Strategy and Information

A rock, a crumpled piece of paper, and a pair of orange-handled scissors are set side-by-side on a black background.

A photograph of a rock, paper, and scissors-representing the well-known hand game Rock, Paper, Scissors. This is an example of what game theorists call a strategic interaction. (Image courtesy of Jesse Kruger on Flickr. License: CC BY-NC.)


MIT Course Number


As Taught In

Spring 2016



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Course Description

Course Features

Course Description

This is an advanced course in game theory. We begin with a rigorous overview of the main equilibrium concepts for non-­cooperative games in both static and dynamic settings with either complete or incomplete information. We define and explore properties of iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, sequential, perfect and proper equilibria, the intuitive criterion, and iterated weak dominance. We discuss applications to auctions, bargaining, and repeated games. Then we introduce solution concepts for cooperative games and study non-­cooperative implementations. Other topics include matching theory and networks.

Related Content

Mihai Manea. 14.16 Strategy and Information. Spring 2016. Massachusetts Institute of Technology: MIT OpenCourseWare, License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA.

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