JUSTICE

Lecture 3 – Communal norms

1. Last time:

- a. The parts of the Principle of Utility and the case for them
- b. Implications of the Principle of Utility
 - i. A comprehensive (personal and political) morality
 - ii. Legal protection for unpopular behavior where punishment "unprofitable"
 - iii. Rights understood as means to maximizing happiness
- 2. Civil liberties: will they be secure if we accept utilitiarianism?
- 3. Bowers v. Hardwick
 - a. Due Process Clauses guarantee a fundamental right to privacy, but
 - b. Right to privacy does not extend to protection for homosexual conduct, because
 - i. Argument A: "no connection" with family/marriage/procreation
 - ii. Argument B: majority's conviction is a "rational basis" for criminalization

4. Lawrence v. Texas

- a. Right to privacy extends to protection for matters of sexual intimacy, because
 - i. Argument A: the argument from "autonomy"
 - ii. Argument B: majority's conviction insufficient basis for criminalization
- 5. How to weigh the majority's antipathy towards unpopular private conduct?
 - a. View 1: there are no fundamental rights, and antipathy *always* counts for something
 - b. View 2: majority's antipathy counts *only* where no fundamental right at stake
 - c. View 3: majority's antipathy *never* counts, even when no fundamental right at stake
- 6. Benthamite utilitarianism and civil liberties
 - a. Does Bentham's view lead to the right result?
 - b. For the right reason?

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