Lecture 11 Game Plan

Reputation and "strategic irrationality"

Course feedback

Credibility and Reputation

"This is our very soul ... our whole life. For them, it's just another field."

- Edwin Land, Polaroid founder, reacting to Kodak's entry into instant photography

Source: Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. *Thinking Strategically: A Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life.* W. W. Norton & Company, 1991.

Kodak's assessment

- Kodak took care to enter gently
 - Kodak film and cameras were incompatible with Polaroid's
 - So Polaroid could still milk profits from its established customer base
- With Kodak's deep pockets, there was no way they would leave
- Thus, Polaroid was going to give in

Polaroid's Growl

- Polaroid responded by not giving in immediately, and saying that it would never give
- How should Kodak react to such statements? Why?

Growling Resolve

Maybe growling changes Polaroid's payoffs enough that it wants to fight

See Figure 23.3 in:

Kreps, David M. *Microeconomics for Managers*. W.W. Norton & Company, 2004: 556-73. ISBN: 0393976793.


Growling Semi-Resolve

What if growling doesn't change Polaroid's payoffs enough that it wants to fight?

See Figure 23.4 in:


Kreps, David M. *Microeconomics for Managers*. W.W. Norton & Company, 2004: 556-73. ISBN: 0393976793.

Reputation in Repeated Games




- Suppose incumbent monopolist always faces 80% chance that another entrant will come along
- Does this change things?

Reputation in Repeated Games




- Fighting costs 3 today
- If Fighting deters next entrant and the one after that, etc.. it has benefit 2 in every future period
 - benefit $2(.8+.8^2+...)=2(1/.2-1)=+8$
- Fighting rational if it preserves "reputation"


"Craziness" to Deter Entry



Not Crazy Enough ...



Responding to "Craziness"



What is the sequential equilibrium of this game?

In-Class Game

Crazy(?) Incumbent Game

Crazy(?) Incumbent: Rules

- Incumbent learns whether it is "Crazy" or "Sane"
 - "Crazy" incumbents love to fight
- Sequence of decisions
- 1. Entrant Enter?
- 2. If so, Incumbent Fight?
- 3. If so, Entrant Stay?
- 4. If so, Incumbent Fight?
 - In last stage, only Crazy want to Fight.

Crazy(?) Incumbent: Payoffs

See handout for details

Get Crazy!

We will play in sets of *five* people

- one Entrant
- four Incumbents

The Entrant may Enter any/all of the four markets

One of the four Incumbents is Crazy!


Get Crazy!

- First, each Incumbent will learn whether it is Crazy or Sane
 - not allowed to credibly reveal this
- Next, Entrant decides which (if any) of the four markets to enter
- In markets with entry, Incumbents decide whether to fight
- In markets with fighting, Entrant decides whether to stay
- In markets with Entrant staying, Incumbent decides whether to Fight

Sane Act Crazy

- Some (but not all!) Sane must Fight
 - if all Fight, entrant will Stay for sure
 - if none Fight, entrant will Leave for sure
- So, Sane must be indifferent to Fighting
- This requires that the entrant must Leave with probability 1/2 after Fight


The Million Dollar Question: Will Entrant Enter?



Entrants Blink

- Some (but not all!) entrants must Leave
 - if all Leave, Sane will Fight for sure
 - if none Leave, Sane will Accom for sure
- Entrant must be indifferent to Leaving
- This requires that incumbent be Crazy with probability 1/3 conditional on Fight
 - so 50% of 75% Sane will Fight

The Million Dollar Question: Will Entrant Enter?



Entrant Stays Out

- What happens if entrant enters?
 - all Crazy Fight (25%) plus 2/3 of the Sane Fight (50%)
 - only get Accomodation 25%
- Entrant should stay out
- What tips the balance is that Entrant must worry about both:
 - Crazy opponents
 - 2. Sane opponents acting crazy (!)

Summary

- Reputation can help establish credibility in repeated games if losing reputation is costly:
 - lost "mystique"
 - others know you aren't Crazy