
I think the number that comes to mind is ten.

1263
01:29:38,840 --> 01:29:42,760
I assume that's ten pounds per square foot
dynamic pressure.

1264
01:29:42,760 --> 01:29:43,350
Yes.

1265
01:29:43,350 --> 01:29:46,809
Is when the ailerons become effective.

1266
01:29:46,809 --> 01:29:51,550
And so you have what is called a blended control
system.

1267
01:29:51,550 --> 01:29:58,150
The first thing that you can do is actually
control your roll, and so you disable the

1268
01:29:58,150 --> 01:30:01,699
roll jets and you enable the ailerons.

1269
01:30:01,699 --> 01:30:05,280
But the pitch and the yaw is still controlled
by the RCS.

1270
01:30:05,280 --> 01:30:12,280
And the critical thing, like Bass was saying,
is you've got to keep your angle of attack

1271
01:30:13,370 --> 01:30:19,239
constant with respect to your velocity vector
because your aerodynamic heating depends on

1272
01:30:19,239 --> 01:30:19,489
that.

1273
01:30:19,409 --> 01:30:24,320
If you get down to too low an angle now you're
going to heat the surfaces, the upper part

1274
01:30:24,320 --> 01:30:28,710
of the Orbiter and you're going to burn up.

1275
01:30:28,710 --> 01:30:32,110
You're controlling your angle around the velocity
vector.

1276
01:30:32,110 --> 01:30:34,750
And now you can move about that.

1277
01:30:34,750 --> 01:30:38,559
You have a lift vector.

1278
01:30:38,559 --> 01:30:44,480
And now the whole name of the game, because,
remember, this is a glider.

1279
01:30:44,480 --> 01:30:49,510
And so energy control is what is absolutely
essential to make sure that you're going to

1280
01:30:49,510 --> 01:30:55,630
end up at the threshold of the runway at about
-- You said we were aiming for 150 knots.

1281
01:30:55,630 --> 01:30:57,520
We never actually made it.

1282
01:30:57,520 --> 01:31:01,989
Actually, about 200 knots was the touchdown
speed.

1283
01:31:01,989 --> 01:31:04,199
But pretty good anyway.

1284
01:31:04,199 --> 01:31:06,550
We got close.

1285
01:31:06,550 --> 01:31:13,550
At every phase of your entry, knowing your
energy and controlling it is critical.

1286
01:31:13,880 --> 01:31:20,880
For instance, for whatever reason, if your
burn didn't go right and you think you're

1287
01:31:21,840 --> 01:31:28,840
going to be short of the runway, we notched
down the angle of attack just a little bit.

1288
01:31:29,190 --> 01:31:34,400
I think about 38 degrees was about the lowest
you could safely go.

1289
01:31:34,400 --> 01:31:36,659
And you keep your lift vector.

1290
01:31:36,659 --> 01:31:42,090
You basically would fly the entire entry with
your lift vector going away from the earth,

1291
01:31:42,090 --> 01:31:44,790
and that maximizes your range.

1292
01:31:44,790 --> 01:31:49,580
But you actually target the entry so that
you have more energy than you need because

1293
01:31:49,580 --> 01:31:54,679
it's a lot easier to bleed off energy than
somehow to get it back, especially when you

1294
01:31:54,679 --> 01:31:56,449
don't have any engines.

1295
01:31:56,449 --> 01:32:02,179
What you normally do then is you will basically
do a roll maneuver.

1296
01:32:02,179 --> 01:32:07,850
And you'll be rolling so that your angle of
attack, with respect to your velocity vector,

1297
01:32:07,850 --> 01:32:09,790
is always 40 degrees.

1298
01:32:09,790 --> 01:32:13,929
But essentially you're rolling around the
velocity vector so you can now point your

1299
01:32:13,929 --> 01:32:16,550
lift over to the side.

1300
01:32:16,550 --> 01:32:23,550
And, for instance, if you didn't have enough
propellant when you were burning, and so now

1301
01:32:26,199 --> 01:32:31,590
you actually have too much energy, what you're
going to do -- Or, for instance, if you have

1302
01:32:31,590 --> 01:32:36,020
a lot of cross-range that you have to make
up, you could spend your entire entry over

1303
01:32:36,020 --> 01:32:37,330
on your side like this.

1304
01:32:37,330 --> 01:32:44,330
And, in fact, there was even a case which
we would simulate if you have an under-burn,

1305
01:32:47,110 --> 01:32:50,420
now you have too much energy and you have
to get really get rid of a lot of energy,

1306
01:32:50,420 --> 01:32:53,900
you could actually roll 180 degrees.

1307
01:32:53,900 --> 01:32:55,929
And that would be pretty sporty.

1308
01:32:55,929 --> 01:32:57,969
[LAUGHTER] Again, nobody has ever had to do
that.

1309
01:32:57,969 --> 01:32:59,350
But we did simulate it.

1310
01:32:59,350 --> 01:33:06,350
And I don't know what you would make of the
aerodynamics coming in, but the point is you

1311
01:33:09,530 --> 01:33:14,639
have a basic design that you're working with
and then you try to develop operational procedures

1312
01:33:14,639 --> 01:33:19,120
to make the system work in as many contingencies
as possible.

1313
01:33:19,120 --> 01:33:20,639
Anyway, that's the deal.

1314
01:33:20,639 --> 01:33:27,639
You basically are rolling around the velocity
vector to control both your energy and your

1315
01:33:28,330 --> 01:33:31,260
cross-range.

1316
01:33:31,260 --> 01:33:32,870
Let's see.

1317
01:33:32,870 --> 01:33:39,870
Then at 20 psf the elevons actually get pitch
affectivity, and so you disable the pitch

1318
01:33:43,969 --> 01:33:44,670
jets.

1319
01:33:44,670 --> 01:33:50,909
And now both the pitch and the roll are controlled
by the elevons.

1320
01:33:50,909 --> 01:33:54,179
The vertical stabilizer, as you can see, is
in the shadow.

1321
01:33:54,179 --> 01:33:58,739
And so, actually, you don't get yaw affectivity
out of the vertical stabilizer until just

1322
01:33:58,739 --> 01:34:05,739
about transonic and subsonic, when you actually
do the final pitch-over to get ready for going

1323
01:34:06,010 --> 01:34:08,210
into the heading alignment circle.

1324
01:34:08,210 --> 01:34:13,809
And that's why sometimes, if you've seen pictures
of the Shuttle as it approaches the landing

1325
01:34:13,809 --> 01:34:16,909
at Kennedy Space Center, you will see little
plumes come out the side.

1326
01:34:16,909 --> 01:34:22,670
And that's the yaw jets and the RCS which
are still firing, because it's still supersonic

1327
01:34:22,670 --> 01:34:25,900
when it gets over the Space Center.

1328
01:34:25,900 --> 01:34:31,780
And, if you're on the ground, you can actually
hear this double sonic boom which is pretty

1329
01:34:31,780 --> 01:34:32,030
impressive.

1330
01:34:31,969 --> 01:34:35,800
And I guess you get one from the front and
one from the back of the vehicle, so it's

1331
01:34:35,800 --> 01:34:42,800
a boom boom and then it goes around.

1332
01:34:43,320 --> 01:34:48,530
And then, of course, you hit the atmosphere
at mach 25.

1333
01:34:48,530 --> 01:34:55,530
And so you're going through this entire aerodynamic
regime down through hypersonic, supersonic,

1334
01:34:57,679 --> 01:35:00,550
transonic, subsonic.

1335
01:35:00,550 --> 01:35:07,550
And I remember, Max Faget gave us a little
talk about how the aerodynamic coefficients,

1336
01:35:07,820 --> 01:35:14,820
I mean you were talking about them, but they
change at different mach numbers, right?

1337
01:35:14,969 --> 01:35:17,580
Oh, yes.

1338
01:35:17,580 --> 01:35:22,040
And we mentioned this before, you know, why
you really need a fly-by-wire system on this

1339
01:35:22,040 --> 01:35:29,040
vehicle, because the control laws that you're
using to do a roll maneuver at mach 15 are

1340
01:35:33,889 --> 01:35:38,639
different from doing a roll maneuver at mach
8.

1341
01:35:38,639 --> 01:35:42,119
These program test inputs, you can hardly
see them.

1342
01:35:42,119 --> 01:35:43,659
I mean you really didn't feel them.

1343
01:35:43,659 --> 01:35:50,659
They were just a couple of degrees that you
would move the stick, you know, just little

1344
01:35:51,869 --> 01:35:52,420
things.

1345
01:35:52,420 --> 01:35:58,850
But that collected enough data to get a much
better determination of these coefficients.

1346
01:35:58,850 --> 01:36:03,350
You're very sensitive to things like beta
angle.

1347
01:36:03,350 --> 01:36:04,960
Probably about two degrees.

1348
01:36:04,960 --> 01:36:07,119
If you go off more than that.

1349
01:36:07,119 --> 01:36:14,119
Actually, when you read the detailed description
of the loss of Columbia, when they had a penetration

1350
01:36:14,830 --> 01:36:20,690
of the forward edge of the wing, that disturbed
the airflow.

1351
01:36:20,690 --> 01:36:27,690
And so the control system was fighting a really
valiant fight to keep Columbia on target.

1352
01:36:32,130 --> 01:36:35,559
And they could see that on the ground.

1353
01:36:35,559 --> 01:36:41,909
There was more aerodynamic surface activity
and the RCS jets kicked in.

1354
01:36:41,909 --> 01:36:48,909
In the end, of course, you run out of control
authority and the vehicle eventually diverged

1355
01:36:50,850 --> 01:36:54,119
and it actually broke up aerodynamically.

1356
01:36:54,119 --> 01:36:56,449
It was not an explosion.

1357
01:36:56,449 --> 01:36:59,960
It just broke up aerodynamically.

1358
01:36:59,960 --> 01:37:06,960
The hot gases in the wing were disrupting
the airflow and eventually the wing was slumping,

1359
01:37:09,489 --> 01:37:12,380
and so things were just getting worse and
worse.

1360
01:37:12,380 --> 01:37:15,969
And I don't know exactly what went first.

1361
01:37:15,969 --> 01:37:19,989
Pieces were falling off along the way.

1362
01:37:19,989 --> 01:37:26,989
The same thing if you read the analysis of
the Challenger accident on a second-by-second

1363
01:37:27,559 --> 01:37:34,409
basis, you'll see the main engines were adjusting
their thrust and trying to keep it -- The

1364
01:37:34,409 --> 01:37:40,570
system was really working hard just doing
what it was supposed to do.

1365
01:37:40,570 --> 01:37:46,679
Essentially the flight control system was
trying to keep it within the control boundaries,

1366
01:37:46,679 --> 01:37:51,960
and eventually it ran out of muscle because
of the other failures.

1367
01:37:51,960 --> 01:37:58,960
And once you go to a bad beta angle or angle
of attack the vehicle breaks up aerodynamically.

1368
01:38:00,610 --> 01:38:06,489
Bass, you might say a word about the aerodynamic
coefficients and which ones were the hardest

1369
01:38:06,489 --> 01:38:11,219
to determine and how big [were the errors?].

1370
01:38:11,219 --> 01:38:11,809
OK.

1371
01:38:11,809 --> 01:38:18,809
Basically, aerodynamic coefficients are normal
forces, side forces, rolling moments, yawing

1372
01:38:21,300 --> 01:38:28,300
moments, pitching moments and those that change
that like elevators, body flaps, rudders and

1373
01:38:33,100 --> 01:38:35,449
speed breaks.

1374
01:38:35,449 --> 01:38:42,449
The coefficients, the biggest variations are
in the low supersonic to transonic speed regimes

1375
01:38:49,760 --> 01:38:52,489
primarily in the control variables.

1376
01:38:52,489 --> 01:38:59,489
The biggest ones were just before transition
or any time that the elevators were in an

1377
01:39:01,250 --> 01:39:08,250
up position where the flow couldn't quite
decide whether to be attached or separated.

1378
01:39:09,770 --> 01:39:11,730
And so you want to avoid that.

1379
01:39:11,730 --> 01:39:17,090
Digging down, not very much variations in
those at all, but coming in the up position

1380
01:39:17,090 --> 01:39:21,139
pretty big variations in the rolling moments
and yaw moments due to those.

1381
01:39:21,139 --> 01:39:27,580
And we tried to avoid those, of course, and
henceforth with the CG location.

1382
01:39:27,580 --> 01:39:34,580
But those were the ones that probably were
the toughest and we tried to stay away from.

1383
01:39:36,510 --> 01:39:43,510
Overall, hypersonics right on, subsonics second
best, transonic the most difficult, low supersonic

1384
01:39:49,929 --> 01:39:52,270
kind of in between there.

1385
01:39:52,270 --> 01:39:59,270
The coefficients, it's hard to talk about
them on a percentage basis because CM is zero

1386
01:39:59,909 --> 01:40:05,850
and the delta CM is an infinite percentage
so you cannot really talk about them on a

1387
01:40:05,850 --> 01:40:09,369
percentage basis.

1388
01:40:09,369 --> 01:40:16,369
But, when you look at the plots like CM versus
alpha, very small variation after we got through

1389
01:40:21,340 --> 01:40:23,719
with the flight test program.

1390
01:40:23,719 --> 01:40:30,409
Before we got through the flight test program,
we probably cut the variations in half on

1391
01:40:30,409 --> 01:40:35,210
things like pitching moments, yawing moments
and rolling moments.

1392
01:40:35,210 --> 01:40:40,880
We did better than that on the pitching moments,
yawing moments and rolling moments due to

1393
01:40:40,880 --> 01:40:47,880
elevator positions when they were local angles
of attack.

1394
01:40:48,199 --> 01:40:55,199
And those were cut quite significantly with
the PTIs.

1395
01:40:55,830 --> 01:41:02,830
But still, even today, you don't just have
one coefficient at one angle of attack, one

1396
01:41:03,280 --> 01:41:05,300
angle of side slippage.

1397
01:41:05,300 --> 01:41:09,159
You evaluate that one plus the variation that's
about it.

1398
01:41:09,159 --> 01:41:16,159
And I remember one of the big activities in
the simulators before the first flight.

1399
01:41:17,320 --> 01:41:23,010
They would have the test flight crews, who
were going to make these flights, do flying

1400
01:41:23,010 --> 01:41:24,179
entries.

1401
01:41:24,179 --> 01:41:28,699
And they would actually vary the aerodynamic
coefficients.

1402
01:41:28,699 --> 01:41:35,340
And, if you put in a big enough variation,
three sigma and all of the parameters and

1403
01:41:35,340 --> 01:41:41,300
they went in the wrong direction, you could
always make it impossible to have a successful

1404
01:41:41,300 --> 01:41:41,639
entry.

1405
01:41:41,639 --> 01:41:47,739
And so it was a real question where the managers,
and Aaron, maybe you have something to say

1406
01:41:47,739 --> 01:41:53,949
about that, you and Chris Kraft had to really
make the decision when you knew enough and

1407
01:41:53,949 --> 01:41:55,369
when you could fly safely.

1408
01:41:55,369 --> 01:41:56,619
You're going to hear Chris Kraft talk shortly.

1409
01:41:56,619 --> 01:42:03,619
But I remember after we landed the first mission
there were a lot of people saying that the

1410
01:42:11,389 --> 01:42:13,030
Shuttle wasn't going to work, all the tiles
were going to come off.

1411
01:42:13,030 --> 01:42:20,030
The flight control system was a big issue
because of the aerodynamics.

1412
01:42:22,030 --> 01:42:22,280
The flight control system, the aerodynamics
wasn't going to work.
I don't know if you've ever been to the Johnson
Space Center and to the Control Room, but

1413
01:42:24,239 --> 01:42:30,530
I was sitting at the consul with Chris Kraft
and he got on the Net and said -- Because

1414
01:42:30,530 --> 01:42:31,940
there was a lot of criticism.

1415
01:42:31,940 --> 01:42:36,400
A lot of people wrote letters that the Shuttle
would crash and wasn't going to make it.

1416
01:42:36,400 --> 01:42:41,350
And he got on the Net and said we're infinitely
smarter today.

1417
01:42:41,350 --> 01:42:44,909
And I guess that summarized it, we were infinitely
smarter and we did design a good system.

1418
01:42:44,909 --> 01:42:51,909
And I think that about summed it up, that
we were infinitely smarter.

1419
01:42:56,300 --> 01:42:58,389
Any more questions?

1420
01:42:58,389 --> 01:42:58,699
Yeah.

1421
01:42:58,699 --> 01:43:00,250
Actually, it's an operational question.

1422
01:43:00,250 --> 01:43:00,559
OK.

1423
01:43:00,559 --> 01:43:05,690
I'm just wondering if the entire crew is trained
on the whole landing procedure.

1424
01:43:05,690 --> 01:43:06,110
No.

1425
01:43:06,110 --> 01:43:11,290
We have two pilots just like in any airplane.

1426
01:43:11,290 --> 01:43:18,150
Some of the people who flew center seat as
flight engineers were trained pilots.

1427
01:43:18,150 --> 01:43:21,239
And I would have been quite comfortable if
they had landed the Shuttle.

1428
01:43:21,239 --> 01:43:27,369
But how many failures do you prepare for?

1429
01:43:27,369 --> 01:43:32,500
We have two people onboard who are trained
to land.

1430
01:43:32,500 --> 01:43:38,940
I always thought to myself, we also have this
auto land software which nobody has ever used,

1431
01:43:38,940 --> 01:43:45,940
but if somehow all the other six people were
incapacitated and it was just me, I would

1432
01:43:46,290 --> 01:43:48,690
push the auto land sequence.

1433
01:43:48,690 --> 01:43:55,690
[LAUGHTER] And all you have to do is put the
gear down manually, and I know how to do that.

1434
01:43:55,960 --> 01:44:02,900
But landing the Shuttle is really very complicated.

1435
01:44:02,900 --> 01:44:08,230
And they train hundreds and hundreds of hours
in the simulator.

1436
01:44:08,230 --> 01:44:15,230
Some day we could spend a whole session talking
about the Shuttle Training Aircraft.

1437
01:44:16,520 --> 01:44:23,290
It is one thing to land in the simulator,
but nobody has ever died in a simulator, number

1438
01:44:23,290 --> 01:44:23,540
one.

1439
01:44:23,460 --> 01:44:27,920
And, number two, you're looking at a TV screen.

1440
01:44:27,920 --> 01:44:29,860
You're not actually looking out at the runway.

1441
01:44:29,860 --> 01:44:32,130
You don't feel the bumpy aerodynamics.

1442
01:44:32,130 --> 01:44:39,130
And so they developed a Shuttle Training Aircraft,
which is the Gulfstream II very heavily modified.

1443
01:44:41,380 --> 01:44:43,690
It's actually a flying simulator.

1444
01:44:43,690 --> 01:44:50,690
Your final approach, because your L/D on this
vehicle, I don't know what it is exactly,

1445
01:44:51,139 --> 01:44:54,190
is about five maybe.

1446
01:44:54,190 --> 01:44:56,350
I think five at best, yeah.

1447
01:44:56,350 --> 01:45:01,389
You're coming in at about a 20 degree approach
angle, which may not seem like a lot.

1448
01:45:01,389 --> 01:45:08,389
But a commercial airplane comes in at about
three degrees and the problem is, you take

1449
01:45:08,909 --> 01:45:14,650
a regular airplane, and you point it down
at a 20 degree angle,and your airspeed is

1450
01:45:14,650 --> 01:45:16,250
going to go above your redline.

1451
01:45:16,250 --> 01:45:22,469
So you've got to make enough drag to simulate
the Shuttle.

1452
01:45:22,469 --> 01:45:27,159
There's computers inside this Shuttle training
aircraft.

1453
01:45:27,159 --> 01:45:33,540
The left seat is set up to be just like the
Shuttle cockpit, and when the pilot makes

1454
01:45:33,540 --> 01:45:38,949
the maneuvers, it basically goes back into
the computers and they work the flight control

1455
01:45:38,949 --> 01:45:43,010
system of the gulf stream, to make the gulf
stream fly like the Shuttle.

1456
01:45:43,010 --> 01:45:48,389
The only way that they can produce enough
drag to make it go at a constant speed at

1457
01:45:48,389 --> 01:45:55,389
a 20 degree angle, is you have full speed
brakes your gear is down, you have thrust

1458
01:45:57,330 --> 01:46:02,929
reverses you run your engines in reverse,
after your on the runway to slow youself down.

1459
01:46:02,929 --> 01:46:07,540
On the gulf stream, they run their engines
at 90% reverse thrust while they're flying

1460
01:46:07,540 --> 01:46:09,139
in the air.

1461
01:46:09,139 --> 01:46:11,400
It's an extraodinary vehicle.

1462
01:46:11,400 --> 01:46:17,440
I've flown in the center seat just to sit
in it and you may be flying on this angle

1463
01:46:17,440 --> 01:46:24,440
but it looks like your flying like this [LAUGHTER]
It's really extraodinary.

1464
01:46:25,600 --> 01:46:32,600
Just one thing to remind you,a week from today
we've asked for the initial report outline

1465
01:46:33,199 --> 01:46:35,350
plus some reference material.

1466
01:46:35,350 --> 01:46:42,350
What we want to get a sense of what is your
plans, what's the scope of what you're going

1467
01:46:42,860 --> 01:46:49,860
to be looking at, what are you going to deal
with and I hope by this time that you've located

1468
01:46:50,909 --> 01:46:57,690
some reference materials you're going to be
using.

1469
01:46:57,690 --> 01:47:02,570
We'll be sort of spiralling in on this so
the idea is we'll take a look at what your

1470
01:47:02,570 --> 01:47:09,210
plans are and then we can work together if
you have some questions or having difficulties

1471
01:47:09,210 --> 01:47:13,510
this gives us some opportunities to talk about
it to make sure you're on the right track

1472
01:47:13,510 --> 01:47:18,929
so you'll be doing something that you can
be proud of, that you'll actually learn something

1473
01:47:18,929 --> 01:47:23,159
from, so that's due a week from today.

1474
01:47:23,159 --> 01:47:28,159
It would be useful for me to have those electronically
so that I can send them to Professor Cohen

1475
01:47:28,159 --> 01:47:29,650
for him to look at.

1476
01:47:29,650 --> 01:47:36,650
I am happy to accept hard copy as well but
I want them electronically Any questions?

1477
01:47:37,590 --> 01:47:40,770
Have a good weekend.