

# Wrap-Up

Our approach: combine game theory with evolutionary dynamics to understand people's puzzling preferences, beliefs, ideologies, and heuristics

Some of the puzzles we tackled:

Where do rights come from?

Why do North Indians find long fingernails beautiful?

Why do we give to Habitat for Humanity?

Why do people have taboos?

Why do we care about principles?

Why do we care so much about symbolic gestures?

Why do we consider omission less bad than commission?

Why do we use innuendos?

Why do we have norms against chemical weapons?

Note how powerful this framework is:

Taught us about...

- rights
- emotions
- beauty
- altruism
- symbolism
- ethics
- communication

Not just posthoc explanation, but also...

- novel predictions
- prescriptions
- clarifies age old debates

New predictions, e.g.:

- The uncorrelated asymmetries we condition rights on have to be evident (e.g. not size but who comes first)

- We will care if people are “principled” when temptation is large but rare

- we will see categorical norms more so in international than domestic law

- direct speech with “noise” works differently than innuendos

New Policy Implications, e.g.:

- Taboos should not be respected in public policy
- domestic law should ignore omission/commission.

Clarifies:

-Our sense of rights isn't God-given, natural, absolute. Rather, it implements the Bourgeois equilibrium

-is beauty completely culturally construed?

-are norms completely arbitrary?

-is prosocial behavior motivated by warm glow?

Or is it altruistic?

Some of the methods we used:

- animals
- cross cultural variation
- reinterpret old experiments
- new lab experiments
- field experiments
- computer simulations
- mathematical proofs
- current events, history, literature, philosophy

## Models:

-nash

Replicator dynamic

-reinforcement learning

-wright fisher

-moran

-extensive form games

-information structures

Let's do a brief overview of the models we focused on:

Hawk-Dove

Costly Signaling

Repeated-PD

CWOL

Common Knowledge

Let's remind you about them one at a time

# Hawk-Dove

## Puzzle

Where do rights come from? Are they God-given, natural, absolute?

## Model

Two players compete for a contested resource

Each can play Hawk, Dove, or Bourgeois (H if arrive first, D o/w)

It is an equilibrium to attend to uncorrelated asymmetries

## Key insight

Our sense of rights isn't God-given, natural, absolute. Rather, it implements this equilibrium

# Hawk-Dove

## Main lesson

Resolves an age-old puzzle

## Also, novel prediction

We later learned that the uncorrelated asymmetries we condition rights on have to be evident

## Technique highlighted

Animal evidence

## One big open question

Why are rights “growing” over time?

Next...

# Costly Signaling

## Puzzle

Why do peacocks have big tails? Why do North Indians find long fingernails beautiful? Why do we find white shoes beautiful? Where does our sense of beauty come from?

## Model

Two kinds of senders: low/high

Can't convey quality; can send otherwise useless signals of different "strengths"

Receivers decide whether to match w/ senders based on signal

It is an equilibrium for senders to send these wasteful signals

## Key insight

Peacock's tails are costly signals; we find costly signals beautiful

# Costly Signaling

Main lesson

Explains really puzzling phenomenon

Techniques highlighted

Simulations

Proofs

Next...

# Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

## Puzzle

Why do we give to Habitat for Humanity? Why is altruism so “weird”?

## Model

Can pay cost  $c$  to benefit other by  $b$ ;  $c < b$

Repeat w/ probability  $\delta$

Any cooperative equilibrium has two traits: reciprocity and  $b/c > \delta$

## Key insight

Altruistic preferences implement cooperative equilibrium; they exhibit these two traits

AND not other traits, like efficiency

# Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

## Main lesson

Practical application: we can increase prosocial behavior!

## Novel predictions/prescriptions

Now that we've talked about CK, we can add a third condition:  $b$ ,  $c$  and  $\delta$  must be CK, and can only reward/punish behavior that is ck (e.g. can't punish omission)

We can interpret and organize the behavioral economics literature

## Techniques highlighted

Field experiment (PG&E): demonstrate feasibility

Next...

# Cooperating Without Looking

## Puzzle

Why do people attend to thoughts, not just cooperative actions

## Model (Envelope Game)

Low or high temptation chosen

Player 1 chooses whether to look at temptation

Player 1 chooses whether to cooperate

Player 2 chooses whether to continue

CWOL/Attend to Looking is a Nash equilibrium

## Key Insight

People that don't look can be trusted. Principles, taboos, etc. keep us from looking

# Cooperating Without Looking

## Main lesson

Explains puzzle cooperation lit couldn't

## Novel predictions/prescriptions

When does looking/attending to looking matter? When temptation is large but rare, and costly

Taboos should not be respected in public policy

## Open question

We neeeeeeeeeeeeeeed evidence!

Next (and last)...

# Common Knowledge

## Puzzles

- Why do we care so much about symbolic gestures?
- Why do we consider omission less bad than commission?
- Why do we use innuendos?
- Why do we have norms against chemical weapons?

## Model

In game with multiple equilibria, can only condition behavior on evident events (i.e. when there is  $\sim$ CK)

## Key Insights

- Symbolic gestures are evident
- Categorical norms condition behavior on evident events
- An act of commission is an evident event but an act of omission is not
- Innuendo is not evident

Main lesson:

Benefit of formalizing: gained a lot of insight, such as...

Novel predictions

Provides a definition for innuendos

We'll care about the omission/commission when coordination is more important choice) (international vs. domestic; coordinated punishment vs. partner choice)

Omission/commission distinction should be ignored in domestic law

We wouldn't have realized that some norms aren't effective in the first place

Technique highlighted


Testing novel predictions w/ experiments (a.k.a. Jill is awesome)

Let's talk (even) big(ger) picture...

We used and learned a wide variety of techniques to implement this approach. Here are some key ones...

Animal evidence

Establishes that  
explanation is  
“deep” and  
“parsimonious”



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## Cross-Cultural Variation

Test comparative  
statics (long  
fingernails aren't an  
equilibrium here)



Image courtesy of Thomas Stromberg on Flickr CC BY-NC

Examples from  
history, current  
events, literature,  
media

Provide evidence,  
demonstrate puzzle,  
elucidate puzzles, rule  
out alternatives

See [The Oatmeal comic](#)  
about chemical weapons.

Reinterpret  
experimental  
evidence


Comparative  
statics and testing  
assumptions



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
Run lab experiments

Comparative statics and testing assumptions




Run field experiments

Demonstrate feasibility



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## Modeling

Prevent confusion/ambiguity, verify intuition, show which assumptions depends on, show how general it is, derive new predictions

# Dynamics

Show that applies to emotions, beliefs, preferences, ideologies... i.e. when people aren't rational; equilibrium selection


$$\dot{x}_A = x_A * (f_A(x_A, x_B) - \bar{f}(x_A, x_B))$$

Current frequency  
of strategy

Own fitness relative  
to the average

# Simulations

Investigate dynamics when can't solve



That's a lot to learn in one semester. Nice work!!

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Thank you for...

... challenging the arguments

... providing evidence

... extending the arguments

... and generally being an incredible class!

**STAY IN TOUCH!**

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14.11 Insights from Game Theory into Social Behavior  
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