## Lecture 11 Game Plan

- Reputation and "strategic irrationality"

Course feedback

## Credibility and Reputation

"This is our very soul ... our whole life. For them, it's just another field."

- Edwin Land, Polaroid founder, reacting to Kodak's entry into instant photography

[^0]
## Kodak's assessment

- Kodak took care to enter gently
- Kodak film and cameras were incompatible with Polaroid's
- So Polaroid could still milk profits from its established customer base
- With Kodak's deep pockets, there was no way they would leave
- Thus, Polaroid was going to give in


## Polaroid's Growl

- Polaroid responded by not giving in immediately, and saying that it would never give
- How should Kodak react to such statements? Why?


## Growling Resolve

- Maybe growling changes Polaroid's payoffs enough that it wants to fight

See Figure 23.3 in:
Kreps, David M. Microeconomics for Managers. W.W. Norton \& Company, 2004: 556-73. ISBN: 0393976793.

## Growling Semi-Resolve

What if growling doesn't change Polaroid's payoffs enough that it wants to fight?

See Figure 23.4 in:
Kreps, David M. Microeconomics for Managers. W.W. Norton \& Company, 2004: 556-73. ISBN: 0393976793.

## Reputation in <br> Repeated Games



- Suppose incumbent monopolist always faces 80\% chance that another entrant will come along
- Does this change things?


## Reputation in Repeated Games



- Fighting costs 3 today
- If Fighting deters next entrant and the one after that, etc.. it has benefit 2 in every future period
- benefit $2\left(.8+.8^{2}+. ..\right)=2(1 / .2-1)=+8$
- Fighting rational if it preserves "reputation"


## "Craziness" to Deter Entry



## Not Crazy Enough ...



## Responding to "Craziness"



- What is the sequential equilibrium of this game?


## In-Class Game

## Crazy(?) Incumbent Game

## Crazy(?) Incumbent: Rules

- Incumbent learns whether it is "Crazy" or "Sane"
"Crazy" incumbents love to fight
- Sequence of decisions

1. Entrant - Enter?
2. If so, Incumbent - Fight?
3. If so, Entrant - Stay?
4. If so, Incumbent - Fight?

- In last stage, only Crazy want to Fight.


## Crazy(?) Incumbent: Payoffs

- See handout for details


## Get Crazy!

We will play in sets of five people - one Entrant - four Incumbents

The Entrant may Enter any/all of the four markets

One of the four Incumbents is Crazy!

## Get Crazy!

- First, each Incumbent will learn whether it is Crazy or Sane
- not allowed to credibly reveal this
- Next, Entrant decides which (if any) of the four markets to enter
- In markets with entry, Incumbents decide whether to fight
- In markets with fighting, Entrant decides whether to stay
- In markets with Entrant staying, Incumbent decides whether to Fight


## Sane Act Crazy

- Some (but not all!) Sane must Fight - if all Fight, entrant will Stay for sure - if none Fight, entrant will Leave for sure
- So, Sane must be indifferent to Fighting
- This requires that the entrant must Leave with probability $1 / 2$ after Fight


# The Million Dollar Question: Will Entrant Enter? 



## Entrants Blink

- Some (but not all!) entrants must Leave - if all Leave, Sane will Fight for sure - if none Leave, Sane will Accom for sure
- Entrant must be indifferent to Leaving
- This requires that incumbent be Crazy with probability $1 / 3$ conditional on Fight
- so $50 \%$ of $75 \%$ Sane will Fight


# The Million Dollar Question: Will Entrant Enter? 



## Entrant Stays Out

- What happens if entrant enters?
- all Crazy Fight (25\%) plus 2/3 of the Sane Fight (50\%)
- only get Accomodation 25\%
- Entrant should stay out
- What tips the balance is that Entrant must worry about both:

1. Crazy opponents
2. Sane opponents acting crazy (!)

## Summary

- Reputation can help establish credibility in repeated games if losing reputation is costly:
- lost "mystique"
- others know you aren't Crazy


[^0]:    Source: Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. Thinking Strategically: A Competitive
    Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. W. W. Norton \& Company, 1991.

