

17.584, Civil-Military Relations, Spring 2003  
 Prof. Roger Petersen  
**Lecture 11: Africa**

**Week 11**


A. Jackman, Robert, and Rosemary O'Kane, Thomas Johnson, Pat McGowan, Robert Slater, "Explaining African Coup d'Etat," *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 225-250.

Debate between Johnson Slater and McGowan 1984. APSR 78: 622-640. and Robert Jackman who had done previous statistical work on African coups (1978 APSR), joined by Rosemary O'Kane (Business Journal of Political Science 1981 statistics article). Jackman and O'Kane accuse the three actors of major flaws in research design, most notably picking wrong indicators for ethnic domination of military and party fractionalization (just measure it at 1975 regardless of after or before coup) and quibble on cases included in sample. Anthony reply--usual statistics brawl as those in Bromelle is class. Can't network well without articles.

**Lecture**

Class plan:  
 Lecture 11 review, Pakistan and Turkey, Japan  
 Lecture 12: review, Latin America, US/USSR  
 Lecture 13: Victor, Petersen: Multiethnic militaries


<p><b>Broader Variables</b></p> <p>Structural</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Economic (GDP)</li> <li>2. Threat (Desch)</li> <li>3. Class structure/Middle class</li> <li>4. Ethnic composition</li> </ol> <p>Historical/Cultural</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Colonial past</li> <li>Norms</li> </ul> <p>Institutional</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Norms</li> <li>Military organization</li> </ul>	<p><b>Control Mechanisms</b></p> <p>Samuels/Andrea handout</p>	<p><b>DV</b></p> <p>Civilian Control of military.</p> <p>Ways to operationalize:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a.) Finer table, spectrum of instant relationship between civil &amp; military (p. 238-9)</li> <li>b.) Rice and Trinkunas spheres of intervention.</li> <li>c.) Stepan's prerogatives</li> <li>d.) Desch: contestation</li> <li>e.) binary: coup/no coup</li> </ol>
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Study why if when the military intervenes, when it leaves why it doesn't intervene or doesn't leave.

Handout  
 Rice 1990, Trinkunas 1998


Graph by Condoleeza  
 Rice PhD at  
 University of Denver.



Can we talk consistently across cases and time with these methods of measuring DV? US, USSR, Japan, Latin America, Turkey, Pakistan.

Handout: list of coups in Latin America (20<sup>th</sup> century only)

If we can measure on scale, secure civil control.



Why military intervene? 4 theories

--50s-60s: characteristics of military vs. characteristics of the society. Military becoming more efficient than society and compelled to intervene. Eg: Pye ('62). Late 60s-70s characteristics of society eg. Huntington ('68).

'70s bureaucratic politics; military looks out for its corporate interests. Wants autonomy, budget, promotion, salaries.

Late 70s military isn't a unified organization. Individuals use the military for their personal goals. Patron-client.

Different Assumptions:

- I. officers see role within society.
- II. Officers back segments of society
- III. Officers back their own organization
- IV. Officers look out for themselves (individually)

IV works in I-III non-exclusively, in general they may be non-exclusive but important to see when one or more is allegedly absent.

### **Control Mechanisms**

Norms, constitutional/legal, elite rotation, parallel hierarchies, etc. Will try to connect them to broader variables to explain the field of variation we see in Dependent Variable.

Handout: chronology of Pakistan history.

### **Pakistan**

There are 5 ethnic groups in Pakistan: Punjabi, Pathan (also known as Pakhtuns and Pashtuns), Sind, Balochi, Muhajir. Punjabi is the dominant ethnic group, Pathan is second since British times. Pakistan was founded by a Muslim league but more legitimate in India.

1947-Independence and partition. Key leaders die in the late 40s.

1958—coup and war with India. Minority rebellion in Baluchistan.

1969—coup, violence in Northwest.

1971—war with India and civilian government takes over.

1973—constitution makes the military interventions illegal. White paper on defense. Bhutto and PPP.

1977—Zie coup. Bhutto hanged; in jail claimed he tried to distance himself from the military and development of nukes and US removed him—But the military pursued nuclear weapons too. US support for Zie. Islamic rhetoric. Law of Allah. President can dismiss the Prime minister.

1985-88--limited opening. Recurrent question: why does the military open up/extract? International pressure (but probably not have), pressure domestically from society, can cooperation to save civil groups to cooperate with you. Student: why not compile a list of mechanisms for military control of civilians and see if they exactly coincide with some of the civil→ military mechanisms?

1988—Zie dies in plane crash. Benazir Bhutto wins (a lot of Sindhi support).

Coalitions since then and often kicked out Prime Ministers by the president.

1998—military runs census, education review, many other functions.

1999 Musharraf removes corrupt Sharif government (tried to charge constitution censorship + divide and rule policy with military.

Arguments: colonial legacy? Compare India.

Geopolitical→ constant threat from India makes the military strong. Military budget ~50%

Mechanisms enabled norms? Military dominance. Petersen: how path dependent are the civil-military relations?

Student: norms are time dependent-settle with time.

Petersen: Pakistan commentaries—even liberals not unhappy with Sharif coup.

Divide and conquer-backlashed against Sharif hard to see it happen.

Constitutional legal-trying in 1973 with little effect (are they relevant on their own? Without the norm?)

Parallel hierarchy not applied. Mass army discussed but would put non-martial peoples in people Punjabis. Security as domain.

Elite rotation yes, but who controls whom?

Small professional army can't do with India. International norms ignored ethnic minority (this means minority hierarchy of groups, not popular composition. in a sense it's opposite of mass army in multi-ethnic states) -Punjabis dominate but still coups.

Why is India different? Leadership-Nehru→60s early establishment of norms. Ethnic divisions-India is too diverse. No group dominates the military← Punjabis most left to Pakistan)—compare with Bangladesh for history of norms.

Military doctrine of Pakistan: Islamic India civilian. Threat: Pakistan fears India more than the other way around (this is the reverse to Desch's argument).

Turkey: history of dependence of norms argument seen to work. Military legitimate protector of the state (and state forced in the 20s-30s to totalitarianism attractive. Compare with Germany during the 19<sup>th</sup> century which was modeled on Britain and France).

Japan: according to Prof. Samuels, bureaucratic isn't quite civilian control. Petersen: institutional/bureaucratic variables. Berger: from Sword to Chrysanthemum: WWII effect military violence out of politics. Katzenstein: post WWII redefining identity (no reason that it had to go that way but it did). Different from Germany. Defies generalizability? Why were these decisions made? Why did this identity develop in Japan and not elsewhere?