24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI

free will again

summary

final exam info




Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

the first part of the incompatibilist argument

Image removed due to copyright restrictions.

let C be a true statement of the initial conditions, and let L be a true statement of the laws of nature

- I. you never had any control over whether C is true
- 2. you never had any control over whether L is true, so:
- 3. you never had any control over whether C&L is true

the second part of the incompatibilist argument

- 4. determinism is true, so:
- 5. C&L entails that 'you came to class today' is true
- 6. if you never had any control over whether P is true, and P entails Q, then you never had any control over whether Q is true, so:
- 7. you never had any control over whether you came to class today, in which case you did not come to class of your own free will

this principle of inference is questionable:

- I. you never had any control over whether A is true
- 2. you never had any control over whether B is true, so:
- 3. you never had any control over whether A&B is true

let A= 'this coin does not land heads', B='this coin does not land tails'; assuming the coin if tossed lands either heads or tails, A&B is equivalent to 'this coin is not tossed'

but we can hardly run this argument to show you never had any control over whether the coin is not tossed!

fixing the first part

Image removed due to copyright restrictions.

fortunately (3) is plausible enough on its own, so we can start the argument with that:

I. you never had any control over whether C&L is true


- I. you never had any control over whether C&L is true
- 2. determinism is true, so:
- 3. C&L entails that 'you came to class today' is true
- 4. if you never had any control over whether P is true, and P entails Q, then you never had any control over whether Q is true, so:
- 5. you never had any control over whether you came to class today, in which case you did not come to class of your own free will

a parallel argument?

- I. the thermostat never had any control over whether C&L is true
 Image removed due to copyright restrictions.
- 2. determinism is true, so:
- 3. C&L entails that 'the room temp. is 70 today' is true
- 4. if the thermostat never had any control over whether
 P is true, and P entails Q, then the thermostat never
 had any control over whether Q is true, so:
- 5. the thermostat never had any control over whether the room temp is 70 today

the incompatibilist must explain why her argument doesn't generalize to show that thermostats don't work

options



- if determinism true, we are not responsible for our actions, since our choices are determined by factors outside our control
- 2. if indeterminism is true, we are not responsible for our actions, since every choice occurs by chance.
- 3. either determinism is true or indeterminism is true, so:
- 4. we are not responsible for our actions


course overview

- I. can computers think?
- from dualism to functionalism
 a survey of theories of mind
- 3. externalism

is the mind in the head?

- 4. perception
- 5. consciousness and the mind-body problem
- 6. free will

our travels



the final exam

This final exam is CLOSED NOTES AND CLOSED BOOKS: you may not use any books, course notes, or other materials during the exam period in answering your questions. Cellphones must be switched off. Complete all four parts of the exam. Read the instructions carefully. Write clearly and legibly. Label each part (I, II, etc.) in your blue book. Start a separate blue book for part IV. You have three hours to complete the exam. Return this exam with your answers.

part l

PART I (15%): for each quotation—(a) to (e) below provide (i) the author's surname; (ii) an explanation of the main point(s) of the quotation in your own words. (3 points each: I for the identification and 2 for the explanation)

e.g. "Clearly the same style of Knowledge argument could be deployed for taste, hearing, the bodily sensations and generally speaking for the various mental states which are said to have (as it is variously put) raw feels, phenomenal features or qualia. The conclusion in each case is that the qualia are left out of the physicalist story."

part II

PART II (10%): Answer "yes" or "no" to the following questions. Put each answer on a separate line next to the question number in your blue book. (I point each)

e.g. Does the type-F monist (panprotopsychist) think that electrons have conscious mental lives like our own?

part III

PART III (15%): Answer each of the following questions in a short paragraph. Explain any philosophical terminology. (5 points each)

e.g. 'Standing on the beach in Santa Barbara a number of summers ago on a bright sunny day, I found myself transfixed by the intense blue of the Pacific Ocean. Was I not here delighting in the phenomenal aspects of my visual experience? And if I was, doesn't this show that there are visual Qualia? I am not convinced.' Why isn't Tye convinced? PART IV (60%): Write essays on each of the following two questions. Your essays should include a clearly identifiable thesis and arguments supporting it. Explain any philosophical terminology. (30 points each)

the two questions will be selected from the following four

I. (a) Give short explanations of the following five views: substance dualism, property (attribute) dualism, behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism. Give two objections to dualism and two to behaviorism. One objection to an identity theory for pain (say, pain = c-fibers firing) appeals to the premise that it is conceivable that there is pain without c-fibers firing, or vice versa. Does this sort of objection to the identity theory work equally well against functionalism? Why or why not?

(b) Take what you think is the most promising of the five views, and defend it.

2. What is physicalism? Carefully explain Jackson's Knowledge argument against physicalism. Assess the argument. Does it establish that physicalism is false? If not, why not? Compare and contrast the Knowledge argument with the argument of Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?"

3. According to Searle, "such great philosophers as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant [believe] that we do not see the real world...In the past century philosophers usually put this point by saying 'We do not perceive material objects, we perceive only sense data'." Explain "this point" without using the jargon of "material objects" or "sense data". The argument from illusion is supposed to establish the conclusion that we only perceive sense data. What is that argument? Set it out in the form of premises and conclusion, commenting on whether the argument as you have set it out is valid. What is wrong with the argument, if anything? Finally, compare the argument from illusion with Valberg's presentation of the puzzle of experience.

4. In "Consciousness and its place in nature", Chalmers distinguishes Type-A Materialism, Type-B Materialism, Type-C Materialism, Type-D Dualism, Type-E Dualism, and Type-F Monism. Pick one that you think is false. Explain what this theory is, and why you think it's false. Now take the theory that you think is true (or, at any rate, is the least implausible of the lot). Explain what this theory is, and defend it against at least one objection.

advice

go to the review session

time your answers in proportion to the points (so allow a little less than two hours for the essays)

compose a one page essay plan for each of the four essay questions, and practice writing it out without notes

stay for the entire time

and, of course, you're most welcome to meet with any of us before the exam




Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu

24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 2011

For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.