Primary Texts

[FT]= Buy at MIT Press Buy at Amazon Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414.

[OR]= Buy at MIT Press Buy at Amazon Osborne, Martin, and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994. ISBN: 9780262650403.

Supplementary Texts

[MS]= Buy at Amazon Mailath, George J., and Larry Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN: 9780195300796.

[W]= Buy at MIT Press Buy at Amazon Weibull, Jorgen. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. ISBN: 9780262731218.

[FL]= Buy at MIT Press Buy at Amazon Fudenberg, Drew, and David Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. ISBN: 9780262061940.

1 Review of basic concepts

[FT] Chapter 1, 2, and 3

[OR] Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 6

2 Application: Bargaining with complete information

[OR] Chapter 7

Rubinstein, A. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model." Econometrica 50 (1982): 97-109.

3 Extensive-form games with imperfect information

[FT] Chapter 8

[OR] Chapter 11, and 12

Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. "Sequential Equilibrium." Econometrica 50 (1982): 863-894.

4 Signaling and forward induction

[FT] Chapter 8, and 11

[OR] Chapter 12

Cho, I. -K., and D. Kreps. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria." Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (1987): 179-221.

5 Application: Signaling in bargaining Admati, A., and M. Perry. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining." Review of Economic Studies 54 (1987): 345-364.
6 Repeated games and their applications

[FT] Chapter 5

[MS] Chapter 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 11

Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring." Econometrica 58 (1990): 1041-1063.

Abreu, D., P. Milgrom, and D. Pearce. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships." Econometrica 59 (1991): 1713-1733.

Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information." Econometrica 54 (1986): 533-554.

Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information." Econometrica 62 (1994): 997-1039.

7 Reputation formation

[FT] Chapter 9

Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. "Reputation and Imperfect Information." Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 253-279.

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. "Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence." Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 280-312.

Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma." Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 245-252.

Fudenberg, D., and D. Levine. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player." Econometrica 57 (1989): 759-778.

8 Application: Screening and reputation in bargaining

[FT] Chapter 10

Gul, F., H. Sonnenschein, and R. Wilson. "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture." Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986): 155-190.

Abreu, D., and F. Gul. "Bargaining and Reputation." Econometrica 68 (2000): 85-117.

9 Rationalizability and correlated equilibrium

[OR] Chapter 12

[FT] Chapter 8, 9, and 11

Bernheim, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior." Econometrica 52 (1984): 1007-1028.

Pearce, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection." Econometrica 52 (1984): 1029-1050.

Aumann, R. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality." Econometrica 55 (1987): 1-18.

Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi. "Rationalizable Bidding in First-Price Auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2003): 38-72.

10 Supermodular games and their applications

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. "Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities." Econometrica 58 (1990): 1255-1277.

Vives, X. "Complementarities and Games: New Developments." Journal of Economic Literature 43 (2005): 437-479.

Buy at Amazon Topkis, D. M. Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. ISBN: 9780691032443.

Van Zandt, T., and X. Vives. "Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities." Journal of Economic Theory 34 (2007): 339-360.

11 Global games and their applications

Buy at Amazon Morris, S., and H. S. Shin. "Global Games: Theory and Applications." In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume I. Edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. ISBN: 9780521524117.

Carlsson, H., and E. van Damme. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection." Econometrica 61 (1993): 989-1018.

Morris, S., and H. S. Shin. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Attacks." American Economic Review 88 (1998): 587-597.

Frankel, D., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities." Journal of Economic Theory 108 (2003): 1-44.

12 Review  
13 Learning and evolutionary foundations

[W] Chapter 2, and 3

[FL] Chapter 4, 5, and 6

Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-run Equilibria in Games." Econometrica 61 (1993): 29-56.

Ellison, G. "Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination." Econometrica 61 (1993): 1047-1071.

Möbius, M. "The Formation of Ghettos as a Local Interaction Phenomenon." Draft paper. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. (This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader.PDF)

Ellison, G. "Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory." Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002): 994-1034.

Sandholm, W. "Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing." Review of Economic Studies 69 (2002): 667-689.

14 Review