## Naive

| Player | Items Allocated <br> To Player | Worth | Side payments | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | A | 10,000 | $-4,000$ | 6,000 |
| 2 | D | 2,000 | $+4,000$ | 6,000 |
| 3 | B\&C | 6,000 |  | 6,000 |

Sum: 18,000
$\frac{1 / 3}{6,000}$

STEINHAUS

| Player | Items Allocated <br> To Player | Worth | Side payments | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | A | 10,000 | $-3,545$ | 6,455 |
| 2 | D | 2,000 | $+2,855$ | 4,855 |
| 3 | B\&C | 6,000 | +689 | 6,689 |

Sum: 18,000

## Imagined disagreement point:

Each player gets $1 / 3$ of each item. (at players' valuation)

| Player | Disagreement <br> Payoff | Share of <br> Excess | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 4,433 | 2,022 | 6,455 |
| 2 | 2,833 | 2,022 | 4,855 |
| 3 | 4,667 | 2,022 | 6,689 |

Sum: 11,933
Pareto opt. sum: 18,000
$\rightarrow$ excess: 6,067

## AUCTION

(High bidder wins at second highest bid)

| Player | Items Allocated <br> To Player | Worth | Side payments | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | A | 10,000 | $-3,167$ | 6,833 |
| 2 | D | 2,000 | $+2,833$ | 4,833 |
| 3 | B\&C | 6,000 | +333 | 6,333 |


| Player | Payment at <br> Auction | Share of <br> Receipts | Side Payment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 7,000 | 3,833 | $-3,167$ |
| 2 | 1,000 | 3,833 | $+2,833$ |
| 3 | 3,500 | 3,833 | +333 |

Sum: 11,500

## COMPARISON

|  | NAIVE |  | STEINHAUS |  | AUCTION |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | side <br> payments | total | side <br> payments | total | side <br> payments | total |
| 1 | $-4,000$ | 6,000 | $-3,545$ | 6,455 | $-3,167$ | 6,833 |
| 2 | $+4,000$ | 6,000 | $+2,855$ | 4,855 | $+2,833$ | 4,833 |
| 3 | 0 | 6,000 | +689 | 6,689 | +333 | 6,333 |

All procedures allocate item $A$ to 1 , item $D$ to 2 , item $B \& C$ to 3

## Mis-Representation - What Can Happen?



- E has value $\$ 90$ to $\# 1$. By distorting \#1 gets $\$ 90-\$ 55$
$=\$ 45$ in actual value to her in place of $\$ 49.75$.
- E has value $\$ 100$ to \#2. Distortion by \#1 yields $\$ 55$ to $\# 2$ in place of $\mathrm{E}-\$ 49.75 \sim \$ 100-\$ 49.75=\$ 50.25$

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### 15.067 Competitive Decision-Making and Negotiation

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