Study Materials

Review Notes; Contracts I (PDF) 

(By Arda Gitmez and Kosti Takala. Used with permission.)

Table of Contents

1. A Very Brief Introduction to Mechanism Design

     1.1 Revelation Principle

2. Efficient Mechanisms

     2.1 Vickrey-Clark-Groves Mechanism

     2.2 Payoff Equivalence

3. Optimal Mechanisms

     3.1 An Example

     3.2 Single-Crossing and Constraint Simplification

     3.3 The General Case

     3.4 Optimal Auctions

4. Appendix

Adverse Selection: An IC Transfer Scheme 

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A graph with blue, teal, red, and green lines that go from bottom left corner to the top right corner.

(Image courtesy of Kosti Takala. Used with permission.)