Course Meeting Times
Lectures: 2 sessions / week, 1.5 hours / session
Recitations: 1 session / week, 1 hour / session
This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.
Textbooks and Readings
In addition to the textbooks listed below, there will be readings from various journals to supplement the texts.
|Take-home final exam||60%|
There will be 5 problem sets due throughout the semester, as well as a take-home exam during the final exam week. Students have 24 hours to complete and return the exam.
|LEC #||TOPICS||KEY DATES|
|1||Review of basic concepts|
|2||Application: Bargaining with complete information|
|3||Extensive-form games with imperfect information|
|4||Signaling and forward induction||Problem set 1 due|
|5||Application: Signaling in bargaining|
|6||Repeated games and their applications|
|8||Application: Screening and reputation in bargaining|
|9||Rationalizability and correlated equilibrium||Problem set 2 due|
|10||Supermodular games and their applications|
|11||Global games and their applications||Problem set 3 due|
|12||Review||Problem set 4 due|
|13||Learning and evolutionary foundations||Problem set 5 due|