Course Meeting Times

Lectures: 2 sessions / week, 1.5 hours / session

Recitations: 1 session / week, 1 hour / session


14.122 Microeconomic Theory II is the prerequisite for this course.


4 problem sets 40%
Take-home final exam 60%

Recommended Textbook

Buy at MIT Press Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414.


1. Solution Concepts for Static Games

     a. Complete information: rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, epistemic foundations

     b. Incomplete information: Bayesian Nash equilibrium, interim correlated

2. Solution Concepts for Extensive-form Games

     a. Backwards induction, subgame perfection, iterated conditional dominance

     b. Bargaining with complete information 

3. Equilibrium Concepts for Games with Imperfect Information

4. Signaling and Forward Induction

     a. Stable equilirium, the intuitive criterion, iterated weak dominance, epistemic

5. Repeated Games

6. Reputation Formation 

     a. Reputation with short-lived opponents

     b. Screening and reputation in bargaining

7. Supermodular Games

8. Global Games

9. Cooperative Games

      a. Nash bargaining solution, core, Shapley value

      b. Non-cooperative implentations