Lecture Notes

Lecture Slides

Strategic-Form Games: Dominated Strategies, Rationalizability, and Nash Equilibrium; Epistemic Foundations (PDF)

Bayesian Games: Type Spaces, Bayesian Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, E-mail Game, Epistemic Foundations (PDF)

Extensive Form Games and Subgame Perfection (PDF)

Single-Deviation Principle and Two-Player Bargaining; Bargaining in Dynamic Markets; Fixed Point Theorems (PDF)

Equilibrium Refinements: Sequential, Perfect, and Proper Equilibria; Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and Stable Equilibria (PDF)

Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring: Folk Theorem and Optimal Penal Codes; Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: Self-Generation, Folk Theorem, Timing of Information (PDF)

Reputation (PDF)

Global Games (PDF) (Slides courtesy of Muhamet Yildiz.) 

Supermodulaity (PDF) (Slides courtesy of Muhamet Yildiz.) 

Lecture Notes

Lecture Notes for Cooperative Games (PDF)

Lecture Notes for Non-Cooperative Games (PDF)