APPLIED ECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS SESSION 11—

I. GAME THEORY AND OLIGOPOLY: RESULTS AND INSIGHTS

- A. COURNOT'S INSIGHT
 - 1. NUMBERS MATTER
 - 2. MORE FIRMS MAKE FOR A MORE COMPETITIVE OUTCOME
 - 3. COLLUSION AND CARTELS
- B. BERTRAND'S INSIGHT
 - 1. PRICE COMPETITION IS FIERCE AND CAN DUPLICATE COMPETITIVE OUTCOME EVEN IF WITH ONLY 2 FIRMS
 - 2. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
- C. STACKELBERG'S INSIGHT
 - 1. ORDER OF PLAY IS IMPORTANT
 - 2. SUSTAINED DOMINANCE OF ONE FIRM
- D. REPEATED GAMES
 - 1. FINITELY REPEATED GAMES: EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE
 - 2. GAMES OF INDEFINITE DURATION
- E. NON-QUANTITY/PRICE GAMES

II. EXTERNALITIES

- A. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: PRICE INDICATES TRUE VALUE AND TRUE COST AT THE MARGIN
- **B. EXTERNAL EFFECTS**
 - 1. COSTS IMPOSED ON PARTY NOT INVOLVED IN THE TRADE
 - ⇒ PRICE DOES NOT EQUAL TRUE MARGINAL COST
 - 2. BENEFITS EXTEND TO PARTY NOT INVOLVED IN THE TRADE
 - ⇒ PRICE DOES NOT EQUAL TRUE MARGINAL VALUE
 - 3. A COMMON TRAGEDY

III. MARKET FAILURE OR A FAILURE TO USE MARKETS

- A. MARKETS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
 - 1. PROPERTY RIGHTS AS A MARKET NECESSITY
 - 2. ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AS THE SOURCE OF EXTERNALITY PROBLEMS
 - 3. RE-INTRODUCTION OF THE MARKET REQUIRES RE-INTRODUCTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
- B. COASE, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND EFFICIENCY
 - 1. PEDESTRIANS, CARS, AND WALK SIGNS
 - 2. ASSIGNMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DISTRIBUTION
- C. MARKET-LIKE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM IN FIJENSEA

IV. NETWORK EXTERNALITIES OR POSITIVE FEEDBACK

- A. A WAKE-UP CALL FROM NEWARK, OHIO
- B. POSITIVE FEEDBACK FOR MS WINDOWS
 - 1. CONSUMERS LIKE BEING ABLE TO INTERACT THEIR PRODUCTS—THE MORE PEOPLE USE *WINDOWS*, THE MORE PEOPLE WANT TO USE *WINDOWS*
 - 2. SCALE ECONOMIES IN SOFTWARE PRODUCTION—THE MORE PEOPLE THAT USE *WINDOWS*, THE MORE SOFTWARE DESIGNERS WANT TO WRITE APPLICATIONS THAT WORK ON *WINDOWS*
- C. THE APPLICATIONS BARRIER TO ENTRY
 - 1. NO FIRM CAN CHALLENGE *WINDOWS* IN THE OPERATING SYSTEM MARKET UNLESS IT HAS A LOT OF APPLICATIONS
 - 2. BUT NO ONE WRITES APPLICATIONS FOR AN OPERATING SYSTEM UNTIL IT IS SUCCESSFUL

D. THE BROWSER WAR

- 1. NETSCAPE HAD DOMINANT SHARE OF BROWSER MARKET
- 2. BROWSER MIGHT BE A FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE PLATFORM
- 3. DESIGNERS WOULD WRITE APPLICATIONS FOR THIS PLATFORM

E. MICROSOFT RESPONSE:

- 1. DEVELOP OWN BROWSER AND OFFER AT 0 PRICE
- 2. TIE UP OEM'S WITH LONG-TERM CONTRACTS

IV. PUBLIC GOODS

- A. NON-RIVALRY IN CONSUMPTION—MARGINAL COST = 0
- B. NON-EXCLUDABILITY—CAN'T EXCLUDE THOSE WHO DON'T PAY
- C. TAXES AND PUBLIC FINANCE