Prof. Daron Acemoglu's Lecture Slides
| LEC # | TOPICS | Lecture Summaries | SLIDES |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1–2 | Collective Choice and Voting | These two lectures introduce some basic notions from the theory of collective choice and the basic static voting models. | Lectures 1–2 Slides (PDF) |
| 3 | Voting and Information Aggregation | This lecture introduces models in which voters have imperfect information about the underlying state or their preferences, and investigates the extent to which voting can act as a method of voting aggregation. | Lecture 3 Slides (PDF) |
| 4–5 | Voting and Political Decisions in Practice | These two lectures provide some evidence on how people vote, the extent to which the predictions of some basic models of voting are borne out, and the motives, strategic or otherwise, of voters. | Lecture 4–5 Slides (PDF - 1.1MB) |
| 6–7 | Electoral Politics Gone Wrong | In this block of lectures, we discuss how the democratic process is often distorted because of the powerful agents and groups exerting undue power via lobbying, vote buying, direct coercion, or the process of patron-client relationships. | Lecture 6–7 Slides (PDF) |
| 8–9 | Political Agency | In this lecture, we introduce the notion of political agency whereby decision-making powers delegated to elect politicians who are then controlled by voters through the democratic process. | Lecture 8–9 Slides (PDF) |
| 10 | Political Agency Gone Wrong | This lecture shows how, in contrast to the theoretical benchmark of well-functioning political agency, in much of the world politicians are able to manipulate the election process and thwart democratic control mechanisms. | Lecture 10 Slides (PDF) |
| 11 | Economic Policy Under Representative Democracy | In this lecture, we discuss two different approaches to economic policy on the representative democracy: legislative bargaining and policy competition with political agency. | Lecture 11 Slides (PDF) |
| 12 | Political Compromise | This lecture discusses how dynamic interactions can lead to political compromise between different groups or parties (both in democratic and nondemocratic environments) and what the limits of this type of political compromise are. | Lecture 12 Slides (PDF) |
| 13–14 | Economic Policy Under Nondemocratic Institutions | This lecture provides an introduction to economic policy when one group holds political power and uses policy in order to directly or indirectly further its economic interests. | Lecture 13–14 Slides (PDF) |
Prof. Benjamin Olken's Lecture Slides
| LEC # | TOPICS | FILES |
|---|---|---|
| 15–17 | Conflict | Lectures 15–17 Slides (PDF - 2.8MB) |
| 18–19 | Collective Action | Lectures 18 & 19 Slides (PDF - 1.8MB) |
| 20–21 | Media | |
| 22–23 | Bureaucracy | Lectures 22 & 23 Slides (PDF - 1.3MB) |
| 24–27 | Corruption |
Lectures 24–27 Slides Part 1 (PDF) |
