MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

<u>15.565</u> Integrating Information Systems: Technology, Strategy, and Organizational Factors

<u>15.578</u> Global Information Systems: Communications & Connectivity Among Information Systems

Spring 2002

Lecture 21

MARKET VS. HIERARCHY: FACTORS IMPACTING ORGANIZATIONAL CONNECTIVITY

<u>GOALS</u>

- UNDERSTAND WHY ORGANIZATIONS DO THINGS THAT APPEAR "IRRATIONAL"
- ORGANIZATIONAL CONNECTIVITY STRUCTURES
 -- MARKETS
 - -- HIERARCHIES (INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS)
 - -- THE FUTURE?

RELATED RESEARCHERS

• MARCH OBSERVED:

- COGNITIVE LIMITS ON RATIONALITY
- LIMITS TO HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING
- BOUNDED RATIONALITY
- SALANCIK SUGGESTED:


– ACTIONS TO FULFILL INTENTIONS WILL BE IMPERFECT IF:

- 1. INTENTIONS NOT CLEAR
- 2. CONSEQUENCES OF ACTIONS NOT CLEAR
- 3. MEANS TO TRANSFORM INTENT TO ACTION UNCLEAR
- 4. INTENTIONS NOT KNOWN TO PERSON SELECTING ACTION
- 5. MULTIPLE INTENTIONS

MARKET VS. HIERARCHY

• MARKET


--SEPARATE BI-LATERAL AGREEMENTS (E.G., INDEPENDENT CORPS)



4

• HIERARCHY

--HIERARCHICALLY STRUCTURED AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS (E.G., DIVISION OF CORP.)



CONNECTIVITY IMPORTANT IN BOTH MARKET AND HIERARCHY

RONALD COASE (1937): **TRANSACTIONAL VIEW**

 VERTICAL INTEGRATION ECONOMIZES ON "COST OF NEGOTIATING AND CONCLUDING" MANY SEPARATE CONTRACTS BY USING FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.

RONALD COASE (1972)


- 1937 ARTICLE "MUCH CITED AND LITTLE USED"
 - -- FAILURE TO MAKE ISSUES OPERATIONAL
 - -- FAILURE TO DIFFERENTIATE SITUATIONS (MARKET VS. VERTICAL INTEGRATION)

WILLIAMSON (1971) CONTRIBUTION:

- MAKE "TRANSACTION" UNIT OF ANALYSIS
- IDENTIFY ALTERNATE MARKET AND "CONTRACTING" MODES
- IDENTIFY CRITICAL DIMENSIONS IN WHICH TRANSACTIONS DIFFERED
- TRACE OUT ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS
- MATCH MODES TO TRANSACTIONS

TOM MALONE (late 1990s) ... MORE LATER ...

KEY ISSUES



- ASSET SPECIFICITY
- COMPLEXITY OF PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

• EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC MARKETS AND ELECTRONIC HIERARCHIES

BOUNDED RATIONALITY

- HUMAN BEHAVIOR THAT IS "INTENDLY RATIONAL, BUT ONLY LIMITED SO"
 [SIMON, 1961]
 - -- PHYSICAL LIMITS: PROCESSING RATE (CPU) & STORAGE LIMITS (RAM)
 - -- LANGUAGE LIMITS (I/O): DIFFICULTY IN ARTICULATING KNOWLEDGE BY USE OF WORDS
- LIMITS OF RATIONALITY REACHED UNDER CONDITIONS OF:
 - --UNCERTAINTY --COMPLEXITY
- COMPLEXITY / UNCERTAINTY FACTORS:
 - -- SIZE OF DECISION TREE
 - -- NOT ALL ALTERNATIVE PATHS KNOWN
 - -- NOT ALL CONSEQUENCES KNOWN
- HIERARCHY HELPS:

-- REDUCES SOME UNCERTAINTY THROUGH LONG-TERM PLANS



• **DISTINCTIONS**:

--STEWARDSHIP:

--INSTRUMENTAL:

--OPPORTUNISTIC:

TRUST, RELATION NEUTRAL, NO SELF-INTEREST SELF-INTEREST WITH GUILE

- TYPES OF INFORMATION ADVANTAGES:
 - -- NORMAL: PRE-EXISTING AND FULLY DISCLOSED
 - -- OPPORTUNISTIC: SELECTIVE OR DISTORTED INFORMATION DISCLOSURE (E.G., AIRLINE "ON-TIME" RECORDS)
 - -- SELF-DISBELIEVED PROMISES (CANNOT DISTINGUISH FROM SINCERE SITUATION, E.G., "TRUST ME")
- SMALL NUMBER OF PLAYERS & INTERACTIONS
 --DECREASED COMPETITION & INCREASED DIFFICULTIES
- HIERARCHY HELPS:
 - -- LESS ABLE TO GAIN AT EXPENSE OF ORGANIZATION (MONOPOLY) -- MORE EFFICIENT & EFFECTIVE AUDIT EASIER TO RESOLVE DISPLITES
 - -- EASIER TO RESOLVE DISPUTES

INFORMATION IMPACTEDNESS (ASYMMETRIC INFO)

- MAIN ISSUE: TRUE UNDERLYING CIRCUMSTANCES
 - KNOWN TO SOME PARTIES
 - NOT KNOWN TO OTHERS (HARD TO DISCERN)
- EVEN IF IDENTICAL INFORMATION KNOWN, BUT INCOMPLETE:
 - EACH PARTY HAS DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS
 - COSTLY HAGGERING LATER
- EXAMPLES:
 - INSURANCE
 - INSUREDS KNOW RISK BETTER THAN INSURERS
 - FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE (INITIAL CONTRACT)
 - GAIN "LEARNING BY DOING"
 - MAY NOT WANT (OR ABLE TO) SHARE KNOWLEDGE LEARNED
- <u>HIERARCHY HELPS:</u>
 - HINDERS EXPLOITATION
 - ALLOWS AUDIT
 - SHARED LANGUAGE (CODING)
 - SUPERIOR ABILITY TO DO "EXPERIENCE RATING"

ASSET SPECIFICITY

- INVESTMENTS THAT ARE TRANSACTION SPECIFIC
 - UNABLE TO PUT ASSETS TO ALTERNATIVE USE
 - EXAMPLES:
 - SITE SPECIFIC (NATURAL RESOURCE, FACTORY LOCATION)
 - PHYSICAL ASSET SPECIFIC (SPECIAL MACHINE)
 - HUMAN ASSET SPECIFIC (TRAINING, HIRING)
 - TIME SPECIFIC (PERISHABLE GOOD: FOOD, MOVIE SEAT) MORE SPECIFIC --> MORE EFFICIENT

- (FOR <u>SPECIFIC</u> PURPOSE)

- PROBLEMS WITH ASSET SPECIFICITY
 - ADDITIONAL GOVERNANCE NEEDED
 - UNCERTAINTY INCREASED CONCERN
- **HIERARCHY HELPS**:

– LONG-RANGE PLAN

COMPLEXITY OF PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

- INFORMATION TO SPECIFY ATTRIBUTES OF A PRODUCT
 NEEDED TO MAKE SELECTION
- SIMPLE DESCRIPTIONS (STANDARDIZED, INTERCHANGEABLE)
 - STOCKS, COMMODITIES
- COMPLEX DESCRIPTIONS (NOT INTERCHANGEABLE)
 - BUSINESS INSURANCE
 - COMPLEX MACHINERY
 - SOFTWARE PACKAGE
- HIERARCHY HELPS:
 - COST OF COMMUNICATION LAYER (SHARED LANGUAGE)
 - LESS COORDINATION NECESSARY

APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR HIERARCHY

- NEED TO ECONOMIZE ON BOUNDED RATIONALITY
 - COMPLEX UNCERTAIN SITUATION
- NEED TO REDUCE <u>OPPORTUNISM</u>
 - ESPECIALLY IF SMALL NUMBERS
- NEED TO REDUCE <u>UNCERTAINTY</u>
 - BY CONVERGENT EXPECTATIONS
- NEED TO REDUCE <u>TRANSACTION COSTS</u>
- NEED TO OVERCOME INFORMATION IMPACTEDNESS
- NEED TO DEAL WITH
 - HIGH ASSET SPECIFICITY
 - <u>COMPLEX PRODUCT DESCRIPTION</u>

EVOLUTION OF HIERARCHIES

1. VERTICAL INTEGRATION -- HIERARCHY

- -- LATE 19TH CENTURY
- -- LARGE SCALE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES
- -- NEW DISTRIBUTION TECHNOLOGY (RAILROAD, TELEGRAPH / TELEPHONE)
- 2. MULTIDIVISION -- HIERARCHY
 - -- GROWTH OF SIZE AND COMPLEXITY HURT FUNCTIONAL FIRMS
 - -- CHANGE FROM FUNCTIONAL TO DIVISIONAL
 - -- REMOVED TOP EXECUTIVES FROM ROUTINE ACTIVITIES
 - -- ALLOWED TOP EXECUTIVES TO FOCUS ON LONG-TERM PLANNING
 - ECONOMIZE ON BOUNDED RATIONALITY
 - REDUCE OPPORTUNISM (SUB-GOAL CLEAR)
- 3. WHAT IS THE NEXT STAGE?
 - -- INTER-DEPENDENT FIRMS?
 - -- MARKETS?

--> TRANSACTION COST MAJOR FACTOR (IT HAS MAJOR IMPACT)

(Long-term)

(Near-term)

GM

Chevy

Pontiac


ELECTRONIC MARKETS AND ELECTRONIC HIERARCHIES

• HIERARCHIES

- CONTROLLED THROUGH HIGHER LEVEL HIERARCHY
- MANAGERIAL DECISIONS (NOT MARKET FORCES)
- PREDETERMINED BUYER AND SELLER
- MARKETS
 - SUPPLY AND DEMAND FORCES
 - BUYER SELECTS FROM CHOICES
 - EXTERNAL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS


SHIFT FROM HIERARCHIES TOWARDS MARKETS

- TECHNOLOGY REDUCES COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION COSTS (MAKES MARKETS MORE FAVORABLE)
- TECHNOLOGY FACILITATE COMPLEX PRODUCT DESCRIPTIONS (TRANSMISSION AND MANIPULATION)
 - E.G., AIRLINE RESERVATIONS (?)
- TECHNOLOGY REDUCES ASSET SPECIFICITY (FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING)
 - CAN SERVE SMALL MARKETS USING HIGH-VOLUME EQUIPMENT (REDUCE RETOOLING COSTS)
- IMPACT OF COMPLEXITY AND SPECIFICITY



POTENTIAL ELECTRONIC MARKET MAKERS

- PRODUCERS
 - FACILITATE PURCHASING BY BUYER (E.G., AA, AHS/BAXTER)
- BUYERS
 - FACILITATE SELECTION, CONTROL INVENTORY (E.G., GE SUPPLY NETWORK)
- DISTRIBUTORS
 - SIMILAR MOTIVATION TO PRODUCERS & BUYERS (E.G., MCKESSON0
- FINANCIAL SERVICES PROVIDERS
 - FINANCIAL INVOLVEMENT (CREDIT) IN MOST TRANSACTIONS ALREADY
 - EXTEND INVOLVEMENT (E.G., CITICORP & MCGRAW-HILL CRUDE OIL?)
- INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY VENDORS
 - ALREADY PROVIDING THE TECHNOLOGY (E.G., INTERNET)



STAGES IN EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC MARKETS

- 0. EXCLUSIVE NON-MARKET ENVIRONMENT (AA)
- 1. BIASED MARKET
 - -- INITIAL PROVIDER SEEKS ADVANTAGE
 - E.G., AIRLINE RESERVATIONS
 - (UNITED: ONLY, AMERICAN: ALL BUT BIASED)
- 2. BIASED --> UNBIASED

(CAB/FAA REQUIRED UNBIASED AIRLINE RESERVATIONS)

- 3. UNBIASED --> PERSONALIZED
 - -- OVERWHELMED WITH ALTERNATIVES E.G., AIRLINE SELECTION CRITERIA (FARES, TIMES)

WHAT'S NEXT?

SUMMARY

NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHY ORGANIZATIONS
 DO THINGS THAT APPEAR "IRRATIONAL"

-- MANY REAL REASONS

- ORGANIZATIONAL CONNECTIVITY STRUCTURES
 - -- MARKETS
 - -- HIERARCHIES (INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS) -- THE FUTURE?