SES # | TOPICS | READINGS |
---|---|---|
I. Egoism | ||
1 | Egoism | Butler, Joseph. Sermon XI in Fifteen Sermons. 1726. (PDF) |
2 | Egoism: empirical and quasi-empirical issues | Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher. "The Nature of Human Altruism." Nature 425 (October 23, 2003): 785-791. |
II. Beliefs, desires, and intentions | ||
3 | Belief/desire psychology and the Humean theory of motivation | Smith, Michael. "The Humean Theory of Motivation." Mind New Series 96, no. 381 (January 1987): 36-61. |
4 | Bratman on intention |
Bratman, Michael. "Taking Plans Seriously." Social Theory and Practice 9, nos. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1983): 271-287. Further readingsFor a short presentation of the Bratman approach and a summary of the empirical work from Gollwitzer:
Bratman, Michael. "Intention and Means-End Reasoning." The Philosophical Review 90, no. 2 (April 1981): 252-265. ———. "Two Faces of Intention." The Philosophical Review 93, no. 3 (July 1984): 375-405. Bratman's position is developed more fully in:
For a quick way into this, see: Velleman, David. "Review of Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, by Michael Bratman." The Philosophical Review 100, no. 2 (April 1991): 277-284. For an alternative view that tries to accommodate intentions within a belief/desire framework, see: Ridge, Michael. "Humean Intentions." American Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 2 (April 1998): 157-178. |
III. Reducing intentions | ||
5 | Velleman on intention |
|
IV. Akrasia and weakness of will | ||
6 | Akrasia |
![]() |
7 | Akrasia and desire |
Watson, Gary. "Skepticism about Weakness of Will." The Philosophical Review 86, no. 3 (July 1977): 316-339. Humberstone, Lloyd. "Wanting, Getting, Having." Philosophical Papers 19 (1990): 99-118. Holton, Richard. "Intention and Weakness of Will." Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 241-262. |
V. Strength of will | ||
8 | Strength of will: descriptive issues |
Muraven, Mark, and Roy F. Baumeister. "Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?" Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000): 247-259. Further readings
McClure, Samuel, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D. Cohen. "Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Reward." Science 306, no. 5695 (October 15, 2004): 503-507. Ainslie, George, and John Monterosso. "A Marketplace in the Brain?" Science 306, no. 5695 (October 15, 2004): 421-423. |
9 | Strength of will: normative issues |
Kavka, G. "The Toxin Puzzle." Analysis 43 (1983): 33-36.
Holton, Richard. "Rational Resolve." The Philosophical Review 113 (2004): 507-535. |
VI. Addiction | ||
10 | Addiction I | Yaffe, Gideon. "Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency." Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 178-221. (![]() |
11 | Addiction II |
Berridge, Kent C., and Terry E. Robinson. "The Mind of an Addicted Brain: Neural Sensitization of Wanting Versus Liking." Current Directions in Psychological Science 4, no. 3 (June 1995): 71-75.
———. "Excusing Addiction." Law and Philosophy 18, no. 6 (1999): 589-619. |
VII. Free will I | ||
12 | Free will I |
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (January 14, 1971): 5-20. Watson, Gary. "Free Action and Free Will." Mind New Series 96, no. 382 (April 1987): 145-172. |
13 | Free will II | Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (December 4, 1969): 829-839. |
VIII. Free will II | ||
14 | Free will IV: libertarianism | Kane, Robert. "Two Kinds of Incompatibilism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 2 (December 1989): 219-254. |
15 | Free will III: Strawson |
Strawson, Peter F. "Freedom and Resentment." Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1961): 187-211.
Wolf, Susan. "The Importance of Free Will." Mind New Series 90, no. 359 (July 1981): 386-405. |
IX. Free will III | ||
16 |
Free will VI: empirical work Free will V: choice |
Wegner, Daniel M., and T. Wheatley. "Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will." American Psychologist 54, no. 7 (July 1999): 480-492. Wegner, Daniel M. "Précis of The Illusion of Conscious Will (and Commentaries and Reply)." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 5 (October 2004): 649-692.
Mele, Alfred R. "Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience." Working Paper, Florida State University, 2007. ( |
X. Identification and autonomy | ||
17 | Identification |
|
18 | Self-determination theory |
Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan. "The Support of Autonomy and the Control of Behavior." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53 (1987): 1024-1037. Ryan, R. M., and E. L. Deci. "Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being." American Psychologist 55 (2000): 68-78. Further readingDeci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan. "The 'What' and 'Why' of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior." Psychological Inquiry 11 (2000): 227-268. |
XI. Self-Deception | ||
19 | Self-deception |
Mele, Alfred R. "Real Self-Deception." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, no. 1 (1997): 91-136. (Note: This is a pre-print, and does not include the peer commentary that appeared with the printed version.) Holton, Richard. "What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 101 (2001): 53-69. |
XII. Moral psychology I: what could empirical work tell us about morality? | ||
20 | The metaethical implications of empirical work | Do the Harvard Moral Sense Test |
21 | Moral judgment and motivation |
Nichols, Shaun. "Norms with Feeling." Cognition 84 (2002): 221-236. Haidt, Jonathan. "The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment." Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001): 814-834. ( Greene, Joshua D., Leigh E. Nystrom, Andrew D. Engell, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen. "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment." Neuron 44 (2004): 389-400. |
XIII. Moral psychology II | ||
22 | Autism and sociopathy |
Kennett, Jeanette. "Autism and Empathy." Philosophical Quarterly 52 (July 2002): 340-357.
Roskies, Adina. "Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from Acquired Sociopathy." Philosophical Psychology 16, no. 1 (March 2003): 51-66. |
23 | Moral luck and the Knobe effect |
Knobe, Joshua. "The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology." Philosophical Studies 130, no. 2 (August 2006): 203-231. Pettit, Dean, and Joshua Knobe. "The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment." Mind and Language forthcoming. ( Nelkin, Dana K. "Moral Luck." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/moral-luck/. Cushman, Fiery. "Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment." Cognition 108, no. 2 (August 2008): 353-380. |
XIV. Moral psychology III | ||
24 | Virtue and character |
Doris, John M. "Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics." Noûs 32, no. 4 (December 1998): 504-530. Bem, Daryl. "On the Uncommon Wisdom of our Lay Personality Theory." Psychological Inquiry 3 (1992): 82-84. Kamtekar, Rachana. "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character." Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004): 458-491. |
25 | Determinism and moral motivation |
Vohs, Kathleen D., and Jonathan W. Schooler. "The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating." Psychological Science 19, no. 1 (January 2008): 49-54. Baumeister, Roy F., E. J. Masicampo, and C. Nathan DeWall. "Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35, no. 2 (February 2009): 260-268. |