A photograph of a rock, paper, and scissors-representing the well-known hand game Rock, Paper, Scissors. This is an example of what game theorists call a strategic interaction. (Image courtesy of Jesse Kruger on Flickr. License: CC BY-NC.)
Instructor(s)
Prof. Mihai Manea
MIT Course Number
14.16
As Taught In
Spring 2016
Level
Undergraduate
Course Description
Course Features
Course Description
This is an advanced course in game theory. We begin with a rigorous overview of the main equilibrium concepts for non-cooperative games in both static and dynamic settings with either complete or incomplete information. We define and explore properties of iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, sequential, perfect and proper equilibria, the intuitive criterion, and iterated weak dominance. We discuss applications to auctions, bargaining, and repeated games. Then we introduce solution concepts for cooperative games and study non-cooperative implementations. Other topics include matching theory and networks.