Topics

1. Static Games of Complete Information

  1. Strictly dominated strategies, iterated strict dominance
  2. Rationalizability, equivalence to iterated dominance
  3. Nash equilibrium: Existence and continuity properties

2. Static Games with Incomplete Information

  1. Bayesian Nash equilibrium
  2. Auctions, revenue equivalence

3. Dynamic Games with Perfect Information

  1. Extensive-form games, multi-stage games
  2. Backwards induction
  3. Subgame perfection
  4. The one-shot deviation principle
  5. Bargaining with complete information
  6. Repeated games: Folk theorems

4. Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information

  1. Sequential equilibrium
  2. Perfect and proper equilibria: Existence and properties
  3. The intuitive criterion
  4. Iterated weak dominance

5. Nash Bargaining

  1. Axiomatization
  2. Non-cooperative bargaining implementation

6. Cooperative Games

  1. Core: Existence and properties
  2. The core and competitive equilibrium
  3. Core tâtonnement
  4. Shapley value: Axiomatizations
  5. Bargaining implementations
  6. Networks

7. Matching Problems

  1. Stable matchings
  2. Lattice structure
  3. The deferred acceptance algorithm
  4. Axioms for deferred acceptance

8. Bargaining in Markets

  1. Symmetric buyers and sellers
  2. Networks