1 00:00:00,090 --> 00:00:02,430 The following content is provided under a Creative 2 00:00:02,430 --> 00:00:03,850 Commons license. 3 00:00:03,850 --> 00:00:06,060 Your support will help MIT OpenCourseWare 4 00:00:06,060 --> 00:00:10,150 continue to offer high quality educational resources for free. 5 00:00:10,150 --> 00:00:12,690 To make a donation or to view additional materials 6 00:00:12,690 --> 00:00:16,620 from hundreds of MIT courses, visit MIT OpenCourseWare 7 00:00:16,620 --> 00:00:17,860 at ocw.mit.edu. 8 00:00:26,184 --> 00:00:27,600 PROFESSOR: What I want to do today 9 00:00:27,600 --> 00:00:30,300 is to continue where we left off last time 10 00:00:30,300 --> 00:00:37,080 in talking about the empirical properties of stocks and bonds. 11 00:00:37,080 --> 00:00:39,660 I want you to develop an intuition 12 00:00:39,660 --> 00:00:43,050 for how to think about markets. 13 00:00:43,050 --> 00:00:47,790 We've already done that over the course of the last few lectures 14 00:00:47,790 --> 00:00:52,890 by looking at market prices and understanding 15 00:00:52,890 --> 00:00:55,590 how to price them, but I'd like you 16 00:00:55,590 --> 00:00:58,080 to get some kind of a historical perspective 17 00:00:58,080 --> 00:01:01,260 now on specific asset classes. 18 00:01:01,260 --> 00:01:04,319 Because we're going to be relying on market prices 19 00:01:04,319 --> 00:01:07,470 to make inferences about other kinds of securities 20 00:01:07,470 --> 00:01:09,407 and other decisions you're going to make. 21 00:01:09,407 --> 00:01:11,490 As I told you at the very beginning of the course, 22 00:01:11,490 --> 00:01:14,520 we're going to rely on markets for information, 23 00:01:14,520 --> 00:01:17,850 because it's the wisdom of crowds that really gets us 24 00:01:17,850 --> 00:01:20,340 the information we need in order to make 25 00:01:20,340 --> 00:01:22,000 good financial decisions. 26 00:01:22,000 --> 00:01:25,290 So I want to begin that process of now giving you 27 00:01:25,290 --> 00:01:27,960 the intuition about the wisdom of crowds 28 00:01:27,960 --> 00:01:32,160 by looking at the historical performance of stocks 29 00:01:32,160 --> 00:01:33,097 and bonds. 30 00:01:33,097 --> 00:01:34,680 And then we're going to talk about how 31 00:01:34,680 --> 00:01:38,760 to quantify risk more analytically 32 00:01:38,760 --> 00:01:43,620 and put it all together in the very basics of modern portfolio 33 00:01:43,620 --> 00:01:45,160 theory. 34 00:01:45,160 --> 00:01:48,180 So I want to start by asking the question, first 35 00:01:48,180 --> 00:01:53,020 of all, what characterizes US equity returns? 36 00:01:53,020 --> 00:01:57,690 How do we get our arms around the behavior of that asset 37 00:01:57,690 --> 00:01:59,022 class? 38 00:01:59,022 --> 00:02:00,480 And the way I'm going to do that is 39 00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:03,270 to give you some performance statistics 40 00:02:03,270 --> 00:02:09,150 about the volatility, about the average return, about how 41 00:02:09,150 --> 00:02:13,620 predictable they are, and also patterns 42 00:02:13,620 --> 00:02:18,580 of returns across different kinds of stocks. 43 00:02:18,580 --> 00:02:22,260 So we're going to look at some empirical anomalies 44 00:02:22,260 --> 00:02:25,710 before actually turning to the analytical work of trying 45 00:02:25,710 --> 00:02:29,880 to figure out how to make sense of this from a more 46 00:02:29,880 --> 00:02:33,090 formal mathematical framework. 47 00:02:33,090 --> 00:02:36,300 Before I do that, let me ask you to think about the following 48 00:02:36,300 --> 00:02:44,070 question, which is, if you are designing a market for stocks, 49 00:02:44,070 --> 00:02:47,910 what properties would you want that market to have? 50 00:02:47,910 --> 00:02:50,460 And I'm going to argue that there 51 00:02:50,460 --> 00:02:53,340 are a few properties that all of us, I think, 52 00:02:53,340 --> 00:02:58,390 can recognize as being good properties for stock prices. 53 00:02:58,390 --> 00:03:02,730 So the first is that stock market prices 54 00:03:02,730 --> 00:03:06,030 are random and unpredictable. 55 00:03:06,030 --> 00:03:08,460 Now, that might seem a little counterintuitive, 56 00:03:08,460 --> 00:03:10,860 and certainly I think you would acknowledge 57 00:03:10,860 --> 00:03:13,470 that over the last several weeks markets have 58 00:03:13,470 --> 00:03:15,340 been supremely unpredictable. 59 00:03:15,340 --> 00:03:16,590 And that doesn't feel so good. 60 00:03:16,590 --> 00:03:19,270 It doesn't seem like that's a good thing. 61 00:03:19,270 --> 00:03:21,240 But in a minute, I'm going to try 62 00:03:21,240 --> 00:03:23,850 to make that a little bit more clear by looking 63 00:03:23,850 --> 00:03:27,000 at the alternative of predictable-- 64 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:29,050 or unpredictable, which is predictable. 65 00:03:29,050 --> 00:03:30,900 So let me come back to that point. 66 00:03:30,900 --> 00:03:33,780 The second property that I think you'll agree 67 00:03:33,780 --> 00:03:35,670 is a reasonable one for us to expect 68 00:03:35,670 --> 00:03:43,760 is that prices should react quickly to new information. 69 00:03:43,760 --> 00:03:47,330 It should adjust to new information 70 00:03:47,330 --> 00:03:50,180 really without any kind of delay. 71 00:03:50,180 --> 00:03:55,280 And finally, we'd like to see that investors shouldn't 72 00:03:55,280 --> 00:04:01,050 be able to earn abnormal returns after you adjust for risk. 73 00:04:01,050 --> 00:04:03,170 So in other words, once risk adjustment 74 00:04:03,170 --> 00:04:05,480 is taken into account, there shouldn't 75 00:04:05,480 --> 00:04:08,360 be any additional return left over. 76 00:04:08,360 --> 00:04:12,161 That's what we think of as a well-functioning market. 77 00:04:12,161 --> 00:04:13,910 Another way of putting it is that a market 78 00:04:13,910 --> 00:04:15,320 is highly competitive. 79 00:04:15,320 --> 00:04:19,040 It's hard to make money in those markets. 80 00:04:19,040 --> 00:04:21,800 Now, they may not be markets that you would enjoy trading 81 00:04:21,800 --> 00:04:23,460 in, but that's not the question. 82 00:04:23,460 --> 00:04:26,420 The question is, what would be a good market, 83 00:04:26,420 --> 00:04:29,240 an efficient market? 84 00:04:29,240 --> 00:04:31,550 So let me talk about predictability for a minute, 85 00:04:31,550 --> 00:04:33,950 because I said that it seems a little counterintuitive 86 00:04:33,950 --> 00:04:37,650 that a good market is one that's not predictable. 87 00:04:37,650 --> 00:04:41,240 So let's pretend that this is the stock market. 88 00:04:41,240 --> 00:04:43,220 This is the S&P 500. 89 00:04:43,220 --> 00:04:48,200 That looks nice-- a nice, regular curve. 90 00:04:48,200 --> 00:04:51,050 Anybody come up with a prediction for this? 91 00:04:51,050 --> 00:04:53,870 How would you go about predicting the behavior 92 00:04:53,870 --> 00:04:57,600 of this kind of a stock market? 93 00:04:57,600 --> 00:04:58,170 What's that? 94 00:04:58,170 --> 00:04:58,920 STUDENT: Cyclical. 95 00:04:58,920 --> 00:04:59,753 PROFESSOR: Cyclical. 96 00:04:59,753 --> 00:05:01,659 What kind of curve would you fit to this? 97 00:05:01,659 --> 00:05:02,450 STUDENT: Sine wave. 98 00:05:02,450 --> 00:05:03,574 PROFESSOR: Yeah, sine wave. 99 00:05:03,574 --> 00:05:05,730 In fact, that's how I generated this. 100 00:05:05,730 --> 00:05:09,420 I used a sine wave, and then I add a little noise. 101 00:05:09,420 --> 00:05:14,130 Now, why might this not be a good model for a market? 102 00:05:14,130 --> 00:05:17,520 If this were the stock market, what would you do? 103 00:05:17,520 --> 00:05:18,227 Yeah? 104 00:05:18,227 --> 00:05:20,283 STUDENT: Everybody would buy on the low 105 00:05:20,283 --> 00:05:22,800 and sell them high [INAUDIBLE] the other end. 106 00:05:22,800 --> 00:05:23,910 PROFESSOR: Exactly. 107 00:05:23,910 --> 00:05:29,490 After a few of these cycles, you sort of get the idea. 108 00:05:29,490 --> 00:05:32,610 And if you're down here, you're going to think, well, gee, 109 00:05:32,610 --> 00:05:34,560 I think it's likely to go back up so I'm 110 00:05:34,560 --> 00:05:36,272 going to buy a ton over here. 111 00:05:36,272 --> 00:05:38,730 And when you get right up there, you'll say, gee, you know, 112 00:05:38,730 --> 00:05:40,877 I think it's time for me to sell a ton. 113 00:05:40,877 --> 00:05:42,960 And you don't have to go through too many of these 114 00:05:42,960 --> 00:05:45,600 before you get richer than your wildest dreams. 115 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:46,361 Yeah? 116 00:05:46,361 --> 00:05:49,798 STUDENT: I would think that [INAUDIBLE] regular market 117 00:05:49,798 --> 00:05:53,480 like that is not true, because as soon 118 00:05:53,480 --> 00:05:56,181 as you want it to raise, it's going to collapse 119 00:05:56,181 --> 00:05:58,977 at 50, 10 points below. 120 00:05:58,977 --> 00:06:00,310 PROFESSOR: That's exactly right. 121 00:06:00,310 --> 00:06:03,030 So as soon as you start doing this, 122 00:06:03,030 --> 00:06:07,620 as soon as you try to do this, what happens to the pattern? 123 00:06:07,620 --> 00:06:09,982 The pattern disappears-- exactly. 124 00:06:09,982 --> 00:06:11,440 You see, this is one of the reasons 125 00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:14,770 why finance is a lot more challenging than physics. 126 00:06:14,770 --> 00:06:18,019 In physics, if you try to drop a ball in a gravitational field, 127 00:06:18,019 --> 00:06:19,560 it won't change its mind and say gee, 128 00:06:19,560 --> 00:06:21,935 now I'm going to change the gravitational constant on you 129 00:06:21,935 --> 00:06:23,860 just because you're testing me. 130 00:06:23,860 --> 00:06:26,050 But in financial markets, the moment 131 00:06:26,050 --> 00:06:28,900 you try to take advantage of this pattern, the pattern 132 00:06:28,900 --> 00:06:29,540 changes. 133 00:06:29,540 --> 00:06:31,390 In fact, the more you try to take 134 00:06:31,390 --> 00:06:35,150 advantage of it, the more quickly the pattern changes. 135 00:06:35,150 --> 00:06:38,230 In fact, if you do this a lot-- 136 00:06:38,230 --> 00:06:43,060 if there are a lot of people trying to predict patterns-- 137 00:06:43,060 --> 00:06:45,700 then you know what you get? 138 00:06:45,700 --> 00:06:47,110 You get no pattern. 139 00:06:47,110 --> 00:06:48,730 You get randomness. 140 00:06:48,730 --> 00:06:53,950 That's the idea behind an efficient market being random. 141 00:06:53,950 --> 00:06:57,430 If it were not random, then that means 142 00:06:57,430 --> 00:06:59,620 that there aren't enough people who 143 00:06:59,620 --> 00:07:02,740 are bothering to try to forecast the price 144 00:07:02,740 --> 00:07:07,010 and incorporate information into the price. 145 00:07:07,010 --> 00:07:10,180 Now, I said two things that at first seemed different, 146 00:07:10,180 --> 00:07:13,480 but in fact they're opposite sides of the same coin. 147 00:07:13,480 --> 00:07:17,050 When you are forecasting market prices, 148 00:07:17,050 --> 00:07:18,250 you know what you're doing? 149 00:07:18,250 --> 00:07:21,130 You're actually helping markets become 150 00:07:21,130 --> 00:07:25,970 more efficient by incorporating information into that price. 151 00:07:25,970 --> 00:07:26,810 How do you do that? 152 00:07:26,810 --> 00:07:30,100 Well, if, for example, you think that having 153 00:07:30,100 --> 00:07:33,760 a presidential election will cause volatility 154 00:07:33,760 --> 00:07:36,520 to decline, then if you know that there's 155 00:07:36,520 --> 00:07:38,440 a presidential election coming up, 156 00:07:38,440 --> 00:07:42,370 you will start trading in a way that will ultimately be betting 157 00:07:42,370 --> 00:07:44,170 on volatility declining. 158 00:07:44,170 --> 00:07:48,160 As you start that trading, you force that volatility index 159 00:07:48,160 --> 00:07:49,700 to go down. 160 00:07:49,700 --> 00:07:51,760 So the fact that you've got information 161 00:07:51,760 --> 00:07:54,664 and you think you can forecast prices, 162 00:07:54,664 --> 00:07:56,080 when you use the information, what 163 00:07:56,080 --> 00:07:57,610 does it mean to use the information 164 00:07:57,610 --> 00:08:00,790 when you buy or sell securities on the basis 165 00:08:00,790 --> 00:08:02,140 of that information? 166 00:08:02,140 --> 00:08:05,200 Then the price of the security ultimately 167 00:08:05,200 --> 00:08:08,410 reflects the information, right? 168 00:08:08,410 --> 00:08:13,210 So an efficient market is one where you don't have this. 169 00:08:13,210 --> 00:08:17,140 You don't have a very strong predictability. 170 00:08:17,140 --> 00:08:20,800 If it is strongly predictable, then most likely 171 00:08:20,800 --> 00:08:25,370 either the market is rigged, or there aren't enough people 172 00:08:25,370 --> 00:08:29,780 that are trading in order to make prices fully reflective 173 00:08:29,780 --> 00:08:32,299 of all available information. 174 00:08:32,299 --> 00:08:35,690 Now, this is the way markets really look. 175 00:08:35,690 --> 00:08:39,020 These are random walks with drift, 176 00:08:39,020 --> 00:08:42,860 drift meaning there's a positive trend or, in some cases, 177 00:08:42,860 --> 00:08:44,570 a negative trend. 178 00:08:44,570 --> 00:08:48,540 But otherwise, it's random around that trend. 179 00:08:48,540 --> 00:08:51,890 So you can't really easily forecast it. 180 00:08:51,890 --> 00:08:55,280 And you can see that prices go up, they go down. 181 00:08:55,280 --> 00:08:57,440 There are long periods where they go up, 182 00:08:57,440 --> 00:09:00,230 but there are also, for other stocks, long periods where 183 00:09:00,230 --> 00:09:01,310 they go down. 184 00:09:01,310 --> 00:09:04,200 And you don't know what's going to happen next. 185 00:09:04,200 --> 00:09:09,276 This is a sign of a very efficient market. 186 00:09:09,276 --> 00:09:13,100 A while ago, there was an academic study 187 00:09:13,100 --> 00:09:15,560 that was done to try to test for efficiency, 188 00:09:15,560 --> 00:09:20,540 and one of the tests was that if the underlying price 189 00:09:20,540 --> 00:09:26,090 series was not very volatile, that was 190 00:09:26,090 --> 00:09:29,024 considered an efficient market. 191 00:09:29,024 --> 00:09:30,440 But it turned out that was roundly 192 00:09:30,440 --> 00:09:35,000 criticized because of the point that just because a market is 193 00:09:35,000 --> 00:09:38,570 not volatile, it doesn't mean that it's working well. 194 00:09:38,570 --> 00:09:40,170 And an example was, at the time-- 195 00:09:40,170 --> 00:09:43,490 this was, like, 20 or 30 years ago-- the Chinese stock market, 196 00:09:43,490 --> 00:09:44,840 the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 197 00:09:44,840 --> 00:09:48,955 It was a relatively young market, and at that time, 198 00:09:48,955 --> 00:09:50,830 there were only two stocks that traded on it. 199 00:09:50,830 --> 00:09:54,350 It was the National Railroad Company and the Bank of China. 200 00:09:54,350 --> 00:09:56,990 And at that time, which is, again, 201 00:09:56,990 --> 00:10:00,740 about 15 or 20 years ago, it was considered 202 00:10:00,740 --> 00:10:04,910 unpatriotic to sell the security if you had bought it. 203 00:10:04,910 --> 00:10:07,310 So you could buy it, but you weren't allowed to sell it. 204 00:10:07,310 --> 00:10:10,010 And so the price went way up and up and up, 205 00:10:10,010 --> 00:10:13,910 and that's not an example of an efficient market. 206 00:10:13,910 --> 00:10:15,920 It was not at all volatile. 207 00:10:15,920 --> 00:10:18,980 But as a result, there was no real information 208 00:10:18,980 --> 00:10:21,190 reflected in that price. 209 00:10:21,190 --> 00:10:21,972 Yeah? 210 00:10:21,972 --> 00:10:23,805 STUDENT: India is talking about getting out. 211 00:10:23,805 --> 00:10:26,391 It looks like somebody's doing one of those roller coaster 212 00:10:26,391 --> 00:10:28,224 rides that goes up and down and up and down. 213 00:10:28,224 --> 00:10:30,680 So is volatility a sign of [? inefficient ?] [INAUDIBLE]? 214 00:10:30,680 --> 00:10:33,680 PROFESSOR: Well, it's not volatility, per se, but rather 215 00:10:33,680 --> 00:10:37,580 the combination of the predictability per unit 216 00:10:37,580 --> 00:10:38,390 volatility. 217 00:10:38,390 --> 00:10:40,070 That's really what you want to focus on. 218 00:10:40,070 --> 00:10:42,611 We're going to come back to that when we talk about portfolio 219 00:10:42,611 --> 00:10:44,900 theory and look at this trade-off between risk 220 00:10:44,900 --> 00:10:46,310 and expected return. 221 00:10:46,310 --> 00:10:49,050 But no, I wouldn't say that the Indian market is inefficient. 222 00:10:49,050 --> 00:10:52,430 It's undergoing some pretty significant changes, 223 00:10:52,430 --> 00:10:55,179 as is the US and as is the world. 224 00:10:55,179 --> 00:10:56,720 But that's because the global economy 225 00:10:56,720 --> 00:10:58,220 is contracting as we know it because 226 00:10:58,220 --> 00:10:59,940 of this financial crisis. 227 00:10:59,940 --> 00:11:03,980 So I wouldn't characterize it as inefficient at this point, 228 00:11:03,980 --> 00:11:06,230 but that remains to be seen. 229 00:11:06,230 --> 00:11:07,130 Yeah? 230 00:11:07,130 --> 00:11:10,190 STUDENT: [INAUDIBLE] down the road [INAUDIBLE] market 231 00:11:10,190 --> 00:11:13,130 [INAUDIBLE]? 232 00:11:13,130 --> 00:11:16,700 PROFESSOR: There isn't any hard and fast rule, no. 233 00:11:16,700 --> 00:11:19,820 But if you take a look at the trade-off of risk 234 00:11:19,820 --> 00:11:22,730 to reward, in other words that ratio 235 00:11:22,730 --> 00:11:24,920 of expected return to volatility, 236 00:11:24,920 --> 00:11:26,810 you can come up with rules of thumb 237 00:11:26,810 --> 00:11:29,240 that will give you a sense of whether or not a market is 238 00:11:29,240 --> 00:11:30,360 efficient or inefficient. 239 00:11:30,360 --> 00:11:31,860 So we're going to come back to that. 240 00:11:31,860 --> 00:11:33,734 In fact, we'll look at that in just a minute. 241 00:11:33,734 --> 00:11:35,510 Let me turn to some data now, and then we 242 00:11:35,510 --> 00:11:38,965 can see exactly what those trade-offs look like. 243 00:11:38,965 --> 00:11:41,090 Now, what's going to be interesting about this part 244 00:11:41,090 --> 00:11:44,190 of the talk is that when I tell you about these numbers, 245 00:11:44,190 --> 00:11:46,790 these numbers are based upon data from 246 00:11:46,790 --> 00:11:49,910 I think it was 1946 to 2001. 247 00:11:49,910 --> 00:11:53,870 In fact, a lot of the data that has been collected 248 00:11:53,870 --> 00:11:57,140 over the last year is very, very different from this, 249 00:11:57,140 --> 00:12:01,850 so it will be interesting to sort of compare the two. 250 00:12:01,850 --> 00:12:04,430 So there are four empirical facts 251 00:12:04,430 --> 00:12:08,310 that I want you to take with you about the US stock market. 252 00:12:08,310 --> 00:12:13,040 The first is that interest rates, in general, 253 00:12:13,040 --> 00:12:16,700 have been slightly positive on average, but not by much. 254 00:12:16,700 --> 00:12:18,590 In other words, the real interest rate, 255 00:12:18,590 --> 00:12:21,110 the nominal interest rate minus inflation rate, 256 00:12:21,110 --> 00:12:26,880 has been pretty low over the course of history. 257 00:12:26,880 --> 00:12:29,420 So the first fact is that real rates 258 00:12:29,420 --> 00:12:31,610 have been slightly positive. 259 00:12:31,610 --> 00:12:35,150 So you can see, for example, the average rate of return 260 00:12:35,150 --> 00:12:39,530 for the one-year T-bill is about 38 basis 261 00:12:39,530 --> 00:12:42,314 points on a monthly basis. 262 00:12:42,314 --> 00:12:42,980 This is monthly. 263 00:12:42,980 --> 00:12:44,806 I haven't annualized it. 264 00:12:44,806 --> 00:12:47,690 But inflation over that same period 265 00:12:47,690 --> 00:12:49,760 is about 32 basis points. 266 00:12:49,760 --> 00:12:51,260 So when you subtract the two, you're 267 00:12:51,260 --> 00:12:54,020 going to get six basis points on a monthly basis 268 00:12:54,020 --> 00:12:57,830 as the real rate of interest. 269 00:12:57,830 --> 00:13:02,490 On the other hand, if you take a look at the stock market, 270 00:13:02,490 --> 00:13:05,500 which is represented by VW stock index-- 271 00:13:05,500 --> 00:13:08,570 VW doesn't mean Volkswagen. VW stands 272 00:13:08,570 --> 00:13:10,280 for the value weighted index. 273 00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:13,010 It's an index of all the stocks on the NYSE, 274 00:13:13,010 --> 00:13:14,840 Amex, and NASDAQ weighted according 275 00:13:14,840 --> 00:13:19,370 to their outstanding market capitalization. 276 00:13:19,370 --> 00:13:22,430 And you can see that the valuated stock 277 00:13:22,430 --> 00:13:26,780 market over this period is about 1% per month. 278 00:13:26,780 --> 00:13:29,720 The equal weighted stock market, EW, 279 00:13:29,720 --> 00:13:32,450 is a little bit higher, 1.18. 280 00:13:32,450 --> 00:13:38,690 And Motorola over this period had an expected rate of return 281 00:13:38,690 --> 00:13:42,750 of about 1.66% per month. 282 00:13:42,750 --> 00:13:47,570 So the return has been higher for these indexes. 283 00:13:47,570 --> 00:13:51,530 And if you want to get a sense of why that might be, 284 00:13:51,530 --> 00:13:53,270 take a look at the next column, which 285 00:13:53,270 --> 00:13:54,740 is the standard deviation. 286 00:13:54,740 --> 00:13:59,510 This, remember, is a measure of the riskiness of the security. 287 00:13:59,510 --> 00:14:01,700 It's a measure of the fluctuations. 288 00:14:01,700 --> 00:14:03,890 And if you take a look at the equal weighted 289 00:14:03,890 --> 00:14:07,140 and the valuated, the volatility is-- 290 00:14:07,140 --> 00:14:10,910 they're both a lot higher than for T-bills. 291 00:14:10,910 --> 00:14:15,920 So this is one of the reasons we got the idea in finance 292 00:14:15,920 --> 00:14:18,710 that there's a risk-reward trade-off. 293 00:14:18,710 --> 00:14:22,430 The more risky, the higher the expected rate of return. 294 00:14:22,430 --> 00:14:25,820 And if you look at Motorola, the riskiness of Motorola 295 00:14:25,820 --> 00:14:29,690 is much larger than that of any of the stock indexes. 296 00:14:29,690 --> 00:14:32,450 Instead of a 5% monthly standard deviation, 297 00:14:32,450 --> 00:14:34,850 you're looking at double, or 10%, 298 00:14:34,850 --> 00:14:36,169 the monthly standard deviation. 299 00:14:36,169 --> 00:14:37,460 But look at the rate of return. 300 00:14:37,460 --> 00:14:39,950 The rate of return is commensurately higher. 301 00:14:39,950 --> 00:14:40,759 Yeah, Remi? 302 00:14:40,759 --> 00:14:43,693 STUDENT: Professor, why [INAUDIBLE] standard deviation 303 00:14:43,693 --> 00:14:44,671 greater than zero? 304 00:14:44,671 --> 00:14:46,140 Isn't that [INAUDIBLE]? 305 00:14:46,140 --> 00:14:49,000 PROFESSOR: Oh, because it fluctuates from month to month. 306 00:14:49,000 --> 00:14:51,960 So the idea is if you're buying a T-bill and you're holding it, 307 00:14:51,960 --> 00:14:53,660 it still has price fluctuation. 308 00:14:57,970 --> 00:14:59,860 The other thing that I want you to see 309 00:14:59,860 --> 00:15:05,600 is something along the lines of the minimum and the maximum. 310 00:15:05,600 --> 00:15:07,810 This is another way of representing 311 00:15:07,810 --> 00:15:10,870 the riskiness of the security. 312 00:15:10,870 --> 00:15:17,200 So T-bills are bounded between 0.03 and 1.34 in terms 313 00:15:17,200 --> 00:15:18,220 of their return-- 314 00:15:18,220 --> 00:15:20,500 very narrow band. 315 00:15:20,500 --> 00:15:24,100 Treasury notes, which are 10-year instruments, 316 00:15:24,100 --> 00:15:27,790 obviously are going to be swinging around much more, more 317 00:15:27,790 --> 00:15:29,210 than a one year T-bill. 318 00:15:29,210 --> 00:15:34,390 So the longer the maturity, the longer the duration, 319 00:15:34,390 --> 00:15:37,390 the riskier is the instrument. 320 00:15:37,390 --> 00:15:40,840 But if you take a look at the valuated return 321 00:15:40,840 --> 00:15:44,050 and the equal weighted return and then Motorola, 322 00:15:44,050 --> 00:15:49,480 you can see progressively more and more risk involved 323 00:15:49,480 --> 00:15:52,840 in these kinds of securities. 324 00:15:52,840 --> 00:15:56,320 Now, if you look at their compound growth rates, 325 00:15:56,320 --> 00:16:00,130 you get what you pay for, in the sense that you're 326 00:16:00,130 --> 00:16:03,220 looking at T-bills down here. 327 00:16:03,220 --> 00:16:06,010 So $1 invested in one of these guys 328 00:16:06,010 --> 00:16:11,170 will give you maybe $10 at the end of 2001, 329 00:16:11,170 --> 00:16:14,140 but you're looking at a much, much larger return 330 00:16:14,140 --> 00:16:18,460 for either the valuated or equal weighted indexes. 331 00:16:18,460 --> 00:16:22,360 More risk, more expected return-- 332 00:16:22,360 --> 00:16:25,660 that's the message that you get from looking at the basic data 333 00:16:25,660 --> 00:16:27,280 here. 334 00:16:27,280 --> 00:16:29,200 Now, that's just to give you a sense of where 335 00:16:29,200 --> 00:16:30,241 interest rates have been. 336 00:16:30,241 --> 00:16:32,560 I think we discussed this when we did fixed income. 337 00:16:32,560 --> 00:16:34,900 Interest rates have really been all over the map. 338 00:16:34,900 --> 00:16:36,670 There was a point in our history, 339 00:16:36,670 --> 00:16:40,570 not that long ago, where the short-term interest 340 00:16:40,570 --> 00:16:45,460 rate, the one year T-bill, was something like 16% to 17% 341 00:16:45,460 --> 00:16:46,600 per year. 342 00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:48,640 That's the one-year T-bill. 343 00:16:48,640 --> 00:16:50,500 It's astonishing. 344 00:16:50,500 --> 00:16:51,970 But that was a period where there 345 00:16:51,970 --> 00:16:56,170 was a large amount of inflation in the United States. 346 00:16:56,170 --> 00:16:59,410 On the other hand, if you take a look at the more recent period, 347 00:16:59,410 --> 00:17:01,828 interest rates have been extremely low, 348 00:17:01,828 --> 00:17:04,119 and that's part of the reason we're in a credit crisis, 349 00:17:04,119 --> 00:17:07,010 is because credit is very cheap. 350 00:17:07,010 --> 00:17:09,400 So you can get yourself into a lot of trouble 351 00:17:09,400 --> 00:17:12,099 when it's relatively easy for you to borrow, 352 00:17:12,099 --> 00:17:17,250 and it doesn't cost you that much in terms of the payments. 353 00:17:17,250 --> 00:17:19,349 Now, let me show you what the total returns look 354 00:17:19,349 --> 00:17:21,089 like for these different asset classes. 355 00:17:21,089 --> 00:17:23,819 By total returns, I mean if you bought one of these instruments 356 00:17:23,819 --> 00:17:25,770 and you held it a month at a time 357 00:17:25,770 --> 00:17:29,280 and you computed the return for holding that instrument. 358 00:17:29,280 --> 00:17:32,150 So for a bond, it includes whatever coupons get paid, 359 00:17:32,150 --> 00:17:34,360 plus the price fluctuations. 360 00:17:34,360 --> 00:17:36,060 It's the total return. 361 00:17:36,060 --> 00:17:38,820 For stocks, it'll include the dividends that got paid 362 00:17:38,820 --> 00:17:40,830 as well as the price fluctuations. 363 00:17:40,830 --> 00:17:43,860 And I'm going to do this on the exact same scale, 364 00:17:43,860 --> 00:17:47,280 from minus 25% to 25%. 365 00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:50,520 So these are monthly returns now that I'm 366 00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:53,990 plotting from 1946 to 2001. 367 00:17:53,990 --> 00:17:58,200 And so you can see that the total return for the US 368 00:17:58,200 --> 00:18:02,730 10-year bond actually has different periods where, 369 00:18:02,730 --> 00:18:06,540 in some cases, it's not very risky but in other cases 370 00:18:06,540 --> 00:18:08,250 it bounces around a great deal. 371 00:18:08,250 --> 00:18:11,190 When there's a fair amount of interest rate uncertainty, 372 00:18:11,190 --> 00:18:14,250 you get a lot of volatility, but when markets are not 373 00:18:14,250 --> 00:18:17,310 moving around that much on the interest rate side, 374 00:18:17,310 --> 00:18:21,940 you get periods that are relatively calm. 375 00:18:21,940 --> 00:18:23,208 Yes? 376 00:18:23,208 --> 00:18:26,701 STUDENT: In the previous slide, that interest rate 377 00:18:26,701 --> 00:18:28,170 are the yield to maturities, right? 378 00:18:28,170 --> 00:18:29,420 PROFESSOR: Yeah, that's right. 379 00:18:29,420 --> 00:18:30,300 That's right. 380 00:18:30,300 --> 00:18:30,860 Correct. 381 00:18:30,860 --> 00:18:34,480 These are yields to maturity. 382 00:18:34,480 --> 00:18:36,470 These are total returns, though. 383 00:18:36,470 --> 00:18:39,290 These are what you get as an investor. 384 00:18:39,290 --> 00:18:42,920 This is what you get if you hold a particular security 385 00:18:42,920 --> 00:18:44,240 to maturity. 386 00:18:44,240 --> 00:18:49,130 Basically, on a given day, you will get these spot rates. 387 00:18:51,860 --> 00:18:53,396 You have a question? 388 00:18:53,396 --> 00:18:55,886 STUDENT: [INAUDIBLE] 10 year. 389 00:18:55,886 --> 00:19:00,368 So in '81 and '82, you could buy any bond 390 00:19:00,368 --> 00:19:02,870 from the year '86 [INAUDIBLE]. 391 00:19:02,870 --> 00:19:03,758 PROFESSOR: Yeah. 392 00:19:03,758 --> 00:19:08,638 STUDENT: So [INAUDIBLE] that incorporates future [INAUDIBLE] 393 00:19:08,638 --> 00:19:09,620 interest rates, right? 394 00:19:09,620 --> 00:19:11,030 PROFESSOR: Well, and also inflation. 395 00:19:11,030 --> 00:19:13,196 STUDENT: And that inflation-- was it people thinking 396 00:19:13,196 --> 00:19:18,454 that inflation was going to be [INAUDIBLE] 10% of the year, 397 00:19:18,454 --> 00:19:19,430 the 10 years out? 398 00:19:19,430 --> 00:19:20,990 PROFESSOR: Either that, or they felt 399 00:19:20,990 --> 00:19:24,405 that that, plus whatever interest rate expectations, 400 00:19:24,405 --> 00:19:25,780 was going to be what you're going 401 00:19:25,780 --> 00:19:27,040 to get over a 10-year period. 402 00:19:27,040 --> 00:19:28,190 Yep. 403 00:19:28,190 --> 00:19:30,412 That's right. 404 00:19:30,412 --> 00:19:33,875 STUDENT: And mentally, people think that stock [INAUDIBLE] 405 00:19:33,875 --> 00:19:36,904 [? upon ?] [? death. ?] [INAUDIBLE]. 406 00:19:36,904 --> 00:19:37,820 PROFESSOR: Apparently. 407 00:19:37,820 --> 00:19:40,770 And there was a time, in fact, when the stock market did yield 408 00:19:40,770 --> 00:19:42,710 that for quite a bit of time. 409 00:19:42,710 --> 00:19:45,662 Absolutely. 410 00:19:45,662 --> 00:19:47,870 On the other hand, let me turn it around and ask you, 411 00:19:47,870 --> 00:19:50,600 now that interest rates are at-- 412 00:19:50,600 --> 00:19:54,410 I don't know, the 10-year I think is at-- or the 30 year is 413 00:19:54,410 --> 00:19:56,880 at 4.17 this morning-- 414 00:19:56,880 --> 00:19:59,600 do you think for the next 40 years or 30 years 415 00:19:59,600 --> 00:20:04,560 that treasury bills are only going to return 4% a year? 416 00:20:04,560 --> 00:20:06,780 Is that realistic? 417 00:20:06,780 --> 00:20:09,690 I mean, it's not so easy to say, is it? 418 00:20:09,690 --> 00:20:12,300 When you're in the midst of it, it's not so easy to say. 419 00:20:12,300 --> 00:20:14,010 Based upon historical evidence, it 420 00:20:14,010 --> 00:20:16,170 seems crazy to think that we could possibly 421 00:20:16,170 --> 00:20:19,590 be in such a low interest rate environment over the next 30 422 00:20:19,590 --> 00:20:22,470 years, especially given that we're printing money 423 00:20:22,470 --> 00:20:24,190 like it's going out of style now. 424 00:20:24,190 --> 00:20:26,815 And we're going to be doing that over the next couple of years. 425 00:20:26,815 --> 00:20:28,470 We've got to, because somebody's got 426 00:20:28,470 --> 00:20:32,140 to pay for all of these rescue packages. 427 00:20:32,140 --> 00:20:36,840 And so we basically have to engage 428 00:20:36,840 --> 00:20:41,040 in some kind of inflationary monetary and fiscal policy. 429 00:20:41,040 --> 00:20:44,790 But it's still saying 4.17 as of this morning. 430 00:20:44,790 --> 00:20:50,610 So the market does the best it can, given the data, 431 00:20:50,610 --> 00:20:52,200 but it's hard to forecast. 432 00:20:52,200 --> 00:20:54,990 And we just said at the beginning of this class 433 00:20:54,990 --> 00:20:57,120 that it better be hard to forecast, 434 00:20:57,120 --> 00:20:59,040 because if it's not hard to forecast, 435 00:20:59,040 --> 00:21:00,720 then something's wrong. 436 00:21:00,720 --> 00:21:02,820 Then it means that it's not reflecting 437 00:21:02,820 --> 00:21:04,817 all available information. 438 00:21:04,817 --> 00:21:05,316 Yeah? 439 00:21:05,316 --> 00:21:08,238 STUDENT: When you showed that graph in the previous slide 440 00:21:08,238 --> 00:21:10,809 of the stocks going way up, I'm wondering how much of that 441 00:21:10,809 --> 00:21:13,225 is due to the fact that this was just a really good period 442 00:21:13,225 --> 00:21:16,908 of the United States and if you compare to other countries 443 00:21:16,908 --> 00:21:17,820 at other times. 444 00:21:17,820 --> 00:21:20,170 PROFESSOR: Yeah, that is definitely a factor. 445 00:21:20,170 --> 00:21:22,800 So I'm not trying to explain the numbers, 446 00:21:22,800 --> 00:21:24,480 and I'm not trying to justify them. 447 00:21:24,480 --> 00:21:25,510 You're absolutely right. 448 00:21:25,510 --> 00:21:30,270 This is a very special country in a very special time. 449 00:21:30,270 --> 00:21:33,490 So you can either thank your good fortune that you're here, 450 00:21:33,490 --> 00:21:36,210 or you can argue that, well, it's not going to persist 451 00:21:36,210 --> 00:21:40,782 and time to move to wherever. 452 00:21:40,782 --> 00:21:41,490 But I don't know. 453 00:21:41,490 --> 00:21:44,060 I don't know which that is. 454 00:21:44,060 --> 00:21:45,150 But it is very unusual. 455 00:21:45,150 --> 00:21:46,530 If you look at other countries, there 456 00:21:46,530 --> 00:21:48,190 are other countries that are having difficulties 457 00:21:48,190 --> 00:21:50,640 during this time period, but there are other countries 458 00:21:50,640 --> 00:21:53,530 that are growing even faster. 459 00:21:53,530 --> 00:21:55,890 If you look at China over the last 10 years, 460 00:21:55,890 --> 00:21:58,440 the growth rate of the Chinese economy 461 00:21:58,440 --> 00:22:01,260 is double to triple what the US economy. 462 00:22:01,260 --> 00:22:03,345 Now, it was a smaller economy, but still 463 00:22:03,345 --> 00:22:04,845 over an extended period of time it's 464 00:22:04,845 --> 00:22:07,380 got tremendous growth rate. 465 00:22:07,380 --> 00:22:09,540 So that really is the challenge, is 466 00:22:09,540 --> 00:22:11,760 to try to understand what's going 467 00:22:11,760 --> 00:22:17,190 on in the context of where we're living and how we're living. 468 00:22:17,190 --> 00:22:19,410 So let me go through and show you some more numbers, 469 00:22:19,410 --> 00:22:21,840 and then we can talk about some of the interpretations. 470 00:22:21,840 --> 00:22:25,110 So this is the total return for the US 10-year. 471 00:22:25,110 --> 00:22:26,880 You've get a sense of the scale-- 472 00:22:26,880 --> 00:22:28,710 minus 25 to 25. 473 00:22:28,710 --> 00:22:31,950 Now, this is the return of the US stock 474 00:22:31,950 --> 00:22:35,400 market during that same period using that same scale-- 475 00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:36,990 more risky. 476 00:22:36,990 --> 00:22:41,020 So you can see the difference in fluctuations. 477 00:22:41,020 --> 00:22:46,050 And if this weren't exciting enough for you, 478 00:22:46,050 --> 00:22:48,650 this is Motorola. 479 00:22:48,650 --> 00:22:52,130 And there are many stocks like Motorola. 480 00:22:52,130 --> 00:22:55,370 So when you invest in an individual stock, 481 00:22:55,370 --> 00:22:58,160 you're getting not just the fluctuations of the economy, 482 00:22:58,160 --> 00:23:00,530 but you're getting the fluctuations that 483 00:23:00,530 --> 00:23:03,650 affect that specific company. 484 00:23:03,650 --> 00:23:07,700 So you should expect, if you're taking on more risk, 485 00:23:07,700 --> 00:23:10,160 that you're going to be getting a reward for these kinds 486 00:23:10,160 --> 00:23:12,140 of incredible bouncing around. 487 00:23:12,140 --> 00:23:13,340 And in fact, you do. 488 00:23:13,340 --> 00:23:16,790 The average return of Motorola is quite a bit higher 489 00:23:16,790 --> 00:23:19,370 than that of the market. 490 00:23:19,370 --> 00:23:22,370 Now let me show you a little bit about predictability. 491 00:23:22,370 --> 00:23:26,190 We talked about a market that's random as one that 492 00:23:26,190 --> 00:23:29,000 is a good or efficient market. 493 00:23:29,000 --> 00:23:33,800 This plots the return today versus tomorrow, 494 00:23:33,800 --> 00:23:36,680 or yesterday versus today if you want to think about that-- 495 00:23:36,680 --> 00:23:43,160 pairs of returns for the aggregate stock market. 496 00:23:43,160 --> 00:23:48,000 And this is done on a daily basis. 497 00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:53,940 Now, if you look at it on a monthly basis for the S&P 498 00:23:53,940 --> 00:23:59,460 500 from 1926 to 1997, you've got something that 499 00:23:59,460 --> 00:24:02,400 also looks kind of random-- 500 00:24:02,400 --> 00:24:07,300 so not much predictability here, not much predictability there. 501 00:24:07,300 --> 00:24:13,960 But suppose we were to graph the return of General Motors 502 00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:16,460 against the S&P 500. 503 00:24:16,460 --> 00:24:19,450 Well, now, all of a sudden, it looks like there's 504 00:24:19,450 --> 00:24:20,920 a little bit of a pattern-- 505 00:24:20,920 --> 00:24:22,310 not totally random. 506 00:24:22,310 --> 00:24:26,140 Sort of looks like there is kind of a line that goes 507 00:24:26,140 --> 00:24:30,830 through that scatter of points. 508 00:24:30,830 --> 00:24:33,690 There is a relationship on a given 509 00:24:33,690 --> 00:24:38,850 day between General Motors and the broad market index. 510 00:24:38,850 --> 00:24:43,230 But over the course of two days or two months, 511 00:24:43,230 --> 00:24:46,860 there's very little predictability. 512 00:24:46,860 --> 00:24:48,960 Now let me talk about volatility. 513 00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:50,356 Your question? 514 00:24:50,356 --> 00:24:54,080 STUDENT: So on the last graph, GM is included in there, right? 515 00:24:54,080 --> 00:24:55,080 PROFESSOR: That's right. 516 00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:58,290 GM is one of the stocks in the S&P 500. 517 00:24:58,290 --> 00:25:01,676 STUDENT: So would you still see that relationship if it was 518 00:25:01,676 --> 00:25:03,417 everything but GM in the S&P? 519 00:25:03,417 --> 00:25:04,500 PROFESSOR: Oh, absolutely. 520 00:25:04,500 --> 00:25:06,900 In other words, it's not any one stock 521 00:25:06,900 --> 00:25:10,186 that gives this random scatter of points. 522 00:25:10,186 --> 00:25:12,060 In other words, this random scatter of points 523 00:25:12,060 --> 00:25:16,260 is really all 500 stocks put into a portfolio. 524 00:25:16,260 --> 00:25:18,400 But remember, we're asking a different question. 525 00:25:18,400 --> 00:25:21,030 This is a question about the relationship between the S&P 526 00:25:21,030 --> 00:25:24,090 500 last month versus this month. 527 00:25:24,090 --> 00:25:25,920 There's no real relationship. 528 00:25:25,920 --> 00:25:29,250 This, on the other hand, is a question 529 00:25:29,250 --> 00:25:32,190 about the relationship between S&P this month 530 00:25:32,190 --> 00:25:34,650 and GM this month, the same month. 531 00:25:37,520 --> 00:25:42,140 Now, you're right that S&P has GM as one of the components, 532 00:25:42,140 --> 00:25:43,940 but it's only one of them. 533 00:25:43,940 --> 00:25:47,000 If it weren't in there, you would actually still see 534 00:25:47,000 --> 00:25:48,518 this kind of a relationship. 535 00:25:48,518 --> 00:25:49,922 Yeah? 536 00:25:49,922 --> 00:25:52,028 STUDENT: On slide 16, you showed us 537 00:25:52,028 --> 00:25:55,316 the one-year and 10-year interest rate. 538 00:25:55,316 --> 00:25:59,694 What does it mean when the two figures cross each other? 539 00:25:59,694 --> 00:26:01,610 PROFESSOR: There's no particular significance. 540 00:26:01,610 --> 00:26:05,150 It just means that that one-year rate happens 541 00:26:05,150 --> 00:26:07,730 to be identical to the 10-year rate, 542 00:26:07,730 --> 00:26:10,460 so people are just assuming that that rate is going to continue 543 00:26:10,460 --> 00:26:12,380 over a period of time. 544 00:26:12,380 --> 00:26:14,390 So there's no particular economic significance 545 00:26:14,390 --> 00:26:15,830 to when they cross. 546 00:26:15,830 --> 00:26:17,450 These are all annualized, remember. 547 00:26:17,450 --> 00:26:20,972 So you're asking the question, over a 10-year period what 548 00:26:20,972 --> 00:26:22,430 is the average interest rate you're 549 00:26:22,430 --> 00:26:24,410 going to get paid by the US Government, 550 00:26:24,410 --> 00:26:25,827 versus over a one year period what 551 00:26:25,827 --> 00:26:28,118 is the interest rate you're going to get paid by the US 552 00:26:28,118 --> 00:26:28,670 Government? 553 00:26:28,670 --> 00:26:29,170 That's all. 554 00:26:31,760 --> 00:26:34,810 Now let me talk about volatility. 555 00:26:34,810 --> 00:26:38,340 These are monthly estimates of US Stock Market 556 00:26:38,340 --> 00:26:40,800 daily volatility from 1926 to 1997. 557 00:26:40,800 --> 00:26:44,850 So every month I've got 20 days or 21 days. 558 00:26:44,850 --> 00:26:46,525 I'm going to take the daily returns 559 00:26:46,525 --> 00:26:49,020 and calculate the standard deviation 560 00:26:49,020 --> 00:26:53,190 for those daily returns, and I plot it and it looks like this. 561 00:26:53,190 --> 00:26:55,620 Now, these are monthly, so if you want to annualize it 562 00:26:55,620 --> 00:26:58,170 you have to multiply it by the square root of 12 563 00:26:58,170 --> 00:27:00,690 to get the annualized volatility. 564 00:27:00,690 --> 00:27:04,650 But the point of this is that there are periods of time where 565 00:27:04,650 --> 00:27:07,200 the market is extremely volatile, 566 00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:10,390 and there are periods of time where it's relatively quiet. 567 00:27:10,390 --> 00:27:13,710 And if I would have extended this to the most recent period, 568 00:27:13,710 --> 00:27:16,890 you would see that within the last several weeks 569 00:27:16,890 --> 00:27:21,600 we had a spike that was about as big as this spike over here. 570 00:27:21,600 --> 00:27:23,894 Anybody know what this spike is? 571 00:27:23,894 --> 00:27:24,810 You can sort of guess. 572 00:27:24,810 --> 00:27:27,240 Yeah, October 1987. 573 00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:29,910 That was the big stock market crash that 574 00:27:29,910 --> 00:27:32,430 occurred during that month. 575 00:27:32,430 --> 00:27:35,490 Volatility shot way up during that month-- lots of risk. 576 00:27:35,490 --> 00:27:37,680 And right now we're in a situation where 577 00:27:37,680 --> 00:27:41,550 there is lots of risk as well. 578 00:27:41,550 --> 00:27:44,910 Now, I'm going to just conclude my overview 579 00:27:44,910 --> 00:27:49,380 with a few interesting anomalies that I want to tease you with 580 00:27:49,380 --> 00:27:51,120 to get you to think a little bit more 581 00:27:51,120 --> 00:27:54,150 carefully about stock markets. 582 00:27:54,150 --> 00:27:55,680 What I'm going to show you are just 583 00:27:55,680 --> 00:27:59,970 a bunch of factoids, factoids meaning that they are 584 00:27:59,970 --> 00:28:02,110 empirical facts in the data. 585 00:28:02,110 --> 00:28:06,990 But if you change some of the assumptions or the sample 586 00:28:06,990 --> 00:28:10,320 that you use, these facts could change. 587 00:28:10,320 --> 00:28:13,140 So these are not universal constants 588 00:28:13,140 --> 00:28:15,990 that, for some theoretical reason, has to be true. 589 00:28:15,990 --> 00:28:18,870 This is just properties of the data. 590 00:28:18,870 --> 00:28:21,390 What I've done here is to take all the stocks 591 00:28:21,390 --> 00:28:27,420 in the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ from 1964 to 2004. 592 00:28:27,420 --> 00:28:30,420 And on a monthly basis, I'm going 593 00:28:30,420 --> 00:28:34,080 to rank them by market capitalization, 594 00:28:34,080 --> 00:28:40,230 break them up into 10 equal numbers of securities, 595 00:28:40,230 --> 00:28:46,680 and then average the returns in those deciles 596 00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:49,410 and then compute it over time and then 597 00:28:49,410 --> 00:28:53,220 average those decile returns. 598 00:28:53,220 --> 00:28:55,260 That sounds a little complicated, 599 00:28:55,260 --> 00:28:56,850 but pretty straightforward. 600 00:28:56,850 --> 00:28:59,790 Let me tell you, for example, what this means here. 601 00:28:59,790 --> 00:29:05,250 This particular bin over here is the bin 602 00:29:05,250 --> 00:29:10,740 of all stocks that have the largest market 603 00:29:10,740 --> 00:29:17,150 capitalizations among all of the stocks in my sample. 604 00:29:17,150 --> 00:29:19,020 I've divided them up into 10 equal groups. 605 00:29:19,020 --> 00:29:21,540 This is the largest 10th, and I'm 606 00:29:21,540 --> 00:29:25,680 going to compute the returns monthly for that bin 607 00:29:25,680 --> 00:29:28,890 and then average that across my entire sample. 608 00:29:28,890 --> 00:29:33,390 And I get an annual return of close to 10%. 609 00:29:33,390 --> 00:29:34,950 This is annualized now. 610 00:29:34,950 --> 00:29:37,080 It's not monthly-- annualized. 611 00:29:40,520 --> 00:29:43,940 If I now compute that same rate of return 612 00:29:43,940 --> 00:29:47,360 for the smallest stocks, the stocks 613 00:29:47,360 --> 00:29:50,870 that are the smallest part of my sample-- 614 00:29:50,870 --> 00:29:52,910 that's down here-- 615 00:29:52,910 --> 00:29:57,260 I get a return of something like 15% per year. 616 00:29:59,960 --> 00:30:04,730 15% versus 10%, that's a huge difference. 617 00:30:04,730 --> 00:30:07,260 That's like a 6 percentage point difference. 618 00:30:07,260 --> 00:30:12,280 No, it's more like 9% versus 15%-plus something. 619 00:30:12,280 --> 00:30:15,600 Five percentage points, 500 basis points a year-- 620 00:30:15,600 --> 00:30:20,630 that's the gap between small stocks and large stocks. 621 00:30:20,630 --> 00:30:26,510 This is known as the size effect or the size premium. 622 00:30:26,510 --> 00:30:30,020 Small stocks seem to do better than large stocks. 623 00:30:30,020 --> 00:30:32,930 Now, there are lots of stories you could tell about why. 624 00:30:32,930 --> 00:30:34,580 I'm not going to tell those stories, 625 00:30:34,580 --> 00:30:37,760 but I just want you to see the data. 626 00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:40,160 Now, you want to know what's weird about this? 627 00:30:40,160 --> 00:30:41,660 What's weird about this picture is 628 00:30:41,660 --> 00:30:46,260 that I'm going to change the sample ever so slightly. 629 00:30:46,260 --> 00:30:48,710 What I'm going to do is I'm going 630 00:30:48,710 --> 00:30:55,700 to compute this graph only for the month of January 631 00:30:55,700 --> 00:30:59,495 and then for all the other months outside of January. 632 00:31:01,744 --> 00:31:03,035 And I'll show you what happens. 633 00:31:07,120 --> 00:31:13,690 The yellow bars-- those are the January returns, 634 00:31:13,690 --> 00:31:18,850 and the blue bars are all of the non-January returns. 635 00:31:18,850 --> 00:31:22,060 So I don't really think there's that much of a size effect 636 00:31:22,060 --> 00:31:24,610 once you delete the Januarys. 637 00:31:24,610 --> 00:31:27,700 You get a little bit of a difference between the biggest 638 00:31:27,700 --> 00:31:29,590 and the smallest, but the difference 639 00:31:29,590 --> 00:31:34,640 that we're talking about now is very small. 640 00:31:34,640 --> 00:31:37,820 But look at the January effect. 641 00:31:37,820 --> 00:31:39,830 That's big. 642 00:31:39,830 --> 00:31:46,040 And it turns out that this seems to be a phenomenon that 643 00:31:46,040 --> 00:31:50,120 has become a little bit less pronounced recently, 644 00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:54,650 but for many years it was quite strong and reliable. 645 00:31:54,650 --> 00:31:58,760 And people actually traded on this particular pattern, 646 00:31:58,760 --> 00:32:04,160 buying stocks in January, holding them in December, 647 00:32:04,160 --> 00:32:08,300 and holding them until January, or doing a spread where you 648 00:32:08,300 --> 00:32:10,370 basically tried to go long-- 649 00:32:10,370 --> 00:32:16,190 small stocks in December and large stocks in December 650 00:32:16,190 --> 00:32:17,180 and hold that spread. 651 00:32:17,180 --> 00:32:18,620 And then it widened. 652 00:32:18,620 --> 00:32:22,670 So this is a really puzzling anomaly. 653 00:32:22,670 --> 00:32:25,144 Again, you can come up with explanations for this. 654 00:32:25,144 --> 00:32:26,810 I'm not going to tell you what they are. 655 00:32:26,810 --> 00:32:30,920 You can think about them and possibly even trade on them 656 00:32:30,920 --> 00:32:32,240 over the next month or so. 657 00:32:34,940 --> 00:32:38,630 Now, the second anomaly that I want you to be aware of-- 658 00:32:38,630 --> 00:32:41,270 and this, depending on who you speak to, 659 00:32:41,270 --> 00:32:43,010 may not be considered an anomaly. 660 00:32:43,010 --> 00:32:44,480 For example, Warren Buffett would 661 00:32:44,480 --> 00:32:48,890 call this genius and fact. 662 00:32:48,890 --> 00:32:50,990 This is the value premium. 663 00:32:50,990 --> 00:32:55,130 What this suggests is that there are certain stocks that, 664 00:32:55,130 --> 00:32:59,150 for whatever reason, are just simply undervalued 665 00:32:59,150 --> 00:33:01,340 systematically-- or, alternatively, 666 00:33:01,340 --> 00:33:05,720 other stocks that are systematically overvalued. 667 00:33:05,720 --> 00:33:09,230 The value premium is where you take the same universe 668 00:33:09,230 --> 00:33:11,330 of stocks that I showed you before, but instead 669 00:33:11,330 --> 00:33:13,280 of sorting according to market capitalization, 670 00:33:13,280 --> 00:33:15,810 you sort it according to another characteristic. 671 00:33:15,810 --> 00:33:19,340 And the characteristic is the price-equity ratio, 672 00:33:19,340 --> 00:33:22,340 or the reverse of that is what you usually hear about, 673 00:33:22,340 --> 00:33:23,720 book-to-market-- 674 00:33:23,720 --> 00:33:26,610 book value divided by market value. 675 00:33:26,610 --> 00:33:29,480 Now, you all know what that difference is by now. 676 00:33:29,480 --> 00:33:33,500 Book value is the value of the company 677 00:33:33,500 --> 00:33:38,990 as it was initially formed and as it accrues either cash 678 00:33:38,990 --> 00:33:44,240 or profitability, but based upon its accounting book value. 679 00:33:44,240 --> 00:33:47,240 Whereas the market value is what the market thinks 680 00:33:47,240 --> 00:33:48,830 the company is worth. 681 00:33:48,830 --> 00:33:50,990 And in many cases, with technology stocks 682 00:33:50,990 --> 00:33:53,090 and other growth stocks, the price 683 00:33:53,090 --> 00:33:58,700 gets way, way ahead of the value of the company's assets. 684 00:33:58,700 --> 00:34:00,680 And so those are situations where 685 00:34:00,680 --> 00:34:04,640 you've got a very large price-to-book ratio. 686 00:34:04,640 --> 00:34:06,944 If you have a very large price-to-book ratio, 687 00:34:06,944 --> 00:34:08,360 that means that you're going to be 688 00:34:08,360 --> 00:34:12,080 on the right hand of this spectrum. 689 00:34:12,080 --> 00:34:14,360 And that says, according to this chart, 690 00:34:14,360 --> 00:34:18,989 that the expected rate of return is generally pretty low. 691 00:34:18,989 --> 00:34:21,770 On the other hand, low book-to-market or high 692 00:34:21,770 --> 00:34:23,750 book-to-price-- 693 00:34:23,750 --> 00:34:26,639 sorry, the other way around-- 694 00:34:26,639 --> 00:34:29,900 high book-to-market, low price-to-book 695 00:34:29,900 --> 00:34:32,460 is on the left-hand side. 696 00:34:32,460 --> 00:34:35,420 These are what Warren Buffett and Graham and Dodd 697 00:34:35,420 --> 00:34:37,040 would call "value stocks." 698 00:34:37,040 --> 00:34:41,270 These are stocks where you've got lots of good book value, 699 00:34:41,270 --> 00:34:43,850 but somehow the market doesn't really appreciate it. 700 00:34:43,850 --> 00:34:47,489 And so the price is low relative to the book value. 701 00:34:47,489 --> 00:34:51,050 In other words, the price-to-book ratio is low. 702 00:34:51,050 --> 00:34:52,880 And look at the returns there. 703 00:34:52,880 --> 00:34:55,370 The value premium is the difference 704 00:34:55,370 --> 00:35:00,350 between the high price-to-book and the low price-to-book, 705 00:35:00,350 --> 00:35:04,610 and you're looking at a premium of about 600 to 700 basis 706 00:35:04,610 --> 00:35:07,010 points, on an annualized basis. 707 00:35:07,010 --> 00:35:11,840 That's a big difference, because in both of these bins 708 00:35:11,840 --> 00:35:16,310 it turns out the risks are actually roughly comparable. 709 00:35:16,310 --> 00:35:18,890 So it's not as if the stocks on the left 710 00:35:18,890 --> 00:35:21,680 are way more risky than the stocks on the right. 711 00:35:21,680 --> 00:35:25,190 That actually is true of the market capitalization effect. 712 00:35:25,190 --> 00:35:27,890 Small stocks actually have higher volatility 713 00:35:27,890 --> 00:35:29,630 than large stocks. 714 00:35:29,630 --> 00:35:32,480 But that's not true of value and growth. 715 00:35:32,480 --> 00:35:36,570 So that's another puzzle, or, depending on who you talk to, 716 00:35:36,570 --> 00:35:39,640 this is a way to invest. 717 00:35:39,640 --> 00:35:44,300 Momentum-- this is something that academics discovered maybe 718 00:35:44,300 --> 00:35:48,260 10 or 15 years ago, which is also really anomalous. 719 00:35:48,260 --> 00:35:55,760 By momentum, we mean simply last year's return. 720 00:35:55,760 --> 00:36:00,470 If that's positive, does it tend to persist over the next 12 721 00:36:00,470 --> 00:36:01,650 months? 722 00:36:01,650 --> 00:36:07,040 So the stocks with low momentum on the left-hand side 723 00:36:07,040 --> 00:36:12,590 seem to do worse than the stocks that have high momentum. 724 00:36:12,590 --> 00:36:15,380 So the momentum effect seems to be really strong. 725 00:36:15,380 --> 00:36:17,180 And again, look at that difference. 726 00:36:17,180 --> 00:36:20,510 That difference is something on the order of a 15% spread, 727 00:36:20,510 --> 00:36:21,770 if not more. 728 00:36:21,770 --> 00:36:24,080 It's a very, very big spread. 729 00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:26,660 So this might lead you to try to construct a trading 730 00:36:26,660 --> 00:36:28,890 strategy based upon this. 731 00:36:28,890 --> 00:36:30,710 And there are a bunch of other anomalies 732 00:36:30,710 --> 00:36:33,240 that have been reported in the academic literature. 733 00:36:33,240 --> 00:36:36,290 In fact, for a while, certain academic journals 734 00:36:36,290 --> 00:36:39,980 were accused of never meeting an anomaly that they didn't love, 735 00:36:39,980 --> 00:36:42,980 because they just kept publishing one after another. 736 00:36:42,980 --> 00:36:48,590 And in a way, you have to be a bit skeptical about this, 737 00:36:48,590 --> 00:36:51,410 because there are so many different ways of looking 738 00:36:51,410 --> 00:36:53,660 at stocks, so many characteristics. 739 00:36:53,660 --> 00:36:59,360 And you know that in a sample of 100 random variables, 740 00:36:59,360 --> 00:37:05,030 5% of them are going to be statistically significant, even 741 00:37:05,030 --> 00:37:09,410 if none of them are in terms of being significantly 742 00:37:09,410 --> 00:37:11,032 different from zero. 743 00:37:11,032 --> 00:37:13,490 So you've got to take these anomalies with a grain of salt, 744 00:37:13,490 --> 00:37:15,230 but what I've presented to you are 745 00:37:15,230 --> 00:37:17,000 the ones that seem to be the most 746 00:37:17,000 --> 00:37:19,640 persistent, the ones that people spin stories about, 747 00:37:19,640 --> 00:37:22,640 the ones that people construct mutual funds around. 748 00:37:22,640 --> 00:37:25,580 And so you'll have to think a little bit about whether or not 749 00:37:25,580 --> 00:37:27,710 you believe any of these anomalies, 750 00:37:27,710 --> 00:37:29,930 but I wanted to make you aware that they're there. 751 00:37:29,930 --> 00:37:34,430 And if you take 15433, investments, 752 00:37:34,430 --> 00:37:36,882 you'd actually end up spending a fair bit of time digging 753 00:37:36,882 --> 00:37:38,840 through each one of these to see whether or not 754 00:37:38,840 --> 00:37:40,730 there's something in there that you could 755 00:37:40,730 --> 00:37:42,320 use for investment purposes. 756 00:37:45,850 --> 00:37:49,750 The last thing I want to mention with this introductory lecture 757 00:37:49,750 --> 00:37:52,620 is mutual funds. 758 00:37:52,620 --> 00:37:58,050 These anomalies were obviously very, very exciting 759 00:37:58,050 --> 00:38:00,810 from the perspective of active portfolio management, 760 00:38:00,810 --> 00:38:02,951 because once you identify one of these anomalies 761 00:38:02,951 --> 00:38:04,950 you could argue, I want to take advantage of it. 762 00:38:04,950 --> 00:38:07,710 Of course, then the argument that was raised earlier 763 00:38:07,710 --> 00:38:08,550 comes into play. 764 00:38:08,550 --> 00:38:10,216 If you're going to take advantage of it, 765 00:38:10,216 --> 00:38:12,160 isn't that going to disappear? 766 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:15,300 And the answer is, in general, yes, it will, 767 00:38:15,300 --> 00:38:16,410 but it may take a while. 768 00:38:16,410 --> 00:38:20,010 And along the way, you'll do quite well. 769 00:38:20,010 --> 00:38:22,920 So the question was asked, well, if that's 770 00:38:22,920 --> 00:38:25,140 the case, if there are all these anomalies 771 00:38:25,140 --> 00:38:27,530 and if you can take advantage of them, 772 00:38:27,530 --> 00:38:30,270 well, then mutual fund managers ought 773 00:38:30,270 --> 00:38:34,560 to be able to outperform simple buy and hold strategies. 774 00:38:34,560 --> 00:38:38,880 Because they can take advantage of these anomalies. 775 00:38:38,880 --> 00:38:44,340 If you do a histogram of mutual fund returns 776 00:38:44,340 --> 00:38:48,240 that are in excess of their risks-- 777 00:38:48,240 --> 00:38:52,080 so if you make some kind of a simple risk adjustment 778 00:38:52,080 --> 00:38:55,530 and you look at the mutual funds' additional value added 779 00:38:55,530 --> 00:38:58,470 above and beyond those risk adjustments-- 780 00:38:58,470 --> 00:39:01,650 those excess returns are given by this histogram. 781 00:39:01,650 --> 00:39:07,950 For data from 1972 to 1991, the histogram of excess returns 782 00:39:07,950 --> 00:39:11,700 has basically this kind of a distribution. 783 00:39:11,700 --> 00:39:15,540 You've got some positives, you've got some negatives, 784 00:39:15,540 --> 00:39:17,760 you've got more negatives than positives, 785 00:39:17,760 --> 00:39:22,720 and on average it's actually less than zero. 786 00:39:22,720 --> 00:39:28,780 Mutual funds net of fees are actually losing money for you 787 00:39:28,780 --> 00:39:29,440 on average. 788 00:39:29,440 --> 00:39:33,640 That was the conclusion by these academics as of a few years 789 00:39:33,640 --> 00:39:34,300 ago. 790 00:39:34,300 --> 00:39:35,442 Yeah? 791 00:39:35,442 --> 00:39:38,117 STUDENT: In defense of the big ones, 792 00:39:38,117 --> 00:39:40,820 isn't part of the purpose to lower 793 00:39:40,820 --> 00:39:43,850 your risk of your portfolio to lower the volatility? 794 00:39:43,850 --> 00:39:49,310 For example, you might be able to get the return plus zero. 795 00:39:49,310 --> 00:39:51,289 But then the next year you might be 796 00:39:51,289 --> 00:39:52,705 able to get the return minus five. 797 00:39:52,705 --> 00:39:55,130 Well, I think mutual fund managers 798 00:39:55,130 --> 00:40:01,360 aim to get you steady terms that are [? being ?] exactly 799 00:40:01,360 --> 00:40:02,620 the term, plus zero. 800 00:40:02,620 --> 00:40:05,260 PROFESSOR: Well, so first of all, that's not necessarily 801 00:40:05,260 --> 00:40:06,850 the objective of every mutual fund 802 00:40:06,850 --> 00:40:09,760 right there are mutual funds that are not 803 00:40:09,760 --> 00:40:11,260 trying to give you lower volatility, 804 00:40:11,260 --> 00:40:13,180 but rather they're trying to give you access 805 00:40:13,180 --> 00:40:16,960 to broader investment vehicles and instruments. 806 00:40:16,960 --> 00:40:19,570 So the original index fund that was set up 807 00:40:19,570 --> 00:40:22,210 by Wells Fargo in the 1970s-- 808 00:40:22,210 --> 00:40:24,820 the purpose was to allow an investor 809 00:40:24,820 --> 00:40:29,530 to get access to 100 securities without having to actually go 810 00:40:29,530 --> 00:40:31,589 out and buy 100 securities. 811 00:40:31,589 --> 00:40:33,130 STUDENT: Thereby diversifying, right? 812 00:40:33,130 --> 00:40:34,810 PROFESSOR: Right, by diversifying. 813 00:40:34,810 --> 00:40:37,210 But it doesn't lower the volatility, 814 00:40:37,210 --> 00:40:39,514 except through diversification. 815 00:40:39,514 --> 00:40:40,180 So you're right. 816 00:40:40,180 --> 00:40:43,630 Diversification will lower it, versus buying Motorola. 817 00:40:43,630 --> 00:40:45,400 But the question is, how does this 818 00:40:45,400 --> 00:40:50,860 do versus buying 100 stocks, or rather buying 819 00:40:50,860 --> 00:40:54,790 a mutual fund like Vanguard, the Vanguard 500 820 00:40:54,790 --> 00:40:56,470 Index Trust, where you're not trying 821 00:40:56,470 --> 00:41:01,150 to outperform the market you're trying to match the market? 822 00:41:01,150 --> 00:41:04,120 And the argument is that the mutual funds that have been 823 00:41:04,120 --> 00:41:09,944 trying to beat the market, on average they don't. 824 00:41:09,944 --> 00:41:11,150 They don't beat the market. 825 00:41:11,150 --> 00:41:12,650 Some of them do; some of them don't. 826 00:41:12,650 --> 00:41:14,950 But as a group, they don't add any extra value. 827 00:41:14,950 --> 00:41:17,180 That's the argument that was made. 828 00:41:17,180 --> 00:41:19,610 Now, that's not to say that there aren't good mutual funds 829 00:41:19,610 --> 00:41:21,460 and there aren't bad mutual funds. 830 00:41:21,460 --> 00:41:22,600 There may be. 831 00:41:22,600 --> 00:41:26,350 So somewhere in here is Peter Lynch's Magellan Fund-- 832 00:41:26,350 --> 00:41:29,800 terrific fund, very talented portfolio manager. 833 00:41:29,800 --> 00:41:31,600 But on the other hand, if you can't 834 00:41:31,600 --> 00:41:35,770 tell in advance who is going to be the next Peter Lynch 835 00:41:35,770 --> 00:41:37,780 and who's going to be the next-- 836 00:41:37,780 --> 00:41:41,020 I don't know who; I won't cast any aspersions. 837 00:41:41,020 --> 00:41:44,110 But if you can't tell in advance who's going to do bad, 838 00:41:44,110 --> 00:41:48,530 then you're essentially throwing a dart at this histogram. 839 00:41:48,530 --> 00:41:50,960 You may be lucky and you'll get on the right side, 840 00:41:50,960 --> 00:41:53,270 or you may be unlucky and hit the left side. 841 00:41:53,270 --> 00:41:56,270 But on average, you should do better 842 00:41:56,270 --> 00:41:58,950 by putting your money in a passive index fund. 843 00:41:58,950 --> 00:42:02,300 Now, that's the argument of Vanguard 844 00:42:02,300 --> 00:42:06,374 and all of the passive investment vehicles. 845 00:42:06,374 --> 00:42:08,540 I'm not going to take a stand on that, because we're 846 00:42:08,540 --> 00:42:10,373 going to come back and talk a bit about that 847 00:42:10,373 --> 00:42:11,480 at the end of the course. 848 00:42:11,480 --> 00:42:13,105 And then as part of investments, you're 849 00:42:13,105 --> 00:42:14,400 going to re-look into that. 850 00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:17,390 I just want you to get a feeling for the data that's out there. 851 00:42:17,390 --> 00:42:18,980 And the data that's out there says 852 00:42:18,980 --> 00:42:21,350 it's very hard to tell whether or not 853 00:42:21,350 --> 00:42:26,020 mutual funds, as an aggregate, are adding any value. 854 00:42:26,020 --> 00:42:28,900 By the way, you realize that there are actually 855 00:42:28,900 --> 00:42:33,220 more mutual funds out there than there are stocks. 856 00:42:33,220 --> 00:42:34,730 You know that? 857 00:42:34,730 --> 00:42:37,130 Yeah, there are about 10,000 mutual funds. 858 00:42:37,130 --> 00:42:39,200 There are about 8,000 stocks out there, 859 00:42:39,200 --> 00:42:42,520 including the penny stocks and pink sheet stocks. 860 00:42:42,520 --> 00:42:44,650 There are probably only 4,000 or 5,000 stocks 861 00:42:44,650 --> 00:42:48,700 that you would actually ever invest in as a retail investor 862 00:42:48,700 --> 00:42:49,940 yourself. 863 00:42:49,940 --> 00:42:51,880 And so the number of mutual funds 864 00:42:51,880 --> 00:42:54,910 far exceeds the number of stocks. 865 00:42:54,910 --> 00:42:57,550 The way that mutual fund managers 866 00:42:57,550 --> 00:42:59,800 justify that is by saying, look, there 867 00:42:59,800 --> 00:43:02,800 are 31 flavors of Baskin Robbins and so we 868 00:43:02,800 --> 00:43:04,600 want to provide investors with lots 869 00:43:04,600 --> 00:43:06,520 of different possibilities. 870 00:43:06,520 --> 00:43:08,320 Not everybody wants the S&P 500. 871 00:43:08,320 --> 00:43:10,180 Some people want the S&P 100. 872 00:43:10,180 --> 00:43:12,340 Some people want the S&P 250. 873 00:43:12,340 --> 00:43:14,770 Some people want the S&P 385. 874 00:43:14,770 --> 00:43:18,400 And so I'm going to construct a fund for every clientele that's 875 00:43:18,400 --> 00:43:19,440 out there. 876 00:43:19,440 --> 00:43:21,400 That's a legitimate argument, as long 877 00:43:21,400 --> 00:43:24,970 as investors understand that when you buy into a mutual fund 878 00:43:24,970 --> 00:43:28,420 you're buying something that may cost you more than if you 879 00:43:28,420 --> 00:43:32,710 try to do this on your own. 880 00:43:32,710 --> 00:43:35,140 So the key points that I want you to take away 881 00:43:35,140 --> 00:43:40,210 is that the average return on US stocks from 1926 to 2004 882 00:43:40,210 --> 00:43:42,250 was 11.2%. 883 00:43:42,250 --> 00:43:46,330 Now that's considered the good old days, so no more. 884 00:43:46,330 --> 00:43:49,340 The average risk premium was about 8%-- 885 00:43:49,340 --> 00:43:50,860 again, the good old days. 886 00:43:50,860 --> 00:43:53,530 That's probably not going to happen for a while. 887 00:43:53,530 --> 00:43:55,900 Stocks are quite risky. 888 00:43:55,900 --> 00:43:59,380 Standard deviation of returns for the market is about 16% 889 00:43:59,380 --> 00:44:01,150 annually. 890 00:44:01,150 --> 00:44:02,950 That isn't risky anymore. 891 00:44:02,950 --> 00:44:05,200 That, again, is the good old days. 892 00:44:05,200 --> 00:44:10,930 The market today, using the implied volatility of the VIX 893 00:44:10,930 --> 00:44:15,070 index, the implied volatility of S&P at the money options, 894 00:44:15,070 --> 00:44:18,580 was about 49%. 895 00:44:18,580 --> 00:44:24,670 So the annual forward-looking S&P 500 stock market volatility 896 00:44:24,670 --> 00:44:30,276 right now is about 49%, which by the way is down from 80% 897 00:44:30,276 --> 00:44:32,210 a couple of weeks ago. 898 00:44:32,210 --> 00:44:35,500 So as I predicted, volatility was 899 00:44:35,500 --> 00:44:39,130 going to decline once the election was clear. 900 00:44:39,130 --> 00:44:41,890 That eliminated a piece of uncertainty, 901 00:44:41,890 --> 00:44:43,480 but there is still a remaining piece, 902 00:44:43,480 --> 00:44:45,650 which is what's going to happen to our economy. 903 00:44:45,650 --> 00:44:49,660 That's why the volatility is at 49% versus a historical average 904 00:44:49,660 --> 00:44:51,220 of 16% to 20%. 905 00:44:54,280 --> 00:44:57,790 Stocks on an individual basis are clearly 906 00:44:57,790 --> 00:45:02,250 much more risky than as a group, so you're absolutely right, 907 00:45:02,250 --> 00:45:04,450 Remi, that when you put it into a portfolio 908 00:45:04,450 --> 00:45:06,400 you reduce the risk. 909 00:45:06,400 --> 00:45:11,380 And so the S&P 500 is a lot less risky than Motorola. 910 00:45:11,380 --> 00:45:15,110 Also, stocks tend to move together over time. 911 00:45:15,110 --> 00:45:17,270 Over time, from one day to the next, 912 00:45:17,270 --> 00:45:19,100 there is very little relationship, 913 00:45:19,100 --> 00:45:23,510 but on a given day stocks tend to move together 914 00:45:23,510 --> 00:45:26,510 in groups, General Motors seemingly 915 00:45:26,510 --> 00:45:31,040 to be correlated with the S&P as well as other stocks. 916 00:45:31,040 --> 00:45:33,470 And obviously, market volatility changes 917 00:45:33,470 --> 00:45:36,890 over time, and financial ratios that 918 00:45:36,890 --> 00:45:39,830 can be used to create these different kinds of bins 919 00:45:39,830 --> 00:45:44,010 for sorting stocks and constructing these anomalies-- 920 00:45:44,010 --> 00:45:48,230 they actually do seem to have some kind of predictive value. 921 00:45:48,230 --> 00:45:50,720 Why, we don't know in many cases, 922 00:45:50,720 --> 00:45:52,490 but the anomalies are there. 923 00:45:52,490 --> 00:45:56,720 And so that's something to be aware of. 924 00:45:56,720 --> 00:45:59,650 Other questions? 925 00:45:59,650 --> 00:46:04,940 Now that you have a feel for the data, 926 00:46:04,940 --> 00:46:07,740 I want to take a step back and ask the question, 927 00:46:07,740 --> 00:46:09,830 how do we make use of this information 928 00:46:09,830 --> 00:46:13,580 in a way that can help the typical investor 929 00:46:13,580 --> 00:46:15,710 and also help the individual trying 930 00:46:15,710 --> 00:46:18,350 to decide on a corporate financial decision? 931 00:46:18,350 --> 00:46:22,490 How do we use these kinds of empirical insights 932 00:46:22,490 --> 00:46:23,840 in our theory? 933 00:46:23,840 --> 00:46:28,820 So to do that, I'm going to turn now to lectures 13 and 14 934 00:46:28,820 --> 00:46:36,410 and focus on how to measure risk and return in a more 935 00:46:36,410 --> 00:46:38,930 systematic way and then incorporate that 936 00:46:38,930 --> 00:46:41,390 into portfolios. 937 00:46:41,390 --> 00:46:44,270 So we're going to talk a bit about motivating 938 00:46:44,270 --> 00:46:47,660 the idea behind portfolio analysis 939 00:46:47,660 --> 00:46:50,810 and then use some of the theoretical concepts 940 00:46:50,810 --> 00:46:54,110 that we introduced last time, like mean, variance, 941 00:46:54,110 --> 00:46:58,070 and covariances and use it to piece together 942 00:46:58,070 --> 00:47:00,960 a good portfolio. 943 00:47:00,960 --> 00:47:05,060 So the motivation for what we're trying to do now 944 00:47:05,060 --> 00:47:10,070 is to figure out how to combine securities 945 00:47:10,070 --> 00:47:13,760 into a group that will have attractive properties. 946 00:47:13,760 --> 00:47:16,790 If you're an investor or a corporate financial manager, 947 00:47:16,790 --> 00:47:20,220 this is a decision that you've got to do almost every day. 948 00:47:20,220 --> 00:47:22,700 For example, all of you have already made that decision 949 00:47:22,700 --> 00:47:24,890 today, whether you know it or not. 950 00:47:24,890 --> 00:47:27,770 Because if you didn't do anything between yesterday 951 00:47:27,770 --> 00:47:30,110 and today to rebalance your portfolio, 952 00:47:30,110 --> 00:47:34,730 you've made an affirmative decision to let the debt ride. 953 00:47:34,730 --> 00:47:35,480 Let it ride. 954 00:47:35,480 --> 00:47:37,430 You're going to be taking another roll 955 00:47:37,430 --> 00:47:40,907 of the dice at 4:00 today, and let's hope 956 00:47:40,907 --> 00:47:41,990 it turns out well for you. 957 00:47:41,990 --> 00:47:43,550 But you've made a decision. 958 00:47:43,550 --> 00:47:46,160 Every day you don't do anything with your portfolio, 959 00:47:46,160 --> 00:47:48,150 you are making a decision. 960 00:47:48,150 --> 00:47:49,730 So what we want to do is to see if we 961 00:47:49,730 --> 00:47:51,980 can think about making that decision a little bit more 962 00:47:51,980 --> 00:47:53,330 systematically. 963 00:47:53,330 --> 00:47:56,250 To do that, I want to define what I mean by a portfolio. 964 00:47:56,250 --> 00:47:59,450 So the definition, in very simple terms, 965 00:47:59,450 --> 00:48:05,480 is just a specific weighting or combination of securities, such 966 00:48:05,480 --> 00:48:07,820 that the weights add up to one. 967 00:48:07,820 --> 00:48:10,072 It's just a way to divide up the pie. 968 00:48:10,072 --> 00:48:11,780 If you've got a certain amount of wealth, 969 00:48:11,780 --> 00:48:14,660 you're going to allocate it among different securities 970 00:48:14,660 --> 00:48:16,280 into a portfolio. 971 00:48:16,280 --> 00:48:20,180 A portfolio is defined as a set of weights of those securities 972 00:48:20,180 --> 00:48:22,730 where the weights add up to one. 973 00:48:22,730 --> 00:48:24,680 Now, this is sort of the framework 974 00:48:24,680 --> 00:48:27,710 that we use in terms of the notation. 975 00:48:27,710 --> 00:48:31,280 So omega, the Greek letter omega, 976 00:48:31,280 --> 00:48:33,800 when you write it as a vector, it 977 00:48:33,800 --> 00:48:38,100 denotes the set of weights for your portfolio. 978 00:48:38,100 --> 00:48:41,750 So if you've got n securities, then this vector omega, which 979 00:48:41,750 --> 00:48:45,210 is equal to omega one, comma, omega two, dot, dot, 980 00:48:45,210 --> 00:48:49,800 dot, omega n, that is a portfolio. 981 00:48:49,800 --> 00:48:52,490 And if you want to be clear about how to define it, 982 00:48:52,490 --> 00:48:55,550 it's simply the number of shares of security 983 00:48:55,550 --> 00:48:59,480 I multiplied by that price, divided 984 00:48:59,480 --> 00:49:04,820 by the sum of all of the values of your securities 985 00:49:04,820 --> 00:49:06,980 in your entire collection. 986 00:49:09,570 --> 00:49:10,670 Any questions about this? 987 00:49:10,670 --> 00:49:12,770 Very basic stuff, but it's important to get 988 00:49:12,770 --> 00:49:15,820 it right upfront. 989 00:49:15,820 --> 00:49:17,910 Now, by the way, the number of shares 990 00:49:17,910 --> 00:49:22,940 NI, I'm going to let that be a real number, 991 00:49:22,940 --> 00:49:28,660 meaning it could be zero, it could be five, it could be 500, 992 00:49:28,660 --> 00:49:31,300 it could be minus 200. 993 00:49:31,300 --> 00:49:34,780 Minus 200 means that you have short-sold 994 00:49:34,780 --> 00:49:37,810 200 shares of that security. 995 00:49:37,810 --> 00:49:41,020 So these weights, they all sum to one, 996 00:49:41,020 --> 00:49:43,480 but they don't have to be all non-negative. 997 00:49:43,480 --> 00:49:45,370 Some of these weights could be zero. 998 00:49:45,370 --> 00:49:49,450 Some of these weights could be negative. 999 00:49:49,450 --> 00:49:52,249 If some of these weights are negative, then 1000 00:49:52,249 --> 00:49:54,290 what do you know about some of the other weights? 1001 00:49:57,540 --> 00:49:59,540 Well, yes, they have to be positive because they 1002 00:49:59,540 --> 00:50:00,456 have to add up to one. 1003 00:50:00,456 --> 00:50:03,647 But tell me more about the weights. 1004 00:50:03,647 --> 00:50:04,730 STUDENT: Greater than one. 1005 00:50:04,730 --> 00:50:05,660 PROFESSOR: Right. 1006 00:50:05,660 --> 00:50:08,510 Because in order for it to add up 1007 00:50:08,510 --> 00:50:11,520 to one, if some of these things are less than zero, then 1008 00:50:11,520 --> 00:50:13,520 some of these other things are greater than one. 1009 00:50:13,520 --> 00:50:16,490 What does it mean for a security to be greater than one, 1010 00:50:16,490 --> 00:50:19,687 a weight to be greater than one? 1011 00:50:19,687 --> 00:50:21,094 Does that make sense? 1012 00:50:25,567 --> 00:50:26,650 What's the interpretation? 1013 00:50:26,650 --> 00:50:27,240 Yeah, Lucas? 1014 00:50:27,240 --> 00:50:28,410 STUDENT: Does it mean you're leveraged? 1015 00:50:28,410 --> 00:50:30,160 PROFESSOR: It means that you're leveraged, 1016 00:50:30,160 --> 00:50:32,430 that's right-- leveraged meaning that you're buying 1017 00:50:32,430 --> 00:50:36,390 more than you have money. 1018 00:50:36,390 --> 00:50:38,770 Where are you getting that money from? 1019 00:50:38,770 --> 00:50:43,644 You're basically getting a loan, but who's 1020 00:50:43,644 --> 00:50:44,560 loaning you the money? 1021 00:50:47,130 --> 00:50:48,150 Andy? 1022 00:50:48,150 --> 00:50:49,823 STUDENT: Well, the stocks that you 1023 00:50:49,823 --> 00:50:51,239 sold short gave you the extra cash 1024 00:50:51,239 --> 00:50:52,650 that you can buy long stock. 1025 00:50:52,650 --> 00:50:53,650 PROFESSOR: That's right. 1026 00:50:53,650 --> 00:50:59,940 So nobody loaned you money, but somebody loaned you something. 1027 00:50:59,940 --> 00:51:01,680 They loaned you a stock. 1028 00:51:01,680 --> 00:51:05,160 So this simple little framework already 1029 00:51:05,160 --> 00:51:07,210 has given us one interesting insight, 1030 00:51:07,210 --> 00:51:12,000 which is that when we short sell a stock and buy another one, 1031 00:51:12,000 --> 00:51:16,610 we're actually getting a loan from somebody 1032 00:51:16,610 --> 00:51:19,880 who's lending the stock to us that we've sold. 1033 00:51:19,880 --> 00:51:23,600 We've taken that cash and we're putting it into another stock. 1034 00:51:23,600 --> 00:51:27,320 So we're getting a loan of one security 1035 00:51:27,320 --> 00:51:29,300 and turning around and using those funds 1036 00:51:29,300 --> 00:51:33,140 to buy another security. 1037 00:51:33,140 --> 00:51:36,740 That's a new transaction as far as we're concerned, 1038 00:51:36,740 --> 00:51:40,130 but it's one that's going to be very important in how we think 1039 00:51:40,130 --> 00:51:42,420 about portfolio construction. 1040 00:51:42,420 --> 00:51:45,110 If you didn't understand that, go back and take a look 1041 00:51:45,110 --> 00:51:48,140 at these nodes and try to work out a numerical example 1042 00:51:48,140 --> 00:51:49,350 for yourself. 1043 00:51:49,350 --> 00:51:52,040 And if you still don't understand it, ask again 1044 00:51:52,040 --> 00:51:54,790 next time or ask the TA during recitation. 1045 00:51:54,790 --> 00:51:58,076 It is a very important point. 1046 00:51:58,076 --> 00:51:59,450 Now, there is a case that I'm not 1047 00:51:59,450 --> 00:52:00,920 going to talk about in this class 1048 00:52:00,920 --> 00:52:04,340 where the weights can actually sum to zero. 1049 00:52:04,340 --> 00:52:07,340 I don't want to talk about that because that's a much more 1050 00:52:07,340 --> 00:52:11,660 complex situation, where basically you have 1051 00:52:11,660 --> 00:52:14,040 a portfolio with no money down. 1052 00:52:14,040 --> 00:52:16,250 This is sort of like the arbitrage portfolios 1053 00:52:16,250 --> 00:52:19,280 that I described to you in earlier settings. 1054 00:52:19,280 --> 00:52:22,250 We're not going to analyze that in the context of stocks, 1055 00:52:22,250 --> 00:52:24,710 but there are a very large number 1056 00:52:24,710 --> 00:52:27,170 of hedge fund strategies that are based 1057 00:52:27,170 --> 00:52:29,747 upon just these portfolios. 1058 00:52:29,747 --> 00:52:31,580 And so this will be a very important concept 1059 00:52:31,580 --> 00:52:35,106 that you'll cover in 433, but we're not 1060 00:52:35,106 --> 00:52:36,230 going to talk about it now. 1061 00:52:36,230 --> 00:52:37,813 I just want to make you aware of that, 1062 00:52:37,813 --> 00:52:41,700 that you can have the weights summing not to one but actually 1063 00:52:41,700 --> 00:52:42,200 to zero. 1064 00:52:44,850 --> 00:52:47,390 Now, the assumption that I'm making implicitly 1065 00:52:47,390 --> 00:52:49,670 is that the portfolio weights are 1066 00:52:49,670 --> 00:52:54,680 summarizing everything there is to know about your investment. 1067 00:52:54,680 --> 00:52:56,780 So once you know the portfolio weights 1068 00:52:56,780 --> 00:52:58,640 and you know the stocks, then you 1069 00:52:58,640 --> 00:53:01,820 know what your portfolio is about. 1070 00:53:01,820 --> 00:53:06,110 So as an example, you have an investment account 1071 00:53:06,110 --> 00:53:09,230 with $100,000, and you've got three stocks in there-- 1072 00:53:09,230 --> 00:53:14,240 200 shares of A, 1,000 shares of B, 700 shares of C, 1073 00:53:14,240 --> 00:53:18,410 so that your portfolio is summarized by the weights 1074 00:53:18,410 --> 00:53:22,220 10%, 60%, and 30%. 1075 00:53:22,220 --> 00:53:25,600 So from now on, we're not going to worry about prices 1076 00:53:25,600 --> 00:53:28,050 and shares anymore. 1077 00:53:28,050 --> 00:53:31,190 We're going to focus just on portfolio weights 1078 00:53:31,190 --> 00:53:35,150 and the returns of your securities multiplied 1079 00:53:35,150 --> 00:53:36,869 by those weights. 1080 00:53:36,869 --> 00:53:37,910 It's just simplification. 1081 00:53:37,910 --> 00:53:39,258 Yeah, Megan? 1082 00:53:39,258 --> 00:53:42,716 STUDENT: I'm just wondering what you think about a 130-30 type 1083 00:53:42,716 --> 00:53:45,690 portfolio in the context of the last slide. 1084 00:53:45,690 --> 00:53:46,940 PROFESSOR: Yeah, sure. 1085 00:53:46,940 --> 00:53:48,590 So you're already asking a question 1086 00:53:48,590 --> 00:53:51,710 that's quite a bit more advanced than what we're going to cover. 1087 00:53:51,710 --> 00:53:53,635 What's a 130-30 portfolio? 1088 00:53:53,635 --> 00:53:55,010 Can you explain that, or have you 1089 00:53:55,010 --> 00:53:57,308 just heard that in the news? 1090 00:53:57,308 --> 00:54:00,079 STUDENT: I understand, I guess, the basic concept, 1091 00:54:00,079 --> 00:54:04,154 which is you're 130% long and are 30% short, 1092 00:54:04,154 --> 00:54:06,452 so you're headed back to a net exposure of zero. 1093 00:54:06,452 --> 00:54:07,160 PROFESSOR: Right. 1094 00:54:07,160 --> 00:54:08,180 That's right, exactly. 1095 00:54:08,180 --> 00:54:10,130 So let me describe a product that's 1096 00:54:10,130 --> 00:54:13,350 out there that's been developed just over the last few years. 1097 00:54:13,350 --> 00:54:18,860 It's called a 130-30 portfolio, and what 130-30 1098 00:54:18,860 --> 00:54:27,490 stands for is 130% long and 30% short. 1099 00:54:27,490 --> 00:54:31,030 Now, you can have a 120-20 portfolio 1100 00:54:31,030 --> 00:54:34,210 or a 180-80 portfolio. 1101 00:54:34,210 --> 00:54:39,160 But the idea is that you have weights that add up to 100%, 1102 00:54:39,160 --> 00:54:45,220 but the long positions are no greater than 130%. 1103 00:54:45,220 --> 00:54:50,180 And the short positions are no less than minus 30%. 1104 00:54:50,180 --> 00:54:52,950 Now, the reason that this is an interesting product is that-- 1105 00:54:52,950 --> 00:54:54,741 I have to give you a little bit of history. 1106 00:54:54,741 --> 00:54:57,250 This is getting a little out of our area, 1107 00:54:57,250 --> 00:55:01,650 but I'll give you a preview of Investments 433. 1108 00:55:01,650 --> 00:55:04,320 Typically, when institutional investors 1109 00:55:04,320 --> 00:55:07,330 like pension funds or mutual funds, when they invest, 1110 00:55:07,330 --> 00:55:10,061 they are not allowed to short sell. 1111 00:55:10,061 --> 00:55:11,560 This has nothing to do with the SEC. 1112 00:55:11,560 --> 00:55:13,290 It has nothing to do with law. 1113 00:55:13,290 --> 00:55:15,690 It has to do with the particular entities that 1114 00:55:15,690 --> 00:55:19,065 are investing, because short selling was viewed way 1115 00:55:19,065 --> 00:55:22,800 back as being a very risky endeavor because you could lose 1116 00:55:22,800 --> 00:55:24,054 everything and more. 1117 00:55:24,054 --> 00:55:25,470 There's unlimited amounts that you 1118 00:55:25,470 --> 00:55:28,560 could lose because your short selling a stock can go way up 1119 00:55:28,560 --> 00:55:31,380 and you could lose tremendous amounts. 1120 00:55:31,380 --> 00:55:34,500 So mutual funds were originally not 1121 00:55:34,500 --> 00:55:37,120 allowed to short sell at all. 1122 00:55:37,120 --> 00:55:40,020 So for a mutual fund, the portfolio weights 1123 00:55:40,020 --> 00:55:42,750 were restricted to be non-negative, 1124 00:55:42,750 --> 00:55:47,160 and certain pension funds were not allowed to short sell. 1125 00:55:47,160 --> 00:55:50,610 So if you were a pension plan or a state university 1126 00:55:50,610 --> 00:55:54,390 and you gave your money to investment manager xyz, 1127 00:55:54,390 --> 00:55:58,890 that investment manager would be required not to short sell 1128 00:55:58,890 --> 00:56:02,380 for your portfolio. 1129 00:56:02,380 --> 00:56:05,350 It was discovered over the last several years 1130 00:56:05,350 --> 00:56:09,580 that this kind of constraint artificially 1131 00:56:09,580 --> 00:56:12,190 dampened the return of a portfolio-- 1132 00:56:12,190 --> 00:56:14,770 not surprisingly, because when the market goes down, 1133 00:56:14,770 --> 00:56:18,160 if you're long-only you're going down with it. 1134 00:56:18,160 --> 00:56:20,200 But if you have a short position, then 1135 00:56:20,200 --> 00:56:24,040 at least the shorts would be able to buffer some 1136 00:56:24,040 --> 00:56:25,737 of the losses on the long side. 1137 00:56:25,737 --> 00:56:27,820 So institutions have started getting more and more 1138 00:56:27,820 --> 00:56:30,032 sophisticated, thanks to hedge funds 1139 00:56:30,032 --> 00:56:31,990 pushing them into this area because, of course, 1140 00:56:31,990 --> 00:56:33,310 hedge funds can do anything. 1141 00:56:33,310 --> 00:56:36,580 They can short, they can long, they can go sideways, whatever. 1142 00:56:36,580 --> 00:56:40,720 So hedge funds led the pack by saying, 1143 00:56:40,720 --> 00:56:42,520 we're going to actually short sell 1144 00:56:42,520 --> 00:56:44,440 some of your long-only portfolio to help 1145 00:56:44,440 --> 00:56:47,910 you get a little bit of extra return on the downside. 1146 00:56:47,910 --> 00:56:50,440 And so pretty soon, institutional investors 1147 00:56:50,440 --> 00:56:54,040 said, well, I actually like the idea of you short 1148 00:56:54,040 --> 00:56:56,702 selling a little bit but I don't want you to do it too much. 1149 00:56:56,702 --> 00:56:58,660 Because I don't really know what the risks are. 1150 00:56:58,660 --> 00:56:59,830 I'm new to this. 1151 00:56:59,830 --> 00:57:02,830 I don't want to get the risks out of control, 1152 00:57:02,830 --> 00:57:05,770 so I'm going to limit how much you can short sell. 1153 00:57:05,770 --> 00:57:08,320 The limit of how much you can short sell 1154 00:57:08,320 --> 00:57:14,230 imposes a limit on how much more long you can go than 100%. 1155 00:57:14,230 --> 00:57:16,315 Just like we said, if something's negative, 1156 00:57:16,315 --> 00:57:18,690 then some of the weights have got to be greater than one, 1157 00:57:18,690 --> 00:57:20,710 or they got to add up to greater than one. 1158 00:57:20,710 --> 00:57:23,770 So when you have that situation where 1159 00:57:23,770 --> 00:57:28,450 you have a limit on the total negative position you can have, 1160 00:57:28,450 --> 00:57:32,830 that limit puts a symmetric upper bound beyond the number 1161 00:57:32,830 --> 00:57:36,250 one of what you can go long. 1162 00:57:36,250 --> 00:57:40,390 And so for reasons that are probably a little bit too far 1163 00:57:40,390 --> 00:57:43,420 afield to get into here, 130-30 seems 1164 00:57:43,420 --> 00:57:46,510 to be a bit of a sweet spot for managers out there. 1165 00:57:46,510 --> 00:57:50,170 So they said, we will limit our short positions 1166 00:57:50,170 --> 00:57:53,200 to no more than 30% of the capital. 1167 00:57:53,200 --> 00:57:55,930 So you give us $100 million to manage, 1168 00:57:55,930 --> 00:57:59,980 we will take no more than $30 million of shorts. 1169 00:57:59,980 --> 00:58:03,580 And therefore, we will take no more than $130 million 1170 00:58:03,580 --> 00:58:04,840 of longs. 1171 00:58:04,840 --> 00:58:08,540 But when you add them up, you still get back to 100%. 1172 00:58:08,540 --> 00:58:09,370 So that's 130-30. 1173 00:58:09,370 --> 00:58:11,650 It's very popular, and it's something 1174 00:58:11,650 --> 00:58:14,230 that is likely to grow, particularly given 1175 00:58:14,230 --> 00:58:15,580 this current market environment. 1176 00:58:15,580 --> 00:58:20,390 Because 130-30 has done better than the S&P, not surprisingly, 1177 00:58:20,390 --> 00:58:24,780 because of that 30% short position. 1178 00:58:24,780 --> 00:58:28,560 So here's the example of your own portfolio 1179 00:58:28,560 --> 00:58:29,880 and how you get those weights. 1180 00:58:29,880 --> 00:58:32,500 That's pretty straightforward. 1181 00:58:32,500 --> 00:58:35,130 Here's another example where you've now 1182 00:58:35,130 --> 00:58:39,210 got some short positions here, and the short positions 1183 00:58:39,210 --> 00:58:40,920 are not from short selling. 1184 00:58:40,920 --> 00:58:43,710 But the short positions are in riskless bonds. 1185 00:58:43,710 --> 00:58:47,320 In other words, now instead of shorting a stock, 1186 00:58:47,320 --> 00:58:50,860 you're shorting a bond or selling a bond or borrowing 1187 00:58:50,860 --> 00:58:54,770 money from a broker and getting leverage. 1188 00:58:54,770 --> 00:58:57,430 So this is leverage where the security that you're 1189 00:58:57,430 --> 00:59:01,150 levering up is using bonds, and you're levering up 1190 00:59:01,150 --> 00:59:02,890 the equity positions. 1191 00:59:02,890 --> 00:59:05,920 So your portfolio weights look like this. 1192 00:59:05,920 --> 00:59:09,580 Your equity positions, when you add up the equity 1193 00:59:09,580 --> 00:59:14,840 positions, those portfolio weights, you get 200%. 1194 00:59:14,840 --> 00:59:20,410 But your riskless bonds, you shorted $50,000. 1195 00:59:20,410 --> 00:59:23,960 You're borrowing $50,000 from the broker, 1196 00:59:23,960 --> 00:59:25,930 so you've got minus 100%. 1197 00:59:25,930 --> 00:59:30,080 When you add those two, you get back 100%, or in this case, 1198 00:59:30,080 --> 00:59:31,270 $50,000. 1199 00:59:31,270 --> 00:59:34,450 So you start out with $50,000 cash 1200 00:59:34,450 --> 00:59:37,900 and then you buy $100,000 worth of stocks 1201 00:59:37,900 --> 00:59:42,590 by borrowing an extra $50,000 from your broker. 1202 00:59:42,590 --> 00:59:43,315 Yeah? 1203 00:59:43,315 --> 00:59:44,898 STUDENT: I understand the [? degree ?] 1204 00:59:44,898 --> 00:59:47,752 of the portfolio [INAUDIBLE], but I thought, fundamentally, 1205 00:59:47,752 --> 00:59:50,670 it's to have different risks and to manage that. 1206 00:59:50,670 --> 00:59:51,330 PROFESSOR: Yes. 1207 00:59:51,330 --> 00:59:52,704 STUDENT: So when you are actually 1208 00:59:52,704 --> 00:59:55,574 structuring portfolios, do you have these risks [INAUDIBLE]? 1209 00:59:55,574 --> 00:59:58,919 Because I would just be willing to do them separately. 1210 00:59:58,919 --> 01:00:01,210 There is no reason for you to have them as [INAUDIBLE]. 1211 01:00:01,210 --> 01:00:02,470 PROFESSOR: Well, the reason that I have them 1212 01:00:02,470 --> 01:00:04,480 here is I want to show you exactly how you 1213 01:00:04,480 --> 01:00:06,700 would compute the portfolio weights 1214 01:00:06,700 --> 01:00:09,080 of your entire portfolio. 1215 01:00:09,080 --> 01:00:12,730 So basically, what this is is your equity portfolio, 1216 01:00:12,730 --> 01:00:17,552 but in addition, your fixed income position's added in. 1217 01:00:17,552 --> 01:00:19,510 I mean, your whole portfolio could be anything. 1218 01:00:19,510 --> 01:00:22,530 It could be stocks, bonds, options, currencies, 1219 01:00:22,530 --> 01:00:24,270 real state. 1220 01:00:24,270 --> 01:00:27,915 So I'm just including all of this in the portfolio itself. 1221 01:00:27,915 --> 01:00:31,875 STUDENT: So basically, it is to try to handle different risks-- 1222 01:00:31,875 --> 01:00:34,850 I mean, different stocks or bonds or whatever they have, 1223 01:00:34,850 --> 01:00:35,590 various risks? 1224 01:00:35,590 --> 01:00:37,850 PROFESSOR: Yes, absolutely, and you are doing that. 1225 01:00:37,850 --> 01:00:39,710 Stocks A, B, and C have different risks, 1226 01:00:39,710 --> 01:00:41,467 as does the bond. 1227 01:00:41,467 --> 01:00:43,550 And so you're mixing and matching and putting them 1228 01:00:43,550 --> 01:00:45,050 together into what hopefully will 1229 01:00:45,050 --> 01:00:46,340 be an attractive portfolio. 1230 01:00:49,150 --> 01:00:53,200 Now, we mentioned before that when you get a mortgage, 1231 01:00:53,200 --> 01:00:54,910 that's leverage, too. 1232 01:00:54,910 --> 01:00:58,990 So this is an example of a situation where 1233 01:00:58,990 --> 01:01:02,350 you buy a home for $500,000, but you only 1234 01:01:02,350 --> 01:01:06,300 have a $100,000 payment. 1235 01:01:06,300 --> 01:01:09,360 Your equity in the home is only $100,000. 1236 01:01:09,360 --> 01:01:12,150 The bank has loaned you $400,000. 1237 01:01:12,150 --> 01:01:15,480 Your leverage ratio is 5:1, so if you 1238 01:01:15,480 --> 01:01:17,250 were to look at your portfolio weights 1239 01:01:17,250 --> 01:01:26,830 it would be 500% house minus 400% bank or bonds or mortgage. 1240 01:01:26,830 --> 01:01:29,080 That's very high leverage. 1241 01:01:29,080 --> 01:01:33,190 And in that case, when you're leveraged five to one, 1242 01:01:33,190 --> 01:01:37,900 if the house price goes down by something like, I don't know, 1243 01:01:37,900 --> 01:01:44,905 2%, you've lost 10% of the value of your home-- 1244 01:01:44,905 --> 01:01:47,520 or the value of your equity, rather. 1245 01:01:47,520 --> 01:01:54,030 If the house price declines by 15%, that's really bad news. 1246 01:01:54,030 --> 01:01:56,640 So leverage is a two-edged sword. 1247 01:01:56,640 --> 01:01:59,310 When things are working well, it gives you a boost. 1248 01:01:59,310 --> 01:02:00,990 When things are not working well, 1249 01:02:00,990 --> 01:02:03,730 it can hurt you on the downside as well. 1250 01:02:06,510 --> 01:02:09,110 Here's another example where you've got 1251 01:02:09,110 --> 01:02:11,660 a zero net investment strategy. 1252 01:02:11,660 --> 01:02:13,250 You can work that out for yourself. 1253 01:02:13,250 --> 01:02:15,710 This is a little bit trickier because the portfolio weights 1254 01:02:15,710 --> 01:02:16,901 now add up to zero. 1255 01:02:16,901 --> 01:02:19,400 You've got to think a little bit about what it means to have 1256 01:02:19,400 --> 01:02:21,177 portfolio weights at all. 1257 01:02:21,177 --> 01:02:22,760 So I'll leave that for you to look at. 1258 01:02:22,760 --> 01:02:24,135 That's something that, as I said, 1259 01:02:24,135 --> 01:02:27,650 we won't cover this course in great detail. 1260 01:02:27,650 --> 01:02:29,750 So now motivation-- what we're trying 1261 01:02:29,750 --> 01:02:32,990 to do now that you know the basic language of portfolio 1262 01:02:32,990 --> 01:02:36,350 weights and how to manipulate them to some degree, 1263 01:02:36,350 --> 01:02:40,520 I want to ask the question, why bother with the portfolio? 1264 01:02:40,520 --> 01:02:42,380 Well, we've already got a couple of comments 1265 01:02:42,380 --> 01:02:43,790 about why you want a portfolio. 1266 01:02:43,790 --> 01:02:46,310 You want to have stocks with different kinds of risks 1267 01:02:46,310 --> 01:02:49,000 so you have diversification. 1268 01:02:49,000 --> 01:02:51,970 But there's another approach, and the other approach 1269 01:02:51,970 --> 01:02:55,720 is championed by Warren Buffett. 1270 01:02:55,720 --> 01:02:59,330 Warren Buffett has criticized this idea of diversification, 1271 01:02:59,330 --> 01:03:01,780 not putting all your eggs in one basket, by saying, 1272 01:03:01,780 --> 01:03:03,880 you should put all your eggs in one basket 1273 01:03:03,880 --> 01:03:06,670 and then simply just watch that basket really carefully. 1274 01:03:06,670 --> 01:03:08,020 Isn't that better? 1275 01:03:08,020 --> 01:03:11,290 Well, that sounds good, but what if it's 1276 01:03:11,290 --> 01:03:12,910 the case that you don't really know 1277 01:03:12,910 --> 01:03:15,540 how to pick the right basket? 1278 01:03:15,540 --> 01:03:18,460 And so therefore, whatever basket you're watching 1279 01:03:18,460 --> 01:03:20,470 may not be particularly attractive 1280 01:03:20,470 --> 01:03:22,750 because you picked the wrong basket. 1281 01:03:22,750 --> 01:03:26,290 So that's really the idea behind portfolio theory. 1282 01:03:26,290 --> 01:03:28,390 It's that not all of us are Warren Buffett. 1283 01:03:28,390 --> 01:03:31,000 Not all of us want to become Warren Buffetts. 1284 01:03:31,000 --> 01:03:35,890 We want to have a relatively systematic approach to making 1285 01:03:35,890 --> 01:03:37,270 a good investment decision. 1286 01:03:37,270 --> 01:03:39,100 We don't want to try to beat the market. 1287 01:03:39,100 --> 01:03:41,110 We want to figure out whether we can come up 1288 01:03:41,110 --> 01:03:45,640 with a responsible and attractive way of investing 1289 01:03:45,640 --> 01:03:49,000 that has some kind of economic logic to it. 1290 01:03:49,000 --> 01:03:52,160 So the point is that we don't know which stock is best, 1291 01:03:52,160 --> 01:03:56,260 and so we don't want to pick just one stock like Motorola. 1292 01:03:56,260 --> 01:03:58,900 Because there are periods where Motorola looks fantastic 1293 01:03:58,900 --> 01:04:01,180 and periods where Motorola looks horrible. 1294 01:04:01,180 --> 01:04:03,760 So we want to be able to pick a portfolio that's 1295 01:04:03,760 --> 01:04:05,690 got good characteristics. 1296 01:04:05,690 --> 01:04:09,530 So diversification is one way to do that. 1297 01:04:09,530 --> 01:04:12,490 It's to basically spread your risk 1298 01:04:12,490 --> 01:04:19,570 across a number of securities, and portfolios can do that. 1299 01:04:19,570 --> 01:04:24,930 But at the same time, they can also create focused bets. 1300 01:04:24,930 --> 01:04:27,810 So it's not just the case that you 1301 01:04:27,810 --> 01:04:31,830 have to buy every possible stock there is out there in order 1302 01:04:31,830 --> 01:04:33,090 to diversify. 1303 01:04:33,090 --> 01:04:35,850 For example, you may have information 1304 01:04:35,850 --> 01:04:40,110 or you may have conviction that information technology is going 1305 01:04:40,110 --> 01:04:42,390 to do really well over the next couple of years 1306 01:04:42,390 --> 01:04:43,950 because somebody's got to figure out 1307 01:04:43,950 --> 01:04:48,360 how to process all of these bad loans and problem banks. 1308 01:04:48,360 --> 01:04:52,080 And IT is going to ultimately be the solution. 1309 01:04:52,080 --> 01:04:56,010 Well, if that's the case, you can make a bet on IT 1310 01:04:56,010 --> 01:05:00,270 without having to make a bet on any one firm or one stock. 1311 01:05:00,270 --> 01:05:03,540 The way you do that is to form a portfolio of stocks 1312 01:05:03,540 --> 01:05:06,040 that are all in the IT sector. 1313 01:05:06,040 --> 01:05:09,040 And so you get diversification, but at the same time, 1314 01:05:09,040 --> 01:05:10,590 you're able to make a bet in an area 1315 01:05:10,590 --> 01:05:14,310 where you think you have particular expertise. 1316 01:05:14,310 --> 01:05:18,810 And finally, portfolios can customize and manage 1317 01:05:18,810 --> 01:05:20,760 your own personal risk-reward tradeoffs. 1318 01:05:20,760 --> 01:05:23,670 So for some of you, you want a lot of risk, 1319 01:05:23,670 --> 01:05:27,000 you want it concentrated in a small number of industries, 1320 01:05:27,000 --> 01:05:31,530 and you want to do it with relatively small priced stocks. 1321 01:05:31,530 --> 01:05:32,550 You can do that. 1322 01:05:32,550 --> 01:05:35,400 Somebody else might have a very different set of preferences. 1323 01:05:35,400 --> 01:05:39,960 Portfolios allow you to tailor the risk-reward tradeoffs 1324 01:05:39,960 --> 01:05:42,630 to your particular preferences. 1325 01:05:42,630 --> 01:05:45,210 So now we have a motivation for portfolios. 1326 01:05:45,210 --> 01:05:48,780 Then the next question is, that sounds great; now tell me, 1327 01:05:48,780 --> 01:05:52,410 how do I construct one of these good portfolios? 1328 01:05:52,410 --> 01:05:54,436 And in order to answer that question, 1329 01:05:54,436 --> 01:05:56,060 I've got to tell you what "good" means, 1330 01:05:56,060 --> 01:05:58,200 or you've got to tell me what "good" means. 1331 01:05:58,200 --> 01:06:03,090 So typically, what we say about a good portfolio 1332 01:06:03,090 --> 01:06:11,400 is it's a portfolio that has high mean and low risk. 1333 01:06:11,400 --> 01:06:13,080 That's what "good" means. 1334 01:06:13,080 --> 01:06:16,560 There are two characteristics that we tend to focus on 1335 01:06:16,560 --> 01:06:19,530 for purely statistical reasons. 1336 01:06:19,530 --> 01:06:22,060 It's because those are easy to compute, 1337 01:06:22,060 --> 01:06:24,270 and they are the first two statistics 1338 01:06:24,270 --> 01:06:25,740 that one would look at when you're 1339 01:06:25,740 --> 01:06:27,900 looking at an investment-- the mean 1340 01:06:27,900 --> 01:06:29,920 and the standard deviation. 1341 01:06:29,920 --> 01:06:32,670 So you might think that, naturally, it would make sense 1342 01:06:32,670 --> 01:06:35,430 to pick a portfolio that's got high mean 1343 01:06:35,430 --> 01:06:37,770 and low standard deviation. 1344 01:06:37,770 --> 01:06:39,162 That's an assumption. 1345 01:06:39,162 --> 01:06:40,870 In other words, we're assuming that we're 1346 01:06:40,870 --> 01:06:44,100 going to measure risk by standard deviation, 1347 01:06:44,100 --> 01:06:46,600 and we're assuming that we're measuring return 1348 01:06:46,600 --> 01:06:49,390 by the actual expected rate of return. 1349 01:06:49,390 --> 01:06:51,740 For certain investors, those are not appropriate. 1350 01:06:51,740 --> 01:06:53,281 For example, there are some investors 1351 01:06:53,281 --> 01:06:58,542 that are really keen on socially aware investing 1352 01:06:58,542 --> 01:07:00,250 so they don't want to invest in companies 1353 01:07:00,250 --> 01:07:02,027 that pollute the environment. 1354 01:07:02,027 --> 01:07:03,610 They don't want to invest in companies 1355 01:07:03,610 --> 01:07:08,200 that engage in nonunion workers, or they 1356 01:07:08,200 --> 01:07:09,790 don't want to invest in companies 1357 01:07:09,790 --> 01:07:15,590 that happen to be exploiting labor in unregulated markets. 1358 01:07:15,590 --> 01:07:18,460 Those are examples of non-pecuniary characteristics 1359 01:07:18,460 --> 01:07:21,190 that figure into this choice of stocks. 1360 01:07:21,190 --> 01:07:22,910 We're going to abstract from that. 1361 01:07:22,910 --> 01:07:25,660 So for our purposes, the characteristics that we're 1362 01:07:25,660 --> 01:07:27,790 going to look at for a good portfolio 1363 01:07:27,790 --> 01:07:31,840 is, does it have a high return, does it have low risk? 1364 01:07:31,840 --> 01:07:33,910 And the way we're going to measure risk 1365 01:07:33,910 --> 01:07:38,750 is in terms of the volatility or standard deviation. 1366 01:07:38,750 --> 01:07:42,820 Now, here, again, there's lots of ways of measuring risk. 1367 01:07:42,820 --> 01:07:47,820 We can measure by the upper quartile, the 5% loss 1368 01:07:47,820 --> 01:07:51,370 or spread, but in fact, what we're going to use 1369 01:07:51,370 --> 01:07:53,890 is this standard deviation measure. 1370 01:07:53,890 --> 01:07:56,080 For symmetric distributions like the normal, 1371 01:07:56,080 --> 01:07:59,800 it turns out that that's not a bad measure, 1372 01:07:59,800 --> 01:08:03,310 but some people have argued that by looking at spread 1373 01:08:03,310 --> 01:08:07,240 you're confusing the upside with the downside. 1374 01:08:07,240 --> 01:08:11,780 Nobody has any problem with upside risk or upside 1375 01:08:11,780 --> 01:08:15,217 distribution. 1376 01:08:15,217 --> 01:08:17,050 I haven't run across anybody that said, gee, 1377 01:08:17,050 --> 01:08:19,340 this year I'm really making too much money 1378 01:08:19,340 --> 01:08:20,979 and that's just not a good thing. 1379 01:08:20,979 --> 01:08:23,290 If you meet anybody like that, introduce me. 1380 01:08:23,290 --> 01:08:26,200 I'll help them out with their problem. 1381 01:08:26,200 --> 01:08:29,560 But the point is that for a symmetric distribution, 1382 01:08:29,560 --> 01:08:34,450 it doesn't matter, and in more advanced approaches 1383 01:08:34,450 --> 01:08:38,080 to investments people have used one-sided measures. 1384 01:08:38,080 --> 01:08:40,326 But we're not going to do that in this course. 1385 01:08:40,326 --> 01:08:42,700 So we're going to focus on variance or standard deviation 1386 01:08:42,700 --> 01:08:46,160 as the measure of risk. 1387 01:08:46,160 --> 01:08:48,080 And the assumptions that I'm going 1388 01:08:48,080 --> 01:08:50,990 to make for the remainder of the course 1389 01:08:50,990 --> 01:08:59,760 is that all investors like higher mean and all investors 1390 01:08:59,760 --> 01:09:03,840 like higher variance. 1391 01:09:03,840 --> 01:09:08,040 Now, that's a really reasonable assumption, 1392 01:09:08,040 --> 01:09:10,800 but you could challenge it if you 1393 01:09:10,800 --> 01:09:14,609 wanted to argue that investors care about other things. 1394 01:09:14,609 --> 01:09:18,120 So just be aware that I'm making an approximation, 1395 01:09:18,120 --> 01:09:21,479 and the approximation is exactly that, that mean and variance 1396 01:09:21,479 --> 01:09:25,710 are the only things that our prototypical investor is 1397 01:09:25,710 --> 01:09:28,670 going to care about. 1398 01:09:28,670 --> 01:09:31,280 So now, we actually are pretty close to being 1399 01:09:31,280 --> 01:09:33,529 able to come up with an answer to the question, what's 1400 01:09:33,529 --> 01:09:37,818 a good portfolio and how do we pick stocks. 1401 01:09:37,818 --> 01:09:39,859 One of the things that we're going to answer over 1402 01:09:39,859 --> 01:09:41,240 the course of the next few slides 1403 01:09:41,240 --> 01:09:45,620 is, how much does a stock contribute 1404 01:09:45,620 --> 01:09:50,460 to the risk and the expected return of a portfolio? 1405 01:09:50,460 --> 01:09:53,750 So if you're thinking about investing in a new stock, 1406 01:09:53,750 --> 01:09:58,682 it's like inviting somebody into your club. 1407 01:09:58,682 --> 01:10:00,140 You want to ask, well, what are you 1408 01:10:00,140 --> 01:10:01,717 going to contribute to my club? 1409 01:10:01,717 --> 01:10:03,800 What are you going to contribute to the portfolio? 1410 01:10:03,800 --> 01:10:05,990 What will you add to what I already have? 1411 01:10:05,990 --> 01:10:08,480 Are you going to help me with my expected return? 1412 01:10:08,480 --> 01:10:10,910 Are you going to help me lower my risk? 1413 01:10:10,910 --> 01:10:13,556 And if the answer is no to both of them, then I don't want you. 1414 01:10:13,556 --> 01:10:15,180 You're not going to do anything for me. 1415 01:10:15,180 --> 01:10:16,760 Why should you be in my portfolio? 1416 01:10:16,760 --> 01:10:18,260 So that's the kind of argument we're 1417 01:10:18,260 --> 01:10:22,940 going to make to be able to construct a good portfolio. 1418 01:10:22,940 --> 01:10:26,550 So let's get a little bit more specific about that. 1419 01:10:26,550 --> 01:10:29,930 Here's a graph, and you're going to see this a lot. 1420 01:10:29,930 --> 01:10:32,390 This graph is going to be one that we use 1421 01:10:32,390 --> 01:10:34,810 for all of portfolio analysis. 1422 01:10:34,810 --> 01:10:38,240 It's where we plot on two-dimensional space 1423 01:10:38,240 --> 01:10:41,780 the average return of the stock as well 1424 01:10:41,780 --> 01:10:44,540 as its risk, where risk is now being 1425 01:10:44,540 --> 01:10:47,720 measured by standard deviation. 1426 01:10:47,720 --> 01:10:51,500 So I've got five assets plotted here. 1427 01:10:51,500 --> 01:10:55,070 Merck is one and General Motors is another one. 1428 01:10:55,070 --> 01:10:57,440 Motorola is a third, McDonald's a fourth, 1429 01:10:57,440 --> 01:11:01,600 and I've got T-bills down there on the lower left. 1430 01:11:01,600 --> 01:11:06,130 This gives you a sense of the different trade-offs there are. 1431 01:11:06,130 --> 01:11:11,350 Clearly General Motors is lower risk that Motorola, 1432 01:11:11,350 --> 01:11:13,920 but it's also lower return. 1433 01:11:13,920 --> 01:11:17,220 And McDonald's is definitely going 1434 01:11:17,220 --> 01:11:24,960 to be higher risk than Merck, but notice that McDonald's is 1435 01:11:24,960 --> 01:11:28,450 also lower return than Merck. 1436 01:11:28,450 --> 01:11:34,410 So at least in this setting, nobody in their right mind-- 1437 01:11:34,410 --> 01:11:36,480 by that I mean, no rational investor-- 1438 01:11:36,480 --> 01:11:41,130 would ever want to hold McDonald's over Merck-- 1439 01:11:41,130 --> 01:11:44,160 by our assumption. 1440 01:11:44,160 --> 01:11:50,250 We're assuming that investors like expected return 1441 01:11:50,250 --> 01:11:53,160 and they don't like risk. 1442 01:11:53,160 --> 01:11:53,660 Question? 1443 01:11:53,660 --> 01:11:54,508 Yeah? 1444 01:11:54,508 --> 01:11:57,992 STUDENT: This [INAUDIBLE] think that McDonald's will 1445 01:11:57,992 --> 01:11:58,617 perform better. 1446 01:11:58,617 --> 01:11:59,992 PROFESSOR: Exactly, that's right. 1447 01:11:59,992 --> 01:12:01,926 So I was waiting for somebody to say that. 1448 01:12:01,926 --> 01:12:03,800 Warren Buffett would say that's the stupidest 1449 01:12:03,800 --> 01:12:07,790 thing I've ever heard, because all you're doing 1450 01:12:07,790 --> 01:12:10,850 is plotting history on this chart. 1451 01:12:10,850 --> 01:12:13,610 And this tells you nothing about what might happen 1452 01:12:13,610 --> 01:12:16,610 over the next 12, 24 months. 1453 01:12:16,610 --> 01:12:20,090 It could be that health care is going to just become 1454 01:12:20,090 --> 01:12:22,430 a real problem, pharmaceutical companies 1455 01:12:22,430 --> 01:12:24,080 are going to get battered because 1456 01:12:24,080 --> 01:12:25,730 of the Democratic administration. 1457 01:12:25,730 --> 01:12:28,400 That's going to force them to reduce the prices. 1458 01:12:28,400 --> 01:12:30,185 And so over the next six to 12 months, 1459 01:12:30,185 --> 01:12:32,060 the only thing that people will be able to do 1460 01:12:32,060 --> 01:12:35,300 is to go to their neighborhood McDonald's and just enjoy 1461 01:12:35,300 --> 01:12:37,760 a nice hamburger and complain about what's 1462 01:12:37,760 --> 01:12:40,940 been going on with the pharmaceutical industry. 1463 01:12:40,940 --> 01:12:42,890 In that case, McDonald's is a great bet 1464 01:12:42,890 --> 01:12:45,740 and Merck is a terrible investment. 1465 01:12:45,740 --> 01:12:47,740 We abstract from all of that. 1466 01:12:47,740 --> 01:12:50,930 We are not in the business of forecasting stock returns. 1467 01:12:50,930 --> 01:12:51,530 Why? 1468 01:12:51,530 --> 01:12:53,660 Because I just showed you in the previous set of 1469 01:12:53,660 --> 01:12:56,360 slides that it's hard to forecast. 1470 01:12:56,360 --> 01:12:58,970 In fact, you told me that in an efficient market 1471 01:12:58,970 --> 01:13:00,710 it's actually hard to tell what's going 1472 01:13:00,710 --> 01:13:01,990 to happen with these stocks. 1473 01:13:01,990 --> 01:13:03,500 And if you could tell, then people 1474 01:13:03,500 --> 01:13:05,490 are going to start using that information, 1475 01:13:05,490 --> 01:13:07,370 and then the information is worthless 1476 01:13:07,370 --> 01:13:10,190 because it'll have already been taken into account. 1477 01:13:10,190 --> 01:13:13,750 So you see, this is a very important 1478 01:13:13,750 --> 01:13:17,950 philosophical difference between Warren Buffett and academics. 1479 01:13:17,950 --> 01:13:19,840 Warren Buffett believes that there 1480 01:13:19,840 --> 01:13:23,350 are systematic mispricings out there that can be 1481 01:13:23,350 --> 01:13:26,400 found and taken advantage of. 1482 01:13:26,400 --> 01:13:29,400 Academic finance, as of the 1960s and 70s 1483 01:13:29,400 --> 01:13:32,380 when this theory was developed, started from the point 1484 01:13:32,380 --> 01:13:35,140 that you just came to very quickly, 1485 01:13:35,140 --> 01:13:38,200 which is that there are no patterns in the data. 1486 01:13:38,200 --> 01:13:41,660 If there were, someone would have already done it-- 1487 01:13:41,660 --> 01:13:44,390 which, by the way, Warren Buffett would answer by saying, 1488 01:13:44,390 --> 01:13:46,850 you know what, that sounds like a joke about the economist 1489 01:13:46,850 --> 01:13:49,460 walking down the road, sees a $100 bill, 1490 01:13:49,460 --> 01:13:50,377 and walks right by it. 1491 01:13:50,377 --> 01:13:51,959 And when somebody says, why didn't you 1492 01:13:51,959 --> 01:13:54,440 pick up the $100 bill, they said, well, if it were real, 1493 01:13:54,440 --> 01:13:58,100 someone would have already picked it up. 1494 01:13:58,100 --> 01:14:00,230 I mean, that's the argument that we made together. 1495 01:14:00,230 --> 01:14:02,990 We made that argument, that if there was a pattern somebody 1496 01:14:02,990 --> 01:14:04,948 would take advantage of it and then the pattern 1497 01:14:04,948 --> 01:14:06,860 can't be there. 1498 01:14:06,860 --> 01:14:08,360 And then, again, Warren Buffet would 1499 01:14:08,360 --> 01:14:10,235 say, that's the stupidest thing I ever heard, 1500 01:14:10,235 --> 01:14:12,890 because in fact, I've done it, I saw the patterns, 1501 01:14:12,890 --> 01:14:15,290 I took advantage of it, and I have a bit more money 1502 01:14:15,290 --> 01:14:18,680 than you do, so there. 1503 01:14:18,680 --> 01:14:19,690 Who do you believe? 1504 01:14:19,690 --> 01:14:22,940 Well, it's kind of hard to argue with a $40-something 1505 01:14:22,940 --> 01:14:24,860 billionaire. 1506 01:14:24,860 --> 01:14:28,010 I think that's his wealth, $40 billion. 1507 01:14:28,010 --> 01:14:31,370 But that's not the perspective of this analysis. 1508 01:14:31,370 --> 01:14:32,296 Mike? 1509 01:14:32,296 --> 01:14:34,797 STUDENT: Well, let's say the expected return was 1510 01:14:34,797 --> 01:14:36,380 you had perfect information and that's 1511 01:14:36,380 --> 01:14:38,215 what was going to be a perfect crystal ball. 1512 01:14:38,215 --> 01:14:40,922 It would still be irrational to buy McDonald's versus 1513 01:14:40,922 --> 01:14:44,978 Merck, so you'd short McDonald's and long Merck 1514 01:14:44,978 --> 01:14:46,310 until the returns became equal. 1515 01:14:46,310 --> 01:14:46,820 PROFESSOR: Exactly. 1516 01:14:46,820 --> 01:14:49,010 So I'm going to talk about that for a little while, 1517 01:14:49,010 --> 01:14:49,730 but you're right. 1518 01:14:49,730 --> 01:14:52,790 So if you could short, then what you'd want to do 1519 01:14:52,790 --> 01:14:53,990 is exactly what you said. 1520 01:14:53,990 --> 01:14:59,540 You want to basically long the low risk, high yield asset, 1521 01:14:59,540 --> 01:15:03,350 short the high risk, low yield asset, make that spread, 1522 01:15:03,350 --> 01:15:05,599 and make it as riskless as you can 1523 01:15:05,599 --> 01:15:06,890 buy including other securities. 1524 01:15:06,890 --> 01:15:07,715 Yes? 1525 01:15:07,715 --> 01:15:09,715 STUDENT: Yeah, but eventually it would collapse, 1526 01:15:09,715 --> 01:15:11,090 and then the relationship would-- 1527 01:15:11,090 --> 01:15:12,339 PROFESSOR: And then it should. 1528 01:15:12,339 --> 01:15:12,920 That's right. 1529 01:15:12,920 --> 01:15:16,460 So the argument that economists would make 1530 01:15:16,460 --> 01:15:21,540 is that this picture is the equilibrium of where 1531 01:15:21,540 --> 01:15:26,580 these returns should be, given what the market determines 1532 01:15:26,580 --> 01:15:31,030 their fair rates of return are, relative to their risks. 1533 01:15:31,030 --> 01:15:33,960 So that's, again, a very big philosophical difference. 1534 01:15:33,960 --> 01:15:36,720 An economist would say, all of these securities 1535 01:15:36,720 --> 01:15:38,940 are exactly where they should be. 1536 01:15:38,940 --> 01:15:43,560 And they may change over time, but at any point in time 1537 01:15:43,560 --> 01:15:45,240 they are where they should be. 1538 01:15:45,240 --> 01:15:48,540 Supply equals demand, market's clear, 1539 01:15:48,540 --> 01:15:53,200 everything is equilibrium, and our decision 1540 01:15:53,200 --> 01:15:56,020 is simply to figure out what to make 1541 01:15:56,020 --> 01:15:59,230 of the portfolio of these securities. 1542 01:15:59,230 --> 01:16:02,750 What is the best portfolio of these securities? 1543 01:16:02,750 --> 01:16:05,426 So I'm just warning you, this is a philosophical departure 1544 01:16:05,426 --> 01:16:07,300 from what you're used to thinking and reading 1545 01:16:07,300 --> 01:16:08,050 in the newspapers. 1546 01:16:08,050 --> 01:16:09,741 Because the newspapers would say, well, 1547 01:16:09,741 --> 01:16:11,740 let's take a look at the earnings at McDonald's. 1548 01:16:11,740 --> 01:16:12,790 Let's take a look at Merck. 1549 01:16:12,790 --> 01:16:14,020 Let's talk to the macroeconomists 1550 01:16:14,020 --> 01:16:15,760 and see what's going to happen over the next 12 months. 1551 01:16:15,760 --> 01:16:16,980 Let's talk to the earnings analysts 1552 01:16:16,980 --> 01:16:18,896 and see whether they forecast higher earnings, 1553 01:16:18,896 --> 01:16:20,020 lower earnings. 1554 01:16:20,020 --> 01:16:22,900 The whole point of the academic infrastructure that we set up 1555 01:16:22,900 --> 01:16:26,110 is that you can't predict these things. 1556 01:16:26,110 --> 01:16:28,360 And if you believe that, then basically Warren Buffett 1557 01:16:28,360 --> 01:16:31,660 is just one really lucky guy. 1558 01:16:31,660 --> 01:16:37,450 So I'm going to have to justify this academic position to you. 1559 01:16:37,450 --> 01:16:39,987 And I won't do that until the end of the semester, 1560 01:16:39,987 --> 01:16:42,320 because first of all, I have a lot of material to cover. 1561 01:16:42,320 --> 01:16:45,280 And I want to cover all of the material in the basic form, 1562 01:16:45,280 --> 01:16:48,280 and then in the end I'm going to give you a sense of where 1563 01:16:48,280 --> 01:16:49,930 things really stand. 1564 01:16:49,930 --> 01:16:50,900 It's a fiction. 1565 01:16:50,900 --> 01:16:54,710 It's a fiction that you can't forecast stock prices, 1566 01:16:54,710 --> 01:16:58,150 but it's a fiction that actually is pretty close to reality 1567 01:16:58,150 --> 01:17:00,730 for 99% of the public. 1568 01:17:00,730 --> 01:17:03,560 Now, you guys are not 99% of the public. 1569 01:17:03,560 --> 01:17:05,770 But for the people that will someday 1570 01:17:05,770 --> 01:17:08,950 be your clients or your investors, 1571 01:17:08,950 --> 01:17:12,010 it will be true, that the typical individual 1572 01:17:12,010 --> 01:17:15,850 has no hope of being able to out-forecast Warren Buffett. 1573 01:17:15,850 --> 01:17:17,860 And if you can't out-forecast somebody, 1574 01:17:17,860 --> 01:17:20,320 then you may as well assume that they're random 1575 01:17:20,320 --> 01:17:23,590 and they're perfectly priced. 1576 01:17:23,590 --> 01:17:25,330 And then you still have the problem, OK, 1577 01:17:25,330 --> 01:17:27,667 if you assume that, then what do you do? 1578 01:17:27,667 --> 01:17:29,500 That's all we're going to try to figure out. 1579 01:17:29,500 --> 01:17:33,890 I'm going to tell you what you do with portfolio theory. 1580 01:17:33,890 --> 01:17:36,580 Now, since we're almost out of time, 1581 01:17:36,580 --> 01:17:38,330 I want to just tell you where we're going. 1582 01:17:38,330 --> 01:17:40,580 What we're going to do is look at this graph 1583 01:17:40,580 --> 01:17:45,230 and ask the question, what do people want? 1584 01:17:45,230 --> 01:17:48,590 They want higher return, they want to go north, 1585 01:17:48,590 --> 01:17:50,120 and they want lower risk. 1586 01:17:50,120 --> 01:17:52,220 They want to go west. 1587 01:17:52,220 --> 01:17:54,350 So the northwest is where we're going 1588 01:17:54,350 --> 01:17:57,110 to be heading in this graph, and the question 1589 01:17:57,110 --> 01:17:58,970 is, how can we get there? 1590 01:17:58,970 --> 01:18:01,820 How can we get as northwest as possible 1591 01:18:01,820 --> 01:18:03,140 using these securities? 1592 01:18:03,140 --> 01:18:05,090 And the answer will shock you, I think, 1593 01:18:05,090 --> 01:18:07,570 because you're going to see that by doing 1594 01:18:07,570 --> 01:18:10,190 a very simple little bit of high school algebra 1595 01:18:10,190 --> 01:18:12,740 we can actually create a portfolio that 1596 01:18:12,740 --> 01:18:15,020 beats all of these things. 1597 01:18:15,020 --> 01:18:17,600 That is, if you didn't know anything 1598 01:18:17,600 --> 01:18:21,170 about portfolio theory, you would be severely worse off, 1599 01:18:21,170 --> 01:18:24,119 because you'd be stuck having to be on one of these five points. 1600 01:18:24,119 --> 01:18:25,910 And if you knew a little bit of high school 1601 01:18:25,910 --> 01:18:29,550 algebra and some finance, you could actually do a lot better. 1602 01:18:29,550 --> 01:18:32,230 So we'll see that on Monday.